One of the main issues that the second wave feminists addressed was the right of women to decide if and when they want to have children. Women in the sixties and seventies protested for their reproductive rights and demanded the legal access to abortion with slogans like “my body, my choice”. Although many countries liberalized their laws concerning abortion, the debate about the moral permissibility still remains one of the most heated debates across different societies.
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s essay “A Defense of Abortion” was published in 1971 and has had a great impact on the philosophical debate on abortion and its moral permissibility. Moral philosophers who are pro- or anti-choice alike have argued about the argumentative strategy that is best to support one’s claims concerning abortion. Thomson’s essay has been critiqued for various different reasons and this papers goal is to work out how Thomson’s position could be rethought after over forty years of its first publishing. My main thesis is virtually the same as Thomson’s: abortion is not always impermissible. However, I disagree with her methodology and I argue that the details of different cases and the societal context they happen in ought to decide whether abortion is morally permissible or not. My critique is especially aimed at Thomson’s strategy to assume – for the sake of the argument – that the fetus is a person, her conception of bodily autonomy and her terminology.
In the first part of the paper I summarize Thomson’s position while focusing on the most important aspects for the following critique. In the second part, I mainly use the theories of Gina Schouten and Rosalind Hursthouse to criticize some of Thomson’s assumptions. Gina Schouten has argued (from a feminist perspective) for considering that there is a societal moral obligation for caring and protecting the most vulnerable which means that depending on the moral status of fetus’, there is an obligation to care for them. Another interesting critique can be made by questioning of the role that (bodily) autonomy plays in bioethics and how Thomson uses it to justify abortion. Rosalind Hursthouse has attacked Thomson’s violinist example for being too different from an actual pregnancy and found her terminology too imprecise.
Table of Contents
Introduction
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Position
1.1 Abortion as Self-Defense
1.2 The Right to Your Own Body
1.3 The Good vs. the Minimally Decent Samaritan
2. Problems with Thomson’s Position
2.1 The Moral Status of the Fetus and the Obligation to Provide Care
2.2 Bodily Autonomy and Thomson’s Terminology
Conclusion
Research Objectives and Core Themes
This paper critically examines Judith Jarvis Thomson’s seminal essay "A Defense of Abortion," arguing that while her pro-choice conclusion remains valid, her methodology—specifically the reliance on abstract thought experiments and the isolation of individual rights from societal context—is insufficient. The author contends that moral reasoning regarding abortion must be empirically informed and situated within the social and political realities of caregiving and collective responsibility.
- Critique of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s philosophical methodology
- Evaluation of bodily autonomy and personhood in the abortion debate
- Application of the "personal is political" feminist perspective to reproductive rights
- Analysis of caregiving obligations and the role of societal norms
- Development of a contextual approach to moral decision-making in pregnancy
Excerpt from the Book
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Position
Judith Jarvis Thomson starts her piece by pointing out the premise that most theories who are against the permissibility of abortion are based on: the unborn child is a person from the moment of conception and to kill persons is wrong, therefore abortion is always impermissible. Conservative views on abortion stress the continuity in the development of a human being and that it is not possible to draw a line at one point where the cells become a person. Therefore, in this line of argument, the fetus must be considered as a person from the moment of conception.
Thomson critiques this view by employing the analogy of an acorn turning into oak tree: nobody would say that an acorn is the exact same thing as the tree. Although it is true that drawing a line in the development of a human being is very difficult, this does not mean that it isn’t possible to argue for the permissibility of abortion. Proceeding from that thought, Thomson starts her argumentation by taking on the premise of her opponents and acting as though it were true. This is a strategically important point since this way she opens another way of thinking about the topic that does not divide people into two camps that have unbridgeable differences in their premises. Instead of trying to prove that a fetus is not a person, her plan is to prove why it is possible to argue for the permissibility of abortions even if fetus’ are granted the status of personhood. Following Thomson’s argument, whether the fetus is a person or not is not the defining moment of the argument. More important than the question of personhood is the question why granting the fetus personhood should necessarily lead to the conclusion that abortion is impermissible.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Outlines the historical context of the abortion debate and the author's intention to critique Thomson's methodology through a feminist and societal lens.
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Position: Summarizes Thomson’s key arguments, including the violinist thought experiment, the claim of self-defense, and the distinction between good and minimally decent Samaritans.
1.1 Abortion as Self-Defense: Explores the conflict between the fetus's right to life and the pregnant person's right to survival in life-threatening pregnancies.
1.2 The Right to Your Own Body: Analyzes Thomson’s defense of bodily autonomy as a fundamental right that prevents the obligation to provide continued use of one’s body to another.
1.3 The Good vs. the Minimally Decent Samaritan: Discusses Thomson’s classification of moral duties and the argument that one is not morally obligated to exceed the standards of a minimally decent Samaritan.
2. Problems with Thomson’s Position: Initiates a critique of Thomson’s reliance on abstract arguments and her failure to account for social reality and varying reasons for abortion.
2.1 The Moral Status of the Fetus and the Obligation to Provide Care: Uses Gina Schouten’s work to argue that moral obligations to provide care are collective and must be weighed against the social context of dependencies.
2.2 Bodily Autonomy and Thomson’s Terminology: Critiques the limitations of Thomson's binary categories (just/unjust) and argues for a more nuanced continuum-based view of caregiving obligations.
Conclusion: Synthesizes the argument that abortion discussions must incorporate empirical realities like inequality and ableism rather than relying solely on isolated rights-based thought experiments.
Keywords
Abortion, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Bodily Autonomy, Bioethics, Reproductive Rights, Fetus, Personhood, Care Ethics, Feminism, Moral Philosophy, Societal Norms, Minimally Decent Samaritan, Self-Defense, Dependency, Social Context
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary subject of this paper?
The paper provides a critical analysis of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s influential essay "A Defense of Abortion," evaluating her philosophical strategies and questioning the applicability of her thought experiments to real-world reproductive contexts.
What are the central themes discussed?
Key themes include bodily autonomy, the moral status of the fetus, the nature of caregiving obligations, the limitations of abstract moral thought experiments, and the role of social and political context in ethical decision-making.
What is the main research question or objective?
The objective is to demonstrate that while Thomson’s conclusion—that abortion is not always impermissible—is correct, her methodology fails to address the societal and empirical complexities inherent in pregnancy, thereby requiring a more situated ethical approach.
Which scientific methodology is applied?
The paper utilizes a critical philosophical methodology, analyzing and contrasting Thomson's rights-based framework with feminist perspectives from scholars like Gina Schouten and Rosalind Hursthouse.
What does the main body of the work address?
The main body examines the components of Thomson’s arguments (self-defense, bodily ownership, and Samaritanism) and subjects them to criticism based on the lack of social grounding, the neglect of diverse reasons for abortion, and inconsistent terminology.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
The work is characterized by terms such as bodily autonomy, feminist ethics, caregiving obligations, reproductive rights, and the critique of decontextualized bioethics.
Why does the author critique the "violinist" thought experiment?
The author argues that the violinist example is too removed from actual pregnancy, as it ignores the biological and social reality of the pregnant person and creates an artificial, "decontextualized" scenario that fails to capture the complexity of human life.
How does the author propose we view caregiving obligations?
The author suggests viewing caregiving on a continuum rather than as an abstract binary of "just" or "unjust," emphasizing that decisions should be informed by the specific circumstances of the case and a societal commitment to solidarity.
- Citar trabajo
- Isil Ceren Yildirim (Autor), 2018, An Alternative Defense of Abortion. A critique of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s "A Defense of Abortion", Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/493621
