The AfD, FPÖ and leading online newspapers. Friend or enemy?


Bachelor Thesis, 2019

109 Pages, Grade: 7,8


Excerpt

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 General explanations
2.1.1 Demand-side explanations
2.1.1.1 Macro-level
2.1.1.2 Micro-level
2.1.2 Supply-side explanations
2.1.2.1 Internal
2.1.2.2 External
2.1.3 Interim Conclusion
2.2 Explanations for the success of the AfD and FPÖ
2.2.1 Demand-side
2.2.1.1 Macro-level
2.2.1.2 Micro-level
2.2.2 Supply-side
2.2.2.1 Internal
2.2.2.2 External
2.3 Conclusion

3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Case selection: Media
3.2 Agenda-setting, priming, and framing
3.3 Qualitative content analysis – case selection
3.4 Qualitative content analysis- Data selection and evaluation

4. RESEARCH FINDINGS
4.1 Bild Zeitung
4.1.1 Volume of reporting
4.1.2 Evaluation of the AfD in the reporting
4.1.3 Sender
4.1.4 Topics
4.1.5 Attributes
4.2 Kronen Zeitung
4.2.1 Volume of reporting
4.2.2 Evaluation of the FPÖ in the reporting
4.2.3 Senders
4.2.4 Topics
4.2.5 Attributes

5. COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION
5.1 Volume and evaluation of reporting
5.2 Senders
5.3 Topics
5.4 Attributes

6. CONCLUSION

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY
7.1 Primary Sources
7.2 Secondary Sources

8. APPENDIXES
8.1 Bild Zeitung: Categories
8.1.1 Positive statements about the AfD
8.1.2 Negative statements about the AfD, its politicians and supporters
8.2 Kronen Zeitung: Categories
8.2.1 Positive statements about the FPÖ
8.2.1 Negative statements about the FPÖ
8.3 Table of findings: Bild Zeitung
8.4 Table of findings: Kronen Zeitung

List of Figures

Figure 1: Number of articles published on the AfD by the Bild Zeitung in the last month before the 2017 election (own representation)

Figure 2: Evaluation of the AfD in analysed Bild articles (own representation)

Figure 3: Proportion of senders regarding the overall amount of judgemental statements made about the AfD in the Bild Zeitung (own representation)

Figure 4: Comparison of the amount of positive and negative statements about the AfD by senders in the Bild Zeitung (own representation)

Figure 5: Number of articles published on the FPÖ by the Kronen Zeitung in the last month before the 2017 election (own representation)

Figure 6: Evaluation of the FPÖ in analysed Kronen articles (own representation)

Figure 7: Proportion of senders regarding the overall amount of judgemental statements made about the FPÖ in the Kronen Zeitung (own representation)

Figure 8: Comparison of the amount of positive and negative statements about the FPÖ by senders in the Kronen Zeitung (own representation)

Figure 9: Comparison of the number of articles published by the Bild Zeitung about the AfD and by the Kronen Zeitung about the FPÖ in the last month before the 2017 elections (own representation)

Figure 10: Comparison of the positive, neutral, and negative evaluation of the AfD in the Bild Zeitung and the FPÖ in the Kronen Zeitung (own representation)

Figure 11: Comparison of the amount of positive and negative statements made by senders in the Bild Zeitung about the AfD and made by senders in the Kronen Zeitung about the FPÖ (own representation)

Figure 12: Comparison of the proportion of senders in the Bild and Kronen Zeitung (own representation)

List of Abbreviations

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

ABSTRACT

In 2017, the right-wing populist parties ‘Alternative for Germany’(AfD) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) got markedly different election results: While the AfD got 12.6% of the vote share, the FPÖ achieved a much higher result with 26%. Considering that the two parties as well as Germany and Austria are ostensibly similar, this puzzle leads to the question of what explains the so markedly different election results of the AfD and the FPÖ in 2017. Based on a review of general factors that explain the success of populist radical right parties and extensive research on the aspects that led to the rise and success of the AfD and FPÖ, the paper focuses on the role of the media, seeking to understand how the two parties were portrayed by the media before the 2017 elections. This task is approached by conducting a qualitative content analysis of the reporting on the AfD by the Bild Zeitung and the depiction of the FPÖ by the Kronen Zeitung, the two most popular online daily newspapers in their countries, during the last month before the elections. It is shown that the two parties used different framing strategies to report on the AfD or FPÖ respectively, resulting in a much more negative portrayal of the former. Considering that the FPÖ was depicted in a more positive way and got a much higher result in the election, the paper contributes to the literature by supporting the theory that the media have an influence on election results by shaping the public image of parties and their leaders, thereby influencing the voter’s perception of them, and offers a relevance point for further research on explaining the varied election results of the AfD and FPÖ in the 2017 elections.

1. INTRODUCTION

Current European political developments affirm Mudde’s statement that we experience a “populist Zeitgeist.”[1] According to different election polls in Europe, the support attained by populist parties increased from 5.1% to 13.2% compared from the 1960s until 2016.[2] Indeed, it seems that the presence of such parties has become a standard in current European politics,[3] constituting one of the most dramatic phenomena in current Western European politics.[4]

This development found expression in the 2017 elections and headlines such as „German election: Merkel wins fourth term but far-right AfD surges to third,”[5] “Plus de 10 millions de viox pour Marine Le Pen: le score historique du FN”[6], and “Austria far right: Freedom Party wins key posts in new government”[7] are just some examples of the headings that decorated the title pages of newspapers after the elections.

Considering Germany’s past, especially the election result of the German ‘Alternative for Germany’ (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) that won 12.6% of the votes in the Bundestagswahl in September 2017,[8] led to much attention and discussions about the rise of populism, in Germany and other countries.[9]

What is often forgotten and got less attention, however, is that one month later, at the Nationalratswahl in Austria, the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) won more than a quarter of votes (26%) in the most recent election[10] and therefore a much higher result.

While this finding is already surprising in itself, it becomes even more significant considering that Germany and Austria are comparable in many respects, especially their “long historical parallels.”[11] It becomes all the more puzzling taking into account that not only the countries but also the parties are ostensibly similar: In their programmes for the 2017 elections, the AfD[12] and FPÖ[13] suggested to halt immigration and promoted respectively the German or Austrian culture, therefore addressing nativism.[14] Furthermore, as both parties proposed to increase the role of society, to reduce the power of the government and suggested to introduce referenda as a form of (a more) direct democracy,[15] they thematised main elements of populism.[16] Consequently, the AfD and FPÖ fulfil (the two) main ideological features, nativism and populism, that according to Mudde characterise populist radical right parties.[17]

As a result of the phenomenon that Germany and Austria as well as the AfD and FPÖ are apparently quite similar but one party is much more successful than the other, the essay seeks to understand why the AfD and the FPÖ achieved so markedly different results in the 2017 elections.

