Process Safety Management (PSM) in Terengganu Oil and Gas Production Platforms


Master's Thesis, 2019
142 Pages, Grade: 3.76

Free online reading

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Background
1.1.1 Process Safety Management for Hazard Risk Mitigation
1.1.2 Process Safety Elements
1.1.3 PSM Practice in Malaysian Oil and Gas Industry
1.1.4 Quality of PSM Awareness and Understanding
1.2 Problem Statements
1.2.1 Lack of knowledge to differentiate PSM and OSH
1.2.2 Need for PSM Knowledge Expansion to Other Non-Technical Groups
1.2.3 Fluctuating Statistical Value of Incident Recurrences Related to PSM
1.2.4 Insufficient Commitment from the Government Agency for PSM Obligation
1.2.5 Conclusion
1.3 Research Objectives
1.4 Research Questions
1.5 Hypothesis
1.6 Significance of the Research
1.7 Term Definitions
1.8 Conceptual Framework

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Quality Factor of Process Safety Excellence in Offshore Production Platform
2.2.1 PSM as an Organizational Hazard Risk Assessment
2.2.2 Process Hazard Recognition to Reduce Process Safety Incident
2.2.3 Major Hazard Mitigation
2.3 Quality of Process Safety Elements
2.3.1 Safe System of Work Documentation
2.3.2 Zero Energy Demonstration
2.3.3 Emergency Response
2.3.4 Consistency of Safety Briefing Messages
2.3.5 Training and Competency
2.3.6 Standard Operation Procedure
2.3.7 Chemical Inventory for Process Safety Information
2.3.8 Process Equipment Maintenance
2.4 Good Safety Culture Practice to Reduce Process Hazard Risks
2.4.1 Performance Indicator
2.4.2 Safety Culture
2.4.3 Decision Making Style
2.4.4 Guidance from Senior Workers
2.4.5 Job Step Compliance
2.5 Current Gap of PSM Need to Be Improved
2.5.1 Regulations
2.5.2 Language Barrier Aspect
2.5.3 Learning from past Incidents
2.5.4 Electronic Management Technology
2.6 Research Matrix
2.7 Conclusion

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Research Scope
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Quantitative Survey Selection
3.3.2 Questionnaire survey
3.4 Study Location and Data Population
3.5 Sample Size
3.6 Pilot Study and Validity Test of Questionnaire
3.7 Data Collection Method
3.7.1 Questionnaire design
3.7.2 Respondent Criteria
3.7.3 Quality of Data Collection
3.8 Method of Data Analysis

CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
4.1 Questionnaire Response Rate
4.2 Demographic Analysis
4.3 Cross Tabulation of Workgroup and Other Variable
4.3.1 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Gender
4.3.2 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Offshore Experience
4.3.3 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Platform Main Product
4.3.4 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Crew Mobility
4.3.5 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Crew Type
4.4 Analysis of mean
4.4.1 Self-Rating in Understanding of PSM by Workers
4.4.2 Worker Perception on level of difficulty in selected PSM Elements
4.4.3 Workers Rating on Current Safety Culture Practice
4.4.4 Mean Analysis in Opportunity to Improve Statements
4.4.5 Cross Tabulation Workgroup versus Part 5 Survey Questions
4.4.6 PSM Will Be More Effective By Involving Government Sector (Q22)
4.4.7 Company Need to Have Parallel Guideline with Local Safety Agency
4.4.8 Translation in Various Learning Aspect of PSM
4.4.9 Detailed In Incident Investigation for More Better Outcome of Learning from Past Incidents (Q25)
4.4.10 Computerized in Process Safety Management
4.5 One-Way ANOVA Analysis of Variables
4.5.1 Workgroup Interaction Analysis between Survey Question Relationship Summary
4.5.2 Safety Factors That Interact with Workgroup
4.6 Regression Analysis
4.6.1 Correlation between Part 2 Total, Part 3 Total and Part 4 influenced by workgroup
4.6.2 Correlation between Part 3 Total and Part Influenced By Workgroup
4.6.3 Correlation between Part 4 Total versus Part 2 and Part 3 Influence by Workgroup
4.7 Hypothesis Test
4.8 Conclusion of research finding
4.8.1 Basic Understanding of PSM among Different Workgroup of Production Platform Workers
4.8.2 Differentiate Workers' Perception on Difficulty Level of Basic PSM Elements
4.8.3 Quality of Current Safety Culture to Reduce Risks in Process Incidents by Different Perspective of Workgroup
4.8.4 To measure worker agreements in opportunities to improve in process safety program gap.

CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary of Main Findings
5.2 Recommendations
5.3 Research Limitations
5.4 Implications of the Study
5.5 Directions for Future Research
5.6 Conclusion

REFERENCES

APPENDICES
APPENDIX A Critical Analysis Questionnaire

ABSTRACT

Piper Alpha platform explosion incident in 1988 has created tremendous improvement in work practices and safety culture in oil and gas (O&G) sector by implementation of process safety management in production platform. Distinguishing Process Safety Management (PSM) effectiveness to different workgroup of production platform in Terengganu Offshore is the main purpose of this research. Survey questionnaire been distributed among 150 respondents of O&G platform workers out of 265 identified data population using online form developed using Typeform® and the link been forwarded to respondents via e­mail and social media. The position of respondents sorted into three major workgroup named as management, non-technical and technical in the same proportion from six selected platforms consist of oil type production and gas production main platforms. Quantitative research method been used and descriptive analysis is useful to determined various results of cross tabulation data. Eleven factors that been identified as influence of differentiation on understanding and compliance of PSM obtained using one-way ANOVA and ranked base on highest P-Value and percentage of R[2] . Overall, non-technical workgroup has lowest rate in mean in most of comparison survey score and in cross tabulated. Suggestion for improvement been discussed to promote equality in understanding and compliance between various workgroups toward PSM

Keywords:

Oil and gas, Process Safety Management, Understanding, Compliance, Terengganu Offshore

ANALISA KEBERKESANAN PENGURUSAN KESELAMATAN PROSES (PSM) DI PELANTAR PENGELUARAN MINYAK DAN GAS DI TERENGGANU UNTUK MENINGKATKAN KEPATUHAN SAMA RATA DARI KUMPULAN PEKERJA

ABSTRAK

Insiden letupan pelantar Piper Alpha pada tahun 1988 telah menyebabkan berlakunya perubahan besar cara kerja dan budaya keselamatan di sektor industri minyak dan gas melalui perlaksanaan pengurusan keselamatan proses (PSM). Membandingkan keberkesanan pengurusan keselamatan proses mengikut kumpulan-kempulan pekerja di pelantar pengeluaran luar pesisir Terengganu adalah merupakan tujuan utama kajian ini. Borang soal selidik dalam talian telah diedarkan kepada 150 responden telah dibina mengunakan Typeform® dan pautan laman sesawang tersebut telah diedarkan menggunakan e-mail dan media sosial. Jawatan responden telah diasingkan mengikut kumpulan kerja utama iaitu kumpulan pengurusan, teknikal dan bukan teknikal dalam nisbah yang sama dan di pilih dari dua jenis pelantar minyak iaitu pelantar pengeluaran minyak dan jenis pengeluaran gas. Kaedah kajian kuantitatif telah digunapakai dan statistik terperinci berguna untuk memberi pelbagai keputusan kajian dari data silang.Sebelas faktor telah dikenalpasti mempengaruhi perbezaan keputusan berkait dengan kefahaman dan kepatuhan menggunakan analisa ANOVA sehala, kemudian ianya disusun mengikut nilai-P yang tertinggi dan peratusan R[2]. Secara keseluruhannya, kumpulan bukan teknikal memperolehi purata terendah dalam kebanyakan data perbandingan.Cadangan penambahbaikan juga dibincangkan untuk meningkatkan kefahaman dan kepatuhan di antara kepelbagaian kumpulan pekerja terhadap PSM

Kata Kunci:

Minyak dan Gas, Pengurusan Keselamatan Proses, Kefahaman, Kepatuhan, Luar Pesisir Terengganu

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious and the Most Merciful

Alhamdulillah, all praises to Allah for His blessings, as well as forces and His blessing along the process of completing this project. I would like to also express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Muhamad bin Mat Noor for his endless support and constant supervision. His precious assistance of comments and suggestions during the course of the thesis works have greatly interjected to the accomplishment of this study. Credit also goes to all the office staffs of Perkhidmatan Antarabangsa SOS and my work counterparts Medic Muhamed Hazlim , Mohd Sabri and Yusriazizi , maintenance and production crew of TAA , JEA and LRA Platform and others for their compassion during my study. Thanks for the companionship and blissful memories. My appreciation also goes to my beloved parents Ayob Imam Akob and Zaini Abu Bakar, parents- in-laws, siblings and relatives for their boundless love, devotions and support. Also not forgetting my wife Dr. Nurizah Md Ngadiran for her love. To those who have incidentally contributed in this project survey, your thoughtfulness means a whole world to me. “God will raise the position of the believers and of those who have received knowledge. God is Well-Aware of what you do” (Q 58:11)

THANK YOU

MOHD AZLAN BIN AYOB

26 June

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Discussed PSM Elements (20-element risk-based) framework

Table 2.2: Overall research elements derived from previous research

Table 3.1: Study Location and Data Population

Table 3.2: Data Population Size and Sample size

Table 3.3: Cronbach's Alpha Value for Every Unit of Survey Questions

Table 3.4: Evaluate worker understanding on process safety management via Likert scale rating

Table 3.5 : Distinguish position into three major workgroup

Table 4.1: Demographic data of respondents

Table 4.2: Cross tabulation data between workgroup and gender

Table 4.3: Cross tabulation data between workgroup and offshore experience

Table 4.4: Cross tabulation between workgroup and platform type

Table 4.5: Cross tabulation data between workgroup and crew mobility type

Table 4.6: Cross tabulation data between workgroup and crew type

Table 4.7: Part two of survey questions

Table 4.8: Mean data for question response and overall score for part two of survey

Table 4.9: Mean data for workgroup with offshore experience

Table 4.10: Mean data of workgroup working in different type of platform

Table 4.11: Crew mobility mean data on different workgroup

Table 4.12: Mean data for workgroup in two type of crew

Table 4.13: Part Three of Survey Questions

Table 4.14: Comparison mean data response between workgroup and survey question

Table 4.15: Mean data for PSM element level of difficulty by workgroup's offshore experience

Table 4.16: Overall rating for PSM elements level of difficulty by workgroup in different type of platforms

Table 4.17: Mean data for overall rating in level of difficulty

Table 4.18: PSM elements compliance rating by workgroup

Table 4.19: Factor of good safety culture as prevention measure for major hazard incident

Table 4.20: Part Four Survey Question versus Workgroup

Table 4.21: Mean data for experience level among divided workgroup for safety culture rating

Table 4.22: Workgroup rating on safety culture from platform type

Table 4.23: Mean data according to workgroup's type of work mobility

Table 4.24: Mean data for workgroup in different type of crew

Table 4.25: Survey Question for Improvement Suggestions

Table 4.26: Mean data from cross tabulation of workgroup and improvement statements

Table 4.27:Q22 sorted highest mean rate from descriptive analysis data

Table 4.28: Q22 sorted lowest mean rate from descriptive analysis data

Table 4.29: Q23 sorted highest mean rate from descriptive analysis data 81 Table 4.30: High mean for Q23 in various criteria of workgroup

Table 4.31: Mean for Q24 in various factor of workgroup

Table 4.32: Least mean for Q24 versus workgroup cross tabulation data

Table 4.33: Highest mean sorted in workgroup cross tabulation

Table 4.34: Least mean for Q25 in various workgroup and its criteria

Table 4.35: High mean sorted from workgroup and its criteria

Table 4.36: Least mean sorted from workgroups

Table 4.37: Factor that influence work group response

Table 4.38: Factor ranking with highest contribution factor at first

Table 4.39 : One Way ANOVA Test to Determine P-Value of Hypothesis

Table 4.40: One Way ANOVA Test to Determine P-Value of Hypothesis

Table 4.41: One Way ANOVA Test to Determine P-Value of Hypothesis

Table 4.42: Analysis of mean in different workgroup

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1 :Contributing Factors of Process Safety Incidents

Figure 1.2: Fluctuated trend of hydrocarbon release (Process safety incident)

Figure 1.3: Conceptual Framework with Independent Variable (IV) and Dependent Variable (DV)

Figure 1.4: Conceptual Framework of the Research

Figure 3.1: Research design

Figure 3.2: GUI of first page in online version of survey questionnaire

Figure 3.3 : Questionnaire design process

Figure 3.4: Demographic Data of Offshore Worker

Figure 4.1: Normality test for sum of Likert scale rating from part two of survey

Figure 4.2: Normality test for sum of Likert scale rating from part three of survey

Figure 4.3: Normality test for sum of Likert scale rating from part four of survey

Figure 4.4: Level of understanding between level of difficulty of PSM elements and safety culture practice correlation.

