What assures us of ‘existences and objects we do not see or feel’? In other words, what leads us to form beliefs about unobserved matters of fact: that the sun will rise tomorrow, that Africa still exists, that the Normans won the Battle of Hastings? What is the correct account of causation? Since this ancient epoch, skepticism has taken a central,- in fact the driving seat- in epistemology with attitude among philosophers, particularly epistemologists, apparently tending to regard a skeptic as a foe rather than a friend, a threat rather than a tool, and a deconstructionist rather than a builder. Ironically, the troubling skepticism forms the foundation of all epistemological enterprise. With the historical development of epistemology, one could possibly establish a self-contradiction any attempt deny the skeptic position of Protagoras- that there are many events that hinder and deny us of an indubitable, sure and stable knowledge.
The ancient period prepared the ground for inquiry, but the medieval (dark) age almost collapsed this foundation with recourse to faith and subjection of reason to the dogmatism of the instrument of faith. However, there was resurgence in the modern era of philosophical reflection, with several attempts to restore reason back to its rightful place in philosophy. One of those philosophers who attempted to rescue epistemology from the unphilosophical and dogmatic theologism was David Hume. Of course, the methodic doubt scepticism of Rene Descartes, French rationalist, was pivotal to all other discussions in the modern period. However, Hume’s resurgent effort was to see that inquiry is once again made into the nature of things, including claims about and of God, human life, scientific processes and procedures, causation, and inductive reasoning. Hume’s effort was to mitigate skepticism and forge a veritable mid-point and alliance between what can be known and what cannot be said to be known. Well, his thought on the endorsement of a priori propositions and some part of a posteriori propositions and rejection of some, such as causation and inductive reasoning has earned him such appellation as a ‘thorough going skeptic and empiricist.’ Our concern in the paper is to take a second but critical investigation into Hume’s idea of causation vis-à-vis the appellation. The paper attempts to literally play the devil’s advocate to examine if such appellation could pass for Hume.
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
2. Skepticism as not anti-epistemology
3. Two-Type Categories of Skepticism
4. Defining Skepticism and the mission of the Skeptic
5. Hume and the Humean Skeptical Legacy of Causal Relation
6. Hume and the Dogma of Cause-Effect
7. Cause and Effect as mere association of Ideas
8. CONCLUSION
Research Objectives and Themes
This paper aims to critically investigate David Hume's skeptical challenge against the traditional understanding of cause-effect relations. It explores how Hume's empiricist philosophy deconstructs metaphysical claims and replaces the notion of necessary connection with a psychological account based on custom, habit, and the association of ideas.
- The role of skepticism as a foundational tool in epistemological inquiry.
- Categorization of skepticism: Knowledge-skepticism versus justification-skepticism.
- Hume's bifurcation of human knowledge into "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact."
- The critique of causality as a necessary connection and its reduction to constant conjunction.
- The implications of Hume's "skeptical epistemology" for the possibility of objective knowledge.
Excerpt from the Book
Hume and the Dogma of Cause-Effect
In another context, Hume does not agree with the prevailing order which establishes a necessary connection between cause and effect. He argues that ‘ideas are connected by association (rather than by logical connections).’ In other words, that causal judgments and knowledge are derived ‘simply due to custom or habit, an ‘instinct or mechanical tendency’ of the mind which transfers past experiences to the future, and so forms our expectations. Beliefs in general arise non-rationally, through associations raised by sense experience.’
Meanwhile, the position of many philosophers on the question of cause and effect especially as brought to its most controversial standpoint by Descartes has been almost univocal: that, one, there is a necessary connection between cause and effect; two, that there is an irrefutable ground to believe that there will always be a cause prior to effect.
Hume’s skepticism, Nanoon notes, must be understood through the prism of his epistemological empiricism. In other words, whatever is to be considered in categorizing Hume as a skeptic must not look beyond his extreme empiricism, which recognizes sense experience as the basis for all claims to be true and infallible knowledge. Although Hume empiricism and subsequent skeptical position have a number of extensions, his position on causal relation has been regarded as ‘the most famous and puzzling problem Hume left to the modern age.’
Summary of Chapters
INTRODUCTION: Provides an overview of the history of epistemology and the central role skepticism has played in challenging and advancing philosophical discourse.
Skepticism as not anti-epistemology: Discusses how skepticism, far from being an obstacle, acts as a foundational tool and "medicine" for epistemology by fostering necessary criticism.
Two-Type Categories of Skepticism: Examines Moser's classification of skepticism into knowledge-skepticism and justification-skepticism, highlighting the nuances of different skeptical traditions.
Defining Skepticism and the mission of the Skeptic: Explores the definition of skepticism as a method of systematic doubt and intellectual caution, emphasizing the pursuit of justified belief.
Hume and the Humean Skeptical Legacy of Causal Relation: Introduces Hume's specific skeptical challenge against metaphysics and the validity of inductive reasoning regarding cause-effect connections.
Hume and the Dogma of Cause-Effect: Analyzes Hume’s rejection of necessary connections, proposing that causal expectations arise from custom and experience rather than logical necessity.
Cause and Effect as mere association of Ideas: Details how the mind connects separate events through principles of resemblance, contiguity, and constant conjunction.
CONCLUSION: Summarizes the implications of Hume’s reductionist approach and his "skeptical epistemology," noting his influence on the limitation of philosophical inquiry.
Keywords
Skepticism, Epistemology, David Hume, Causality, Cause-Effect, Empiricism, Induction, Constant Conjunction, Impressions, Ideas, Associationism, Justification, Metaphysics, Reasoning, Philosophical Critique
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this work?
The work focuses on David Hume’s critical investigation into the concept of causality and his broader skeptical challenge against traditional epistemological claims.
What are the primary thematic areas covered?
The paper covers the history of skepticism, the definition of the skeptic's mission, the rejection of metaphysical certainty, and the analysis of causal relations as psychological associations.
What is the primary research goal?
The objective is to examine Hume's skeptical challenge against the "cause-effect" deadlock and determine if he can be categorized as a "thorough-going skeptic and empiricist."
Which scientific methodology is utilized?
The paper uses a philosophical analysis and critical examination of historical and contemporary epistemological texts, specifically focusing on Hume's "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding."
What is treated in the main body?
The main body treats the nature of skepticism, Hume's distinction between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact," his rejection of necessary connections, and the role of impressions in knowledge formation.
Which keywords characterize the work?
Key terms include skepticism, causality, Hume, empiricism, induction, constant conjunction, and epistemology.
How does Hume define the link between cause and effect?
Hume rejects the idea of a necessary logical link and argues that our belief in causality is merely a result of custom, habit, and the association of ideas based on constant conjunction.
What is the significance of the "constant conjunction" principle?
It explains that we assume a causal link because we have observed two events repeatedly follow one another, though we have no sensory impression of any actual force or power connecting them.
- Quote paper
- James Alabi (Author), 2018, An Appraisal of Hume's Scepticism in Epistemology, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/450100
