ABSTRACT
Dieser Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Umsetzung der Privatisierung in Russland im Rahmen des Transformationsprozesses. Die Umwandlung von Staats- in Privateigentum in einer ehemaligen sozialistischen Planwirtschaft galt als einer der konstituierenden Grundbausteine beim Aufbau einer Marktwirtschaft. Hierzu musste ein umfangreiches Privatisierungsprogramm erarbeitet und umgesetzt werden. Die Besonderheit in der ehemaligen Sowjetunion bestand dabei vor allem darin, dass es für eine derart weit reichende Privatisierung fast sämtlicher Industriezweige innerhalb kürzester Zeit bis dato noch kein praktisches Äquivalent gab, an dem man sich hätte orientieren können.
Westliche Ökonomen, die als Berater der russischen Reformer wesentlichen Einfluss auf das Programm nahmen, legten bei ihren Annahmen und Zielen neoklassische Wirtschaftstheorien zugrunde, die im wesentlichen rationale und nutzenmaximierende Akteure voraussetzen. Sie hatten jedoch relativ wenig Erfahrung mit dem tatsächlichen Verhalten russischer Akteure.
Woran diese westlichen Ansätze bei ihrer praktischen Umsetzung scheiterten, wird der folgende Aufsatz versuchen zu beschreiben.
Einige der zu erwartenden Restriktionen des Privatisierungsprozesses, wie z.B. die ungünstigen ökonomischen und rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen, politische Instabilität und das wahrscheinliche Fortbestehen bestimmter informeller Netzwerke, waren den Reformern durchaus bewusst und konnten dementsprechend teilweise bei der Planung Berücksichtigung finden. Zur inhaltlichen Eingrenzung soll in diesem Aufsatz jedoch nur auf jene Faktoren eingegangen werden, die größtenteils unterschätzt wurden, und welche sich auch als nur schwer beeinflussbar erwiesen. Hierbei wird insbesondere auf kulturelle Werte im Sinne von über Jahrzehnte erlernter Verhaltensweisen und Denkmodelle, auf Informationsdefizite, die Rolle von Kriminalität und auf die (erhofften) neuen Anreize der beteiligten Akteure eingegangen. Diese anfänglichen Reaktionen auf die Privatisierung, die eben nicht der Theorie des Homo Oeconomicus entsprachen, behinderten die Umsetzung der angestrebten Ziele. Daher zieht der letzte Teil Bilanz, inwieweit diese von den Reformern geplanten Ziele verwirklicht werden konnten.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Conceptual Basics of the Privatisation process
2.1 Aims and tasks of privatisation
2.2 Different strategies of putting privatisation into action
2.3 Consequences for ownership
2.4 Special features of the Russian case
3. The course of privatisation in Russia
3.1 The Privatisation Program
3.2 Privatisation in its practical implementation
4. Underestimated difficulties in achieving the aims
4.1 Cultural values
4.2 Information deficits
4.3 The role of crime
4.4 Management initiative and incentives for restructuring
4.5 Incentives for restructuring on the part of workers
5. Summary and conclusion
Objectives and Research Focus
This paper examines the implementation of the Russian privatisation process during its initial phase of economic transformation. It investigates why Western-style economic reforms failed to achieve their intended goals when applied to a post-communist society, specifically focusing on large and medium-sized enterprises until 1994.
- Theoretical foundations of the Russian privatisation program.
- The divergence between economic theory and the practical reality of Russian actors.
- Barriers such as ingrained cultural values, lack of information, and the role of crime.
- Management and worker incentives regarding enterprise restructuring.
- The assessment of initial privatisation outcomes against original reform goals.
Excerpt from the Book
4.3 The role of crime
During the course of reforms the “invisible hand of the market” was becoming more and more criminal, and the private sector increasingly became hostage to the intrusions of criminal groups. One reason was the loosening of state control in ways that permitted organised crime to step into the resulting coordination vacuum. In 1994, a study prepared under Yeltsin aide Petr Filippov found that at least 70 percent of all privatised enterprises and commercial banks had connections with organised crime, which controlled all kinds of activity.