Figure 4.5: Correlate PSM level of difficulty and good safety culture influence by workgroup

Figure 4.6: Safety culture correlation between level of understanding and level of difficulty of PSM elements influence by categorical factor of workgroup

Figure 4.7: Boxplot of Total Score in level of understanding in PSM

Figure 4.8: Boxplot of Total Score in PSM elements level of difficulty rate as easier by technical crews

Figure 4.9: Boxplot of total score in safety culture

Figure 4.10: Boxplot of total score in part five

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Background

The tragic accident in Bhopal, India on December 3rd, 1984 has witnessed 2000 deaths by hazardous chemical vapour. On 6 July 1988, the Piper Alpha disaster in the North Sea sparked tremendous implication in the offshore industry after the oil production platform was demolished by a massive fire event and explosion where 167 workers were killed. Both incidents occurred after there are hazardous chemical bursts from its production containments. These incidents have increased the importance of the safety aspect in the processing area for the government sectors and private organisations. Thus, industrial-oriented countries promulgated regulations to reduce the risk of a similar incident from occurring again by enhancing the safety of processes and industrial plants proactively. This is done by using the highest standard of engineering aspect and management excellence then called as process safety management which includes the prevention of accidently releases source of chemicals, energy or other hazardous materials. Implementation of occupational safety management alone is only reflect on classic health and safety aspect normally associated with encouraging individual safe behaviour whilst performing their job and prevention of trips, slips and falls hazards. In process safety, the main major hazards that are more likely to result in major catastrophe with big impact and scale of consequences whereas occupational safety addresses incidents involving personal safety an usually will reflect on individual life quality.

Process safety help company to prevent incident from their routine production activities such as fire, explosions, pollution etc. whereas occupational safety prevent personal injury like cuts and broken bones. Process safety management in oil and gas industry need to be implemented as an obligation due to their high risk production activity and this industry are produced globally from small 100 barrel daily to small private wells and also large bore 4000 barrel daily oil production, from 20 meters deep of reservoirs to 3000 meter deep wells in more than 2000 meters of sea depth and it was very risky. This also covers from USD 10,000 of onshore wells to 10 billion dollars of hi-tech oil rigs which is high cost of operation wise. These different types of well operation use a similar kind of process flow and design (Devold, 2006) and these will need process safety which been practiced worldwide. Oil and gas industry in Malaysia contribute almost half of electric energy generation source and make this industry extremely importance to sustain electrical supply nationwide. Domestic gas demand was 2.6 billion per square feet and almost 82% demand accounted from Peninsular Malaysia (Malaysian Gas Association, 2016)

1.1.1 Process Safety Management for Hazard Risk Mitigation

The Piper Alpha incident is viewed as the starter of risk thinking within asset management. Prior to the 1990s, the literature on risk in asset management is scarce. However, it is now widely recognised as one of the pillars, as evidenced by the focus on risk management in the ISO55000 (Wijnia, 2015). Due to the extent of damages costing almost $3.4 billion, the Piper Alpha disaster was viewed as the largest human­made disaster at the time and continues to be the worst offshore oil disaster in terms of lives lost and industry impact. Although the Cullen Inquiry found Occidental guilty of inadequate maintenance and safety procedures, no criminal charges were brought against the company (NASA Safety Center, 2013). The offshore industry has embedded Piper Alpha explosion event as part of the safety commitment benchmark and has produced self-regulation for the offshore oil and gas industry which require operators to do the same as any process safety implemented globally (Kletz, 2001).

1.1.2 Process Safety Elements

Process safety aims to prevent process-related events or incidents such as fires, explosions, and releases of toxic substances from harming process facilities. It is concerned with process-oriented issues such as runaway reactions, inadvertent mixing of hazardous substances, and failure of equipment, corrosion and so forth which produce negative impact and consequences to the people, environment, assets and reputation. Process Safety Management (PSM) is a combination of engineering and safety management components focused on preventing man-made disasters such as fires, explosions, and toxic chemical burst out which are used in the process. These incidents occurred due to Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) and this will trigger potential catastrophic accident or multiple fatalities if not properly controlled and managed by a systematic safety management system. The standard has been enacted into law in 1990 where 14 minimum elements of PSM must be adhered by the employers. Depending on the type of operation, certain organisation regulates the PSM elements into their activities scope of facility process safety activities. Some companies adopted the 20-element risk-based (RBPS) framework for process safety (Bakar et al., 2017).

In the USA, shortly after the publication of OSHA's proposed PSM standard in 1990, American Congress enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) containing the amendment from OSHA to the Clean Air Act of 1990. The standard included a list of highly hazardous chemicals such as toxic, flammable, highly reactive, and explosive substances. CAAA specified areas that need to be implemented which are covered by the standard as follows:

(a) Process Safety Information (PSI) - Developing and maintaining written safety information on identifying workplace chemical and process hazards recognition for processes related to equipment and technology used for production purposes;
(b) Process Hazard Assessment (PHA) - Performing workplace hazard identification through a proper assessment process by performing rectification of potential sources of accidental releases, an identification of any previous release within the facility including potentially catastrophic consequences, estimation of workplace effects of a range of releases by implementing good practices in the chemical inventory system and also estimate the effect of the health and safety in such range on employees;
(c) Consultation with employees and their representatives on the development and conduct of hazard assessment and the development of chemical accident prevention plans and provide access to these and other records stipulated in the standard;
(d) Establishing a system to respond to the workplace hazard assessment findings which address prevention, mitigation, and emergency responses;
(e) Periodically reviewing the workplace hazard assessment and response system;
(f) Developing and implementing written operating procedures for the chemical process including procedures for each operation phase, operating limitation, and safety and health considerations;
(g) Providing written and operating information to employees and train employees in operating procedures, emphasising hazards and safe practices;
(h) Ensuring contractors and contract employees are provided with appropriate information and training;
(i) Training and educating employees and contractors in emergency response in a comprehensive and effective manner;
(j) Establishing a quality assurance programme to ensure that the initial process related to equipment, maintenance materials, and spare parts is fabricated and installed consistently with the design specifications;
(k) Establishing a maintenance system for the critical process related equipment including written procedures, employee training, appropriate inspections, and testing of such equipment to ensure ongoing mechanical integrity;
(l) Conducting pre-start-up safety reviews for all newly installed or modified equipment;
(m) Establishing and implementing written procedures to manage change to process chemicals, technology, equipment and facilities; and
(n) Investigating every incident, including near misses, which results in or could have resulted in a major accident in the workplace, with any findings to be reviewed by operating personnel and modifications made, if appropriate.

Despite the use of certain mechanisms to ensure all equipment in the offshore installation is working intact as identified in FMA 1967 which is in parallel compliance with the national statutory requirements. The integrity of other equipment which is not included in FMA 1967 will be managed under the PETRONAS guidelines of Offshore Self-Regulation Management System (OSR MS). The aim of OSR-MS is to integrate safety and environment (HSE) management system for excellent achievement for all offshore facilities (Offshore Self-Regulation Management System (OSR-MS), 2018).

1.1.3 PSM Practice in Malaysian Oil and Gas Industry

In Malaysia, the implementation of PSM is widely used among oil and gas platforms derived from OSR-MS which stands for Offshore Self-Regulation Management System. This is introduced by the Malaysia Petroleum Management (MPM), PETRONAS, and agreed by the Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) for managing and sustaining safe operation in the offshore facilities by integrating Asset Integrity and Reliability (AIR) management system and health and safety management system (Offshore Self-Regulation Management System (OSR- MS), 2018). The programme branding of PSM differs according to certain oil field operator companies such as ExxonMobil, Carigali Hess, Petrofac, and etc. These companies use a different standard to show their commitment to the implementation of the highest standard to maintain their assets.

1.1.4 Quality of PSM Awareness and Understanding

Training and competency in PSM elements are essential to ensure every worker know how to differentiate process safety and personnel safety aspect. Also, they should learn how to cope with the PSM system to ensure no catastrophic incident related to LOPC happens. In an offshore platform setting, a high standard safety culture is practised in terms of relaying safety message using various types of media channels such as posters, daily toolbox, and safety leadership programmes. However, there are inconsistencies on safety performance related to process safety incidents such as gas release incidents, chemical spill, and process machinery failure. A comprehensive process safety awareness campaign is designed to ensure all technical workers know their responsibilities to achieve zero incidents workplace. The overall rationale for training and education is to improve awareness of safety and health hazards, to expand the knowledge of the causes of occupational illness and injury, and to promote the implementation of effective preventive measures (DOSH, 2001)

Failure to fully understand PSM elements is a critical issue. Thus, this effectiveness of this programme must be ensured to stop people from making errors in their work whilst dealing with production equipment. This study will be conducted to identify factors and workers' perception of PSM programme implementation in their current offshore platform. Ineffectiveness in a certain operation, significant major hazard disaster, and equipment failure, and also human error are key contributing factors to operating inefficiencies, equipment damage, and significant plant events (Chen-Wing & Davey, 1998). PSM implementation should be addressed for three major groups in the production platform setting. The management crew is derived from highly knowledgeable killed background whereas technical crew consists of technically well-trained personnel in their specific job and lastly non-technical workgroup which has their priority in operational support such as catering crew and medical personnel.

An effective management system is needed to help offshore platforms to implement process safety awareness with a new mind set from all workgroups as previously mentioned. To comply with the self-regulation system of HSE management, all crew on board need to understand the whole concept of PSM thoroughly. To prevent major hazard incidents from occurring in offshore platform, hazard recognition skill is much more important by maintaining a high level of safety awareness (Burns, 2002).

1.2 Problem Statements

1.2.1 Lack of knowledge to differentiate PSM and OSH

This research is needed to identify limitations that prevent offshore Malaysia workers from understanding PSM which encompasses all essential practice of PSM to ensure operational safety reliability. This factor needs to be evaluated for any opportunity of improvement to take place. Workers did not fully understand PSM due to certain factors such as language barrier and lack of communication which will increase the risk of incident. The development of a safety modelling language based on safety term is fair to all intermediate educated workers who possess a weak mastery of English (Pasman, Jung, Prem, Rogers, & Yang, 2009). Workers' failure to utilise PSM elements will trigger possibilities of incidents. For example, in November 2012, an explosion and fire on an oil platform owned by Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations LLC killed three workers. Third party investigation found that the company focused blame on the contractor's pipe-welding operation but the federal department of safety discovered that Black Elk failed “to establish an effective safety culture and communicate risks and precautions to its contractor” (Medicine, 2016).

Process safety management programme and personnel safety need different approaches to hazard recognition. Identification and analysis of hazard risk are vital elements of work safety, health, and environmental management programme. Risk analysis makes it possible to achieve the necessary improvements and apply the methods for loss prevention and control. Most of the crew was confused between process safety hazard and occupational hazard. The duality type of hazard risk encourages workers safety behaviour to create a unique type of workforce and requires special attention to the development of their hazard recognition knowledge and competency (Fleming, 2009). The workers need be knowledgeable to differentiate between two safety management of process and occupational health risk as knowing that a hazard risk re-evaluations should be made when process been changed can prevent accidents and dangerous activities from happening (Kumru, 1993). Human error is a factor resulted from lack of situation awareness related to the perception of components in the process environment. A thorough understanding of each component in PSM enables the workers to develop experience-based process hazard identification and assist in the prevention of incidents and failures (Alkhaldi, M, Pathirage, C and Kulatunga, 2017).

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Figure 1.1 :Contributing Factors of Process Safety Incidents, Adapted from “Lessons learned from process incident databases and the process safety incident database (PSID) approach sponsored by the Center for Chemical Process Safety”, Journal of hazardous materials, 130(1-2), 9-14 by Sepeda, A. L. (2006).

1.2.2 Need for PSM Knowledge Expansion to Other Non-Technical Groups

Only certain workgroup participates in PSM and this learning culture of PSM needs to be expanded to other workgroups of offshore worker to breakthrough reductions in workplace injuries through behavioural-safety initiatives (Burns, 2002). Safety and health management system should be customised according to local factors and supported by the strong commitment of management team, effective worker involvement, and programme integration (A. Ian Glendon, Sharon G. Clarke, 2006).

This could be interpreted that the knowledge of PSM needs to be relayed to all offshore workers and not be limited to certain workgroups and positions.

1.2.3 Fluctuating Statistical Value of Incident Recurrences Related to PSM

Full compliance of the fourteen elements of PSM been established recently by the Peninsular of Malaysia Offshore Company. Each offshore setting has a different application of the PSM model. For example, ExxonMobil platform has implemented bow tie concept in their process safety programme starting for their 2018 safety campaign. A strong commitment was demonstrated to improve safety awareness among crews yet there is a number of process safety-related incident that could happen. (Alkhaldi M., Pathirage C. and Kulatunga, 2017) found that the rate of accidents in the O&G industry is two and a half times higher than the construction industry and seven times higher than general industries. An analysis of 30-year data from 100 hydrocarbon processing facilities indicates that the frequency of incidents has remained high compared to long-term historical levels. This stressed that an improvement in process safety has not been achieved despite the fact that serious incidents continuously occur and impact key company performance areas (Burns, 2002).

Process safety incident occur year to year with no sign of significant improvement and there is no evident that it will be worsening in the O&G company that truly implement effective of PSM , for example in O&G industry in UK , process safety incident occur every year in fluctuated data as per shown as Figure 1.2 below .

