This paper provides an explanation for the continuous failure of peace processes in Somalia over the last decade, using based on an extended rational choice / public choice approach. Based on the concept of “Spoilers” and their main motives as outlined by Schneckener (2003), it provides a mapping of the main actors in stateless Somalia and analyses their respective motives. As a result, this paper argues that the behavior of the main actors in Somalia is completely rational. The two main motives out of which the actors involved have spoiled peace processes in the past reflect the basic dichotomy that has been discussed in recent literature concerning intra-state wars. The most important reason for spoiling peace processes in Somalia is greed, which applies mostly to local warlords and businessmen as well as to international companies. To a lesser degree also neighboring countries are affected by greed. The second important motive is grievance; which affects mostly neighboring countries as external actors, and - to a lesser degree - “separatist” actors from the northern autonomous regions of Somalia. Two other motives – “creed” and “autism of violence” are not as important, but also play a distinct role for some actors, in the first case foremost for members of local militias, in the latter case for the “separatist” regions. Based on the detailed analysis, this paper provides a summary mapping of the relevant actors according to their predominant motives. It concludes with some strategies on how to deal with the different Spoilers in the Somali context.
Table of Contents
1 ABSTRACT
2 BACKGROUND: ON THE CONCEPT OF “SPOILERS”
3 HISTORY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOMALIA
3.1 GENERAL SITUATION
3.2 THE “OLD” TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (“TNG”; 2000-2003/4)
3.3 THE „NEW“ TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (FROM OCTOBER 2004)
4 SPOILERS IN SOMALIA: SUSTAINING THE CHAOS AS RATIONAL CHOICE
4.1 GREED: THE WAR ECONOMY IN SOMALIA
4.1.1 THE REGULAR SECTOR: BANANAS, CHARCOAL AND KHAT
4.1.2 THE INFORMAL SECTOR: MONEY TRANSFERS, CURRENCY PRINTING, AND THE MARITIME BUSINESS
4.1.3 THE CRIMINAL SECTOR: ARMS & AMMUNITION AND TOXIC WASTE
4.2 GRIEVANCE: WHY NEIGHBORS WANT TO SUS TAIN THE STATUS QUO
4.2.1 ETHIOPIA
4.2.2 KENYA
4.2.3 ERITREA, DJIBOUTI, UGANDA AND EGYPT
4.3 AUTISM OF VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE AS A WAY OF LIFE
4.4 CREED
4.4.1 THE DIASPORA
4.4.2 “SEPARATISTS”
4.5 THE SOMALI SPOILERS AND THEIR MOTIVES: SUMMARY
5 NO WAY OUT? DEALING WITH SPOILERS
Objectives & Core Topics
This paper examines the recurring collapse of peace processes in Somalia over the past decade by applying an extended rational choice framework. It investigates the actors categorized as "spoilers" to determine why maintaining the volatile status quo is perceived as a rational economic and political preference.
- Analysis of rational actor behavior within a stateless environment.
- Investigation of greed and grievance as primary drivers for conflict perpetuation.
- Mapping of internal and external actors and their motivations for spoiling peace initiatives.
- Evaluation of potential strategies for managing spoilers in the Somali context.
Excerpt from the Book
4.1 Greed: The War Economy in Somalia
Schneckener (2003: 10) argues that especially “warlords, criminals, transnational networks, mercenaries, and transnational companies [….] sometimes superpowers and neighboring countries” are “greedy Spoilers”. In the case of Somalia, one finds a conglomerate of warlords, local businessmen and international companies that have a distinct interest in spoiling the peace process out of the greed motive, with warlords being the thriving force. However, it is almost impossible to make a distinction between warlords, businessmen and criminals14. Looking at the economy in Somalia, it is easy to define particular areas in which warlords co-operate with local and international businessmen - or act as businessmen themselves - and profit from the stateless and chaotic status quo.
As opposed to civilian economies, war economies are “rarely self-sufficient or autarchic [...] On the contrary, though controlling local assets, they are heavily reliant on all forms of external supports and supplies” (Duffield 2000: 75). The conflict in Somalia is also highly reliant on external resources. Hence, it is necessary to also look at the role external actors play in providing funding for armed conflict in Somalia, i.e. “individuals, groups, corporations and institutions based outside the conflict zone but supporting conflict parties through economic interaction (Grosse-Kettler 2004:3).
Chapter Summaries
1 ABSTRACT: This section outlines the research goal of mapping main actors in Somalia based on their motives and rationales for spoiling peace processes.
2 BACKGROUND: ON THE CONCEPT OF “SPOILERS”: This chapter introduces the rational choice theoretical framework used to explain why actors sabotage peace processes to maximize utility.
3 HISTORY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SOMALIA: This chapter provides a brief historical overview of the Somali conflict, including the establishment and failure of previous transitional governments.
4 SPOILERS IN SOMALIA: SUSTAINING THE CHAOS AS RATIONAL CHOICE: This chapter analyzes how internal and external actors utilize greed, grievance, autism of violence, and creed to profit from and sustain the conflict.
5 NO WAY OUT? DEALING WITH SPOILERS: This concluding section evaluates different strategic approaches—such as bargaining, bribing, and coercive diplomacy—to manage spoilers and potentially advance peace in Somalia.
Keywords
Somalia, Spoilers, Rational Choice, War Economy, Warlords, Greed, Grievance, Peace Processes, Statelessness, Civil War, Transitional Federal Government, Conflict Management, Political Economy, Militia, Horn of Africa
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
The paper focuses on explaining why peace processes in Somalia have consistently failed over the last decade by analyzing the behavior and motives of the actors involved, whom the author categorizes as "spoilers."
What are the central thematic fields discussed?
The central themes include the political economy of conflict in Somalia, the role of war economies, the interplay between internal and external actors, and the rational motivations behind sabotaging peace.
What is the primary research question?
The research seeks to identify the rational motives—specifically greed and grievance—that drive actors to prefer the violent status quo over a stable peace agreement.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The author uses an extended rational choice and public choice approach to assess cost-benefit ratios of the actors in the context of a stateless conflict environment.
What topics are covered in the main section?
The main section details the war economy (bananas, charcoal, khat, money transfers, and arms trade), the roles of regional neighbors like Ethiopia and Kenya, and the distinct motives of various spoilers.
How would you characterize the work based on its keywords?
The work is characterized by its focus on political science and international relations, specifically addressing state failure, the economy of violence, and conflict resolution strategy.
How does the author categorize the motive of "greed"?
Greed refers to actors profiting economically and politically from conflict, including the extraction of resources and protection money, which allows them to maintain power and fund their operations.
Why is coercive diplomacy considered ineffective in the Somali context?
The author argues that coercive diplomacy, such as military intervention, has historically failed and is likely to be counterproductive by triggering further violence from local militias.
What role do neighboring countries play in the conflict?
According to the paper, most neighboring countries act as "grievance" spoilers, supporting various factions to exercise power politics and secure regional supremacy rather than promoting a stable Somali state.
- Quote paper
- Dirk Spilker (Author), 2005, Spoilers in Somalia: The self-sustaining chaos and its supporters, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/46600
