This essay aims to argue against the common claim of philosophers and scientists that free will is just an illusion. My general thesis is that it is possible that we have a free will – and that we are morally responsible for our actions – if we understand free will as a potentiality that can be actualized – or not.
Table of Contents
Definitions and basic assumptions
The 2 metaphysical pre-conditions of free will
Free will as a potentiality that can be actualized
Arguments against the illusion of free will
Summary and Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
The essay explores the feasibility of free will and moral responsibility, arguing against the prevalent scientific and philosophical claim that free will is merely an illusion. The central research question examines how human beings can be held morally responsible if actions are allegedly determined by biological or neurological mechanisms, proposing that free will should be understood as a latent potentiality that can be actively realized.
- Analysis of metaphysical pre-conditions for moral responsibility.
- Critique of the "causa sui" (cause of oneself) problem.
- Distinction between natural causation and human intentionality.
- Integration of psychiatric and neurological perspectives on character formation.
- Refutation of determinism through the lens of human potentiality.
Excerpt from the Book
The 2 metaphysical pre-conditions of free will
In my experiences, thinking and meditating about free will finally always ends up by fundamental questions like that: “Is it possible to fully explain the phenomenon of acting by the methods of natural sciences?”; “Is it appropriate to reduce our brain, mind and decision making process to neuronal processes?”; “Is it possible that people are more than not just empirical entities?”. The following two metaphysical pre-conditions constitute the fundamental argumentative basis through which it would be possible that people are free and morally responsible for their actions:
(A) A person can be the “causa sui” of an action.
(B) Humans cannot be ultimately understood as empirical entities and actions cannot be ultimately explained as empirical phenomena.
Summary of Chapters
Definitions and basic assumptions: This chapter establishes the fundamental terminology, including action, moral responsibility, and free will, while formulating core assumptions about the necessity of freedom for moral accountability.
The 2 metaphysical pre-conditions of free will: The author introduces two necessary conditions—the concept of "causa sui" and the limitation of empirical science—to create a philosophical framework for human freedom.
Free will as a potentiality that can be actualized: This section challenges the rigid "Basic Argument" by Galen Strawson, proposing that responsibility is tied to the realization of preferences rather than being the absolute source of one's entire character.
Arguments against the illusion of free will: The author critiques scientific studies that frame free will as an illusion, arguing instead that belief in one's potentiality is empirically supported by psychological outcomes and human development.
Summary and Conclusion: This final section synthesizes the previous arguments, reaffirming that free will is not a static property, but a potentiality that manifests through self-directedness and conscious decision-making.
Keywords
Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Determinism, Causa Sui, Empirical Entities, Natural Sciences, Potentiality, Character, Neurological Processes, Human Agency, Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, Self-directedness, Cooperation Capability, Self-transcendence.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this work?
The essay investigates the existence of free will and its vital relationship with moral responsibility, challenging contemporary naturalistic arguments that view human actions as mere deterministic outcomes.
What are the primary thematic areas covered?
The work covers metaphysics, ethics, neurology, and psychiatry, specifically exploring how character and moral decisions interact with biological predispositions.
What is the main research objective?
The objective is to argue that free will is not an illusion, but a fundamental potentiality that enables individuals to be held morally accountable for their actions.
Which scientific methods are applied?
The author employs a philosophical analysis of logical arguments alongside a critical reflection on psychiatric findings, specifically utilizing the work of Robert Cloninger and Raphael Bonelli.
What does the main body address?
The main body examines the "causa sui" problem, compares deterministic and non-deterministic views on human action, and discusses the role of the neocortex in shaping human behavior.
Which keywords best characterize this essay?
Key concepts include free will, moral responsibility, potentiality, causa sui, and the distinction between empirical entities and human agency.
How does the author define moral responsibility in the context of the SS-officer case studies?
The author uses the SS-officer comparison to demonstrate that even if desires are influenced by natural causality, moral responsibility depends on the individual's capacity to act as "causa sui" regarding the realization of those desires.
How is the concept of "potentiality" used to defend free will?
The author frames free will as an latent capacity that must be actively realized, similar to musical or intellectual talent, arguing that empirical science cannot fully capture this subjective ability through simple observation.
- Quote paper
- Alexander Hölzl (Author), 2018, The Possibility of Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/496772