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Figure 1.2: Fluctuated trend of hydrocarbon release (Process safety incident) in offshore industry of North Sea Source [website]:http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/rrpdf/rr672.pdf

Process safety research is a crucial scientific activity because there are many implications from incident consequences such as loss of wages and trauma among affected personnel which in turn affect other personnel (Subramaniam, Faridahwati, Md. Lazim, Ramalu, & Zuraida, 2016). Mismanagement of PSM could be attributed as one of the causes of these incidents. Hence, a systematic and effective approach in PSM can enhance reputations and provide opportunities for future growth and development (Moore, n.d.). This improvement needs feedback from people's perspective on the current practices of PSM in offshore Malaysia and a comprehensive understanding of PSM implementation.

1.2.4 Insufficient Commitment from the Government Agency for PSM Obligation

PSM practices in the offshore platforms of Malaysia rely on a combination between PETRONAS OSR-MS and a global work management derived from established production companies such as ExxonMobil. Similar with manufacturing industries, DOSH Malaysia delegate self-regulatory by using Occupational Safety and Health Committee (OSHC) which is started two decades ago same as other country such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Farouk, Richardson, & Santhapparaj, 2011).

The government and by default, should conduct a comprehensive study to analyse and identify gaps in the industrial interference opportunity. The government should coordinate the offshore industry to ensure that these industries survive within safe workplace conditions (Alkhaldi, M, Pathirage, C and Kulatunga, 2017). In Malaysia, existing studies on the industrial accident were mainly focused on the issues of the establishment and enforcement of occupational safety and health act (OSHA) and the evolution of the safety-related regulations (Said & Halim, 2012). It is still beyond the maturity state and PSM is still far behind. Understanding the perception and local contributing factors of PSM effectiveness in incidents reduction for Malaysian aspect can assist government agencies to possess a clear understanding of what measures need to be done proactively to ensure legislative aspect is complied.

1.2.5 Conclusion

Production platform is a high-risk processing unit which produces hydrocarbon in a remote location. Thus, the platform needs full implementation of PSM to ensure safety to human, asset and environment. The awareness of PSM is still very low among our local industries since and the focus is on grooming the industrial players about occupational safety and health (OSH) approach instead of PSM (Bakar et al., 2017). We are still focused on poor working attitude, knowledge enrichment, and good safety culture to avoid high-cost implication on incident occurrence (Said, Said, & Halim, 2012). The Malay Basin is a relatively mature location, with well-known hydrocarbon reserves. Therefore, there are a lot of work is in progress to increase the current production by improving the amount of hydrocarbon recovered from existing sources and by finding new reservoirs in areas that have been previously overlooked. New exploration and interpretation of data in currently producing regions have resulted in new finds (Candiah, 2005) and this will create more production rate opportunities in the future and emphasises the need for an effective PSM implementation.

1.3 Research Objectives

The following research objectives are postulated for this study related to research problem that been discussed previously, main objective this research is to establish the factors that affecting the effectiveness of process safety management compliance among three major workgroups, To achieve the objective, several specific objectives that needs to be fulfilled by this research such as:

(i) To identify level of understanding for each divided workgroups in basic PSM knowledge.
(ii) Evaluating workers' perception on level of difficulties in basic PSM elements that already been implemented in offshore facilities and how it been rated by different workgroup.
(iii) To investigate current quality of safety culture that reliable to reduce risks of process incidents.
(iv) To propose opportunities to improve in basic process safety program.

1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions are formulated as follows:

1. What is the level of understanding in basic PSM program among offshore production platform workers?
2. What is the workers' perceptions on basic PSM elements level of difficulty in offshore production facility?
3. What is current quality of safety culture to reduce process safety incident in their platform?
4. How do the workers will react in improvement proposal for current practice of basic process safety program?

1.5 Hypothesis

1. There is equality on level of understanding in basic PSM among every worker due to frequent training related to basic process safety to be held in induction program and safety meeting.
2. Level of difficulty of basic PSM will same for all workgroups due to company requirement
3. There will be a good rating in current practice of safety culture among all workers.
4. There will be a same reaction of every worker on improvement proposal in certain aspect of current practiced of PSM.

1.6 Significance of the Research

The process safety scenario in Malaysia is still underdeveloped since the knowledge about PSM implementation is minimal compared to the United Kingdom, the United States, and European section which is the result of lack of research about PSM in Malaysia which makes it difficult to be implemented in industries (Bakar et al., 2017). Although there is literature on PSM, it is still inadequate in the management aspect. Most of the latest research in Malaysia concentrates on the engineering aspect, focusing on how to operate certain equipment safely and exercising engineering control measures. We do have operational safety for those involved in the technical aspect of certain new equipment and how to ensure it will be running in a safe range. Despite the technological advancement in process design and operation, companies in the process sector were not able to cope with the frequent process incidents over the last decade. These incidents, which resulted in significant losses for companies, triggered discussions about the qualities of an effective PSM programme. These have led to the initiation of a review in academia about the past, current, and future of process safety in the 21st century.

Researchers around the globe have recently paid attention to reviewing the current challenges related to PSM in the process industry and recommended future improvement in PSM performance in the sector. However, significant gaps in PSM literature remain undiscovered. Gaps in PSM knowledge are reliable sources to improve certain process management. Thus, a comprehensive study is needed to improve people's understanding in PSM programme related to worker perspective difficulties to understand PSM and the contributing factors that made it difficult for workers to comply with it. A majority of study concentrates on identifying the root causes of accidents and classifying causes of accidents into technical/physical or human/organisational failures (Kidam, Hurme, & Hassim, 2010).

1.7 Term Definitions

Occupational Safety and health

Occupational safety and health (OSH) is a multidisciplinary field. Generally, it is in relation to safety, health, and welfare of people at their work place. The term also refers to the objectives of the field, the aims of occupational safety and health programs incorporated to enhance a safe and healthy work environment, that may also safeguard co-workers, family members, employers, customers, and many others who might be directly or indirectly impacted by the workplace environment. At the same time, In the United States of America (USA), OSH is denoted as occupational health and occupational and non-occupational safety, which includes safety for activities outside of work. In Malaysia, OSH is regard as an “Act” to make further requirements for securing the safety, health and welfare of persons at work, for safeguarding others against hazards to safety or health pertaining to the activities of persons at workplace, to establish the National Council for Occupational Safety and Health, and for difficulties linked therewith.

Process Safety

Process safety is a well-ordered framework to accomplish the uprightness of operating systems and processes that handle hazardous properties. This highly relies on wholesome design principles, engineering and operating and maintenance exercises. It also deals with the prevention and control of procedures that have the possibility to discharge hazardous materials and energy.

Both ‘process safety' and ‘asset integrity' are used throughout the petroleum industry. As for the oil and gas industry, the importance of process safety and asset integrity is to avoid accidental releases, which may cause a major incident. Normally, a major incident began by a hazardous release. It may also base on structural failure or loss of stability that worsens to a major incident.

Offshore Production Platform

Offshore production platforms are meant to unearth oil and gas from beneath the seabed. The production platform may be operated with important features, such as drilling equipment, processing facilities, storage facilities, as well as living quarter modules. The investment to position a production platform is massive. This is due to the fact that the platform has to be intact last for decades. Most importantly, the platform should be able to survive the most destructive situations on the planet.

Compliance

Commonly, compliance is referred to obeying to a rule, for instance, a specification, policy, standard or law. Regulatory compliance defines the objectives that administrations seek to accomplish in their determinations to ensure that they are conscious of and take steps to conform to relevant laws, policies, and regulations. In relation to the increasing number of regulations and need for operational translucence, administrations are progressively adopting the use of consolidated and harmonized sets of compliance controls. This approach is operated to guarantee that all required governance requirements could be met.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

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Figure 1.3: Conceptual Framework with Independent Variable (IV) and Dependent Variable (DV)

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature and describes current quality factors of process safety programme understanding by workers in the offshore platform context. Then, several factors that influence quality of implementation in PSM's elements are discussed. After that, the nature of safety culture on process safety practice will be explored. Lastly, improvement aspect discussed in relationship between previous research process failure and system upset in other offshore location.

Table 2.1 : Discussed PSM Elements (20-element risk-based) framework

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End of Table 2. 1

2.2 Quality Factor of Process Safety Excellence in Offshore Production Platform

2.2.1 PSM as an Organizational Hazard Risk Assessment

The Malaysia oil and gas industry has gradually expanded its operation since the new era of petroleum invention in the 1900s which witnessed significant growth in the exploration and production of oil. There are approximately 200 platforms at present managed by various operators in Malaysia. Hence, it is crucial to create a strong awareness among the decision-makers, managers, and technical professionals in the Malaysia petroleum industry on the effectiveness of risk assessment implementation on the offshore platforms. As corporations have become more familiar with risk assessment database, this database can be used by applying statistical analysis to improve the decision-making processes (Aminatul Hawa Yahaya & Noraini Abdullah, 2013).

The establishment of risk assessment related to the attributing factor of incidents is necessary by identifying complex combinations of deficiencies. Many offshore companies focus on personal safety and behavioural observations than on major accident prevention (The National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine 2016). The establishment of detailed process safety safeguards and adequate management systems by the regulatory regime are able to deliver the necessary oversight for high-risk activities involved in deepwater exploration, drilling, and production. This regulatory enforcement will reflect on safeguard effectiveness, human and organisational factors that create a safe workplace environment despite the challenging operational risk such as higher-pressure reservoirs or crudes which are difficult to recover because of higher viscosity. All these factors emphasise the importance of offshore process safety and operational reliability of offshore facilities (Mannan & Wang, 2011). Recap on Deep Water Horizon blow-out incident, Cullen and Whitekirk (2018) said that the incident happen after poor level of hazard awareness and understanding of PSM on the site been demonstrated by workers and they also tolerate hazard risk that finally trigger major catastrophe .

2.2.2 Process Hazard Recognition to Reduce Process Safety Incident

Offshore safety programmes are usually established with a strong understanding of every incident and the explanations on what caused the incident. The programmes don't rely on accidental mistakes or randomised factors. The accident reduction programme is reflected from a high awareness of PSM hazard by performing an effective training programme to all offshore crew aims to identify hazard in the workplace. Workplace hazard is able to impair the production rate and workers' quality of work and productivity and also increase production cost (Khan, Mustaq, & Tabassum, 2014). Trevor Kletz in (2001) said that satisfactory hazard recognition programme enables the active identification of major hazards and their consequences. Hence, companies must take the initiative to take all precaution to avoid accidents or have mitigation actions in place. A study to predict accident occurrences besides incident, near miss, and insignificant data of injuries was conducted in 2013 by Aminatul Hawa Yahaya & Noraini Abdullah using a logistic regression model and the study shows that all incident events and all interrelated contributing factors were crucial to be created in complete database on the risk assessment on offshore platforms.

An experimental study was conducted by Trish Kerin, director of the Institution of Chemical Engineers Safety Centre (ISC) in 2015. This study evaluates different understandings within the safety hazard and occupational safety processes. She showed a picture of an operator working at a pump and pointed out the differences that an occupational health and safety OSHA specialist and a process safety specialist would see, whether it was an occupational hazard such as trip hazard or a process safety hazard such as pressure release. That experiment demonstrates both sides of the safety aspect and that hazard risk is valid(Depth, 2015).

Certain workgroups in offshore focus on advancing one of these two incident prevention areas. However, for a successful accident reduction action in hazardous processing areas such as offshore, there is dual risk of catastrophic process incidents, occupational injuries, and illnesses. These conditions need operators and maintenance workers must wear both hats (process safety and OSHA) simultaneously every day. By performing a good hazard recognition, catastrophic process hazard risk triggered by occupational risk which is significantly dangerous to people, environment, asset, and company reputation can be mitigated (Fleming, 2009).

2.2.3 Major Hazard Mitigation

Statistical data show that the likelihood of fatalities incident is lower than occupational-related accident (DOSH 2017).This shows us that occupational-related incident was the main issue that needs to be resolved. Along with this line, a statistical report in 2004 shows that fatalities case related to fall from a certain height was six times greater than fatalities caused by explosion or burn (Attwood, Khan, & Veitch, 2006). This is due to difficulties in hazard elimination on offshore facilities because most of the process area are hazardous and directly related to the function of the facility. Previous research has shown that process and structural failure contribute to 70% of offshore facilities incidents (Mannan & Wang, 2011). Major incidents can be reduced by identifying effective preventative measures on process safety equipment, process design, and machinery (Elssayed, 2012).

2.3 Quality of Process Safety Elements

2.3.1 Safe System of Work Documentation

Most worker will be more familiar with certain procedures from an effective learning process. Most process facilities use an array of job planning tools to prevent occupational and process incidents. These tools include job safety (hazard) analysis, pre-job risk assessments, dynamic risk assessments, and permit-to-work systems (Fleming, 2009). Job safety analysis and process hazard analysis focus on the sequential order of tasks be performed, obey safety procedures, and are aware of hazards on the machinery. It should be noted that behaviour in the workplace directly influences the safety climate in the workplace, which in turn exerts a positive effect on the attitude of employees in the workplace (Mojapelo, Mafini, & Dhurup, 2016).

