Frontex. A principal-agent perspective

Table of contents

Introduction

Section 1: European Regulatory Agencies
1.1 Agencification in the European Union
1.2 Principal-agent theory: Why, What, How

Section 2: Research questions, methodology, data
2.1 Research questions
2.2 Methodology and data

Section 3: Frontex and the external borders of the European Union
3.1 Delegation dilemmas: to guard or not to guard?
3.1.1 Origins
3.1.2 First steps
3.2 Agency mission, Regulation, composition and tasks
3.3 Institutional design
3.3.1 Management Board
3.3.2 Executive Director
3.3.3 Staff and structure
3.3.4 Resources
3.4 Activities output and working methods
3.4.1 Risk Analysis
3.4.2 Operational activities
3.4.3 Research, development, training and cooperation with external bodies
3.4.4 Joint return operations
3.5 The Member States, the Commission, the Parliament
3.6 Criticism
3.6.1 Institutional settings
3.6.2 Brief assessment of output

Section 4: Conclusions
4.1 Frontex: the road ahead

Bibliography

Annexes A-E

Abstract

The purpose of this research focuses on one of the latest and most significant development of Justice, Freedom and Security policies of the EU: the creation of FRONTEX, the Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, established in 2004 and operational since 2005.

In particular, this paper will utilise a principal-agent perspective in an attempt to explain why Frontex has been established, what roles the various institutions played in the process of, and the context behind, its creation. The paper argues that Member States established an agency borne out of the need to enhance the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security in the context of the Schengen agreements. Consequently, the paper highlights the deficiencies of the structure, especially regarding its independence from its principals, and its current funding regulation limits, that result in a wide range of tasks and a high dependence from the resources of Member States.

However, even if primarily only used in the context of counter-illegal immigration operations, the paper highlights how the agency has been growing steadily in power and resources, and represents a first fundamental step towards an effective communitarisation of border management that could lead, in the long term, to the establishment of a European Border Police.

Introduction

Since October 2005 there is a new actor in the family of European regulatory Agencies: the Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, commonly known as Frontex (from French: Frontières extérieures). The mission of the agency is wide and ambitious: coordinate cooperation and solidarity between Member States in the management of external borders. Accordingly, its responsibilities are widespread and include risk analysis, operational cooperation, training-related activities, follow up on research, assist Member States in technical and operational assistance and support joint return operations.

To explain the reasons behind the creation of this new agency, the paper begins with an up-to-date picture of delegation to regulatory agencies in the EU from the ‘70s until today. Thereafter, the paper offers recognition of the principal-agent framework, the main systematic and efficient way of analysing non-majoritarian institutions currently used by EU scholars, to explain the increasingly popular phenomenon of delegating powers and resources to independent regulatory agencies. In this way, it will be possible to proceed to an exploration of Frontex, explaining the terms of interests beyond delegation, its intra and extra institutional design and relate these aspects to the agencies’ outcomes. Given the young age of Frontex, the need of assessing the coherence of this new institutional development within the needs and prerogatives of the Communitarian goals is a salient issue.

The paper argues that in a field mainly covered by Second and Third Pillar agencies such as Justice, Freedom and Security, where the “multiplication of actors […] has been impressive” [Lavenex and Wallace, 2005], Frontex was set up mainly to tackle illegal migration more efficiently on the Community level, and has been rapidly expanding its tasks, resources and credibility; however, the paper argues that despite being a First Pillar body, the agency suffers greatly from the control from its main principals – Member States – because of its dealing with tasks that have traditionally been a battleground of political contention [Pollak and Puntscher Riekmann, 2008]. In fact, the agency still highly depends on divided loyalties and non-Communitarian resources, and suffers from fundamental deficits and inadequacies in its Regulation.

SECTION 1: European Regulatory Agencies

1.1 Agencification in the European Union

In the recent history of the European Union, the need for establishing non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs) has significantly increased in light of the growing need for independent bodies to improve the effectiveness of public governance in terms of regulation, information and coordination [Majone, 1997; 1999]. As a result, the EU established a plethora of agencies that “(a) possess and exercise some grant of specialised public authority, separate from that of other institutions, but (b) are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials” [Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 2]. In this sense, European Regulatory Agencies (ERAs) are only one of the possible structural forms of non-majoritarian bodies present in the EU, differing from institutions such as the European Commission or the European Central Bank, but still part of the ‘Distributed Public Governance’ [OECD, 2002] “consistent with the late-twentieth century practice of most advanced industrial democracies” [Moravcsik, 2002: 611].