Being aware of the numerous factors that have an impact on the (electoral) success of a party,[18] an extensive review of the various mechanisms that impact party success and intensive research on the factors that led to the rise and/or success of the AfD and FPÖ caused the author of this paper to approach this puzzle by focusing on the role of the media and the question of how the AfD in Germany and the FPÖ in Austria were portrayed by the media before the 2017 elections.

Grounded on a qualitative content analysis of reporting on the AfD in the Bild Zeitung and the FPÖ in the Kronen Zeitung (the most popular online daily newspapers in Germany[19] and Austria[20] ), it is argued that the two newspapers used different framing strategies to portray the parties, as the AfD was depicted in a much more negative way in the Bild Zeitung than the FPÖ in the Kronen Zeitung.

Considering that we are living in an age of “mediatization” and it is argued that the media spread the messages and shape the images of political parties and their leaders[21], therefore having an influence on election results,[22] this paper supports this theory by finding that the AfD was portrayed by the media much more negatively by the media compared to the FPÖ and was also less successful in the election.

Thus, it contributes to the literature on closing the “gap between demand-side factors of support and the external supply-side environment as provided by the mass media”[23] by revealing the factor of the media as a reference point for explaining their varied successes and thereby offering a possibility for further research.

In terms of political purposes of the paper, the importance for political parties and candidates of having a positive relation to the media in order to be depicted positively by them and therefore having a higher chance of being successful is highlighted. Next to that, the results of this paper strengthen the point that Germany and Austria have developed different ways of dealing with their Nazi past[24] and that the German press, also because of Germany’s past, makes it harder for populist movements to establish themselves.[25]

Regarding the structure of this paper, in the first section, the various mechanisms that affect party success as well as the literature explaining the rise and successes of the AfD and FPÖ are reviewed, situating this essay within the state of research and highlighting the necessity of analysing the role of the media to understand the above-mentioned puzzle. In the second chapter, the methodology underlying the work is outlined. The third section presents the findings of the qualitative content analysis of the reporting on the AfD and the FPÖ in the Bild Zeitung and Kronen Zeitung, focusing in particular on the positive and negative attributes associated with both parties. Next, the results of the analyses are compared and discussed, leading to the conclusion that the portrayal of these parties in the media varied significantly, representing a reference point for explaining the varied successes of the AfD and FPÖ. The relevance and implications of this finding are discussed in the conclusion.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

As the broader topic of this paper is to understand the varied electoral successes of the AfD and FPÖ in recent elections, the aim of this literature review is three-fold: The first section identifies general mechanisms that scholars have recognised as having an impact on a party’s success. The second section focuses in particular on the AfD and the FPÖ to find out which of these conditions apply to the two parties specifically. Based on these two parts, the third one concludes that it is necessary and the next logical step to research the role of the media to approach the issue.

The literature in the first two sections is synthesised into two approaches: Firstly, demand-side explanations on a macro- and micro-level for the success of the two parties are critically reviewed. Scholars of this technique focus on the question of “which socio-economic and political developments contributed to the voters’ grievances that the populist radical right parties appeal to and mobilize.”[26] Secondly, internal and external supply- side explanations that concentrate on how the individual features of far right parties and the “political opportunity structure” in which they operate have an impact on their success[27] are reviewed.

2.1 General explanations

2.1.1 Demand-side explanations

Demand-side explanations, focusing on the “grievances that create the ‘demand’” for populist radical right parties,[28] can be divided into macro- and micro-level explanations: Regarding the first one, researchers examine broader historical, social, and economic developments on a national or global level.[29] On a micro-level, the correlation between the electoral behaviour of individuals and their attitudes are analysed.[30]

2.1.1.1 Macro-level

-ne of the main theories on the macro-level is concerned with grievances that are caused by the modernization process, arguing that the so called “modernization losers”, not being able to adapt to the changes that arise due to the process of modernization, vote for the far right.[31] However, evidence for the modernization theory is mixed[32] and even if there is a positive correlation, this does not automatically mean that there is a causation.[33] Consequently, as studies of this theory are often vague regarding the effect of this phenomenon on the micro-level and face empirical and theoretical problems,[34] they cannot be seen as useful explanations for the success of populist radical right parties.[35]

Next to modernization, many academics stress the “vital role of ‘crisis’”.[36] Especially the effect of economic crises plays a big role in the literature, particularly by examining the correlation between the level of unemployment and the electoral success of populist radical right parties.[37] However, the results are often contradictory[38] and based on the literature, one can conclude that economic grievances are highly context-dependent and do not automatically lead to success of populist radical right parties.[39] Golder states that the “effect of unemployment on populist parties is conditional on the level of immigration” as unemployment only leads to a higher success of populist parties when the number of foreigners is high.[40] It is argued that in times of economic crises, “members of the ingroup are apt to blame the outgroup for economic problems”, therefore causing discrimination,[41] and far right parties use these economic grievances by connecting immigration to economic hardship in their campaigns.[42] Therefore, on an individual level, there is strong evidence confirming the economic grievance theory as voters of the far right have stronger anti-immigration attitudes that are also linked to “individual perceptions of economic threat”.[43] This supports Ivarsflaten’s argument that in Western Europe, populist right parties were especially successful in elections when focusing on immigration grievances,[44] while concentrating on economic grievances alone did not increase their vote share.[45]

A further explanation in the literature is that due to political changes (such as EU integration), people are dissatisfied with current politicians.[46] Therefore, scholars study the link between the electoral support of populist radical right parties and political disillusionment.[47] Ivarsflaten, however, shows that “although highly influential in many cases, neither disillusionment with politicians, lack of trust in the European Parliament, nor opposition to the green agenda were mobilized better by all successful populist right parties than by the major parties of the left and right.”[48] Consequently, while grievances over economic and political issues remain important factors for the electoral success of populist radical right parties, several scholars conclude that grievances over immigration play a bigger role in explaining their success.[49]