In Malaysia, the literature on safety phenomena and issues related to inconclusive findings in training elements are reflected on the underestimation of safety performance (Wahab, Rajab, Shaari, Rahman, & Saat, 2014). Minimal research has been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of training programme in PSM. Pranesh and team have studied the experimental results from five basic events, namely, supervision, training, communication, equipment, and skills in the Deepwater Horizon failure case and the results clearly reveal that training was the primary contributor (31.1%) of the failure event which could be attributed to inadequate training of the crew (Pranesh, Palanichamy, Saidat, & Peter, 2017). Adequate training plays an important role in creating awareness and knowledge with the aim to improve safe practice within the organisational environment (Bahn & Barratt-Pugh, 2013).In offshore platforms, a comprehensive specific training programme is designed for recognising major hazards for specific locations in offshore workplace and the training needs to be completed by the PIC, Deputy PIC, or team members. This is essential to create reliable responses in actual process safety major hazard incidents (Charlton & Sinclair, 2012).

2.3.2 Zero Energy Demonstration

Hendershot, (2013) in his Journal of Chemical Health and Safety said “Inadequate lockout/tagout procedures is a main factor of piper alpha incident” and Lilliey (2013) mentioned , inadequate procedure in lockout/tagout system resulted in gaps in multiple levels of safety aspect. Process safety incident also can be occurred when the process equipment was not adequately prepared for schedule maintenance for example, no isolation been completed from hazardous material (Drive, 2009).All work groups including employees and contractors must take serious in preventing major hazard incident by implementing a permit-to- work system or lock-out and tag-out procedures (Mom, 2014). Energy isolation procedure will eliminate pressurised chemical or product in primary containment or flow line that need to be serviced and this process need operator to divert the line contents to a flare boom and other line draining method with isolation valve to be kept closed or blinds need to be installed to block the inlet and outlet lines (Fleming, 2009) . In PSM related accident, manager need to be vigilant because there is no accidents to be occurred in first time and this gap will be explained as poor procedures and inadequate compliance by worker (Drive, 2009). The complexity of energy isolation process makes planned task very challenging due to a lot of consideration between production policies and process safety aspects (Nadeau, Charlot, & Kenne, 2007). The person in charged for lock or tag should be the only person to perform de­isolation process to avoid unintentionally equipment been energized (Windau, 1998).

2.3.3 Emergency Response

A competent crew such as Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) plays a pivotal role in ensuring safety of all crew during emergency situation. This crew has a real understanding of all possible major hazards of the installations and is knowledgeable in the prevention, mitigation, and control measures to manage major accident hazard scenarios to an acceptable level (Charlton & Sinclair, 2012). To ensure reliability of emergency response procedure compliance, it must be simple and concise for better understanding and easy to remember (Norazahar, Khan, Veitch, & MacKinnon, 2014).Major hazard incident scenario drill will need to be constructed with consideration of various situation combine with environmental factor such as darkness, smoke, heat, noise, fog, and coldness, and hazard conditions, such as fires and explosions. It must also be considered wisely in evacuation flow with comprehensive exercise theoretically and practically (Norazahar et al., 2014). All mentioned emergency response aspect defined effectiveness of safety measures to mitigate further implication of company reputation because fatalities and permanent disabilities will also reflect on victims socioeconomically (Hui-Nee A., 2014).

2.3.4 Consistency of Safety Briefing Messages

The offshore oil and gas industry is constantly evolving as new technologies are invented to explore and produce petroleum in challenging unpredictable environments. To ensure these conditions will not reflect the current operation, continuous learning attitude is needed by operators to take suitable hazard recognition and precautions relating to emergency response to prevent major incident from happening and to control the damage by knowing the procedures of certain technology, management, operations, and personnel competency of certain equipment (Norazahar et al., 2014) but with learning alone ,does not guarantee actual safety if there is no effort by workers in obtaining actual information (Janssen, 2012).

2.3.5 Training and Competency

OHSAS 45001:2018 and PSM really emphasising understanding of process hazard to be included in training module. By establishing thorough learning aspect of process safety, operator will more realise and able to recognize process hazard and able to resolve and diagnose more accurate in process equipment. Improvement can be made on system function by good training conducted to operators (Bakar et al., 2017). The modules of the training need to be further emphasized and meet operational aspect and it will improve safety culture, safety performance and encourage all workers to involve in top safety management of the company(Elssayed, 2012).

2.3.6 Standard Operation Procedure

Failure and hazard occurrences from operation aspect can be happen when workers taking shot-cut whilst performing job without thinking about consequences from their wrong doing act (Bakar et al., 2017). Negative impact from the consequence can be reduced by existed of comprehensive job detail and general policies in written standard of procedure (SOP). Worker will be more prone in regulatory compliance and specific requirement and this was a not kind of option , it is obligation to be complied by the whole organization member for implementing the program elements and reduce the risk of major hazard accident (Chinniah, Burlet-vienney, Chinniah, & Burlet-vienney, 2015).

2.3.7 Chemical Inventory for Process Safety Information

According to Chemical Industries Council of Malaysia, 1999 , Standard of quality need to be established by production companies by enhancing process safety information such as information on maximum inventory level of process chemical . Company must have current safety data sheet (SDS) with updated information for less than 3 years from last update, or there is some changes in the manufacturer's specifications and lay-out(Workplace Safety and Health Caucil of Singapore, 2012). Safety Data Sheets must in comprehensive list and kept in hard copy in easy and accessible area such as in first air room. This will be useful during emergency event that someone has contaminated with dangerous process substances (Dwight D. Eisenhower, 2013). In Malaysia context , all employees that handle hazardous substance and for those supervise a job that required to handle hazardous chemical shall able to access this documents (DOSH, 2001). In conjunction with this regulation, SDS need to be attached with PTW that related to handling chemical job which is necessary information such as toxicity, permissible, reactivity, corrosively materials , thermal and chemical stability data readily accessible (Bakar et al., 2017).

2.3.8 Process Equipment Maintenance

The official investigation of the incident of Piper Alpha found that there is significant finding about equipment were not functioning according to normal specification without nobody try to resolve the temporary mitigation to be fixed(Cullen, Whitekirk, & Investigator, 2018). This data shows us about the important of proper scheduled maintenance, inspection, and testing of emergency equipment can reduce risk of major hazard due to equipment failure (Norazahar et al., 2014). Common problem of process equipment that occur randomly like machinery breakdowns which can cause downtime and needed for proper corrective and preventative approach in maintenance schedule (Nadeau et al., 2007).

2.4 Good Safety Culture Practice to Reduce Process Hazard Risks

2.4.1 Performance Indicator

Safety performance indicators will influence external expressions such as potential client and it has an important role in the organisation as proof of excellent operation (He, Xu, & Fu, 2012). In management science aspect, good performance is defined as limited resource that was used to achieve a specific organisational goal. In the offshore platform context, with the inevitable limitation of resource such as logistic difficulties and communication, they need to compete with other oil field operators in terms of safety programme that was implemented. Other than that, a detailed PSM implementation will create a positive perception of a safe workplace by the worker and the client. This healthy interaction between the worker and a safe workplace will promote safety behaviour and good corporate culture. Good safety culture consists of proper control in the workplace environment and procedures (Attwood et al., 2006).

2.4.2 Safety Culture

Safety culture is interrelated with accident and incident rates in offshore platforms. As the most fundamental means, improving the quality and operation mode of safety management level could prevent major hazard incident, reduce accident rates, and automatically reflect safety performance improvement (He et al., 2012). Mannan & Wang,( 2011) mentioned about bad safety culture will be one of contributing factor of industrial accident including in offshore facilities whereas Attwood, Khan, & Veitch (2006) describe about good safety culture such as proper scheduled maintenance, inspection, and testing of emergency equipment can reduce the likelihood of technical problems during routine operation and this will reflect the incident rate.

Safety intervention can be relates with workers category , some workers will exposed to numerous hazard regarding to their work nature, for technical worker, they will intervene in hazardous zones of process safety equipment during repairing and maintenance job (Chinniah et al., 2015)(Rostykus, Ip, & Dustin, 2016) Using correct and effective tools in process safety management contributes to smaller number of injuries (Khan, Mustaq, & Tabassum, 2014). However, this learning programme needs management's support to ensure well-executed training practices or else its efficiency in managing safety performance will be reduced (Wahab et al., 2014).

2.4.3 Decision Making Style

Research on perception about safety culture maturity shows management commitment was more concentrated on HSE aspect in comparison with making profit (Lawrie, Parker, & Hudson, 2006). Improving human decision factors have a significant influence on the occurrence of process safety incidents( Mannan & Wang ,2001) analyses the causes of incidents involving offshore structures and indicate that unanticipated human decision actions during installations, operations, and maintenance actually cause the majority of incidents (80%). This fact highlights that only a small percentage of incidents is caused by structure failures. The quality of PSM programmes closely relies on human factors decision making style and it is very critical in offshore installation and production (Mannan & Wang, 2011). Human decision error constitutes as the largest contributor of over 70% of all accidents occurred globally (Alkhaldi, M, Pathirage, C and Kulatunga, 2017) and followed by component failure or natural disaster. In summary, the cause of 85% of accidents was human decision errors and another 15% is associated with machine, structural, and natural disasters (Pranesh et al., 2017).

2.4.4 Guidance from Senior Workers

Senior workers who have been transferred to other locations or retire are considered a major threat because most of them are familiar with the current operational system and their awareness of PSM is higher than newly hired workers. Their knowledge is precious and their documentation related to safety report will be more understandable if submitted for learning purposes (Charlton & Sinclair, 2012). Qualified senior personnel possesses more ability to operate certain equipment and are more skilled in analysis and response during equipment failure compared to new operators who always suffer from injuries caused by improper handling of equipment (Chong & Low, 2014). Nowadays, many oil and gas platforms implement a buddy system to ensure each new worker has a companion to ensure instant intervention if something wrong is observed (Falck Nutec, 2008) .

2.4.5 Job Step Compliance

Intentional use of operational procedure was a best practice of incident prevention program and employees will see more updated comprehensive job procedure after an event of accident (Lawrie et al., 2006) .Level of worker compliance in job step rely on human factors such as skills, communications, stress, fatigue, level of knowledge, mental capabilities, and physical conditions . Proper identification of all mentioned factor will prevent personnel from making errors or performing unsafe acts (Norazahar et al., 2014). For example, in certain production platforms, high productivity pressure on increasing production rate will create distraction on safety concern. Knowing this, all oil and gas industry have a policy to not rush people and everybody has an obligation to stop their work if it is deemed there is risk of danger, they called it with “Stop Work Authority”. If this policy is not been managed accordingly, safety measures will be negatively impacted (Janssen, 2012).

2.5 Current Gap of PSM Need to Be Improved

2.5.1 Regulations

Mannan & Wang,( 2011) in their journal of “Stretch in technology and keeping the focus on process safety for exploration and production in the 21st century” stated that in the recent development of oil and gas technology usage where new equipment is introduced in current operations, enforcement of regulations should not be stagnant and must always be made available for modification based on occurring issues in this industrial sector. Recent amendment of Factory and Machinery Act 1967 (amendment 2014) and Occupational Safety and Health Act 1994 shows no specific sentences addressing on PSM implementation in the act or regulation. There are no stipulated order of implementation and enforcement for industries in Malaysia according to PSM enforcement consist of 14 or 20 elements (Bakar et al., 2017).

High quality of PSM and its effectiveness must incorporate with a strong cooperation between the government and offshore field operators to develop comprehensive safety management programmes to improve productivity, technical data, emergency shutdown cases and property(Aziz & Shariff, 2017). Since legislative mandate for fifteen year given by local DOSH to implement OSHCs, the safety performance level of this self-regulation falls on a medium scale(Farouk et al., 2011) although labour-intensive firms for non-offshore business were found to be more sensitive towards the regulations(Said et al., 2012).

2.5.2 Language Barrier Aspect

Previous case study of Macondo Well Blowout shows that, in five basic event been evaluated , 31.1 % indicate that training was a major contributing factor of Deepwater Horizon blow out incident related to inadequate training of the crew(Pranesh et al., 2017). Developing a comprehensive training module in adequate language usage and literacy by majority of workers are needed and suggested by NIOSH, this will help avoid unsafe condition and improve hazard recognition (Sanders-Smith, 2007). Operation method, labelling and other arrangement of various input of safety will be hard to be understood by whom English is a second language (Wagner, Birt, & Duncanson, 1996). In Malaysia context, unavailability of PSM specific guideline in Malay from local authority of safety department will lead to lack of communication and support from cross department (Depth, 2015).

2.5.3 Learning from past Incidents

Raising safety awareness through comprehensive safety training and proper incident investigation if there is incident occurred related to PSM will create transparency in learning from the past incidents concepts and this will also improve safety performance(Wahab et al., 2014)(He et al., 2012).Improvement in safety culture is primarily influence by managerial values and need thorough assessment of the safety culture (Mennella, 2016). Information about incident trends in process safety hazard is required to assess the level of safety performance and also provide improvement opportunities (Alberto, Fabian, 2017).

Bad safety reputation with additional negative outcomes included direct economic costs of loss of working time and production will lead offshore company to the risk of loss in future contracts and possible threats to the continuity of the business. It also increased insurance risks and premiums because the company was unreliable to promote zero incident workplace. In addition, and depending on the severity of the incident, there will implication in social and environmental issues that may tarnished company reputation, the consequences in social and environment can be prolong and persist by year to decade (Tyler, 2007).