From a historical perspective, the EU is today experiencing a third wave of agencification, following the waves of the mid-1970s and mid-1990s. In the first period, though not directly challenging the overall institutional setting of the Union and with very limited power, the Centre for Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFUND), were created. In the ‘90s, a second and more consistent wave of agencies was essentially linked to the completion and monitoring of the Single Market, and resulted in the creation of several new non-majoritarian bodies as, for example, the European Environmental Agency (EEA). The new agencies started dealing with ‘new’ social and environmental policy-making dimensions. Finally, a third wave arose with the start of the new millennium; this represents the most complex attempt thus far to establish a wide network of EU regulators. Along with the introduction of new policy-making instruments and administrative tools, such as the Open Method of Coordination, and the introduction of a powerful actor, such as the European Central Bank, many third generation agencies have been introduced. Characteristic of agencies such as the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Maritime Safety Authority (EMSA) or the European Aviation Authority (EASA), is the handling of a significant variety of sectors in the field of safety and inter-operability, which emerged as a significant change in the Union’s status quo [Dehousse, 1997, 2008; Kreher, 1997; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002; Geradin and Petit 2004; Coen and Thatcher, 2008; Pollak and Puntscher Riekmann, 2008].

As an “answer to a desire for geographical devolution and the need to cope with new tasks of a legal, technical and/or scientific nature” [Commission, 2008], EU agencies are grouped into 4 different strands: Community agencies, Common Foreign and Security Policy agencies, Police and Judicial Cooperation in Judicial Matters agencies and Executive agencies. However, it can also be seen that certain regulatory agencies cover not only matters pertinent to the First Pillar, but also the Second and Third Pillar, traditionally linked to security matters, which is in turn linked to affairs regarding statehood and sovereignty and particularly affected by problems of transparency, divided loyalties and incoherence [Pollak and Puntscher Riekmann, 2008]. Consequently, it is possible to say that the creation of these agencies answered two fundamental requirements reflected in their legislative set-up. The first constitutes the functional needs of EU policy-makers, while the second is the need for the preservation of the sovereignty of Member States [Lavenex and Wallace, 2005]. This also explains why these agencies are symbolically being spread across Europe, and consequently termed ‘decentralised agencies,’ that is having their seat decided by the Council on a case by case basis.

Moreover, as the Commission has recently stated, the process of agencification “has not been accompanied by an overall vision of the place of agencies in the Union” [Commission, 2008b:2]. On one hand, therefore, agencies were “created by regulation in order to perform tasks clearly specified in their constituent Acts, all have legal personality and all have a certain degree of organisational and financial autonomy” [Commission, 2002:3]; while on the other, differences in responsibilities, powers, organisational and financial matters, as well as in accountability procedures, “far outweigh their similarities” [ ibid. ], and the desire to limit their regulatory powers to clear and precise conditions is growing [Coen and Tatchet, 2008; Commission, 2008b]. As Groenleer, Boin and Kuipers [2005] state, all these agencies have very distinct features, especially in terms of budget and staff capacity, and with regards to their independence respect all the stakeholders involved. Therefore, it is legitimate to cast doubts on a hypothetical European agency model [see Pollak and Puntscher Riekmann, 2008 for an exhaustive introduction on the issue].

Nonetheless, regulatory agencies today play an important role in the Union’s everyday work. They employ around 3800 people, and operate on an annual budget of around €1 100 million, a figure which includes a Community contribution of around €559 million [Commission, 2008b]. For the above reasons, the Commission is currently trying to work out a common approach for the governance of regulatory agencies, as well as trying to establish an interinstitutional working group [ ibid.] and an horizontal evaluation by 2009-10. The idea is to reach “a balance between the need for an approach sufficiently standardized that agencies have a coherent place in European governance ― and the need to respect agencies’ specific characteristics” [2008: 6]. A common framework would in this sense help to clarify the agencies’ tasks, structures and working methods, as well as their accountability to other institutions, communication strategies, and a clearly defined process for the creation and termination of their operations. While in 2002 the Commission distinguished between regulatory agencies according to their responsibilities and powers [Commission, 2002], in light of this proposal today’s approach underlines the functions that agencies perform by looking at the “centre of gravity” of the agencies’ activities [2008:7; see Annex A].

