This research undertakes a comparative analysis of the constitutional limitations and freedoms of France and Germany in regard to the establishment of the European Security and Defence Union. Integration in a sensitive policy-field will certainly lead to political debates, but where are the limits of national constitutions to this process? Which constitutional legal conditions are imposed when the conferral of substantive competences that touch the structural sovereignty of a state to the Union is required? What are the differences and similarities in the national constitutions of Germany and France for the conferral of powers to the Union?
Allowing to explore these and other questions, the constitutional law is analysed and in a subsequent discussion, the findings of the analysis is assessed to identify provisions restricting or facilitating further integration. These crucial provisions are evaluated and a potential path for overcoming the restricting laws is deduced. France and Germany have different constitutional provisions and requirements, which allow for the establishment of a common European Security and Defence Union. Both constitutions also set high hurdles for the conferral of sovereign powers to the Union and limit the abilities of a common Defence policy.
Seen against this background, the conclusion of international agreements appears to be first steps of an incremental approach to reach a common policy. The most promising avenue for future research could be the employment of comparative legal research methodology applied to multiple legislations in order to check for their mutual compatibility in certain policy areas. This approach allows for the identification of likely expectations of future development in this policy area.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Case selection
1.2 Background
1.3 Research problem
2 Research design
2.1 Methodology
3 National constitutional law and EU law in defence policy
3.1 EU law, national constitutional law and the hierarchy of norms
4 The limits of European integration in defence matters
5 Hard limits or flexible provisions?
5.1 Constitutional Amendments
5.2 Differentiated integration
6 Conclusion
Objectives and Key Themes
This thesis examines the legal compatibility of European integration in the field of security and defence with the national constitutional frameworks of Germany and France. It investigates the constitutional conditions imposed on the transfer of sovereign powers to the European Union, specifically addressing how these two nations manage the tension between EU-level integration and domestic constitutional constraints.
- Comparative analysis of German and French constitutional limitations regarding defence policy.
- Evaluation of the "conferral of powers" principle in the context of EU law and national sovereignty.
- Assessment of the role of national high courts in shaping the relationship between EU law and domestic constitutions.
- Investigation of potential pathways for incremental European defence integration through differentiated legal approaches.
Excerpt from the Book
1.1 Case selection
This contribution is focussed on the comparative evaluation of France's and Germany's constitutional provisions. These two particular countries have been selected because of their influential status within Union and their openly-stated intentions to advance cooperation in military and security policy-areas. The development of the European Security and Defence Union as well as the recent election of the former German minister of defence as president of the European Commission underlines the timeliness of the issue. Both countries have a shared history which has developed into a significantly different approach to military questions and defence issues. Whereas the Germans after World War II have been increasingly restrictive with the development and financing of military and security assets, the French have maintained a high level of engagement and investment.
From the legal perspective, Germany has a dualist legal system which requires the transposition of international law into domestic law. The BVerfG historically has been hesitant to accept the absolute primacy of EU law over its domestic legal-hegemonal position. Only 23 years after the establishment of the principle of EU law primacy in Costa/ ENEL in 1964, the German constitutional court formally recognised it in its famous Solange rulings. The BVerfG is an active court which understands its own position in the hierarchy of the European judicial system seriously. The German court aims to ensure that the constitutional identity of the German constitution is maintained and is hesitant to automatically give full precedence to EU law. In 2009, the BVerfG ruled in its Lisbon judgement that national sovereignty in key political areas must be maintained and the BVerfG maintained the right to control the Union's institutions including the ECJ.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: Provides the foundation for the research by discussing the interplay between national constitutions and European defence policy, identifying the core research question regarding the conditions for transferring structural sovereignty.
2 Research design: Outlines the exploratory, descriptive approach of the study and details the methodology used to compare legal provisions across the two member states.
3 National constitutional law and EU law in defence policy: Analyzes the historical evolution of the relationship between EU law and national constitutional orders, emphasizing the hierarchy of norms and judicial perspectives.
4 The limits of European integration in defence matters: Examines specific instances and treaties where French and German constitutional limitations have shaped or restricted their participation in EU defence initiatives.
5 Hard limits or flexible provisions?: Investigates the mechanisms for overcoming constitutional constraints, specifically through constitutional amendments and the strategy of differentiated integration.
6 Conclusion: Synthesizes the findings, suggesting that while constitutional hurdles exist, an incremental approach and differentiated integration may provide a path toward a common European security and defence framework.
Keywords
European Security and Defence Union, German Basic Law, French Constitution, Constitutional Identity, Conferral of Powers, BVerfG, Conseil d'État, CSDP, PESCO, European integration, Legal Compatibility, National Sovereignty, Primacy of EU Law, Differentiated Integration, Defence Policy
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental objective of this thesis?
The thesis aims to identify the constitutional conditions and limitations imposed by the French and German constitutions on the transfer of sovereign powers to the European Union within the sensitive policy area of security and defence.
Which countries are analyzed in this research?
The study focuses on Germany and France due to their influential status in the EU and their distinct historical and legal approaches to military and security cooperation.
What research methodology is employed?
The author uses a comparative legal analysis, examining relevant national constitutional provisions, case law from high courts, and the evolution of EU treaty law.
How do the German and French legal systems differ regarding EU law?
Germany utilizes a dualist system with a constitutional court that closely guards its national constitutional identity, while France has a monist system that generally grants precedence to ratified international agreements.
What is the role of the principle of "conferral of powers" in this work?
The principle serves as the central constitutional challenge, as it requires that any transfer of competences to the EU must comply with strict national legal requirements and democratic safeguards.
Why is the concept of "differentiated integration" significant?
It is presented as a potential solution or flexible pathway that allows member states to advance integration in defence matters without requiring immediate, wholesale changes to their national constitutions.
How does the BVerfG influence the integration process?
The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) asserts a right to scrutinize EU actions to ensure they do not violate the fundamental democratic principles of the German constitution, specifically regarding the transfer of budgetary and security powers.
Does the French constitution pose similar obstacles to German law?
While the French constitution also protects sovereignty, the mechanisms for ratifying international agreements are different, often involving the President and the parliament, with the Constitutional Council providing necessary scrutiny to ensure compatibility.
- Quote paper
- Kristen Feiter (Author), 2019, Legal Compatibility of European Integration in Security and Defence matters with German and French Constitutional Law, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/512522