This leads us to the next theory, the one over cultural grievances.[50] According to Ivarsflaten, the “immigration mobilization model” is the best explanation for the success of the populist right.[51] The idea behind this macro-level theory is that parties on the far right exploit an individual’s “desire for self-esteem” that leads to the perception that one owns groups is superior to other groups by “highlighting the (alleged) incompatibility of immigrant behavioral norms and cultural values with those of the native population.”[52] Mudde states that many scholars view populist radical right parties in Western Europe as a reaction to mass immigration that had been perceived as a threat.[53]

However, the literature seems to be more divided than that[54], confirming Mudde’s claim that the empirical results of this theory often lead to contradictions as they are depending on several decisions, for example the data and indicators that are used.[55] Nevertheless, although some qualifications need to be made,[56] it is concluded that mass immigration was still an important factor for the electoral success of some populist radical right parties.[57]

2.1.1.2 Micro-level

Focusing on the micro-level, a majority of studies seeks to understand the reasons behind people voting for populist radical right parties.[58] An often mentioned argument is that the voters of such parties are mostly insecure due to macro-level developments like immigration and economic crises,[59] ignoring the fact that the electorate is heterogenous.[60] Moreover, opinions of scholars are also mixed[61] regarding the statement that voters of radical right parties “tend to have more anti-immigrant, exclusionist, intolerant or authoritarian attitudes”, due to their education and gender.[62]

2.1.2 Supply-side explanations

Supply-side explanations, analysing the “institutional, strategic and organizational contexts” of populist radical right parties and how such factors benefit or hinder the success of these parties,[63] can be divided into internal and external factors: While internal factors focus on the characteristics of the party itself, external ones concentrate on the context, the “political opportunity structure”, in which the party operates .[64]

2.1.2.1 Internal

Several scholars, focusing on internal supply-side explanations and concentrating on the party itself[65], argue that especially the organizational strength of populist radical right parties is crucial for their success.[66] Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that many scholars agree that a party’s organizational strength seems to be more important for their survival rather than their electoral breakthrough.[67]

In relation to organizational strength, numerous scholars emphasize the significance of leadership for the success of populist radical right parties.[68] Charismatic leadership seems to be especially important for the electoral breakthrough of a party by attracting many voters, while for the electoral persistence of the party, its organizational strength is more relevant.[69]

The internal supply-side factor that is mentioned most frequently in the literature is party ideology, linking the success of populist radical right parties to their rather moderate ideology.[70] However, the broader political environment needs to be taken into account as the damaging effect of ideological extremity varies from country to country.[71]

2.1.2.2 External

Regarding external factors, many studies focus on the institutional context as it is argued that different political systems lead to different opportunities or limitations for the electoral success of populist radical right parties .[72] According to Golder, the electoral system is the main institutional factor shaping the political opportunity structure far right parties are confronted with.[73] In Europe, although most countries have a proportional or a mixed electoral system with a proportional character, there is a great spectrum of proportionality, leading to different results about the impact of such systems on the electoral success of such parties.[74] As scholars come to opposite results,[75] this factor only helps little regarding the point of explaining the success of populist radical right parties across different countries.[76]

Stated by both Mudde and Golder, the political cleavage structure plays a key role in determining the success of populist radical right parties as there is a need for space in the political system for a new party to emerge.[77] Party competition is also an important aspect of the political context in which they operate.[78] According to Mudde, the positioning of mainstream parties on important old issues is crucial in this respect as it creates or closes political space for new parties.[79] Although the evidence for both arguments is mixed[80], it is claimed that empirical findings do support the simple convergence thesis and that convergence is especially relevant for the electoral breakthrough of populist radical right parties.[81] However, one has to bear in mind that convergence does not only benefit them, but radical right parties in general.[82] Due to that, it is argued that issue salience and issue ownership also play an important role, as populist radical right parties do especially well when they have the ownership of an issue and when this issue is salient.[83] This leads to a further important point, namely the reaction of other parties.[84]

The “concept of ‘political culture’” is important regarding the explanation of the electoral success of populist radical right parties because some countries, due to their national values and norms, might be more likely to support such parties than others.[85] Several scholars argue that in Western Europe, for example Germany, stigmatization is a major factor that hinders the electoral success of them, while in Austria, strong nativist subcultures exist that “have a facilitating effect upon both the discursive and organizational opportunities of the populist radical right.”[86] While the cultural stigmatization of populist radical right parties has devastating effects, a favourable political culture can be highly advantageous for the development of such parties.[87]

A further external supply-side factor that is crucial in explaining the (lack of) success of populist far right parties is the role of the media as the degree to which such parties can inform the electorate about their agenda is dependent on the kind of ‘discursive opportunity structure’ that is created by the press.[88] They can either ignore the parties and their issues or they can incorporate them and depict them in a positive or negative way.[89] Consequently, as appropriately summarised by Mudde, “’the media,’ as a heterogeneous sphere of institutions, is both friend and foe of populist radical right parties” and they are often both by spreading the main messages of such parties while at the same time criticising the parties themselves.[90]

2.1.3 Interim Conclusion

Concluding this section, especially the factors of the demand-side as well as the external supply-side are considered to be especially important for the electoral breakthrough of a party.[91] On the demand-side, grievances over immigration seem to be the most important factor.[92] And regarding external supply-side explanations, the political system and the political culture of a country , as well as the media are especially determining for the electoral success of populist radical right parties by either stigmatizing or favouring them.[93] Moreover, on the internal supply-side, party ideology and charismatic leadership also play a role.[94]

By applying these factors to the AfD and FPÖ, the next section demonstrates the main similarities and differences between the two parties and Germany and Austria, and highlights the role of the media as a reference points for explaining the varied successes of both parties.