1.2 Principal-agent theory: Why, What, How

As Metcalfe states,

The term ‘agency’ is a label, like quango, that is applied to quite diverse entities. It is not a concept or a model of a type of organisation. Any attempt to classify or categorise agencies will run up against the unavoidable facts of organisational diversity as well as terminological vagueness [1999: 183].

In this sense, a principal-agent analysis (P-A) is usually the preferred method of organisation in order to understand how the delegation of power works in complex polities, and how executive tasks are divided between different actors and bodies [Hix, 2005]. Being rooted in organisational and transaction cost economics [Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002], the P-A has proved to be a fruitful tool to understand EU institutional architecture [Kiewet and McCubbins 1991; Mitnick 1994; Pollack, 1997]. According to this framework, the primary holders of executive power ― usually political officials ― delegate certain powers to independent agents so to insulate them from political pressure in turn demanding these agents to supply them with certain tasks, since they consider the benefits of delegating outweigh the costs [Bendor, Glazer and Hammond, 2001; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002]. Based on the assumption that principals retain initial control, it would then follow to build on the notion that “the agent’s remit are a matter of institutional design, and the authority to constitute or not to constitute agents falls within the principals’ jurisdiction” [Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002:4]. In brief, as Pollack underlines, the functional rationale behind the delegation of executive power is to obtain better outcomes in the long run [Pollack, 1995].

Among the main justifications of delegation are:

- to alleviate commitment problems; agents help the principals to enforce and eventually reinforce the promises made between multiple principals, and from principals to their constituencies [Majone, 1996, 2006; Pollack, 1997, 2003; Everson and Majone, 1999; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002];
- to overcome information asymmetries when technical or scientific expertise is required for regulation [Majone, 1996, 2006; Pollack, 1997, 2003; Everson and Majone, 1999; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002];
- to enhance the efficiency of rule-making in specific areas where an immediate, constant fine-tuning of rules and standards, as well as an attention to technical development is needed [Everson and Majone, 1999; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002];
- to co-opt determined groups in the decision-making process [Everson and Majone, 1999];
- to avoid the blame for unpopular policy decisions [Fiorina, 1982; Egan, 1997; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002]; and,
- to increase transparency in the decision-making process [Groenleer, Boin and Kuipers, 2005; Pollak and Puntscher Riekmann, 2008].

On the other hand, it is also essential to consider the particular position and behaviour of every EU institution when dealing with the creation of new NMIs and ERAs in particular, and to look at the institutional context behind it. In other words,

It would be difficult to explain the recurrent tensions between the Commission and the Council of Ministers over the composition of agency administrative boards or the ambivalence of the Commission, which has long appeared reluctant to accept delegations of power and yet has continued to propose the establishment of new agencies. Nor one would be able to understand the multiplicity of controls to which European agencies are subjected [Dehousse, 2008: 790-1].

This is why it seems appropriate to talk of ‘Multiple Principals’ (or ‘No Principal’) in the EU scenario. Encompassing the classic Intergovernmentalism-Neofunctionalism debate and acknowledging the initial primacy of Member States over supranational bodies [Pollack, 2003], Keleman sees the creation of First Pillar ERAs as the outcome of an interinstitutional struggle highly dependent on how all the veto players of the matter exercise their powers [2002]. As he states, the Council is likely to delegate power to new or already existing agencies so as to not further enlarge the Commission competences, as it did with the six ERAs created between 1990 and 1994 in particular, or to eventually block the creation of new agencies, such as with the hypothesised EU Telecom Agency. With regards to the Commission, the establishment of new agencies is usually a second-choice alternative; in fact, while for example the Commission created the EFSA in an area where it had no previous power, it opposed the creation of an European Cartel Office, in an area where its competencies were already well developed. With regard to the European Parliament, this has clearly increased its influence of conditionality since the Amsterdam treaty [1997], and is more likely to influence agency design, and establish strong agency scrutiny and accountability controls [Keleman, 2002].

