With my study I want to contribute to the current debate on the influence of so-called lobby coalitions on policy outcomes with a focus on the way the lobbying process in the European Commission is organized. Since this is a rather new field that still lacks empirical research, I will analyse the influence of lobby coalitions in European policymaking with the help of a representative case. I will focus on business lobby coalitions especially.
In the end of November 2017, the German Minister of Agriculture voted surprisingly for a further use of the herbicide Glyphosate in the Council of the European Union. However, Minister Schmidt did neither concur with his national coalition partner SPD nor with the World Health Organisation, which declared that Glyphosate could foster cancer. Did Schmidt give the agriculture lobby a voice with his vote? Companies like Monsanto, being part of the German Giant Bayer and the agriculture lobby, would have lost its main field of business with a decision against the herbicide. The controversial case of Glyphosate revives the old debate on the role of business interest lobbyism in the EU. Frequently, the process of policy making is under critic by the public for its lack of transparency in regard to the influence of powerful business lobbies. Particular the European Commission (EC), which on one hand has an exceptional role in the European legislation and on the other hand relies on input legitimacy for their policy-making, which is mainly provided by experts (interest groups) and on their expert information.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction – Relevance of the research question
2. Theory
2.1. Lobbying in the European Commission
2.2. Exchange theory – access goods
3. Argument
4. Method
4.1. Case Study Design
4.2. Case selection
5. Analysis
5.1. Case description – Emission trading system
5.2. Case Analysis
5.3. Case outcome
6. Discussion
6.1. Limitations and Implications
7. Conclusion
8. Bibliography
Research Objectives and Themes
This study investigates the influence of business lobby coalitions on policy outcomes within the European Commission. The research specifically aims to determine whether the relative size of a business lobby coalition correlates with its success in influencing the Commission's policy positions, testing this through the analysis of data from a public consultation on the European Emission Trading System.
- Dynamics of lobbying coalitions in the European Union
- Application of Social Exchange Theory to interest group behavior
- Influence of business interest groups (BIGs) on policy formulation
- Methodological analysis of public consultation responses
- Relationship between resource supply (information) and lobbying success
Excerpt from the Book
5.1. Case description – Emission trading system
The written public consultation on the ‘Emission Trading System (ETS) post-2020 carbon leakage provisions’ was conducted for 12 weeks from May 8th to July 31st 2014 by means of a questionnaire using an Interactive Policy Making tool. In the following I will refer to the European Commission’s (n.d.) document, in which the raw data from this particular consultation is presented. The original document, on which my case description and analysis is based, can be found among my references under the name of the public consultation.
The European ETS in general is seen as a cornerstone of the EU’s drive to reduce its emissions of man-made greenhouse gases. The system works by putting a limit on overall emissions from covered installations which is reduced each year. Within this limit, companies can buy and sell emission allowances as needed. This approach gives companies the flexibility they need to cut their emissions in a cost-effective way. The EU ETS covers the 28 EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The aim of the consultation was to canvass opinions on different options for a system to avoid carbon leakage after 2020, based on a questionnaire. ‘Carbon leakage’ refers to the situation that may occur if, for reasons of costs related to climate policies businesses transfer production to other countries that have laxer constraints on greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, industrial installations deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage receive special treatment from the EU ETS to support their competitiveness.
The questionnaire of this public consultation consisted out of 23 multiple choice questions alongside the possibility to provide comments and was calling for responses from all kind of stakeholders. In my analysis I will focus on the responses from all participating BIGs on question 8 in the EC’s proposed questionnaire, represented below.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction – Relevance of the research question: Introduces the controversy surrounding business lobbying in the EU and outlines the study's focus on the impact of lobby coalitions on policy.
2. Theory: Explores the conceptual framework of EU lobbying and Social Exchange Theory as a basis for understanding how interest groups trade information for policy influence.
3. Argument: Establishes the research hypothesis, proposing that larger business lobby coalitions possess a higher probability of influencing policy outcomes due to their ability to provide more information.
4. Method: Details the qualitative case study approach used, focusing on the selection of a public consultation on the Emission Trading System to test the hypothesis.
5. Analysis: Presents the empirical case data, categorizing lobby coalitions based on their responses to specific consultation questions and comparing them against the Commission's actual policy proposals.
6. Discussion: Reflects on the findings, addresses potential confounding variables, and suggests improvements for future research, such as using broader data sets and advanced text analysis tools.
7. Conclusion: Summarizes that the initial hypothesis was falsified by the case data and calls for further academic research into the complexities of lobby coalitions.
8. Bibliography: Lists the academic sources and legislative documents utilized throughout the research.
Keywords
European Commission, Business interest groups, Lobby coalitions, Social Exchange Theory, Emission Trading System, Policy outcomes, Carbon leakage, Access goods, Lobbying success, Public consultation, Political influence, Interest group representation, Policy formulation, European Union, Empirical research.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research?
The paper examines whether larger business lobby coalitions are more successful in influencing the European Commission's policy decisions compared to smaller ones.
What are the primary thematic areas?
The study revolves around EU lobbying dynamics, the application of Social Exchange Theory, the role of business interest groups, and the legislative policy formulation process.
What is the central research question?
The research asks if business lobbying coalitions increase the lobby success of business interest groups within the European Commission.
Which scientific methodology is utilized?
The author employs a qualitative methodology, conducting a descriptive case study based on empirical raw data derived from a European Commission public consultation.
What is covered in the main section?
The main part includes the theoretical framework, the formation of the research hypothesis, a detailed case analysis of the Emission Trading System consultation, and a discussion of the study's limitations.
Which keywords define this work?
The work is defined by terms such as lobby coalitions, European Commission, Social Exchange Theory, policy outcomes, and business interest groups.
How were the lobby coalitions identified?
Lobby coalitions were categorized by coding the respondents' answers to specific questions in the Emission Trading System consultation, grouping them based on their desired policy direction along an issue dimension line.
What was the outcome of the hypothesis testing?
The hypothesis was falsified, as the empirical data showed that the relatively smaller business lobby coalition was more successful in influencing the Commission's policy position.
Why was the Emission Trading System consultation chosen as the case study?
It was chosen because it represents a core EU policy area, provides accessible and usable raw data, and offers clear opportunities to observe the interplay between interest groups and the Commission.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Roxane Diesing (Autor:in), 2018, Do business lobbying coalitions increase the lobby success of business interest groups in the European Commission?, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/491865