2.2 Explanations for the success of the AfD and FPÖ

2.2.1 Demand-side

2.2.1.1 Macro-level

Literature about the rise and success of the AfD and FPÖ suggests that both parties benefitted from the economic crisis of 2008:

Regarding the AfD, a number of authors agree that the Euro crisis played a crucial role regarding the rise of the party, being the “opportunity for […] the founding of AfD.”[95] This is because the AfD profited from the sudden increase of Euroscepticism in Germany[96] as its criticism on the policies for the rescue of the Euro attracted people from the middle-class, workers from medium-sized companies, and parts of the supporters of established parties.[97]

The economic crisis was also important for the success of the FPÖ, as the fact that Austria’s economy is underperforming compared to other European countries since the economic crisis of 2008 and the unemployment rate has reached 10%, gave the FPÖ the possibility to claim that mainstream parties have failed to offer solutions to economic issues and presenting itself as an alternative to these parties.[98] Moreover, an analysis of Stockemer and Lamontagne showed that unemployment grievances played a role as districts with a high number of unemployed have more people that vote for the extreme right.[99]

Furthermore, the literature on the success of the AfD and FPÖ shows that the factor of political dissatisfaction was a further point that led to the strength of both parties:

In Germany, as the AfD addressed new topics such as Euroscepticism, the party benefitted from the neglection of such issues by established parties.[100] Moreover, many people had the feeling that they were no longer represented by established parties,[101] and the dissatisfaction with Merkel’s refugee policy[102] led to the fact that the AfD gained many votes from people who previously voted for other parties[103] and non-voters.[104]

In Austria, the change from an industrial economy to a postindustrial economy that is “said to have shaken the structural foundations of Austrian society, eroding traditional party loyalties and creating new political issues,”[105] as well as several corruption scandals led to political dissatisfaction.[106] Consequently, Ellinas states that the FPÖ gained votes from people that were dissatisfied and alienated by mainstream parties and politicians.[107]

Based on the literature, one can conclude that immigration issues also played a crucial role in the success of the AfD and FPÖ:

Regarding the AfD, several authors argue that the refugee crisis played an immense role for its rise,[108] being an “unexpected gift.”[109] While the Euro crisis provided the first mobilizing impulse for the development of the AfD, the immigration crisis in 2015 was the reason for its increasingly extreme views.[110] Lees claims that due to Germany’s generous response to the migrant crisis that resulted in a disconnection between Merkel and her main electorate, the AfD changed its tactic from criticising the Euro crisis to more radical standpoint against immigration, and forced Merkel to admit that her government acted incorrectly regarding the crisis.[111] This new tactic paid off in the 2017 state elections[112] and authors agree that the AfD’s success was due to its “anti-immigration and anti-refugee stance rather than to its anti- euro position.”[113]

Similar to Germany, Austria experienced an immense number of arriving immigrants too, leading to dissatisfaction among many Austrians who consequently voted for parties that addressed this issue.[114] The FPÖ stated that with regard to the immigration crisis, mainstream parties have not been able to develop satisfying resolutions and presented itself as an alternative to such parties.[115] Consequently, Bugaric and Kuhelj claim that the FPÖ’s “most effective message to capture voters who were once loyal supporters of the centrist ruling groups has been to warn that an influx of refugees will jeopardize the blessings of the welfare state.”[116] And by using a rhetoric that is both anti-immigrant and highly supportive of the welfare state, the FPÖ became especially popular among the working class.[117]

2.2.1.2 Micro-level

The literature focusing on the electorate of the AfD and FPÖ indicates that the parties share a similar electorate:

Although Klikauer argues that one cannot explain the AfD’s success just by the factor of “migration”,[118] literature focusing on micro-level explanations of the demand-side confirm that the refugee crisis played a main role in explaining the success of the AfD: As stated by Decker, the motivations driving the voters of the AfD can be best described by the “dual term of insecurity/anxiety.”[119] This argument is affirmed by the finding that especially voters of the AfD express fears about the refugee crisis, are dissatisfied with Merkel’s refugee policies and position themselves ideologically on the right.[120] Particularly blue-collar workers and unemployed were attracted by the anti-immigrant/refugee policies of the AfD.[121]

Analysing the electorate of the FPÖ, McGann and Kitschelt stress the importance of immigration for the success of the party by stating that when “xenophobic appeals and opposition to immigration” became core elements of the FPÖ’s popularity, the FPÖ became the most popular Austrian party with regard to blue-collar workers.[122] Consequently, as the FPÖ combined such appeals with “free-market economics and socio-cultural conservatism”, the FPÖ’s constituents resulted in an electorate that is dominated by people such as farmers, blue-collar workers, and older people.[123]

2.2.2 Supply-side

2.2.2.1 Internal

Regarding the leadership of the AfD and FPÖ, scholars argue that both parties are lacking a charismatic leader:

The AfD is missing such a head of party under the guidance of Alexander Gauland[124] and Heinz-Christian Strache is also lacking the charisma and leadership potential of the former and charismatic FPÖ chef Jörg Haider.[125]

Regarding their ideologies, academia indicates that the AfD and FPÖ have several similarities:

Regarding the AfD’s ideology, several authors agree that it became the third biggest party in the German Bundestag due to this radicalization[126] driven by the migrant crisis[127] and its related stance against anti-immigration and anti-refugee.[128] Since 2015, “the AfD’s Eurosceptic narrative became increasingly nested within a more populist and critical approach to the entire German political settlement”[129] and it increasingly fulfils the criteria of a right-wing populist party.[130] The AfD promotes the idea that the leaders of established parties are corrupt and do not, contrary to their own party, represent the interests of the population.[131] Moreover, the AfD uses an “us versus them” narrative with regard to immigration issues[132], and it “pretend[s] […] to be the sole ‘ guardians’ of nationalism.”[133]

Regarding the FPÖ’s ideology, Pelinka argues that its success on a national level is caused by combing three characteristics: It is “populist” by stating that it represents das Volk (the people) against the elite, it is also “right-wing populist” as it argues to defend the national identity in Austria and opposes open borders, and it is also a “traditional party”[134] that was founded by leading people of the NSDAP and is in permanent association with Nationalsozialismus.[135] While resistance to immigration and xenophobic attitudes became core features of the FPÖ’s ideology since the 1990s,[136] the party downplays its devotion to such extreme positions and rebrands itself as a “part[y] of the ‘ordinary man’ left behind by a corrupt system that caters to the elites.”[137]

2.2.2.2 External

According to the literature, while the political context is comparable in Germany and Austria, the political culture in the two countries seems to differ:

Regarding the AfD, the struggles between the CSU and CDU about the refugee crisis were crucial in strengthening the position of the AfD.[138] By combining “euroskepticism with liberal economic policies and a conservative social issue agenda”, the AfD benefitted from the fact that other parties did not touch upon such topics.[139] This allowed the AfD to present itself as an alternative way of German politics.[140]

Similar to that, the success of the FPÖ is also “about anger, dissatisfaction, and the disappointment of people who feel betrayed by elites,”[141] confirming that the success of the extreme right is also dependent on the (poorer) performance of especially centre parties on the right[142] as many voters who tended to vote for the moderate shifted to the radical right.[143]

