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How do Dictatorships end Civil War?

Authoritarian Regimes and the Termination of Intra-State Conflict

Titel: How do Dictatorships end Civil War?

Bachelorarbeit , 2018 , 38 Seiten , Note: 2,0

Autor:in: Jan Will (Autor:in)

Politik - Thema: Frieden und Konflikte, Sicherheit
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Zusammenfassung Leseprobe Details

This study investigates whether there is a significant impact of different authoritarian regimes, namely personalist and nonpersonalist civilian autocracies as well as their respective military counterparts, on the termination of civil war. The paper suggests that in civil wars those regimes that function on a civilian basis have an advantage in co-opting their opponents to reach a settlement of the conflict. Furthermore, military leaders are expected to be less reluctant towards the use of force than civilian ones which should make them more likely to win civil wars. The same applies to personalist dictators who are hypothesised to view the state as their own and are inclined to forcefully defend their achievements. Several multinomial logit models are tested for the time period between 1946 and 2010. The average predicted probabilities show that personalist civilian regimes indeed are more likely to reach a settlement than other types. Nonpersonalist civilian dictatorships are correctly hypothesised to least likely win an intra-state war, whereas personalist military leaders do so with a comparatively high probability.

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At a glance

  • Grade: 2.0 (1.0 is the best grade)
  • 55 sources in the bibliography
  • 5 figures and 4 tables

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

2. Previous Literature

3. How Regimes impact Conflict Termination

3.1 Nonpersonalist Civilian Regime

3.2 Personalist Civilian Regime

3.3 Personalist Military Regime

3.4 Nonpersonalist Military Regime

4. Data and Research Design

4.1 Dependent Variable

4.2 Independent Variable

4.3 Control Variables

4.4 Model

5. Results

6. Discussion and Conclusion

Research Objectives and Core Themes

This bachelor thesis investigates whether different authoritarian regime types have a significant impact on how civil wars terminate, focusing on distinctions between personalist and nonpersonalist as well as civilian and military autocracies.

  • Categorization of authoritarian regimes into four distinct types based on two dimensions
  • Analysis of civil war termination outcomes including government win, rebel win, and negotiated settlement
  • Evaluation of theoretical mechanisms such as domestic audience costs, use of force, and cooptation capabilities
  • Utilization of multinomial logit models and observed-value approaches on data from 1946 to 2010
  • Discussion of control variables like war duration, army size, and post-Cold War effects

Excerpt from the Book

3. How Regimes impact Conflict Termination

Iraq has experienced eight different civil wars between 1946 and 2010. The first two were fought under the aegis of personalist military leaders and were won by the government. The six subsequent conflicts occurred within civilian regimes, five of which were personalistic autocracies. They all ended in a settlement between the warring parties. Did this pattern arise coincidentally or are there indeed observable causalities between the regime type and the outcome of civil war in autocratic regimes? This paper investigates if there is empirical evidence for differences in civil war termination among different types of authoritarian regimes. In the following, the underlying theoretical arguments will be developed for why the four different regime types investigated in the study reach different outcomes in civil wars. Therefor, nonpersonalist civilian regimes are distinguished from personalist civilian autocracies and the respective military forms of these two kinds of dictatorships.

No matter what kind of dictatorship one looks at, its leader’s main goal is to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). That is why the heads of these regimes in the first place should try to avoid civil wars constituting a serious threat to their reign. Sometimes intra-state conflict occurs nonetheless. However, the primary aim of keeping the position steady has not changed. Different kinds of dictatorships may, due to their divergent capabilities and perceptions, try to reach different conflict outcomes (either governmental victory or conflict settlement) to do so.

To elaborate the theory about how diverse autocracies end civil war, this paper will look at (1) what the attitude is towards the use of arms, of both the regime’s leader and the respective domestic audience, and (2), to what degree a regime is able to coopt its adversaries. Furthermore, (3) the self-perception of personalist dictators should play a crucial role in answering rebel activities. The first and third point are expected to have an influence on the likelihood of a regime to win a civil war, the second one should impact the probability of reaching any kind of settlement (official or tacit). Below, they are investigated further.

Chapter Summaries

1. Introduction: Introduces the research puzzle regarding how different authoritarian regime types influence the termination outcomes of civil wars.

2. Previous Literature: Reviews existing political science research on civil war termination, international interventions, and conflict duration.

3. How Regimes impact Conflict Termination: Develops theoretical arguments linking regime characteristics, attitudes toward force, and cooptation capabilities to specific conflict outcomes.

4. Data and Research Design: Describes the dataset, operationalization of dependent and independent variables, control variables, and the multinomial logit model.

5. Results: Presents the statistical findings from the multinomial logit regressions and average predicted probabilities across different regime types.

6. Discussion and Conclusion: Discusses the implications of the empirical findings, study limitations, and potential directions for future research.

Keywords

authoritarian regimes, civil war termination, autocracy, personalist regime, military regime, civilian regime, negotiated settlement, government victory, multinomial logit, cooptation, domestic audience costs, political science

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the primary focus of this academic work?

The work investigates whether different types of authoritarian regimes have a systematic impact on how civil wars end, distinguishing between personalist, nonpersonalist, civilian, and military autocracies.

What are the central thematic areas covered in the study?

The study covers civil war termination outcomes, autocratic regime classification, leader survival strategies, domestic audience constraints, and the role of cooptation and military force.

What is the primary research question or objective?

The main objective is to determine if empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that specific authoritarian regime types are more likely to achieve specific civil war outcomes such as settlements or government victories.

Which statistical methods are applied in the research?

The author applies multinomial logit models and calculates average predicted probabilities using the observed-value approach to analyze conflict data from 1946 to 2010.

What is analyzed in the main body of the work?

The main body develops theoretical arguments for four distinct regime types, establishes the research design using UCDP and Geddes et al. datasets, and evaluates regression results and predicted probabilities.

Which keywords best characterize the publication?

Authoritarian regimes, civil war termination, autocracy, personalist regimes, military regimes, civilian regimes, negotiated settlements, and multinomial logit models.

How do nonpersonalist civilian regimes differ in their approach to conflict?

Party-based civilian regimes possess institutional frameworks that facilitate broad cooptation and spoil distribution, making them well-suited to reach negotiated settlements while remaining hesitant to use force.

Why are personalist military leaders expected to favor military victories?

Military leaders typically view force as a legitimate and efficient tool, and personalist leaders lack institutional constraints and are driven by self-glorification to aggressively defend their regime's achievements.

Ende der Leseprobe aus 38 Seiten  - nach oben

Details

Titel
How do Dictatorships end Civil War?
Untertitel
Authoritarian Regimes and the Termination of Intra-State Conflict
Hochschule
Universität Konstanz
Note
2,0
Autor
Jan Will (Autor:in)
Erscheinungsjahr
2018
Seiten
38
Katalognummer
V445066
ISBN (eBook)
9783668818484
ISBN (Buch)
9783668818491
Sprache
Englisch
Schlagworte
dictatorships civil authoritarian regimes termination intra-state conflict
Produktsicherheit
GRIN Publishing GmbH
Arbeit zitieren
Jan Will (Autor:in), 2018, How do Dictatorships end Civil War?, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/445066
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