This paper critically assesses Robert Michels' famous "Iron Law of Oligarchy". After a summary of Robert Michels' argument, it challenges his assumption that this law of oligarchy is "iron" by giving counter-examples for egalitarian societies in Africa. As these egalitarian societies come along with serious disadvantages, the Athenian model of democracy by lot is presented as a more viable alternative to the law of oligarchy. The conclusion applies this model of democracy by lot to Robert Michels’ starting point: the political party.
Yes, there is a law of oligarchy. But this law of oligarchy is not "iron", it is man-made. By calling it "iron" Robert Michels commits the cardinal fault of the bourgeois social scientist: he reifies and naturalizes societal processes.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Law of Oligarchy
3. Egalitarian Societies
4. More democratic democracy
5. Conclusion
Objectives & Topics
This paper critically assesses Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" by challenging its claim of inevitability and proposing the Athenian model of democracy by lot as a mechanism to mitigate oligarchic tendencies within modern political parties.
- The theoretical deconstruction of Robert Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy"
- Examination of egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies as a counter-model to hierarchy
- Critique of organizational necessity and private property as drivers of elite rule
- Analysis of the Athenian "democracy by lot" system as a tool for political inclusion
- Practical application of democratic reform strategies within contemporary political parties
Excerpt from the Book
The Law of Oligarchy
Robert Michels’ argument about the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ is as simple as it is powerful. It derives its power from the very organization of society itself. While democracy means rule of the people, oligarchy is the rule of the few, the rule of a powerful elite. Robert Michels now argues that democracy is actually not the rule of the people, but always the rule of interchanging elites. Instead of being a description of reality, democracy is merely a legal principle (Michels 2004: 342).
For Michels this follows from the hierarchical organization of society: “Who says organization, says oligarchy.” (Michels 2004: 365) This conclusion follows from the observation that in every organization there is a “dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators.” (Michels 2004: 365) Apart from the hierarchical organization of society, further causes of this law of oligarchy are the need for a technically skilled elite (Michels 2004: 61-81) and the psychological needs (Michels 2004: 85-92) of the masses for leadership. Democracy thus merely means that the minority group of the ruling is not based on a hereditary principle like in an aristocracy, but that the people can from time to time decide which elite will rule them (Michels 2004: 355).
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: This chapter outlines the critique of Robert Michels' law of oligarchy and presents the research strategy, which ranges from anthropological evidence to the proposal of an Athenian-inspired democratic model.
2. The Law of Oligarchy: This section summarizes Michels' core argument that organizational structures inherently lead to the dominance of elites, asserting that democracy is effectively only a process of elite exchange.
3. Egalitarian Societies: This chapter uses anthropological examples, specifically the !Kung and Hadza, to argue that hierarchy and oligarchy are not inevitable features of social life but are contingent upon specific organizational and property structures.
4. More democratic democracy: This section advocates for the introduction of selection by lot as a method to break the power of self-perpetuating elites and increase political participation.
5. Conclusion: This chapter discusses the practical implications of implementing a system of democracy by lot within political parties, weighing the benefits for ideological versus deliberative models of politics.
Keywords
Iron Law of Oligarchy, Robert Michels, Democracy, Elite theory, Egalitarianism, Athenian democracy, Democracy by lot, Hunter-gatherer societies, Political parties, Bureaucracy, Hierarchy, Social organization, Political power, Representation, Deliberative democracy
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core argument of this work?
The work challenges the inevitability of Robert Michels’ "Iron Law of Oligarchy," suggesting that oligarchy is not an "iron" natural phenomenon, but a man-made consequence of specific hierarchical organizational structures.
What are the primary themes covered?
The themes include the critique of elite theory, the role of organizational structure in social hierarchy, the viability of non-hierarchical social models, and democratic reform through selection by lot.
What is the ultimate goal of the research?
The goal is to demonstrate that modern political parties can be made more democratic by moving away from exclusive elite leadership toward systems that foster broader citizen participation, such as democracy by lot.
Which scientific methods are employed?
The paper utilizes a critical assessment of political theory (Michels, Marx, etc.) combined with an interdisciplinary analysis using anthropological evidence and historical models of governance.
What does the main body address?
It addresses the theoretical origins of oligarchic rule, contrasts these with egalitarian hunter-gatherer societies, and evaluates the Athenian method of selection by lot as a potential solution for modern party politics.
Which keywords characterize this paper?
Key terms include "Iron Law of Oligarchy," "democracy by lot," "egalitarian societies," and "elite theory."
How do egalitarian societies refute Michels?
The author argues that societies like the !Kung and Hadza maintain equality through immediate-return systems that prevent the accumulation of personal power, proving that society does not inherently necessitate hierarchy.
Why does the author advocate for "democracy by lot"?
Because it offers a more objective selection process than popular voting, which often favors the wealthy and rhetorically skilled, thereby reducing the detachment of the "political class" from the people.
- Quote paper
- Maximilian Konrad (Author), 2013, Robert Michels reconsidered. Is there an "Iron Law of Oligarchy"?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/506798