However, with regard to the rise of populist radical right parties in the past and the political cultures of Germany and Austria, the two countries seem to differ: In the 1990, political parties and the press in Germany marginalized, de-legitimized and stigmatized the rise of such a party (in this case the German Republicans, REPs),[144] while the situation was far more moderate in Austria.[145] The Austrian press supported the FPÖ and the population did not, as in Germany, react with mass protests to the success of a far right party.[146]

The literature focusing on the role of the media with regard to the AfD and FPÖ, confirm that the reaction of the media towards both parties differed in the two countries:

According to Klikauer, the media caused, at least to a certain degree, the electoral success of the AFD, especially by inviting AfD representatives to TV talk shows.[147] Consequently, before the elections, the issues raised by the AfD dominated the TV debates, “converting it into an AfD election platform.”[148] Schärdel, analysing the reporting of three main platforms of German online media (such as the Bild Zeitung) regarding the AfD before the Bundestagswahl 2013 and EP elections 2014, supports this argument in the sense that the party got more attention than the average.[149] However, Schärdel’s analysis challenges Klikauer’s argument by showing that journalists reported to a large extent negatively on the AfD.[150]

In Austria, the FPÖ benefitted from the “recontextualization of discourses and elements of rhetoric” that allows the FPÖ to disseminate its messages via different media channels, thereby reaching different people of the Austrian electorate.[151] In the 1990s, regarding its portrayal in the media, the FPÖ has been, contrary to the situation in Germany, supported by the Kronen Zeitung, and even in times of political setbacks, the newspaper defended the party.[152]

2.3 Conclusion

In sum, several important consequences can be drawn from this review: The first section shows that there are several factors that contribute to the success of populist radical right parties and that some factors are more important than others for the electoral breakthrough of a party. The second part demonstrates that the factors that led to the emergence and/or success of the AfD and FPÖ are known, but that a comparison of the two, as done in this paper, has not yet been undertaken. Furthermore, the review confirms that Germany and Austria as well as the FPÖ and AfD are indeed comparable as the countries and parties correspond to a large extent regarding the factors that explain the success of populist radical right parties. However, a factor that stands out as being different in the two cases is the political culture of Germany and Austria as well as the reaction of the media regarding the two populist radical right parties. As the media is an expression of political culture as the latter one is communicated through public media[153] and as media coverage has a big influence on how the public perceives topics and actors[154], consequently also influencing election results,[155] an analysis of the media portrayal of the AfD and the FPÖ before the 2017 elections is a logical reference point for approaching the puzzle of their varied electoral successes.

Although the portrayal of the AfD by the Bild Zeitung and the depiction of the FPÖ by the Kronen Zeitung have been analysed before, the periods that were analysed are at least fifteen years apart. In this paper, however, the analysis covers two elections that took place within three weeks and which are still relevant as they are the most recent elections on a federal level. This ensures the same historical and global context for a comparable analysis.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Case selection: Media

Especially for the electoral breakthrough of a populist radical right party, the media are important by reporting in a positive or neutral manner on their actors.[156] The reason for this is that the media “control the gateway to the electoral market”[157] by providing legitimacy in the form of portraying topics and candidates as politically suitable.[158] Considering that “electorates have become more volatile, more sensitive to […] images of political leaders” during the last years,[159] the fact that the media decide which politicians get attention and also shape the public images of them[160] becomes even more important.

In general, it has been argued that media coverage of political actors or campaigns has an impact on candidate support as voters experience politicians through the media which, as a consequence, have an influence on the voter’s perception of political candidates.[161] Consequently, it has been stated that the success of right-wing populist parties “can be partially attributed to the public image of their leaders […], which, in turn, conceivably derives from how these leaders are portrayed in the media.”[162] It is assumed that a positive portrayal of a party has a beneficial impact on the support for it, while a critical portrayal has a deterrent effect on voters.[163] The media shape the image of political actors by deciding on the salience of particular political actors and/or their qualities.[164]

3.2 Agenda-setting, priming, and framing

The media “decide which actors are present in the public discourse, which issues are covered and in what light these issues are presented and perceived” through three concepts, namely agenda-setting, priming, and framing.[165]

Agenda-setting is concerned with the degree of representation of the party in the media.[166]

Priming addresses the issues and subjects that are covered in relation to the party.[167] The priming hypothesis claims that as the media influence the salience of issues, they have an impact on the standards by which political actors are judged.[168] This strategy is essential for two reasons: The first one is that the media coverage can have an influence on “associations of issue-ownership with the parties” and the second reasons is that it suggests if parties have been in the position to bring particular topics on the agenda of the media.[169]

The last concept, framing, refers to the question of how the party is portrayed and characterized in the media.[170] This paper follows Entman’s definition of framing as “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”[171] Thus, framing deals with the prominence of issue attributes[172] and deals with the representation of topics.[173]

Therefore, frames have an impact on opinions by emphasizing certain considerations, such as specific attitudes and facts, that under a different frame would not have seemed that relevant.[174] In other words, it is assumed that based on the wording of the description of an issue, frames can consequently influence how the audience thinks about the topic.[175] With regard to the puzzle of this paper, the analysis of this strategy is especially important as it shows whether the political actors are portrayed as being trustworthy, competent, etc., thereby also indicating whether the media coverage is positively or negatively biased.[176] As these aspects play a role in how voters evaluate parties, these points are crucial to study.[177] Bos et al. confirm this point and add that especially legitimacy and effectiveness are two aspects that are essential for the public image of leaders of right-wing populist parties in order to be successful.[178]

The identification of frames in the media can follow an inductive or deductive approach: Following an inductive approach, one identifies news frames during the analysis, meaning that the frames turn up from the material.[179] In contrast, following the deductive approach, the frames are defined before one starts with the analysis.[180]

3.3 Qualitative content analysis – case selection

This paper approaches the task of analysing the portrayal of the AfD and FPÖ by the media by performing a qualitative content analysis of the (online) reporting on the AfD and the FPÖ in the German Bild Zeitung and the Austrian Kronen Zeitung. As online reporting has increased its importance in recent years and many articles published in the print version are also published on the internet, allowing a higher number of articles online,[181] this paper focuses in its content analysis on the online versions of the two newspapers (regardless of whether the online version corresponds to the print version or not).

[...]


[1] Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 49, no.4 (2004): 542.

[2] Adina-Elena Cincu, “Far Right Populist Challenge in Europe. Alternative for Germany and the National Front,” Europolity: Continuity and Change in European Governance 11, no. 1 (2017): 22.

