The European Union’s regulatory system becomes increasingly more complex and by the incremental amount of competences that are conferred upon it by the Treaties. The traditional partitioning between the Union’s legislative institutions sees an increasing mismatch between the ever-larger complexity and specialisation of functions of government, which is not adequately met with an increase in potent administrative instruments these institutions could rely upon. One of the methods, the Union has established to counter this expanding problem, is the instalment of agencies which shall provide the law-making bodies with expertise, information and consultation. The principle of subsidiarity has been interpreted in order for the European Union to be delegating powers to these agencies.
Agencies are capable of significantly reducing the workload of the legislative capacities while addressing politically or technically difficult or divisive topics and are frequently used in sensitive issues of domestic policy-making. Agencies may also provide expertise in complex policy areas, to integrate or to exclude interest groups into the policy process for different reasons. Judicial-type agencies have advantages on the grounds of quickness, the inclusion of technical expertise, the neutrality in the eyes of interests suspicious of the conventional legal system and their greater degree of public accessibility. These advantages of larger flexibility, speed and ability to choose the composition of the agencies come with potential risks and downsides.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Introduction and Issue
- Legal background
- Application
- Subsidiarity and separation of powers
- Legitimacy
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This paper analyses the legitimacy, accountability, and subsidiarity of European Union agencies. It examines the delegation of power to these agencies from the legislative institutions of the Union and the implications of this delegation for the principles of democratic oversight and public accountability. The paper also explores the legal basis for the existence of agencies and their role in the law-making process.
- The delegation of power to EU agencies and its implications for democratic oversight and public accountability
- The role of the principle of subsidiarity in justifying the delegation of power to agencies
- The legal basis for the existence and operation of EU agencies
- The potential risks and downsides of delegating power to agencies
- The relationship between EU agencies and the legislative institutions of the Union
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
- Introduction and Issue: This chapter introduces the concept of EU agencies and their increasing role in the Union's regulatory system. It highlights the potential challenges posed by agencies in terms of democratic oversight, accountability, and the principle of subsidiarity. The chapter discusses the use of agencies to address complex policy areas and their advantages and disadvantages.
- Legal background: This chapter examines the legal framework surrounding EU agencies, drawing on the principal-agent theory to explain the potential conflicts between the aims of the legislative institutions and the agencies. It explores the concept of risk sharing and the importance of a clear contract between the principal and the agent to ensure effective governance. The chapter also discusses the legal basis for the constitutionality of agencies, including the principle of subsidiarity and the Meroni doctrine. It highlights the ongoing debate about the ability of elected governance bodies to delegate powers to non-elected agencies.
- Application: This chapter delves into specific areas of criticism regarding EU agencies, including the separation of powers and the issue of legitimacy. It discusses the application of legal arguments and potential legal remedies for challenging the actions of agencies. The chapter examines the role of subsidiarity in relation to the separation of powers and explores the different models of governance applied by agencies, highlighting the potential lack of democratic oversight and public involvement.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
The main keywords and focus topics of this paper are EU agencies, legitimacy, accountability, subsidiarity, principal-agent theory, risk sharing, democratic oversight, public involvement, legal framework, Meroni doctrine, separation of powers, and governance models. The paper focuses on the challenges of ensuring democratic accountability and upholding the principle of subsidiarity in the context of delegating power to EU agencies.
- Citar trabajo
- Kristen Feiter (Autor), 2018, Legitimacy, Accountability and Subsidiarity of the Union’s Agencies, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/512523