Lastly, the next step in the P-A framework is to analyse the risks of ‘drifts’ or ‘agency loss,’ that is agents diverging from the principals’ original intentions through ‘slippage’ or ‘shrinking’. While ‘shrinking’ refers to a lack of effort in the agent’s behaviour, ‘slippage’ occurs when the principal fails to correctly observe the agent, resulting in the latter taking advantage of the situation [Moe, 1984; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Egan, 1997]. As depicted in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Bureaucratic Drift [adapted from Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994:5]

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Points A, B and C represent three diverse ideal policy preferences belonging to three different principals, while the agent’s preference lies at point Y. If the triangle A-B-C represents the ‘space’ for governmental preferences, the agent maximizes its utility by moving the final policy outcome from point X to point X', closer to its policy preference. In order to prevent such a phenomenon from occurring, with regards to ongoing controls, principals are likely to limit bureaucratic drifts, through ‘police-patrol’ or ‘fire-alarm’ oversights [McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; McCubbins, Noll, Weingast, 1987; Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994; Pollack, 2003]. Regarding ERAs in particular

Procedural requirements […] affect the institutional environment in which agencies make decisions and hence limit an agency’s scope for policy action. Direct monitoring, hearings, investigations, budgetary reviews, appointments and organisational changes are other means by which political principals can influence agency behaviour. When such a system of procedural and substantive controls operates correctly, a situation is created whereby no one controls the agency, yet the agency is under control [Everson, Majone, Metcalfe, Schout, 1999:13].

On the other hand, principals can also design rules and procedures that will ex ante minimize agency discretion:

What are the procedures, including reporting and consultation requirements, which an agency must follow to make policy? Who are the agency’s key constituents and how will they influence decision making? What standards or criteria must an agency consider when promulgating regulations? In which executive department will the new agency be located, and how far down the organizational ladder will political appointments reach? [Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994:3].

In this case, Y’s ability to move the final policy outcome will be limited to X'', as evident in Figure 2. Needless to say, limiting agency discretion will result in a cost that principals will have to carefully weight before putting in place [Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994].

Figure 2: Controlling bureaucratic drift by limiting agency discretion [adapted from Epstein and O'Halloran, 1994:5]

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Moreover, other problems might be added to the list. Legitimacy could easily be ‘reversed,’ if independence is too high and the level of transparency too low; for instance, accountability to the public is essential if improving EU output and procedural legitimacy is an issue [Everson and Majone, 1999; Majone, 1999; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002; Hix and Follesdal, 2006]. The status of funding could also be problematic, according to their possible sources [Everson and Majone, 1999]. Furthermore, co-ordination is another serious problem, considering the overlapping nature of regulations: it is often difficult to understand and strike a balance between the urgencies of all aspects of any issues, such as environmental ones for example [Everson and Majone, 1999]. Also, among the most common problems, a weak delegation is also likely to result in an extreme, and consequently redundant, dilution of power [Dehousse, 2008].

In any case, the fact that P-A analysis has its limitations must not be overlooked; being based on a rational choice framework itself, it excludes non-rational strategies, that could play an important part in institutional creation and evolution; also, P-A privileges the formal structures of delegation and downplays informal resources and controls, and it has come under severe criticism when the post-delegation behaviour of agencies are examined [Keleman, 2002; see Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, Coen and Thatcher, 2005, 2008 for an exhaustive introduction on the issue]. Nonetheless, a P-A analysis “can offer a starting point, not an end point, for analysis” [Coen and Thatcher, 2008: 54]. With regard to an agency as young as Frontex is, this might prove to be particularly true.

SECTION 2: Research questions, methodology and data

2.1 Research questions

In light of the literature examined above, assuming that creating and designing an agency is the result of a set of different expectations from several sources, it is possible to formulate specific questions that this paper will attempt to answer, in particular based on the works of Schout [1999] and Coen and Thatcher [2008].

- What have been the reasons for delegating powers to an independent agency in the field of border security?

The history of the delegation of power unto Frontex will be explored; therefore, the historical background that led to the creation of such an agency, its origins, its principals and its contextual decentralised position in the Justice and Home Affairs field, JHA (now Justice, Freedom and Security, JFS) will be taken into consideration.

- What are the mission, the legal bases, the intra and the extra-organisational design of Frontex?