[3] Juho Kim, „The radical market-oriented policies of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and support from non-beneficiary groups –discrepancies between the party’s policies and its supporters,” Asian Journal of German and European Studies 3, no.6 (2018): 2.

[4] David Art, “Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria,” Party Politics 13, no. 3 (2007): 331.

[5] Kate Connolly, “German election: Merkel wins fourth term but far-right AfD surges to third,” The Guardian, September 24, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/24/angela-merkel-fourth-term-far-right-afd-third-german-election.

[6] “Plus de 10 millions de viox pour Marine Le Pen: le score historique du FN,” Le Parisien, May 7, 2017, http://www.leparisien.fr/elections/presidentielle/score-historique-de-marine-le-pen-le-vote-fn-en-constante-augmentation-depuis-dix-ans-07-05-2017-6912330.php.

In English: More than 10 Million votes for Marine Le Pen: the historical (election) result of the FN.

[7] “Austria far right: Freedom Party wins key posts in new government,” BBC News, December 16, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42379985.

[8] “Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide,” BBC News, May 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006.

[9] See for example: Thomas Klikauer, “Alternative for Germany: Germany's new right-wing extremists,” Labor and Society 21 (2018): 211-229; Andrea Althoff, “Right-wing populism and religion in Germany: Conservative Christians and the Alternative for Germany (AfD),” Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik 2, no. 2 (2018): 335-363; “Rising populism in Germany: What should mainstream parties do about it?” BBC News, October 1, 2018. https://www.thelocal.de/20181001/populism-in-germany-is-on-the-rise-what-should-mainstream-parties-do-about-it.

[10] “Europe and nationalism: A country-by-country guide,” BBC News.

[11] Marc Morjé Howard, „Can Populism Be Suppressed in a Democracy? Austria, Germany, and the European Union,” East European Politics and Societies 14, no. 2 (2000): 21- 22.

[12] Alternative für Deutschland, Programm für Deutschland: Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 24. September 2017, April 2017, https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/06/2017-06-01_AfD-Bundestagswahlprogramm_Onlinefassung.pdf.

[13] Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Österreicher verdienen Fairness: Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017, 2017, https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Wahlprogramm_8_9_low.pdf.

[14] Linda Bos, Wouter van der Brug, and Claes de Vreese, “How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders,” Political Communication 21, no. 2 (2011): 189.

[15] Alternative für Deutschland, Programm für Deutschland: Wahlprogramm der Alternative für Deutschland für die Wahl zum Deutschen Bundestag am 24. September 2017; Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Österreicher verdienen Fairness: Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017.

[16] Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese, “How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders,” 189.

[17] Ibid., Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 26.

[18] See for example Cas Mudde, Populist radical right parties in Europe, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), for a good overview.

[19] „Bild Zeitung,“ euro/topics, accessed May 2, 2019, https://www.eurotopics.net/de/148423/bild.

[20] „MA 17/18: Mehr als zwei Millionen Leser machen die „Krone“ erneut zur klaren Nummer 1-Tageszeitung,“ APA-ots, October 11, 2018, https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20181011_OTS0149/ma-1718-mehr-als-zwei-millionen-leser-machen-die-krone-erneut-zur-klaren-nummer-1-tageszeitung-bild.; „Kronen Zeitung,“ euro/topics, accessed May 2, 2019, https://www.eurotopics.net/de/148614/kronen-zeitung.

[21] Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese, “How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders,” 184.

[22] Linda Bos, Wouter van der Brug, and Claes de Vreese, “Media coverage of right-wing populist leaders,” Communications 35 (2010): 142.

[23] Penelope Sheets, Linda Bos, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden, “Media Cues and Citizen Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 28, no. 3 (2016): 307-330.

[24] Howard, „Can Populism Be Suppressed in a Democracy? Austria, Germany, and the European Union,” 18.

[25] Julian Schärdel, „„Ein Schelm, wer Böses dabei denkt“: Eine empirische Analyse der Onlineberichterstattung über die Alternative für Deutschland unter Einbezug von Leserkommentaren,“Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 10 (2016): 137.

[26] Elisabeth Ivarsflaten and Frøy Gudbrandsen, “The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe,” in Europa Regional Surveys of the World, ed. by Europa Politics (London: Routledge, 2014), 2.

[27] Matt Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” Annual Review of Political Science (2016): 478.

[28] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 478.

[29] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 202.

[30] Ibid., 219.

[31] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 482-83.

[32] While Arzheimer and Carter, for instance, claim that working as a manual worker increases the probability of voting for a populist right party (2006, 438-39), Lucassen and Lubbers state the opposite (2012, 567).

[33] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 483.

[34] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 203-4.

[35] Ibid. 205.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., 205-6.

[38] While some find a positive correlation (Mudde 2007, 206) such as Miller whose model predicts that the chance of electoral success of a populist outsider increases during an economic crisis (2011,19) as both more income inequality as well as poverty might lead towards populism (Miller 2011, 26), Doležalová et al. do not find a “correlation between the far-rights vote share and the development of macroeconomic indicators” (2017, 1). Arzheimer and Carter find even a negative effect of unemployment on the election success of populist right parties (2006, 439), whereas Stockemer claims that it is the increase in unemployment that benefits radical right parties, rather than unemployment per se that is positively related to the success of radical right parties (2017, 52).

[39] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 485.

[40] Matt Golder, “Explaining variations in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 4 (2003): 460.

[41] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 483.

[42] Golder, “Explaining variations in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe,” 438.

[43] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 484.

[44] Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in 7 successful cases,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no.1 (2008): 14.

[45] Ivarsflaten, “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in 7 successful cases,” 12.

[46] Ibid.,7.

[47] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 207.

[48] Ivarsflaten, “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in 7 successful cases,” 12.

[49] Ibid., 18; Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen, “The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe,” 4-5.

[50] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 485.

[51] Ivarsflaten, “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in 7 successful cases,” 15.

[52] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 485.

[53] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 211.

[54] Although Lucassen and Lubbers stress that “cultural ethnic threats are a much stronger predictor of far-right preference than are economic ethnic threats” (2012, 566), the two authors (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012, 567) as well as Arzheimer and Carter (2006, 434) argue that the number of foreigners does not play a role, while Stockemer states that regions with a larger number of foreigners also have a higher vote share for radical right parties (2017, 52). Golder’s statement that the level of unemployment only leads to a higher election result of populist parties when the number of foreigners is high in the country (2003, 460) supports the latter view.

[55] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 211.

