Do we always perceive our actions as good? I defend the claim that an agent always perceives at least some good in his intentional action - often called the “guise of the good“ (GG) thesis. In the philosophical debate, this goodness requirement has often been rejected by pointing to its problematic consequences. However, the source of such objections lies in the ambiguity and the imprecise use of the term “good“. Thus, I will show how the presumed problems can be tackled. First, "intentional action" is specified and a distinction of two interpretations of the term “good“ is given, which are relevant not only for the purpose of this paper, but also for gaining a clear view on the debate about the goodness requirement for intentional agency in general. Then, my main argument is presented and justified in detail, explaining for which understanding of “good“ it is correct and for which it can obviously be deemed false. The main argument goes as follows: (P1): Intentional actions are actions done for motivating reasons by an agent A. (P2): If A has motivating reasons for his intentional action, he necessarily perceives at least some good in his action. (C): Therefore, A always perceives at least some good in his intentional action. This paper further includes a reconstruction of Kieran Setiya's objection to the GG thesis. Regarding his arguments, I will show in which way the problems highlighted can be handled by applying my argument. I conclude with a brief overview of the results, their practical implications and a demand for further interdisciplinary investigation, especially in psychology.
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION
II. INTENTIONAL AGENCY
III. HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE “GOOD“
IV. MAIN ARGUMENT
(P2) PREMISE 2
V. KIERAN SETIYA’S OBJECTION
VI. CONCLUSION
Research Objectives and Themes
This paper examines the "guise of the good" (GG) thesis, which posits that an agent always perceives some level of goodness in their intentional actions. The primary research goal is to resolve the common philosophical rejection of this thesis by demonstrating that the perceived problems arise from an ambiguous use of the term "good," and by showing that the thesis remains valid when "goodness" is understood in a non-moral, subjective sense.
- Analysis of the definition and requirements of intentional agency.
- Distinction between moral and non-moral interpretations of "good."
- Logical justification of the premise that motivating reasons imply a perception of non-moral good.
- Critical reconstruction of Kieran Setiya’s objections regarding evaluation requirements in agency.
Excerpt from the Book
(P2) PREMISE 2
(P1) has already be explained in section II. So let’s turn to (P2). This premise is obviously not true in regard to moral goodness. If all humans did only things they regard as morally good (right), there would be no violence, abuse, harming or war on our planet. But such things do exist and probably every human has done at least one thing he regrets or is ashamed of, because he regards it as morally bad (wrong) in retrospect. Opponents of the GG thesis who use cases of bad agency as counterexamples are in fact pointing to reasons which are regarded as morally bad, based on which norms are taught in a certain society (Tenenbaum 2013: 1).
However, (P2) is correct in regard to non-moral goodness. When A has a certain intention to do X, there are reasons which motivate him to do X. Having motivating reasons (no matter if being conscious of them or not) for doing X implies that they have a positive value for A. So, the intention to do X generates positive emotions which in turn function as the trigger for motivating A to actually execute X. One can imagine these feelings as an urge for making progress, which implies that A perceives the execution of the act as the right thing to do and a better option than not executing it instead. Therefore, A necessarily perceives his reasons for an intentional act as good, on a non-moral scale, independently of whether he sees those reasons as morally good or bad.
Summary of Chapters
I. INTRODUCTION: The author outlines the scope of the paper, defending the "guise of the good" thesis and identifying the ambiguity of "good" as the source of philosophical disagreement.
II. INTENTIONAL AGENCY: This chapter defines intentional actions as those performed for reasons, distinguishing them from mere habits or reflexive behaviors.
III. HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE “GOOD“: The section provides a critical distinction between moral goodness and non-moral, subjective goodness to clarify the debate.
IV. MAIN ARGUMENT: The author presents a formal argument demonstrating that while the GG thesis fails in a moral context, it is correct when applied to non-moral motivation.
V. KIERAN SETIYA’S OBJECTION: This chapter reconstructs Setiya’s critique regarding the evaluative requirements of agency and refutes his claims by applying the non-moral goodness framework.
VI. CONCLUSION: The author summarizes the findings, confirming that the GG thesis holds under a non-moral interpretation and suggests implications for human autonomy and responsibility.
Keywords
Guise of the Good, Intentional Agency, Motivating Reasons, Non-moral Good, Moral Good, Kieran Setiya, Intelligibility, Rationality, Evaluation Requirement, Human Nature, Subjective Perception, Agency, Philosophical Debate.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core argument of this paper?
The paper argues that the "guise of the good" thesis—which states that agents perceive some goodness in their intentional actions—is valid if "good" is understood as non-moral, subjective value rather than objective moral correctness.
What are the central themes discussed?
The central themes include the nature of intentionality, the distinction between moral and non-moral goodness, the role of motivating reasons, and the validity of evaluation requirements in human agency.
What is the primary research objective?
The goal is to defend the "guise of the good" thesis against philosophical objections by clarifying that the perceived counterexamples arise from confusing moral evaluation with subjective motivational preference.
Which methodology does the author apply?
The author uses conceptual analysis and logical argumentation to refine the premises of the GG thesis and reconstructs counter-arguments by established philosophers like Kieran Setiya to address them systematically.
What does the main body of the work cover?
The main body defines intentional agency, distinguishes between types of "goodness," presents a logical argument (P1, P2, C), and performs a critical assessment of Setiya’s objections regarding intelligibility and reflection requirements.
Which keywords best describe this study?
Key terms include Guise of the Good, Intentional Agency, Motivating Reasons, Non-moral Good, and Agency Evaluation.
How does the author address the counter-argument regarding "bad" actions?
The author explains that agents can perform objectively "bad" actions while still perceiving them as "good" in a non-moral, subjective sense, because they are motivated by positive feelings or personal progress.
What is the "modest version of the GG thesis" mentioned?
It is an interpretation proposed by Setiya that suggests reasons make actions intelligible by showing them to be approximately rational, though the author argues that even this version faces difficulties regarding cognitive capacities.
Why does the author reject the "intelligibility" requirement?
The author argues that basing the GG thesis on intelligibility is too strong because it would exclude many agents from acting intentionally if they cannot articulate or rationalize their reasons to an external observer.
- Quote paper
- Andjelika Eissing-Patenova (Author), 2019, Acting under the "Guise of the Good". A critical analysis of the evaluation requirement for intentional agency, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/459487