2.5.4 Electronic Management Technology

An electronic document management system (EDMS) implemented in some platform as a part of their PSM initiative is a great achievement which contribute better outcome of incident prevention by automatic prompter been established for critical equipment that need to be always in optimise condition . There is a lot of electronic management system offered by many of software vendor such as SAP. The SAP software able to integrate of the entire oil and gas asset management from the wellhead till production. In certain area, using this electronic system gave a good outcome on system improvement but certain aspect still remain unchanged (Mishra & Mishra, 2011).

Electronic permit to work system and electronic job safety analysis has benefit to company related to hazard analysis, risk mitigation, competency management, monitoring inspection and emergency response. Implementing this electronic system will highly increase company expenditure due to annual software support and maintenance cost( Reddy, 2015). Some of O&G companies that adopted electronic management system realize that some improvement in performance in term of safety and profit compared with non-adopting organization (Romero, Menon, Banker, & Anderson, 2005).

2.6 Research Matrix

Table 2.2: Overall research elements derived from previous research

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End of Table 2. 2

2.7 Conclusion

All in all, this research focus on various factors that is essential for excellent process safety management which has benefit to offshore organization and worker to avoid major catastrophe related to process safety incident. There is several factor that been concluded from previous research that meet for all three major workgroup that been identified has different level of knowledge and this will reflect their judgment in process safety elements and performance. Opportunity of improvement been derived from previous research gap on current practice of PSM in peninsular of Malaysia offshore.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the research methodology employed in this study. This research aims to determine factors that influence workers' perspective on the effectiveness of PSM programmes and how PSM reflects their work culture in improving safety performance. Then, survey questionnaire structure and selection of respondents from various groups of worker were discussed. Data input from this research consists of feedback sourced from questionnaire survey and case study.

3.2 Research Scope

The scope of the current study is specifically limited to the process safety management area that was already implemented in the offshore site. A breakthrough performance study could be obtained by analysing any situation that promotes organisational culture into a new state of effectiveness and efficiency (DOSH, 2011) by reviewing the perspective from three major workgroups which are supervisors, technical crews, and non-technical crews. This study will investigate data from three major groups yet represent all production platform workers. The data from this research will be collected from two type of production platform.

3.3 Research Design

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Figure 3.1: Research design

3.3.1 Quantitative Survey Selection

A quantitative research design is employed because of in certain phenomenon, it will be able to be described in numerical value derived from a scale of quality (Rajasekar, Philominathan, & Chinnathambi, 2006). This research will use Likert scale data, using linguistic variable then been analysed according at the interval measurement scale (Boone, 2012). Using Likert-type scales will facilitate equal units from most negative to most positive and interpreted from smallest numerical value as one and five as maximum value. This allows researcher to measure workers' perceptions, level of understanding and provides a means of quantifying the data(Simon & Goes, 2013).

3.3.2 Questionnaire survey

Questionnaire survey aims to evaluate workers' perception of the effectiveness of PSM programmes. The survey assesses their understanding of certain elements of PSM that were implemented in the offshore safe work system. It also attempted to capture an overview of the current implementation of PSM whether it can reduce incidents and benefit offshore organisations. This questionnaire survey also evaluates the current practices in oil and gas platform on how safety learning will reflect workers' understanding and the quality of the workers' understanding of hazard recognition between process safety management and occupational safety. Survey gathers information efficiently with regards to the respondents' perception of PSM. This questionnaire survey method was practical to be conducted in an offshore environment because the workers have an extra workload, are reluctant during interviews due to privacy issue and policy in data protection.

3.4 Study Location and Data Population

This study conducted in six selected platform with total personnel on-board between 90 to 110 people. The selection of offshore production platform consist of both oil and gas product, which mean three platform produce oil and the rest is platform that produce gas. The selection between two types of production platform will show some differentiation because every type of platform has their specific process lay-out and the process safety management will be slightly differ in term of equipment and device. As mentioned before, this questionnaire will not expose company name to protect organizational reputation. Table 3.3 below show population of potential respondents for this study. Total respondent been chosen base on minimum percentage of 15% of management workgroup and need of same percentage for every workgroup in this research to ensure accuracy of data sampling. Total of 265 data population size been identified (n -265).

Table 3.1: Study Location and Data Population

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3.5 Sample Size

This research consist of 265 of population size from all six platform that participated in this study and from table 3.4 shows estimated data sample for certain data population. In this research, 150 set of questionnaire distributed to all potential respondents.

Table 3.2: Data Population Size and Sample size

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Note: Sample size selection base on Krejcie, R. V., & Morgan, D. W. (1970) “Determining sample size for research activities”. Journal of Educational and psychological measurement, 30(3), 607-610.

3.6 Pilot Study and Validity Test of Questionnaire

In order to test the questionnaire, an approach that can be used is a pilot survey. It is done on a smaller sample size as compared to the intended sample size. The questionnaire, in managing a survey, is given to a percentage of the total sample population. In rather informal research, it can be answered by a convenience sample. Conducting a pilot survey is considered vital, as a collection of items that is supposed to measure a variable has to be undoubtedly focused on that particular variable (Cox, S. J., & Cheyne, A. J. T. 2000). The acknowledged value for this statistic, which is Cronbach's alpa, is mjst be above 0.7.

Table 3.3: Cronbach's Alpha Value for Every Unit of Survey Questions

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End of table 3.3

Pertaining to this study, the researcher, from the pilot survey to validate the questionnaire. The researcher had chosen 30 respondents to be involved in this phase. 10 respondents represent from management workgroup, ten 10 were technical crews, and another ten were non-technical crews. The overall Cronbach's Alpha value is 0.8561. As for the single question items, the value of all the alphas is above 0.7. High value in alpha is suggested that some items are redundant and the question been tested using various part or groups is actually in the same of meaning and a maximum alpha value of 0.90 has been recommended to aware researcher of any redundancy (Tavakol, M., & Dennick, R., 2011). In this research tool, the questionnaire that been constructed was valid to be used.

3.7 Data Collection Method

3.7.1 Questionnaire design

The literature on PSM implementation needs to be compared and summarised to obtain a comprehensive understanding of PSM. Then, potential research questions were established derived from various topics in literature review. A summary of the research scope can be easily identified and segregated by research matrix and conceptual framework. By extracting various factors from the research framework, a questionnaire draft was created and needs to be reviewed. Several recommendations and comments from offshore workers were considered and incorporated in the finalised questionnaire. This requires the researcher to compile two types of questionnaires which are paper-based and online questionnaires. In online version, researcher using TypeForm® platform which is beautiful and easy to attract more respondents. The question asked in the survey sheet uses simple English and Malay to ensure no ambiguity. The link to the survey is sent to all involved personnel via whatsApp and e-mail to guide the respondent to the survey form. In this questionnaire is clearly mention that there will be no proprietary data will be collected regarding company name and there is no personnel info needed as data policy protection requirement.

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Figure 3.2: GUI of first page in online version of survey questionnaire

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Figure 3.3 : Questionnaire design process

The questionnaire survey consisted of five parts. In Part One, the respondents need to provide information about themselves, their facility type and their work nature 51 and year of experience. Part two was related to the PSM understanding level rate by respondents Part three aimed at gathering more details on the workers' perspective on level of difficulties in the implementation of PSM programmes. Part four was designed with the intention of obtaining information on worker rating in current safety culture in their offshore facility. Part five explored the workers' agreement of certain improvement factors from PSM that been found as gaps in current PSM practice in offshore.

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Figure 3.4: Demographic Data of Offshore Worker

Part one of the questionnaire consist several close ended questions related to respondents gender, offshore experience, type of platform product whether it was gas or oil , current position and their work mobility factors. A quantitative strategy is based on numerical data collection from Likert scale that been used which requires respondents to choose the likelihood in other part of research questionnaire.

Respondent need to rate between linguistic variables from most negative represent smallest value such strongly disagree till most positive represent maximum value of five.

Table 3.4: Evaluate worker understanding on process safety management via Likert scale rating.

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3.7.2 Respondent Criteria

Simple random sampling technique was employed to select offshore workers as respondents to answer the questionnaire. This technique was selected as it enables every unit to have an equal chance of selection which mitigates bias. The nature of this study's data collection enables a comparison factor to be determined to identify another factor that contributes to PSM understanding, practice and safety culture. In comparison sampling, it is important to distinguish between three groups: (1) the management and supervisor, (2) technical workgroup, (3) and non-technical group. The population refers to the three groups from all platform sorted from position entry response in part one of survey question.

Table 3.5 : Distinguish position into three major workgroup

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3.7.3 Quality of Data Collection

The collection of information was carried out via two methods. Firstly, a phone call been made to all selected platform and authorization from offshore platform managers is needed to perform the survey since specific names of the crew and their contact number need to be obtained. The response rate from a postal and e-mail survey may be low and this will lead to the results being biased toward those who were selected. In this case, personnel involved in this survey was encouraged by using mobile web questionnaire and the method to increase the response rate was to send the link of survey form via mobile social media application to individuals who are most likely to answer the questionnaire. Finding the required person's name and obtaining his consent to answer the questionnaire before mailing it was difficult and time-consuming, but it was more effective as compared to mailing to the workers' addresses. It will increase the control of people who will cooperate to answer the questionnaire. As the research is a paramedic who is responsible to provide safety briefing for every session of crew change, this will provide an advantage to the research to encourage workers to participate in the survey. It might be difficult to obtain other platform workers to fill the survey form. Predicting that it will be difficult to obtain responses from other platforms, the researchers' medical personnel colleagues were contacted to solve this limitation. According to respondent criteria subtopic, less population identified for management and supervisor crew which occupied 15% of total personal on-board in production platform which is same ratio of respondent need to be selected from every workgroup.

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

After the answered survey forms were returned to the researcher, the responses will be edited to ensure completeness, consistency, and readability. Once the data had been checked, they were arranged in an Excel spreadsheet form that will facilitate data analysis. Quantifiable or numerical data from the questionnaires will be coded and added into Minitab software for analysis. Minitab was selected because the graphic user interface (GUI) of this software is user-friendly and easy to download via internet.

Statistical techniques were conducted to analyse the data which were collected from the survey. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used as tools of evaluation in the data analysis. The sampling frequency was used to make statistical inferences about the offshore worker populations on selected platforms. A brief discussion of the statistical techniques chosen for this research and the rationale behind them was presented and several limitations were captured during the data analysis stage. Data collected were analysed using descriptive statistics of mean, standard deviation, frequency and percentages and also the normality of the data to be tested. The data analyses were carried out using Minitab® Product version: 18.1 (Minitab Inc., USA).

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

4.1 Questionnaire Response Rate

From a total of 150 questionnaires distributed via online form using Typeform®, 86 were returned consisting of 4 questionnaire answered using computer and laptop , 80 respondents using mobile phone and only 2 person choose to answer in paper questionnaire .This represents a 57% response rate. This response rate is lower than a 59% from similar study of Nordlöf, Wiitavaara, Högberg, & Westerling, in 2017 and higher compared with Ghettas in 2015 with participation rate of 45%.

4.2 Demographic Analysis

Table 4.1: Demographic data of respondents

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End of Table 4.1

Table 4.1 shows proposition between male and female worker which is male dominate about 97.67% of respondent compare with 2.33% of female workers. This data shows us that there is inconvenience of offshore life to be accommodate by female. Almost half of respondents came from 1-9 years of experience contributed 54.65% compared with 4.65% of 20-29 years offshore experience. Most of respondent derived from non-technical group about 47.67% secondly by technical crew 32.56% and lastly management team contribute 19.77%.Non-technical worker was the highest data contributor in this survey which shows us that most hired position in offshore was not directly involved in process activity.

Most of the survey response from oil producing platform contribute 67.44% compared with gas producing platform. Non-roving crew which is only assigned at one platform in certain project contribute more than half of survey data 53.49% and regular crew was 69.77% of total respondents.

4.3 Cross Tabulation of Workgroup and Other Variable

4.3.1 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Gender

Table 4.2: Cross tabulation data between workgroup and gender

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Management crew consist majority 94% of male worker compared with only 6% of female worker. Non-technical group has 2% of female worker and 98% of male and technical group dominate by male worker at 100%. This data tally with Table 4.2 that female worker respondent only 2 person over 86 people.

4.3.2 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Offshore Experience

Table 4.3: Cross tabulation data between workgroup and offshore experience

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Based on the table, high respondent from management group for 10-19 years of offshore experience (35%) compare with less than 1 year experience constituted of 6%. 61% from non-technical group with offshore experience 1-9 years and none non­technical crew from 20-29 years of experience. Technical crew which has main roles in process safety performance constituted of majority 64% followed by 25% (10-19 years) then 11% from 30 years above ,none of technical crew from experience offshore less than 1 year and 20-29 years.

4.3.3 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Platform Main Product

Table 4.4: Cross tabulation between workgroup and platform type

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Oil platform constitute highest in all respondents in management group (71%), non-technical (66%) and technical crew (68%) almost 2/3 within oil and gas platform respondents. Table 4.4 show us that most of the platform type in offshore Terengganu is producing oil more than gases.

4.3.4 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Crew Mobility

Table 4.5: Cross tabulation data between workgroup and crew mobility type

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End of Table 4.5

Most of management crew (59%) is roving to other platform different with non-technical crew (61%) were non-roving type of crew. For technical crew, there is equal value of 50-50 between non-roving and roving type. Roving management crew usually has main roles of supervisor from service contractor and most of them handling a lot of skilled but non-technician crew such as painter, construction worker such rigger and scaffolder.