The legalised nature of Frontex will be analysed. In this sense, particular attention will be given to the regulation underlying the foundation of the agency, as well as the agency mission. Consequently, intra and extra-organisational design will be explored: size, structure, resources, and control mechanism.

- What are the goals, limits and possibilities of the agency?

A primary analysis of Frontex powers and activities is carried out so as to attempt to relate the operations of Frontex to inter and intra-organisational design, investigate its effectiveness in relation to the tasks attributed to it, and question if it has lived up its expectations.

2.2 Methodology and data

The methodology used for this dissertation follows an exploratory case-study approach to the analysis of a contemporary event [Yin, 2003; Berg, 2007]. This work constitutes a third attempt to analyse the above-mentioned agency, distinct from the studies of Jorry [2007] and Carrera [2007], and similar to the outlines of Léonard’s study draft [2008]. In the selection of the agency as the object of study two factors counted as essential: firstly, the fact that Frontex represents a further step in the process of institutionalization of formal and informal supranational structures within the JFS; secondly, the fact that it is a very young agency, which became operational on 3 October 2005 [Frontex, 2006], which amounts to just under three full years at the time of writing. In this sense, this dissertation aspires to be a blueprint for further research, possibly oriented to allow for a more in-depth exploration of Frontex operations.

The data compiled comprises a number of different sources. Primary sources will mainly be:

- Frontex Regulation and amendments;
- official documents from the Commission, the Council, the Parliament; in particular, Commission Communications, JHA Councils and European Councils’ Conclusions, and in general, essential documents related to the matter of border management from 1997 onwards;
- Frontex documents and reports as found on the agency website ― http://www.Frontex.europa.eu/.

All of the above materials were obtained from the respective official EU websites.

Moreover, a number of open-ended interviews were conducted with current representatives or members from all the three institutions [listed and detailed in Annex E]. These interviews are based on a core of topics common to all three institutions, but are distinct due to the different perspectives and access to information that each interviewee had. In any case, the interviews are focused on the exploration of previous questions, the nature of the agencies’ mandate and its interpretation, the relationship between Frontex and other EU bodies, and the features of Frontex in terms of accountability and legitimacy. The interviews are faithfully transcribed, and used with permission.

The secondary sources are obviously more varied than primary sources; along with the previously mentioned studies on Frontex and P-A theories, EU literature on the JFS field obviously proved to be essential.

Section 3: Frontex and the External Borders of the European Union

3.1 Delegation dilemmas: to guard or not to guard?

3.1.1 Origins

Leading from the creation of the Single Market in 1987, which had a ‘knock-on’ effect on JFSP policies [Stetter, 2000], the need for a common security policy has been increasing along with exogenous pressures such as global migration [Davis, Hirst, Mariani, 2001; Nyberg–Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg–Pedersen, 2002; Monar, 2003; Hix, 2006]. In fact, since the 1990s, the European Commission has been studying the recognition of ‘European borders’ and launched a proto-form of cooperation within the Odysseus programme in 1998 [Monar, 2003; Hobbing 2005]. As a result, the seeds of the agency’s creation, with the fundamental concepts of “closer co-operation and mutual technical assistance” in the founding Regulation were in nuce contained in the Tampere Council conclusions [Council, 1999].

In fact, even if new security issues have been important – counter-terrorism for instance [see Council, 2002; House of Lords, 2003; Balzacq and Carrera, 2007; Vaughan-Williams, 2007], the main opportunity for the establishment of a new actor was given by the rising migratory pressure resulting in illegal immigration and the planned EU enlargement of 2004, that following the Amsterdam treaty has resulted in an enlargement of the Schengen area [see Annex B]. In this sense, Member States realised that the existing problems in the implementation of the Schengen rules would have been unbearable on a larger scale, with the potentially explosive Eastern European frontier to add to the already problematic Mediterranean [Lavenex, 2001, 2004; Frontex, 2006; Jorry, 2007; House of Lords, 2003, 2008; Laitinen, 2008]. In practical terms, the problem was that “even if affected by illegal migration, the Dutch could not act anyhow to stop migrants from entering any Union’s ‘high risk area’, before Frontex was put in place” [de Temmerman, 2008]. Contextually, persistent differences in national legislations in terms of external borders management afflicted the application of Schengen, especially in old Member States [Stetter, 2000; Monar, 2003; House of Lords, 2003; 2008; Jasinski, 2008 ]; therefore, the idea of mutual trust and recognition, which were the cornerstones of the Schengen regime, became opportune leverage: having to rely on the competence of other police forces rather than their own, Member States decided to push forward common standards and templates of agencies that still presented different characteristics, organisation, priorities, budgets, languages and perspectives [Commission, 2002b; Monar, 2003; Jorry, 2007; House of Lords, 2008; Parzyszek, 2008 ]. Moreover, the only way of regulating EU borders was a form of ‘burden-sharing’ between Member States, because it is clear that the costs were not the same in any border-related issue, especially for southern and new Member States [Thielemann 2003; Neumayer, 2004; Lavenex and Wallace, 2005].