[56] Even though several studies show a positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and support for the far right, one should not overstate this point as such attitudes may also be results of economic rather than cultural grievances, and studies have demonstrated that both such concerns matter regarding anti-immigration attitudes (Golder 2016, 485). Moreover, this macro-level demand-side explanation is based on “some questionable theoretical assumptions” such as the one that ethnic diversity equals ethnic conflict (Mudde 2007, 216).

[57] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 216.

[58] Ibid., 219.

[59] Ibid., 223.

[60] Ibid., 225.

[61] While Ivarsflaten and Stubager, for instance, finding a strong connection between the level of education and having an anti-immigration attitude, state that the probability of voting for a populist radical right party is higher for people with a lower degree of education (2013, 122), Stockemer claims that “higher aggregate education levels and increases in education lead to more support for the radical right, albeit not in cities” (2017, 52).

[62] Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen, “The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe,” 4.

[63] Ibid., 2.

[64] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 232.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen, “The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe,”4; Mudde, Populist Radical Right parties in Europe, 264; Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe”, 489.

[67] Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen, “The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe,”4; Mudde, Populist radical right parties in Europe, 264; Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 489.

[68] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 260.

[69] Ibid., 261-62.

[70] Ibid., 257.

[71] Ibid., 259.

[72] Ibid., 233.

[73] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 486.

[74] Mudde, Populist radical right parties in Europe, 234.

[75] Regarding the effect of the disproportionality of the electoral rule and the success of the populist right, Arzheimer and Carter find a positive correlation (2006, 439), while Veugelers and Magnan state that the support for radical right parties is higher in countries with a more proportional system (2005, 855). Furthermore, it is claimed that while there is strong evidence that parties on the far right win less seats in systems that are disproportional, studies find mixed results regarding the hypothesis that such parties win less votes (Golder 2016, 486).

[76] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 234.

[77] Ibid., 237; Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 488.

[78] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 486.

[79] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 238.

This argument goes well with Golder’s point that often-made arguments are that populist radical right parties are especially successful when mainstream parties converge in their positioning, especially when established parties converge around centrist positions (2016, 486-87).

[80] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 487.

[81] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 239.

[82] Ibid., 240.

[83] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 487; Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 243. Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen confirm these findings by stating that in the late 1980s and 1990s populist radical right parties faced low competition of mainstream parties as established parties were slow in responding to immigration grievances (2014, 4).

[84] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 243.

[85] Ibid., 243-44.

[86] Ibid., 245.

[87] Ibid., 247-48.

[88] Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 487.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 253.

[91] Ibid., 275.

[92] Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen, “The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe,”4.

[93] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 254.

[94] Ibid., 275-276.

[95] Simon T. Franzmann, „Calling the Ghost of Populism: The AfD's Strategic and Tactical Agendas until the EP Election 2014,” German Politics 25, no.4 (2016): 458.

[96] Robert Grimm, “The rise of the German Eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland, between ordoliberal critique and popular anxiety,” International Political Science Review 36, no. 3 (2015): 265.

[97] Andrea Althoff, “Right-wing populism and religion in Germany: Conservative Christians and the Alternative for Germany (AfD),” Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik 2, no.2 (2018): 343.

[98] Bojan Bugaric and Alenka Kuhelj, “Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of Law in Danger?”, Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 10, no.1 (2018): 29.

[99] Daniel Stockemer and Bernadette Lamontagne, “Pushed to the Edge: Sub-National Variations in Extreme Right-Wing Support in Austria,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 22, no.1 (2014): 51.

[100] Frank Decker, „The „Alternative for Germany: Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-wing Populist Party,” German Politics and Society 34, no.2 (2016): 1.

[101] Thomas Klikauer, “Alternative for Germany: Germany's new right-wing extremists,” Labor and Society 21 (2018): 619; Joachim Ragnitz, „Wahlerfolg der AfD im Osten- Reflex auf die ökonomische Lage?“, Wirtschaftsdienst (2016): 702.

[102] Althoff, “Right-wing populism and religion in Germany: Conservative Christians and the Alternative for Germany (AfD),” 350.

[103] Ibid., 349; Klikauer, “Alternative for Germany: Germany's new right-wing extremists,” 622.

[104] Klikauer, “Alternative for Germany: Germany's new right-wing extremists,” 622; Ragnitz, „Wahlerfolg der AfD im Osten- Reflex auf die ökonomische Lage?“, 703; Decker, „The „Alternative for Germany: Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-wing Populist Party,” 10.

[105] Antonis A. Ellinas, The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 42.

[106] Bugaric and Kuhelj, “Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of Law in Danger?”, 29.

[107] Ellinas, The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card, 42.

[108] Decker, „The „Alternative for Germany: Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-wing Populist Party,” 10; Charles Lees, “The ‘Alternative for Germany’: The rise of right-wing populism at the heart of Europe”, Politics 38, no.3 (2018): 301; Althoff, “Right-wing populism and religion in Germany: Conservative Christians and the Alternative for Germany (AfD),” 350.

[109] Decker, „The „Alternative for Germany: Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-wing Populist Party,” 10.

[110] Lees, “The ‘Alternative for Germany’: The rise of right-wing populism at the heart of Europe”, 307.

[111] Ibid., 301.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Kim, „The radical market-oriented policies of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and support from non-beneficiary groups –discrepancies between the party’s policies and its supporters,” 1.

[114] Stockemer and Lamontagne, “Pushed to the Edge: Sub-National Variations in Extreme Right-Wing Support in Austria,” 47.

[115] Bugaric and Kuhelj, “Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of Law in Danger?”, 29.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Klikauer, “Alternative for Germany: Germany's new right-wing extremists,” 623.

[119] Decker, „The „Alternative for Germany: Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-wing Populist Party,” 11.

[120] Verena Hambauer and Anja Mays, “Wer wählt die AfD? – Ein Vergleich der Sozialstruktur, politischen Einstellungen und Einstellungen zu Flüchtlingen zwischen AfD-WählerInnen und der WählerInnen der anderen Parteien,“Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 12 (2018): 150.

[121] Kim, „The radical market-oriented policies of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and support from non-beneficiary groups –discrepancies between the party’s policies and its supporters,” 1.

[122] Anthony J. McGann and Herbert Kitschelt, “The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ,” Party Politics 11, no.2 (2005): 163.

[123] McGann and Kitschelt, “The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ,” 162.

[124] Klikauer, “Alternative for Germany: Germany's new right-wing extremists,” 618.

[125] Reinhard Heinisch, “Right-Wing Populism in Austria: A Case for Comparison,” Problems of Post-Communism 55, no.3 (2008): 46.