4.3.5 Tabulated Statistics: Workgroup, Crew Type

Table 4.6: Cross tabulation data between workgroup and crew type

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Management crew constituted 59% from non-regular crew compared with 41% of regular crew. Non-technical crew majority from regular crew (70%) compared with 29% of non-regular. Many of technical crew is regular for their platform constituted of 86%. Regular crew is most important crew that reflect on safety performance in production platform and they are needed to demonstrate leadership in safety.

4.4 Analysis of mean

4.4.1 Self-Rating in Understanding of PSM by Workers

In part two of the questionnaire, respondents need to rate their understanding by Likert scale with linguistic variables (1) for strongly disagree, (2) for disagree, (3) if not sure, (4) if they agree and finally (5) strongly Agree. Total of score for every respondent stored in different data set as part two and normality of data distribution is tested.

Table 4.7: Part two of survey questions

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A normality test is done to examine if the total scores of worker rating in understanding of PSM are normally distributed. Based on Figure 4.1, the significant value for Kolmogrov-Smirnov is 0.142 and the value is greater than a=0.05. Therefore, it shows that the data is normally distributed.

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Figure 4.1: Normality test for sum of Likert scale rating from part two of survey

Table 4.8: Mean data for question response and overall score for part two of survey

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End of Table 4.8

Management and technical crew rate Q5 for highest mean (X = 4.471) and(X = 4.500) “Identification of equipment and safety device that related to process safety” compared with non-technical rating for highest mean (X = 3.951) Q1 “Ability to describe about process safety”. This data shows us that management and technical crew triggered to choose equipment and device related to process safety as important factor in PSM compare to non-technical crew prone to choose on general information regarding process safety with inconsistency of understanding level and this can be proof by large number of Standard deviation (SD 1.139). For overall rating of “level of PSM understanding” among workgroup, technical crew shows high level of understanding with mean(X = 21.464). Least level of PSM understanding among non-technical crew (X = 18.683) shows that they will need to learn more about PSM with adequate training.

Table 4.9: Mean data for workgroup with offshore experience

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Experienced worker 10-19 years of offshore experience show high understanding in process safety (X = 22.50) followed by technical crew less than 1 year(X = 21.778) then management crew 20-29 years of experience(X = 21.25).Least mean by less than one year of experience from non-technical crew(X = 21.778)with offshore experience less than one year. This data show that management have a good knowledge of PSM compared to non-technical group due to various exposure to training opportunity and working closely with PSM environment.

Table 4.10: Mean data of workgroup working in different type of platform

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High understanding in process safety management by technical workgroup (X = 21.895) then management crew (X = 21.17) working in oil production platform compare non-technical workgroup with lowest(X = 17.79) working at gas production platform. Whether working in oil or gas production, low mean between two different group show less understanding of non-technical crew on basic understanding of PSM and this will need to be corrected.

Table 4.11: Crew mobility mean data . on different workgroup

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High understanding in process safety offshore worker of both roving and non­roving technical crew(X = 21.929) and (X = 21.00) prove that this workgroup level of understanding will always superior compare to other workgroup and the understanding will be more higher from roving crew due to their exposure in different platform layout , equipment's and work management systems .

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Better understanding in process safety of management which is in regular crew type (X = 21.57) followed by technical which is regular crew for particular platform (X = 21.500) ,this shows good collaboration in work execution and arrangement related to process area between supervisor and subordinate in the platform related to slightly different in overall understanding in PSM. Non-technical in both crew type shows less mean compare to other workgroup.

4.4.2 Worker Perception on level of difficulty in selected PSM Elements

In part three of the questionnaire, respondent need to rate their understanding by Likert scale with linguistic (1) Very difficult, (2) difficult, (3) Neutral, (4) Easy, (5) Very Easy. Sum of score for every respondent rating stored in different data set named as part three total and tested for data normality.

Table 4.13: Part Three of Survey Questions

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A normality test is done to examine if the total of scores from worker perception in PSM elements given are normally distributed. Based on the Figure 4.2, the significant value for Kolmogrov-Smirnov is 0.126 and the value is greater than a=0.05 shows that the data is normally distributed.

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Figure 4.2: Normality test for sum of Likert scale rating from part three of survey

Table 4.14: Comparison mean data response between workgroup and survey question

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End of Table 4.14

Management crew rate Q8 for highest mean (X = 4.529) “Risk assessment” compared with non-technical and technical crew rating for highest mean (X = 4.529) and (X = 4.5714) Q11 “Incoming crew safety briefing” and technical crew this data shows us that non-technical and technical crew choose structured learning material such as briefing compare to management crew prone to choose on documentation aspect e.g. risk assessment. This data show us that most of subordinate crew (non-technical and technical) taking serious in learning aspect compared to management crew prone to concentrate on proper documentation and reporting. For overall rating of “PSM element level of difficulty” among workgroup, technical crew shows high score of Total score in PSM element with mean(X = 44.57). Least level of total score among non-technical crew (X = 37.27) shows that they will need to be coached on PSM elements more than other crew. PSM element is harder to be understand and complied by non-technical crew compare with other group.

Table 4.15: Mean data for PSM element level of difficulty by workgroup's offshore experience

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Experienced technical worker with 1-9 years of offshore experience show high easiness of complying process safety elements (X = 44.78) followed by management 10-19 years of experience (X = 44.00) then (X = 43.00) management crew with 1­9 years of experience. Least mean by less than one year of experience from non­technical crew(X = 25.00). This show that technical crew feel PSM element more easier compared to other workgroup and year of experience related to adequate training given by company to ensure process area handled by knowledgeable technician.

Table 4.16: Overall rating for PSM elements level of difficulty by workgroup in different type of platforms

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High score of process safety element level of difficulty by oil type production platform technical crew (X = 44.89) followed by management crew from same type of platform (X = 44.25).This data analysis shows excellent work alignment between supervisor and manager (e.g. platform OIM, PIC, production supervisor) between their subordinate from technical crew related to same level of rating in process safety element with easy to be complied and managed.

Table 4.17: Mean data for overall rating in level of difficulty

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High score of process safety element level of difficulty by non-roving management crew (X = 46.14) followed by roving technical crew (X = 45.21).least mean for non-roving of non-technical crew (X = 35.16).This data analysis shows crew mobility of many platform slightly reflect on non-technical overall rating (X = 40.56) in PSM element difficulty to more easy compared to roving management crew (X = 40.30).

Table 4.18: PSM elements compliance rating by workgroup

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Process safety element level of difficulty overall rated as easiest by technical crew in both type of crew,(X = 45.50) for non-regular and (X = 44.417) for regular followed by regular crew from management (X = 45.21).least mean for regular non­technical crew (X = 36.31).This data analysis shows that non-technical position in platform which is regular crew need to more exposure to PSM element to ensure process safety message to be adapted in their work scope and their knowledge on process hazard need to be enriched.

4.4.3 Workers Rating on Current Safety Culture Practice

In part four of the questionnaire, respondent need to rate their understanding by Likert scale with linguistic variable (1) Very poor, (2) poor, (3) moderate, (4) good, (5) Very good. Sum of score for every respondent rating stored in different data set named as part three total and tested for normality.

Table 4.19: Factor of good safety culture as prevention measure for major hazard incident

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A normality test in Figure 4.3 done to examine if the total of scores from worker rating current safety culture to ensure data normality. The significant value for Kolmogrov-Smirnov is 0.166 and the value is greater than a=0.05 shows that the data is normally distributed.

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Figure 4.3: Normality test for sum of Likert scale rating from part four of survey

Table 4.20: Part Four Survey Question versus Workgroup

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Management crew rate Q21 'no practice of short-cut in every job procedure” for highest mean (X = 4.706) due to active supervision concept need to be performed by all supervisor and management team to ensure every crew comply with job procedure and avoid any incidents, non-technical and technical crew rate Q17 “Intervene culture in any dangerous act or condition” for highest mean (X = 4.244) and (X = 4.536) cause by their active participation in intervention program that need them to write down any unsafe act and condition into a card system e.g. observation card. This shows us that safety intervention program was successful and really been implemented among large workgroup of technical and non-technical. All group show least mean in Q20 “Consideration of senior worker's opinion before commencing critical job” shows this statement are least important and they are bonded with company policy and procedure more during doing critical job and less consideration on senior guidance because offshore culture believe in concept everybody has changes to do mistake.

Table 4.21: Mean data for experience level among divided workgroup for safety culture rating

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Technical crew with offshore experience above 30 years agreed that high standard of safety culture been demonstrated in offshore platform with highest mean (X = 28.33) followed by 10-19 years of offshore experience management crew(X = 27.83). Lowest mean (X = 18.50) from non-technical crew less than one year of experience show that they does not familiar with current practice and hard to justify what is current practice of safety culture.

Table 4.22: Workgroup rating on safety culture from platform type

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High rating from technical crew in oil platform(X = 26.737) followed by Management workgroup in oil production platform (X = 26.667).Least mean (X = 22.86) from non-technical crew working in gas type platform(X = 22.86).

Table 4.23: Mean data according to workgroup's type of work mobility

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Management crew for non-roving worker rate high in safety culture practice (X = 28.00) followed by roving technical group (X = 27.07l).Least mean (X = 23.92) from non-technical working in non-roving mode(X = 23.92). Roving non-technical crew able to rate their safety culture slightly higher (X = 24.63) than roving management crew(X = 24.10). Roving mode create more exposure to non­technical to create good safety culture practice by complying various type of company policy and safety systems.

Table 4.24: Mean data for workgroup in different type of crew

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High rating in safety culture with mean (X = 27.75) from non-regular technical crew followed by regular crew from management side(X = 27.571). Non­regular technical crew usually from service vendor and contractor that need to apply good practice of safety knowledge interpreted by good safety culture performance.

4.4.4 Mean Analysis in Opportunity to Improve Statements

Linguistic variables from (1) strongly disagree, (2) Disagree, (3) Not Sure, (4) Agree, (5) strongly Agree, all data will be analyse individually according with research questions.

Table 4.25: Survey Question for Improvement Suggestions

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4.4.5 Cross Tabulation Workgroup versus Part 5 Survey Questions

Table 4.26: Mean data from cross tabulation of workgroup and improvement statements

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Highest mean for worker agreement on opportunity to improve statement is “The more detail in incident investigation is conducted, the more we could learn to prevent incidents” with mean (X = 4.706) by management crew followed by (X = 4.607) from technical crew. These two group agreed more on incident reporting need to be concise and comprehensive so we could learn from previous incident efficiently. Least important statement rated by non-technical worker with mean (X = 3.756) ' Process safety management will be more effective to be handled electronically” and most of workgroup rating with low mean in this improvement statement due to complexity of the PSM system would to be handle electronically and this will need more effort and extra job for them to learn a new skill.

4.4.6 PSM Will Be More Effective By Involving Government Sector (Q22)

Table 4.27:Q22 sorted highest mean rate from descriptive analysis data

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Both of above 30 years offshore experience from technical and non-technical crew strongly agreed on “Involving government safety agency will improve PSM performance” with same mean(X = 5.000) followed by “agree” rating by management crew with working experience 20-29 years and non-regular technical crew with same mean (X = 4.750).This data shows senior worker with over 20 year offshore experience found that involvement of outside agency and government sector will create some improvement on process safety performance because the welfare of offshore worker will be more secured. Most of non-regular technical crew come from contractor service and expectation of PSM improvement will be more focus on contractor management elements.

Table 4.28: Q22 sorted lowest mean rate from descriptive analysis data

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End of Table 4.28

Management group less than one year of experience disagree on “involvement of government sector to improve PSM in offshore” with mean (X = 2.000) follow by unsure to agree level range by non-technical crew 10-19 year of experience(X = 3.700) . Range from unsure and more to agree level by non­roving technical crew with mean(X = 3.929).Less experience management group was not involve in offshore life and they are from fresh graduate engineer of safety related person. Their disagreement on government interfere related to stringent policy and will expose company reputation if there is serious incompliance of local legislation and act.

4.4.7 Company Need to Have Parallel Guideline with Local Safety Agency

Table 4.29: Q23 sorted highest mean rate from, descriptive analysis data

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End of Table 4.29

Management group 20-29 years of experience strongly agreed on “parallel guideline must be followed by offshore” with mean (X = 5.000) same mean for non­technical with above 30 years and non-regular technical crew. This show that high experience worker agreed a guideline to be endorse by government safety agency and support by technical crew which is from service contractor or non-direct employee such as vendor engineer an technician. Overall, high agreement by all type of workgroup agreed with this statement with high mean above (X = 4.500) for all non­roving and non-regular crew. This significantly that person who working in many platform and field operator more comfortable working in a standard safety environment and safety management.

Table 4.30: High mean for Q23 in various criteria of workgroup

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Lower agreement by management above 30 years and non-technical worker less than one year above with mean (X = 4.000) followed by non-roving technical with mean(X = 4.214).Overall, all workgroup agreed parallel guideline to be implemented between government safety guideline of process safety.

