The relationship between knowledge and certainty varies according to conception. I argue that knowledge and certainty are usually equivalent, but there are cases in which certainty is possible without knowledge and knowledge is possible without certainty.
The connection between knowledge and certainty does not change much when considering René Descartes’ philosophy because methodological skepticism consists of doubting beliefs that are uncertain. That there exist external objects is uncertain because a malicious demon could be deceiving us by creating the illusion of an external world.
Although Descartes suggests that we can doubt all of our beliefs, his conception of science consists of secure insight: “Omnis scientia est cognitio certa et evidens” (Descartes 1907). This means that all science is certain and evident knowledge, or a high degree of certainty.
Three centuries later, G. E.Moore had another reasoning when writing “A Defense of Common Sense” and “Proof of an External World.” He suggests that doubting that the world exists is unnecessary; we must trust that the universe exists. He is against George Berkeley’s suggestion that matter does not exist; everything is just ideas of the mind of God, and to be is to perceive. This is similar to propositions from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who was an idealist because he claimed that all possible worlds lie in God, and we are substances observing the best alternative (Leibniz 2014, §43-46).
Moore suggests that it is irrational to believe such premises. He held intuitions that a person has in everyday life, the common sense philosophy. We cannot be certain yet we claim to know many things. Moore also purports that the external world is real and he tried to prove it (Moore 1993a).
His argument goes as follows:
P1: Here is one hand.
P2: Here is another.
C1: There are at least two external objects in the world.
C2: Therefore, an external world exists.
He argues that he had the experience of observing his hands and reiterates that at least his hands offer the sum of two objects, which at a specified time existed (Ibid.).
Table of Contents
1 Moore’s Arguments Against Idealism and Skepticism
2 Wittgenstein’s Criticism
3 Knowledge and Certainty
3.1 Knowledge versus Certainty
3.2 Objective and Subjective Certainty
3.3 The Process of Learning
4 Conclusion
Research Objectives and Key Topics
This paper investigates the complex, often overlapping relationship between knowledge and certainty. By examining G. E. Moore’s common sense philosophy and contrasting it with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s critical perspective in "On Certainty", the author explores whether these concepts are interchangeable or distinct, ultimately arguing that while they often intersect, certainty is essentially subjective, whereas knowledge requires justification.
- The distinction between knowledge and subjective vs. objective certainty.
- G. E. Moore’s common sense arguments against skepticism and idealism.
- Wittgenstein’s critique of Moorean "truisms" and the concept of a world-picture.
- The role of learning and language games in acquiring and justifying knowledge.
- The epistemological implications of fallibilism and "hinge" propositions.
Excerpt from the Book
Wittgenstein’s Criticism
Moorean truisms address the point in the Venn diagram above, where knowledge and certainty touch between AB and B, and we have certainty. However, it is vague whether it is a matter of knowledge. We do not commonly reason that we know the kind of propositions that Moore lists because we take our reality for granted and assume that the objects around us are real. Truisms are fundamental such that everyone could claim them. If someone says, “I know that the world exists,” we take that person as being philosophical or silly, but if someone contrarily claims, “I know that the world does not exist,” we think that the person is demented (Wittgenstein 1984, §155). Throughout his notes, he touches the subject of appearing like a madmen among normal people when doubting the established language games.
Wittgenstein criticizes that propositions of the kind “here is a hand” are not something we can know. Although Wittgenstein does not suggest that Moorean truisms are propositions that we ‘know,’ he recognizes that these have special status. They are part of our world-picture (Ibid., §162), the inherited background of a person who decides what false and true are (Ibid., §94). We do not commonly have to justify the basis of our world-picture.
We could create scenarios in which articulating “I know” those truisms makes sense because we would have to justify how we know them. Situations such as meeting aliens or wild tribes (Ibid., §162) and having philosophical discussions (Ibid., §467) are compatible with knowing truisms because then we would have to think about justification and evidence. If we are not dealing with the kind of unusual scenarios in which we can give grounds for knowing, then we misuse the words “I know.”
Summary of Chapters
1 Moore’s Arguments Against Idealism and Skepticism: This chapter reviews how G. E. Moore defended common sense and the existence of the external world against skeptical and idealist challenges.
2 Wittgenstein’s Criticism: This section presents Wittgenstein’s analysis of why Moorean "truisms" function as a foundational "world-picture" rather than as empirical knowledge that requires justification.
3 Knowledge and Certainty: This core chapter dissects the nuances between knowledge and certainty, introducing the author's Venn diagram model to explain how these concepts relate and diverge.
3.1 Knowledge versus Certainty: This subsection distinguishes between knowledge as justified belief and certainty as a feeling or tone of voice, highlighting the pragmatic nature of Wittgenstein's philosophy.
3.2 Objective and Subjective Certainty: This part explores the difference between subjective conviction and objective certainty, linking the latter to "hinge" propositions that remain beyond doubt.
3.3 The Process of Learning: This subsection examines how we inherit a world-picture through culture and language, and how our knowledge evolves as we learn and encounter new evidence.
4 Conclusion: The concluding chapter summarizes the main argument, stating that while knowledge and certainty are separate, they can fuse through cognitive processes and the correct application of grounds.
Keywords
Knowledge, Certainty, Wittgenstein, Moore, Epistemology, Skepticism, World-picture, Truisms, Justification, Fallibilism, Language games, Subjective, Objective, Learning, Philosophy.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper explores the epistemological relationship between knowledge and certainty, questioning whether the two terms can be used interchangeably or if they represent fundamentally different categories of belief.
What are the central themes discussed in this work?
Key themes include the defense of common sense, the status of foundational beliefs (hinge propositions), the role of language in constructing our reality, and the necessity of justification for genuine knowledge.
What is the primary goal of the author?
The goal is to demonstrate that while knowledge and certainty often overlap in daily life, they are distinct: knowledge requires justification, whereas certainty is often a subjective feeling or an foundational assumption.
Which scientific or philosophical methods are utilized?
The author employs analytical philosophical methods, specifically exegesis and critical comparison of G. E. Moore's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's texts, supported by conceptual modeling (Venn diagrams) to clarify relationships between terms.
What does the main body of the text cover?
The main body provides a background of the skepticism-idealism debate, followed by a critique of Moore's common sense approach, and concludes with a detailed analysis of the nuances between objective and subjective certainty and the learning process.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
The most relevant terms are Knowledge, Certainty, Wittgenstein, Moore, Epistemology, World-picture, and Justification.
How does the author interpret Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the "hinges"?
The author interprets the hinges as foundational, undoubtable propositions that allow us to function within our world-picture; because they are beyond doubt, they are effectively unknowable in a traditional sense.
Why does the author discuss the Apollo moon missions?
The moon missions serve as a case study to illustrate how Wittgenstein's own "world-picture" was limited by his time, demonstrating that beliefs we are certain of can still be incorrect, which proves that certainty does not automatically entail truth or knowledge.
- Quote paper
- Valery Berthoud (Author), 2018, The Relationship Between Knowledge and Certainty, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/450141