If such obstacles in the Russian marketplace hampered Russian entrepreneurs, they had a deterrent effect on foreigners, for whom organised crime exacerbated the cultural barriers between the ex-socialist East and capitalist West. Unlucky foreign businessmen found themselves the target of extortion and worse and found little sympathy from already overworked police and courts.
Another example of criminal activity evolved among investment funds, where there was a great number of bogus firms exploiting the unawareness of ordinary citizens by promising astronomical dividends. Extensive advertising campaigns on television and radio led to a run on shares of some of funds which could not only be purchased against vouchers but also against cash. The stock rate was set by the investment firm itself, climbed permanently and thus suggested profitable investment opportunities. “In St Petersburg, three companies set up to receive investments simply disappeared – as did the savings of about 400,000 of their depositors.” It was only then that controls increased. At that time, however, peoples’ trust in the voucher programme had already been lost.
Chapter Summaries
1. Introduction: Outlines the research objective of analyzing why the Russian privatisation process encountered significant difficulties compared to Western economic assumptions.
2. Conceptual Basics of the Privatisation process: Details the theoretical aims of privatisation, such as depoliticization and the creation of efficient corporate governance, while discussing various allocation strategies.
3. The course of privatisation in Russia: Describes the actual implementation of the government's voucher program and the concessions made to powerful interest groups like enterprise directors.
4. Underestimated difficulties in achieving the aims: Analyzes the practical obstacles that hindered successful restructuring, including deep-seated cultural values, lack of transparency, criminal influence, and misaligned management incentives.
5. Summary and conclusion: Synthesizes findings, concluding that while privatisation achieved some political stability, it failed to trigger the anticipated economic efficiency due to institutional and societal constraints.
Keywords
Privatisation, Russia, Economic Transformation, Transition, Market Economy, Voucher Program, Corporate Governance, Depoliticization, Insider Privatisation, Restructuring, Cultural Values, Organised Crime, Management Buy Out, Labour Collective, Economic Reform.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper examines the privatisation of large and medium-sized enterprises in Russia during the early 1990s and assesses why the implementation deviated significantly from initial economic theories.
What are the primary themes discussed?
The primary themes include the transition from a command to a market economy, the conflict between neoclassical economic assumptions and Soviet-era institutional realities, and the unintended consequences of the voucher privatisation program.
What was the main goal of the Russian reformers?
The reformers aimed to depoliticize the economy, dismantle the influence of the communist nomenklatura, and create a broad base of private shareholders to foster efficient, profit-oriented enterprises.
Which scientific methodology is used?
The paper utilizes an analytical comparative approach, contrasting Western neoclassical economic theories and institutional frameworks against the historical and social peculiarities of the Russian context.
What does the main body of the text cover?
The main body evaluates the conceptual basics of privatisation, the practical execution of the voucher program, and the structural obstacles—such as crime, information deficits, and resistance to change—that undermined the effectiveness of the reforms.
Which keywords define this work?
The work is characterized by terms such as transition, privatisation, voucher program, corporate governance, insider ownership, and institutional change.
How did "collective social jealousy" affect the reform?
It acted as a barrier to economic restructuring because it reinforced egalitarian values from the communist era, preventing the introduction of wage differentials or other material incentives that could have motivated higher productivity.
What role did organized crime play?
Organized crime filled the power vacuum left by the declining state, infiltrating a vast percentage of privatized enterprises and banks, which created high risks for entrepreneurs and deterred legitimate foreign investment.
Why was the "insider" model so prevalent?
The insider model, which favored managers and workers, was adopted as a political compromise to ensure the program's feasibility in the face of strong lobbying from enterprise directors and the need for public support.
- Citar trabajo
- Christine Polzin (Autor), 2003, Privatisation in Russia - a successful experiment on the way to a market economy?, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/53817