4.4.8 Translation in Various Learning Aspect of PSM

Table 4.31 : Mean for Q24 in various factor of workgroup

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Both non-technical and technical crew with 30 years and above strongly agreed for “Safety learning of process aspect need to be translated in local language” (X = 5.000) and followed by management with worker experience 20-29 years and non-regular technical crew (X = 4.750). This data show that most experience worker and contract basis technical crew agreed for PSM learning module need to be translated to local language for better understanding.

Table 4.32: Least mean for Q24 versus workgroup cross tabulation data

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4.4.9 Detailed In Incident Investigation for More Better Outcome of Learning from Past Incidents (Q25)

Table 4.33: Highest mean sorted in workgroup . cross tabulation

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Management crew with 10-19 years, both non-technical and technical crew with 30 years and above offshore experience and both roving and regular crew for management strongly agree (X = 5.000) with detail investigation report was a factor for better learning outcome related to previous incident. This shows most of management crew and experienced technical crew agreed with this factor because they were contribute in coaching people about safety learning.

Table 4.34: Least mean for Q25 in various workgroup and its criteria

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Above table shows all workgroup agreed with detail investigation report to be conducted and learning aspect will be improved by comprehensives investigation report because the lowest mean (X = 4.000)equal to agree level in Likert scale.

4.4.10 Computerized in Process Safety Management

Table 4.35: High mean sorted from workgroup and its criteria

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Management with offshore experience 10-19 years and technical crew 30 years and above strongly agree for PSM to be implement electronically with mean (X = 5.000) followed by non-regular management crew (X = 5.000).All these group were the key players of executing safe work practice in production site and they know about the importance of PSM system to be run in electronically for efficient work management.

Table 4.36: Least mean sorted from workgroups

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Management crew less than one year offshore experience disagree on PSM to be handled electronically (X = 2.000) because with their new entry experience into oil and gas industry, they prefer using manual and “on paper” method so they could learn more on basic operation. For “unsure” rating, non-technical with 10-19 years (X = 3.400) same with management crew working in gas platform. Other criteria of offshore group rate in “unsure” was non-technical crew working in oil platform, roving management crew , non-technical with working mobility in non-roving crew , non-regular of management crew and lastly regular non-technical crew. By implement electronic PSM. Company must have a lot of effort to give adequate training for large group of worker to understand the system and to know the benefit in this electronic PSM system such as e-PTW, e-MOC and many more

4.5 One-Way ANOVA Analysis of Variables

Using one-way ANOVA for analyse which factor can be influence by different workgroup. By obtaining p-value less than 0.05, we can conclude that particular factor react with workgroup in different way. Contribution percentage shows influence level of all different workgroup interact with survey question.

4.5.1 Workgroup Interaction Analysis between Survey Question Relationship Summary

Table 4.37: Factor that influence work group response

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End of Table 4.37

From all twenty six of survey questions, only eleven interact with different workgroup with P-Value smaller than significant value a=005. Which mean, every factor in survey question with be differently interpreted by three different workgroup and their perception and also rating in Likert scale is also different , this is same with study by Mitchual , Donkoh and Bih in 2015 - Willingness To Use Personal Safety Equipment By The Workers, they use ANOVA one way testing to differentiate between various factor of worker interaction on their willingness to use personal safety equipment (Mitchual, Donkoh, & Bih, 2015).Overall, from twenty six of question, 42.31% was interact differently by workgroup of offshore worker.

4.5.2 Safety Factors That Interact with Workgroup

Table 4.38: Factor ranking with highest contribution factor at first

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From the table above, worker ability to identify device and equipment which is related to process safety rated differently in every workgroup with highest contribution factor of 25.61% followed by maintaining process equipment. From the result we could conclude that non-technical crew will rate differently in this factor due to their work nature does not involve directly in technical aspect. In process safety, the aim is clear, all information about process safety and the knowledge in prevention of major hazard must be equally conveyed to all personal on-board. ANOVA testing make researcher able to evaluate more in eleven factor that been rated or interpreted differently in three large workgroup or in another words, three different work group is significant predictors to influence all eleven factor that been mentioned in the table above. Knowing that, improvement of further research need to be done for all workgroup able to fully understand and comply with basic PSM system.

4.6 Regression Analysis

Regression analysis will describe relationship between two or more variables of process safety management research subjects such as level of understanding among workgroup, how they rate about level of difficulty of PSM element and how good of their safety culture in preventing major hazard incident.

4.6.1 Correlation between Part 2 Total, Part 3 Total and Part 4 influenced by workgroup

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Figure 4.4: Level of understanding between level of difficulty of PSM elements and safety culture practice correlation.

Figure above shows that relationship between Y variable which is “level of understanding in PSM” is correlated with X 1= “level of difficulty of PSM elements” and X2= “good practice of safety culture” by R square 55.89% and P-Value smaller than 0.001. In other way, good understanding of process safety determined by an easy to comply of PSM elements with good safety culture performed by workgroup. Various possibilities arose from the results, but first and foremost it is clear that safety training turned out to be the most approachable method to propagate good learning outcome for process safety management. The training provides great opportunity to convey equal safety message to all type of offshore workgroup. The company has taken serious in establishment of good safety culture among worker and carried out a good intervention program and behavioural observation of safety attitude and this is also contribute of better understanding in process safety management .

4.6.2 Correlation between Part 3 Total and Part 4 Influenced By Workgroup

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Figure 4.5: Correlate PSM level of difficulty and good safety culture influence by workgroup

Figure above shows that relationship between Y variable which is “level of difficulty in PSM elements” is correlated with X 1= “Safety culture rate by crews” and influence by workgroup category can be explained by R square 61.32% and P- Value smaller than 0.001. This show that a good safety culture toward minimizing major hazard incident will create better compliance and increase easiness perspective by worker in deferent work group. Excellent practice of safety culture will create positive worker attitude such as safety intervention in unsafe act and behaviours, following company procedure and policy and always vigilant in any kind of risk that jeopardize people safety related to PSM failure. Excellent safety culture will create learning environment to all worker for their knowledge improvement.

4.6.3 Correlation between Part 4 Total versus Part 2 and Part 3 Influence by Workgroup

Y variable which is “total of safety culture rating” is correlated with X 1= “level of understanding in PSM” and X 2 = “Level of difficulty in PSM elements” and influence by workgroup category can be explained by R square 66.77% and P-Value smaller than 0.001. This show that a good safety culture toward minimizing major hazard incident is correlated with good understanding in PSM and low difficult in compliance and practice of PSM elements.

4.7 Hypothesis Test

Hypothesis 1

Null Hypothesis H 0 : There is equality on level of understanding in basic PSM among every worker due to frequent training related to basic process safety to be held in induction program and safety meeting,

Alternative Hypothesis H 1 : Level of understanding in PSM was different among workgroups

Table 4.39 : One Way ANOVA Test to Determine P-Value of Hypothesis

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From the table above show P-Value (0.008) less than significant value 0.05 that mean null hypothesis H0 is rejected and alternative hypothesis is accepted.

Hypothesis 2

Null Hypothesis H 0 : Level of difficulty of basic PSM will same for all workgroups due to company requirement.

Alternative Hypothesis H 1 : Level of difficulty of basic PSM are not same to be rated by all workgroup.

Table 4.40: One Way ANOVA Test to Determine P-Value of Hypothesis

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From the table above show P-Value (0.000) less than significant value 0.05 that mean null hypothesis H0 is rejected an alternative hypothesis is accepted.

Hypothesis 3

Null Hypothesis H 0 :There will be below of good rating in current practice of safety culture among all workers.

Alternative Hypothesis H 1 : There will be above of good rating in current practice of safety culture among all workers.

Null hypothesis Ho: p = 24,

Alternative hypothesis Hi: p > 24

To obtain at least “good” rating from the survey, mean must be at least (X = 24) and using one-sample T test, hypothesized mean (x) been set to 24

and P-value from the test was 0.010 which is smaller than significant value and null hypothesis is rejected. Which mean, alternative hypothesis is valid.

Hypothesis 3

Null Hypothesis H 0 :There will be a same reaction of every workers on improvement proposal in certain aspect of current practice of PSM.

Alternative Hypothesis H 1 : There is different reaction from every workers improvement proposal in certain aspect of current practice of PSM

Table 4.41: One Way ANOVA Test to Determine P-Value of Hypothesis

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From the table above show P-Value (0.475) bigger than significant value 0.05 that mean null hypothesis H0 is fail to be rejected.

4.8 Conclusion of research finding

4.8.1 Basic Understanding of PSM among Different Workgroup of Production

Platform Workers

There is large different between three workgroup on their understanding of basic process safety management that will need all worker to have the knowledge as preventative measure to lower the risk is major catastrophe happen in their platform. Between all three workgroup that been divided according to worker positions, highest score for technical workgroup determined by highest mean in overall score and specific item in questionnaire survey. Technical crew who is specifically involved in maintaining production equipment and specialize in handling process machinery and able to control production rate are highly knowledgeable in process safety. Second high knowledge and understanding into PSM is from management group which is derived from various position such as supervisor and engineer that mainly working on planning, monitoring and act as decision maker. Workers from this workgroup will not involve closely at the site but they need to supervise every job to be completed in safe and timely manner.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Figure 4.7: Boxplot of Total Score in level of understanding in PSM

Lowest understanding of basic PSM by non-technical group with their rating of PSM understanding in the middle from “not sure” to “agree” which mean this group are still not fully trained for process hazard identification and differentiate between occupational hazard and process hazard. Basic understanding of PSM will be need to enrich to entire workgroup of offshore workers so this will trigger their mind to work safely and aware of any danger related to process safety and able to react during emergency wisely. This research show that management and technical crew more attract in process equipment and safety device that related to process safety compared to non-technical crew concern on ability to describe about process safety only. Overall, some proactive action need to be done by company to ensure their message of process safety conveyed effectively for every non-technical crew such as painter, catering crews, scaffolder , medical staff and even safety health officer. They need to be trained for basic production system and major hazard for current operation that will risk their own life.

4.8.2 Differentiate Workers' Perception on Difficulty Level of Basic PSM Elements

Supervisor and other management team feel easy of PSM element related to risk assessment such as job safety analysis compared to their subordinate such as non­technical crew and technical crew rate “easy” for them to understand and comply incoming safety briefing. High rating in level of difficulty of PSM by technical crew shows that PSM elements that been included in survey question were easy to be complied followed by management workgroup as second highest rating .Overall, non­technical crew still response from “neutral” to “easy” show that they need to be trained more on PSM elements that been implemented long time ago in safe work practice in the platform. Company must have initiative to provide learning material for non­technical group for them to explore operational information especially related to process safety.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Figure 4.8: Boxplot of Total Score in PSM elements level of difficulty rate as easier by technical crews

4.8.3 Quality of Current Safety Culture to Reduce Risks in Process Incidents by Different Perspective of Workgroup

Highest rating of safety culture implementation from technical crew perspective followed by management crew and lastly non-technical crew. Surprisingly, in certain condition of crew mobility type, non-technical who in roving mode of their work nature will rate differently between another two type of workgroup. Non-technical workgroup will be knowledgeable and rate differently in safety culture if there are working intra platform because of their exposure on different environment of safety culture practice.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Figure 4.9: Boxplot of total score in safety culture

4.8.4 To measure worker agreements in opportunities to improve in process safety program gap.

Table below show that willingness to change was lower among non-technical workgroup. Compare with management crew and technical crew, their mean was slightly different. Non-technical rating was low in implementation PSM using electronic method which make crew to learn more and as a new burden for their workload. Boxplot below shows that non-technical worker agreement was low compare with another two workgroups. With lack of knowledge related to PSM and lack of process safety exposure by non-technical crew, this factors influence on their decision making style to rate their understanding, compliance and safety culture in offshore platform.

Table 4.42: Analysis of mean in different workgroup

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Figure 4.10: Boxplot of total score in part five

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary of Main Findings

Three aspect of questionnaire survey been distribute to all workgroup and the aims is to differentiate between these three workgroup related to their PSM understanding, their rating on PSM elements that been implemented in offshore facilities and to know their perspective using their rating on current safety culture factor that will influence effectiveness of major incident prevention. Lastly, their opinion on opportunity to improve statements from previous research gap been asked.

In this research results finding, non-technical workgroup always been lowest among another two workgroup in term of their understanding of PSM, lowest rating in level of difficulty in PSM elements and also lowest safety culture practice rating in offshore facilities. In certain condition on cross tabulation data, non-technical will rate higher than other workgroup if their work mobility type in roving mode, mean they have better exposure of safety when working in many type of platform. Consistency of highest ranking of mean analysis by technical crews prove that reliable of process safety management been implemented among offshore company and this will facilitate excellent of both operation and safety aspects.

In one-way ANOVA test, several factor from survey questions interact differently among all these three workgroups, high interaction rate prove by low P- Values between all three workgroup were related to technical aspect of PSM elements such as ability to identify certain device and equipment to be relate with process safety, proper maintaining process equipment, energy isolation process and permit to work system (PTW) which detailed been discussed in subtopic 4.4. Knowing this different factors will facilitate some improvement in PSM coaching.

On regression analysis, all aspect of PSM implementation was interrelated between each other and the correlation between PSM understanding to other aspect of PSM such as safety culture and PSM elements level of difficulty can be measure and well interaction with categorical factor of workgroup been observed, which mean, the consequence of bad practice of certain aspect will negatively impact on other correlated aspect of PSM practice with workgroup as influencer factor. With regression equation, researcher could predict the outcome result of other variables base on safety performance indicator.