[126] Lees, “The ‘Alternative for Germany’: The rise of right-wing populism at the heart of Europe”, 297.

[127] Ibid. 307

[128] Kim, „The radical market-oriented policies of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and support from non-beneficiary groups –discrepancies between the party’s policies and its supporters,” 1.

[129] Lees, “The ‘Alternative for Germany’: The rise of right-wing populism at the heart of Europe”, 305.

[130] Ibid., 307.

[131] Cincu, “Far Right Populist Challenge in Europe. Alternative for Germany and the National Front,” 41.

[132] Ibid., 42.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Anton Pelinka, „Die FPÖ in der vergleichenden Parteienforschung: zur typologischen Einordnung der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs,“Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 31, no. 3 (2002): 281.

Please note that the citations are translated from German to English by the author of this paper.

[135] Pelinka, „Die FPÖ in der vergleichenden Parteienforschung: zur typologischen Einordnung der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs,“ 288.

[136] McGann and Kitschelt, “The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ,” 163.

[137] Bugaric and Kuhelj, “Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of Law in Danger?”, 29.

[138] Timo Lochocki, The Rise of Populism in Western Europe: A Media Analysis on Failed Political Messaging (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 141.

[139] Decker, „The „Alternative for Germany: Factors Behind its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-wing Populist Party,” 1.

[140] Cincu, “Far Right Populist Challenge in Europe. Alternative for Germany and the National Front,” 34.

[141] Bugaric and Kuhelj, “Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of Law in Danger?”, 30.

[142] Stockemer and Lamontagne, “Pushed to the Edge: Sub-National Variations in Extreme Right-Wing Support in Austria,” 39.

[143] Ibid., 49-50.

[144] Art, “Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria,” 338.

[145] Ibid., 344.

[146] Ibid.

[147] Klikauer, “Alternative for Germany: Germany's new right-wing extremists,” 614.

[148] Ibid., 623.

[149] Schärdel, „„Ein Schelm, wer Böses dabei denkt“: Eine empirische Analyse der Onlineberichterstattung über die Alternative für Deutschland unter Einbezug von Leserkommentaren,“ 158.

[150] Ibid.

[151] Bernhard Forchtner, Michal Krzyzanowski, and Ruth Wodak, „Mediatization, Right-Wing Populism and Political Campaigning: The Case of the Austrian Freedom Party,” in Media Talk and Political Elections in Europe and America, ed. by Mats Ekström and Andrew Tolson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 206.

[152] Art, “Reacting to the Radical Right: Lessons from Germany and Austria,” 343.

[153] Detlef Lehnert and Klaus Megerle, „Problems of Identity and Consensus in a Fragmented Society: The Weimar Republic,” in Political Culture in Germany, edited by Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Ralf Rytlewski (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993): 56.

[154] Schärdel, „„Ein Schelm, wer Böses dabei denkt“: Eine empirische Analyse der Onlineberichterstattung über die Alternative für Deutschland unter Einbezug von Leserkommentaren,“ 135.

[155] Ibid.

[156] Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 254.

[157] Ellinas, The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card, 3.

[158] Sheets, Bos, and Boomgaarden, “Media Cues and Citizen Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties,” 307-330.

[159] Gianpietro Mazzoleni and Winfried Schulz, „“Mediatization“ of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?”, Political Communication 16, no. 3 (1999): 254.

[160] Mazzoleni and Schulz, „“Mediatization“ of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?”,251.

[161] Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese, “How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders,” 185.

[162] Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese, “Media coverage of right-wing populist leaders,” 142.; A similar argument is made by Janet Takens, Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Anita Van Hoof & Wouter Van Atteveldt, “Party Leaders in the Media and Voting Behavior: Priming Rather Than Learning or Projection,” Political Communication 32, no. 2 (2015): 262.

[163] Schärdel, „„Ein Schelm, wer Böses dabei denkt“: Eine empirische Analyse der Onlineberichterstattung über die Alternative für Deutschland unter Einbezug von Leserkommentaren,“ 136.

[164] Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese, “How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders,” 197.

[165] Julian Schärdel and Pascal König, „Professors, comedians and billionaires: An empirical analysis of newspaper coverage of new Eurosceptic parties in three 2013 national elections,” Comparative European Politics 15, no. 2 (2016): 313.

[166] Schärdel and König, „Professors, comedians and billionaires: An empirical analysis of newspaper coverage of new Eurosceptic parties in three 2013 national elections,” 315.

[167] Ibid.

[168] Dietram A. Scheufele, “Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication,” Mass Communication & Society 3, no. 2-3 (2000): 305.

[169] Schärdel and König, „Professors, comedians and billionaires: An empirical analysis of newspaper coverage of new Eurosceptic parties in three 2013 national elections,” 315.

[170] Ibid.

[171] Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of Communication 43, no.4 (1993): 52.

[172] Scheufele, “Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication,” 298.

[173] Claes H. de Vreese, „News framing: Theory and typology,“Information Design Journal+ Document Design 13, no. 1 (2005): 53.

[174] Scheufele, “Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication,” 298.

[175] Ibid., 309.

[176] Schärdel and König, „Professors, comedians and billionaires: An empirical analysis of newspaper coverage of new Eurosceptic parties in three 2013 national elections,” 315.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Bos, van der Brug, and de Vreese, “How the Media Shape Perceptions of Right-Wing Populist Leaders,” 183.

[179] de Vreese, „News framing: Theory and typology,“ 53.

[180] Ibid. The approach that is used in this paper is mentioned below.

[181] Schärdel, „„Ein Schelm, wer Böses dabei denkt“: Eine empirische Analyse der Onlineberichterstattung über die Alternative für Deutschland unter Einbezug von Leserkommentaren,“, 137.

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Title
The AfD, FPÖ and leading online newspapers. Friend or enemy?
College
Leiden University
Grade
7,8
Author
Year
2019
Pages
109
Catalog Number
V509886
ISBN (eBook)
9783346078629
ISBN (Book)
9783346078636
Language
English
Tags
FPÖ, newspaper, content analysis, party, populism, AfD, macro-level, micro-level, election, Bild Zeitung, Kronen Zeitung, demand-side, supply-side, Zeitung, Inhaltsanalyse, Partei, Wahl, Wahlerfolg, electoral success, Populismus
Quote paper
Carolina Gerwin (Author), 2019, The AfD, FPÖ and leading online newspapers. Friend or enemy?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/509886

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