This essay explains Fodors canonical argumentation in favour of the Language of Thought Hypothesis as well as the conceptual counter argument by Hacker. It becomes clear that even though Fodor makes a strong case for the value of the hypothesis, Hackers considerations provide a striking argument against it. However since these considerations presuppose an essential normativity of language, it results that despite the immense value of the Language of Thought hypothesis, whether it is tenable seems to hinge on whether one is able to provide a theory for the normativity of language. This is then viewed as the central problem in the debate that needs to undergo further scrutiny, since it is logically prior to any other criticism one might target the Language of Thought Hypothesis with. This essay was written in order to deliver insight into Fodors arguments and Hackers counter-arguments and to thereby show how one arrives at the aforementioned conclusion. For before one takes aim, ones target needs to be in clear view.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 LOT and Fodors Presupposition
2.1 The Language of Thought Hypothesis
2.2 Fodors Presupposition
2.2.1 The Technical Argument
2.2.2 The Metaphysical Argument
3 Fodors Arguments
3.1 The Methodological Argument
3.2 The Argument from Psychological Processes
3.3 The Argument from Productivity and Systematicity
4 Hackers Criticism of LOT
4.1 The Argument from Linguistic Ability
4.2 The Argument from Language as a Social Practice
5 The Point of Discussion
6 Conclusion
Research Objectives and Themes
This essay aims to analyze the debate surrounding the Language of Thought (LOT) hypothesis by examining Jerry Fodor's arguments in favor of its existence and Peter Hacker's conceptual critique. The primary objective is to demonstrate that the tenability of the LOT hypothesis ultimately depends on resolving the fundamental issue of whether language is essentially normative.
- The structure and postulates of the Language of Thought Hypothesis.
- Fodor’s methodological, psychological, and systemic arguments for LOT.
- Hacker’s Wittgensteinian-inspired critique regarding linguistic ability and social practice.
- The central role of normativity in the ongoing philosophical debate.
Excerpt from the Book
3.1 The Methodological Argument
Now what we have here is an event C1 that normally causes the effect E1, an event C2 which normally causes the effect E2 and an event C3 which causes the complex effect of E1 & E2. According to Fodor it would ceteris paribus be reasonable to then infer that C3 is a complex event that has C1 and C2 as constituents (see Fodor, 1987, p.141). So if from intending to lift your left hand it normally follows that you do lift your left hand and if from intending to lift your right hand it normally follows that you do lift your right hand, it would be reasonable to suppose that in order to achieve the effect of lifting both hands you would have to have both the intention to raise the left and the intention to raise the right hand. While one could deny that such inference necessarily holds, it seems rather problematic to do so.
It could be tried to argue that the etiology of E1 & E2 does not include the etiology of events that are just E1 but that would also imply there to be at least two ways of causing E1 with distinct etiologies (see Fodor, 1987, p.141). The problem here is that it would have to somehow be explained how these two or more different etiologies could all converge upon E1 (see Fodor, 1987, p.141). For if one could not provide such explanation it would be rational to assume the phenomenon to be accidental. However it seems much more reasonable to just accept the supposed rule of inference instead of introducing such lucky randomness into our theory. Obviously though in accepting said rule one ought to also accept the constituent structure of thought for it must be presupposed for the inference to work.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: This chapter provides an overview of the Language of Thought Hypothesis and outlines the central debate between explanatory value and conceptual possibility.
2 LOT and Fodors Presupposition: This section explains the core postulates of LOT and Fodor's presuppositions regarding the nature of intentional content and mental causality.
3 Fodors Arguments: This chapter details Fodor’s three main justifications for LOT, focusing on methodological inference, computational processes, and the systematic nature of thought.
4 Hackers Criticism of LOT: This chapter presents Peter Hacker’s critique, arguing that language requires social conventions and rule-following, which a brain cannot perform.
5 The Point of Discussion: This chapter identifies the normativity of language as the fundamental issue that must be addressed to advance the debate on LOT.
6 Conclusion: The final chapter summarizes the conflict and suggests that the debate hinges on reconciling the need for a theory of thought with the normativity of language.
Keywords
Language of Thought Hypothesis, LOT, Jerry Fodor, Peter Hacker, Intentional Realism, Mental Representations, Computational Theory of Mind, Systematicity, Productivity, Linguistic Normativity, Social Practice, Constituent Structure, Meaning, Philosophy of Mind, Mental Causality.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper explores the debate between the Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOT) and conceptual critiques against it, specifically focusing on its viability in contemporary philosophy of mind.
What are the primary themes discussed?
The themes include intentional realism, the computational theory of mind, the nature of language as a social practice, and the requirement of normativity for meaningful thought.
What is the central research question?
The central question is whether the Language of Thought Hypothesis is conceptually tenable, given the challenges posed by the normative requirements of language.
Which methodology is employed in this work?
The essay utilizes an analytical philosophical approach, summarizing and contrasting the arguments of Jerry Fodor (pro-LOT) and Peter Hacker (anti-LOT).
What is covered in the main body of the paper?
The main body breaks down Fodor's arguments for syntax and combinatorial semantics in thought, followed by Hacker’s arguments against attributing linguistic capacities to the brain.
Which keywords define this work?
Key terms include LOT, intentional realism, systematicity, computational theory of mind, and linguistic normativity.
Why does Hacker argue that a brain cannot have a language?
Hacker argues that language is a rule-governed social activity that requires third-party verification and a capacity to follow conventions, which a physical brain cannot do.
What is the conclusion regarding the normativity of language?
The paper concludes that normativity is a central, unavoidable problem; for the LOT debate to progress, philosophers must first determine whether language is essentially normative.
- Quote paper
- Hans Tapfer (Author), 2018, Can There Be A Language Of Thought?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/461334