This research aim is to differentiate between three major group of offshore worker which been divided according to their work nature. Management derived from various position among plenty of work scopes such as supervisor, engineers and managers which not involve directly at process site and their work nature was supervise and ensure in safe operation whilst maintaining good production. On- technical crew consist of various position assisting in good production rate and participate in safety program. Technical crew consist of maintenance crew and production crew with adequate experience to operate process equipment and maintain machinery functionality. Other than that, their main roles is to ensure process safety equipment including sensor, gas detector and valve in good condition. Overall, the results from this research shows that more work on educating non-technical crew need to be done soonest to ensure better implementation of basic PSM for all offshore folks.

5.2 Recommendations

Learning is the most important aspect to ensure equal safety message could be absorb by all workers. In this research, only basic PSM element been evaluate and there is many other element that not been discussed. Knowledge in basic o PSM will increase reliability of production activity without jeopardize safety of the workers. Learning from past incident will be useful for all offshore folks to ensure same incident will not reoccur in their facilities. To ensure everybody could learn better, proactive teaching methodology need to be conducted despite of using one-way presentation to all audience by presenter. Platform personnel who has responsibility in coaching people must have some brilliant way to present learning material using many type of media such as video presentation, online quizzes and interactive mobile application. Providing a lot of material and learning resource will create successful learning organization concept and this will improve non-technical group in their basic knowledge of PSM which is lower than other group.

Safety leadership is a training that will encourage group leader especially worker in management workgroup category to be more active in guiding their subordinate and motivating them to learn more about PSM. Adequate Safety leadership training is very important role to drive all worker for working safely by motivating them (Subramaniam, Shamsudin, & Alshuaibi, 2017).Non-technical worker must undergo comprehensive training of process safety prior starting a job in certain platform. Briefing that contain complete explanations in operation and production system will be useful for non-technical worker to have ideas how safety system works to maintain good production and safe operation.

Most of the training material and resources in offshore platform written in English. To ensure good understanding of PSM from non-technical workgroup, Malay translation is useful to ensure basic knowledge about PSM can be understand by low English proficiency personnel working in offshore. For example, company could describe in local language about their commitment in safety, their involvement in process safety, what are the system of PSM that currently been used. Explaining basic PSM in Malay language will encourage most of the worker especially in non-technical crew and the information will be more attractive because non-technical worker are not been confused by new term from direct translation of technical term compared with technical crew which been trained in English term of technical language.

Non-technical crew working in roving mode will be more knowledgeable compared with static non-technical worker. Working in many kind of platform make them gain a lot of experiences in different company and their awareness with new work surrounding is always like their first assignment. In other way, rotating non­technical crew for different platform will improve their knowledge by exploring different exposure of safety practice and culture in various platform. Information of platform operational fact need to be provided in easily and accessible for non-technical crew, to ensure no proprietary data and for security sake, platform management could provide learning resource related to basic operation and promoting process safety learning via poster and electronic media such as safety video material.

Resources of safety personnel need to be increased to ensure safety message could be learnt by all crew. Higher management personnel need to give approval for adequate safety personnel to be deployed to all platform for effective process safety coaching to all personnel on-board. Some company using discreet strategy by minimize the risk of exposing their potential dangerous occurrence and reluctant to cooperate in occupational and process safety incident by choosing not to hire dedicated company's certified personnel in occupational safety and health officer to be deployed in certain platforms. Existence of offshore safety and health officer will be more needful in oil and gas industry to ensure parallel guideline and OSHA act from Malaysia government authority in safety practice. Higher management commitment towards safety should be as same as displayed occupational safety and health policy as a minimum requirement by Occupational Safety and Health Act (Act 514)(Subramaniam et al., 2017).

Local agency of safety department such as Department of Occupational Safety and Health Malaysia (DOSH) are welcome to monitor implemented process safety management that been implemented in offshore industry. Active involvement by DOSH in offshore setting will improve more on local worker morality because the workers' welfare aspect in OSHA act 1994 will be complied in both side of company and worker. For example, some worker does not know what the implication of non­compliance in wearing PPE whilst doing their job, from their limited understanding, there will be some consequence management from company depend on higher management decision. In bigger context of OSHA Act 1997, Personnel who does not comply in PPE requirement will be subjected to be fine of RM 500 and also applicable for company negligence in supplying proper PPE to worker, there will be higher amount of fund and this will tarnished their reputation of world class oil and gas company that established for many decades. OSHA Act and regulation will be more effective if this department expand their coverage on offshore industry.

Malaysia offshore industry regulation is derived from PETRONAS Malaysia Petroleum Management (MPM) has main role as an only reference point for all upstream exploration that been managed by various oil and gas investor in production activities. PETRONAS responsibility is to ensure continuous of energy stability and security for Malaysia and sustain the development in domestic oil & gas industry as per mandate stipulated in section 3 of Petroleum Development Act endorsed since 1974.With this full trustworthy perspectives from local government towards PETRONAS as a part of government linked company, their wise decision in exposing their process safety related incident investigation report and transparency in managing process related technology will be much appreciated. This will encourage many researcher from Malaysia to see any gap of current practice in OSR-MS and some opportunity of improvement could be advice in different eyes or if the excellent management of OSR-MS was a far advance compared with other manufacturing industry, this could be some benefit to other industry to implement the efficient way same with what have been done in oil and gas industry in Malaysia.

5.3 Research Limitations

Similar to other academic works, this research has several limitations. The first limitation of this study is the small size of the final sample considered for analysis. In this research, the questionnaire will be created in dual language of Malay and English and will be made available online form which creates a limitation since computer illiterate workers might experience difficulties to respond to the questionnaire. Another limitation is that in the speed of the internet connection in a certain platform. Nearest to shore field platform uses fibre optic telecommunication. Nevertheless, other north fields, low-speed satellite internet communication was installed. All these factors might cause incomplete surveys which prevent statistical analysis of the statistical significance of responses and uncertainties in participants' answers. Due to data restriction policy and for a sake to protect company reputation, some participants will not participate in this research survey although this survey responses will be classified as anonymous. Worker assume in any non-positive research finding will be reflect on their company reputation and will impact on business risks for example, no open ended question regarding about PSM compliance will be ask due to worker perception of legislative action could be charge due to regulatory incompliance.

Although a competent bilingual TESL academician verified the Malay version of questionnaire, the translation of the survey from English to Malay may have caused a minor loss in the meaning of some technical terms. Finally, due to the unavailability of published data about PSM incident from PETRONAS and DOSH, it is difficult to confirm the facts provided by recent data of incidents due to confidentiality issues. Therefore, this work considered only the most frequent issues in common PSM elements that need to be understood by all crews on board and the evaluation mostly related to respondents' perspective and likelihood scale.

5.4 Implications of the Study

Limitation of this study mostly related to unwillingness of offshore folks to participate in the survey question, there is several factors that influence low participation among offshore worker related to stringent data protection policy that misinterpreted by workers which could reflect company reputation if there is some non-positive research finding might been explored by researcher. With low participation of respondents, this research does not fully utilize broad feedback from large population in offshore oil and gas platform workers. Other limitation is PSM elements that been studied is not a complete either fourteen element or twenty Risk­Base Process Safety (RBPS) approach. That mean , only basic of PSM element which is been identified that suit for all personnel working in oil and gas industry that need to be understand in three divided major workgroup of management, technical and non­technical. This research also not represent actual safety performance of any oil and gas field operator in Malaysia and the aims of this study is only to analyse different perspective of understanding and rating in safety culture and PSM implementation from three different workgroups.

Implication from this research will be effected on non-technical workgroup which is need to be trained in more effective way and different approach will be needed to evaluate how the process safety learning aspect could be learned by this workgroup in efficient way. Company may give more attention for this group by increasing some requirement of certain knowledge competency related to process safety by creating comprehensive learning module to suit for this workgroup understanding need. The safety culture in oil and gas industry will be changed and leadership by example is needful for other than non-technical crew to be more proactive in providing some thought and information on how their operate PSM in their routine jobs to no-technical crew.

Higher management of the oil and gas company expected to increase the budget in gathering resources to ensure all PSM learning module and extra effort is needed ensure safety message been understand by all workers. New requirement from company in safety knowledge will be change and there will be some challenge from services contractor side to fulfil the requirement. Otherwise, company will work in extra to provide learning material which can be access across company intranet network and will be compulsory to all new join worker to the industry to complete the training module related to process safety prior been graduated from new worker induction program.

5.5 Directions for Future Research

This research is expected to provide further data to be used for further research, by knowing any limitation of worker to understand PSM , it might facilitate potential researcher from PSM topic to improve level of awareness and understanding PSM in more effective way by providing improvement suggestion. PSM factor that differently reacted toward different workgroup might be useful for future researcher to dig more deeply on various PSM factor that might need improvement on how it can be learned from different workgroup .This research project will give researcher to gain more knowledge regarding PSM and there is advantage for researcher who was not in technical field get close in site to see how PSM been implemented excellently in oil and gas industry in Peninsular Malaysia Offshore (PMO).

There are many indicator of good practice of PSM that not been included in this research such as management of change (MOC) compliance ,mechanical integrity aspect that which is need to be measure by potential researcher. With prolonged timeline of research activity, potential researcher could measure percentage of completed preventative maintenance procedure as per scheduled job and this quantitative aspect of research method will be more accurate toward machinery and workplace aspect as added value in research paper related to oil and gas in Malaysia. Future researcher also can evaluate the effectiveness of learning aspect in process safety among offshore worker by taking some feedback or looking for pre-or post-test in safety learning module among offshore worker.

5.6 Conclusion

This research paper show that basic process safety management which is been expected to be understood to all kind of offshore worker is need some improvement. The knowledge of PSM need to be expand to non-technical background crew to ensure they have some sense of ownership to their workplace which is considered as high risk activity and high chances of massive destruction if unwanted incident happen. To achieve equal compliance of basic PSM that has been discussed in literature review, all worker need to fully understand it. There is several factors that been discussed in research finding which been identified to be interpreted or rated differently by each workgroup can be use as benchmark for future improvement to achieve the equality of understanding.

Improvement factor is also discussed in this research and proposed to all respondent of this research should be taken as a serious matter and need to be revised by industry player and regulation maker to ensure sustainability of O&G industry in Terengganu Offshore without jeopardize offshore worker welfare and safety by only rules using authority, in some point, this research is represent the voice of small population in O&G in Malaysia. Perhaps in the future, more research will be conducted specifically in O&G Malaysia to show how excellent of safety aspect consist of OSH , PSM and behavioural been practiced in Malaysia offshore.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

“ANALYSING PROCESS SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA OFFSHORE PRODUCTION PLATFORM”

-Critical Analysis Questionnaire­

Dear Participant,

I hereby invite you to participate in a study entitled Critical Analysis of Process Safety Management in Malaysian Oil and Gas Production Platforms. I am, at present, enrolled in MSc. In Occupational Safety Health and Risk Management program at Faculty Of Science And Technology , Open University Malaysia and in the process of writing my thesis. The data for this research can be used for further research by evaluating current practice of process safety in offshore platform including level of understanding, compliance and organizational safety culture practices. This could facilitate potential researchers on the PSM field to improve the level of awareness and understand PSM among different workgroups in a more effective way by providing suggestions for improvement.

Your feedbacks will be anonymous and confidential. No company name or field operator proprietary data will be collected. The data obtained from this research will be only reported as a collective combined total. If you agree to participate in this study, please answer the questions on the questionnaire as honest as you can.

Thank you for your assistance in the completion of this project.

Sincerely yours,

(MOHD AZLAN BIN AYOB )

PART I: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENT Tick (/) in the box provided.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

PART II: WORKERS' QUALITY OF UNDERSTANDING IN THE PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Please read the statements and choose one option based on the Likert Scale.

(1) Strongly disagree , (2) Disagree , (3) Not Sure , (4) Agree , (5) Strongly Agree

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

PART III: WORKERS' PERCEPTION ON BASIC PROCESS SAFETY ELEMENTS DIFFICULTY

Please read the statements and rate accordingly.

(1) Very difficult , (2) difficult , (3) Neutral , (4) Easy , (5) Very Easy

How do you rate the following process safety compliance in your platform?

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PART IV: CURRENT QUALITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY CULTURE TO REDUCE MAJOR INCIDENT

Please read the statements and rate safety culture in your platform

(1) Very poor , (2) Poor , (3) Moderate , (4) Good , (5) Very Good

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PART V: WORKERS' PERCEPTIONS ON OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE IN PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Please read the statements and choose one option based on the Likert Scale.

(2) Strongly disagree , (2) Disagree , (3) Not Sure , (4) Agree , (5) Strongly Agree

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Details

Title
Process Safety Management (PSM) in Terengganu Oil and Gas Production Platforms
College
Open University Malaysia
Course
MASTER IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT
Grade
3.76
Author
Year
2019
Pages
142
Catalog Number
V510758
Language
English
Tags
process, safety, management, terengganu, production, platforms
Quote paper
Mohd Azlan Ayob (Author), 2019, Process Safety Management (PSM) in Terengganu Oil and Gas Production Platforms, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/510758

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