For these reasons, in October 2001 the Commission backed a Feasibility Study for the setting up of a European Border Police force [2002] commissioned by several Member States, such as Italy, Belgium, France, Germany and Spain [Commission, 2002b; House of Lord, 2003]. As a consequence of the different positions that emerged in the Council, in December 2001 at the Laeken Council, Member States asked the Commission to express an opinion on the issue so as to counter terrorism, illegal immigration and human trafficking [Council, 2001]. The idea of a European Corps of Border Guards encountered resistance from several Member States, such as the UK and the Scandinavian countries [Black and Carrol, 2002; House of Lords, 2003: 18; Jorry, 2007]. According to The Guardian, the study was defined in Brussels as “80 pages of waffle” because of its inconsistency [Black and Carrol, 2002].

3.1.2 First steps

In May 2002, the Commission issued a communication named “Towards an Integrated Border Management of the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union” [European Commission, 2002b], laying down a proposal for the components of a common EU border policy that included. The latter included a common corpus of legislation to define common rules in terms of best practices, including common training, a mechanism for coordination and cooperation based on a new External Borders Practitioners Common Unit developed within the Strategic Committee for Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum working group (SCIFA+ Committee), a Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) established within the Common Unit, financial burden-sharing mechanisms and cooperation with customs services and was ultimately set to lead to the creation of a European Corps of Border Guards.

According to Danny de Temmerman, the interviewee from the Commission, the latter would not have had the possibility of hosting such a project by itself, and that is why it started to move in order to reach the target of setting up a structure external to its own domain [ ibid.]. But in June 2002, the Seville JHA Council issued a plan with a more moderate approach, downplaying the Commission proposal. Following the plan for the management of the external borders of Member States issued by the Council [2002], an External Borders Practitioners Common Unit within the SCIFA+ committee was created later the same year under the Danish Presidency and 17 pilot projects and joint operations were undertaken the following year [Council, 2002; Council, 2003; House of Lords, 2003; Jorry, 2007]. In practice, the Council set up an intergovernmental network based on an operational co-operation plan [House of Lords, 2003; Monar, 2003]. Apart from the Common Unit, the Risk Analysis Centre (RAC) was set up in Helsinki, an ad hoc Training Centre (ACT) in Vienna and a multitude of centres in several Member States were better interconnected [Monar, 2003]. However,

The initial solution inside the SCIFA+ Committee was a ‘political’ decision, considering the lack ofan operational component and the mere advisory role of the SCIFA+ until that moment; in any case, since a solution inside the same Commission was not feasible, the real two options on the table have immediately been an agency orputting in placeaCommunity border guard [de Temmerman, 2008].

As predicted by the Commission, under the Greek presidency, in June 2003, the deficiencies of the established setup erupted: the Commission envisaged the need for a new permanent Community structure to deal with the operational unresolved problems [Commission, 2003], and the claims for a new institutional structure were welcomed by the Council [Council, 2003b]. Later the same month, at the Thessaloniki Council, Member States finally agreed on asking the Commission to draw a proposal for the establishment of a new EU structure [Council, 2003c]. In many ways, this represented “a normal pattern for the establishment of an agency; Member Stateswanted something different, and the Commission did not immediately propose an agency because the times were not mature, andat that timetoo many options were on the table"” [de Temmerman, 2008]. In November 2003, the Commission was finally able to introduce its proposal [2003b]. Finally, within the contextual launch of the 5-year Hague Programme in 2004, the decision was adopted by the Council [Council, 2004]. Starting May 2005, it has become operational and its seat has been established in Warsaw [Council, 2005].

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