Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong opened the 6thSummit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Hanoi with the words: "This has been a traumatic year for ASEAN members." Indeed, the financial crisis of 1997 marked the end of an extraordinary decade of internationally oriented economic growth throughout Southeast Asia, and came as a shock for the Southeast Asian countries. Although Paul Krugman had warned that Asian growth, like that of the Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seemed to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like labour and capital rather than by gains in efficiency, his was a lone voice in academic discussion. The severity of the crisis inevitably raised the question of how it would affect ASEAN. Ross Garnaut commented that the largest long-term effect of the crisis would be its effect on policy formulation.
Since its formation in 1967, ASEAN has occupied a central role in the international relations of Southeast Asia.5It was the first regional organization in Asia, and is a crucial factor in East Asian and Asia-Pacific regionalism. From the beginning, ASEAN’s mission was regional resilience against great power interests. Economic development in the region was perceived as means to ward off communist and ethnic rebellions. However, after three decades of promoting peaceful intra-regional relations, ASEANone of the most successful regional organizations in the developing world-has needed to seriously reinvent itself since 1997. As the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, Shanmugam Jayakumar, noted in April 2006: “we have to rethink and remake ASEAN”. According to Jayakumar, ASEAN has to deepen and accelerate the process of integration to stay competitive in the face of the challenges confronting the regional grouping, or face the risk of being marginalised. Furthermore, he claimed that ASEAN must adopt a different paradigm with both bold and practical ideas for the future.
This essay will examine four reasons why ASEAN must redefine its future aims, strategies and paths. The first part deals with its failure to react to the financial crisis, while the second outlines its norms, especially non-interference. Parts three and four analyse external factors: the rise of China, the emergence of East Asian regionalism and other geopolitical factors.
Table of Contents
Introduction
I. Failure to react to the financial crisis
II. Ineffectiveness of the ‘ASEAN-way’
III. ASEAN’s view on China
IV. Emergence of East-Asia regionalism and geopolitical factors
Conclusion
Objectives and Themes
This essay examines the imperative for ASEAN to undergo a process of reform and reinvention following the regional financial crisis of 1997. It explores the organization's struggle to maintain relevance and credibility in the face of shifting internal norms and external geopolitical pressures.
- The impact of the 1997 financial crisis on ASEAN's regional influence.
- Critique and evaluation of the "ASEAN-way" and its norm of non-interference.
- The shifting strategic relationship between ASEAN and a rising China.
- The influence of East Asian regionalism and Sino-Japanese competition on ASEAN's future.
Excerpt from the Book
I. Failure to react to the financial crisis
Asiaweek commented in December 1998: “Never before have the members differed with each other so intractably and so publicly – leading many observers to even fear for ASEAN's very survival.” Indeed, the financial crisis had been widely recognised, even within the grouping itself, as a major blow to ASEAN’s credibility. In many ways, it had shown the limits of Southeast Asian’s regional capability, as the Southeast Asian nation-states did not respond to this major economic crisis by strengthening cooperation. Bluntly stated, ASEAN as an organization was irrelevant in the financial crisis. Neither as a group nor as individual members were the ASEAN countries able to provide the resources to one another that would have enabled them to restore financial stability.
ASEAN states were basically left on their own to deal with the IMF and to find their own ways out of the crisis. Anthony Milner highlighted the differing perceptions and interpretations of the financial crisis. The King of Thailand proposed in December 1997 that if it could revert to being a self-sufficient economy, Thailand would survive. In Indonesia, the crisis quickly escalated from being solely monetary to a near total, including political, disaster. Indonesia’s earlier prosperity was as attributed to the achievements of Suharto, but with the crisis the father of the state had failed. Until the beginning of December 1997, Malaysia’s position was characterized by denial that it would suffer Thailand’s fate. Problems were deemed to be temporary and were also blamed on external forces. Later, Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, repeatedly made vitriolic attacks on speculators and on the West, and evened threatened to impose capital controls.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Outlines the historical context of ASEAN and the immediate challenges posed by the 1997 financial crisis, establishing the need for institutional reform.
I. Failure to react to the financial crisis: Discusses the organization's inability to provide collective economic solutions and the resulting loss of regional credibility.
II. Ineffectiveness of the ‘ASEAN-way’: Analyzes the growing criticism of traditional norms, such as non-interference, in light of regional humanitarian and security issues.
III. ASEAN’s view on China: Examines how the rise of China as an economic and regional power forces ASEAN members to re-evaluate their identity and security.
IV. Emergence of East-Asia regionalism and geopolitical factors: Explores how external pressures and competition, particularly between China and Japan, shape ASEAN's new regional strategy.
Conclusion: Summarizes the uncertain path forward for ASEAN and the necessity of addressing internal governance and human rights issues to avoid marginalization.
Keywords
ASEAN, financial crisis, regionalism, non-interference, economic reform, China, geopolitics, East Asia, security community, integration, sovereignty, human rights, ASEAN+3, Sino-Japanese competition, economic growth.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this paper?
The paper focuses on the necessity for ASEAN to redefine its strategies and norms in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis to remain a relevant and effective regional organization.
What are the central themes discussed?
The central themes include the limitations of the "ASEAN-way," the impact of external economic powers like China, and the tension between national sovereignty and regional cooperation.
What is the primary research question?
The research asks why it became imperative for ASEAN to embark on a process of reform and "reinvention" following the regional crises starting in 1997.
Which methodology is applied?
The study employs a qualitative analysis of regional political developments, drawing on academic literature, press reports, and official policy statements to assess ASEAN's institutional performance.
What topics are covered in the main body?
The main body covers the failure to mitigate the 1997 financial crisis, the flaws in the non-interference doctrine, the strategic shift toward China, and the influence of broader East Asian regional frameworks.
Which keywords best describe this work?
Keywords include ASEAN, financial crisis, regionalism, non-interference, economic reform, and geopolitical competition.
How did the financial crisis affect ASEAN's organizational cohesion?
The crisis exposed a lack of collective capability, as individual members struggled independently, leading to public disagreements and internal friction that severely damaged the group's reputation.
Why is the "ASEAN-way" currently under scrutiny?
The "ASEAN-way," particularly its norm of non-interference, is under scrutiny because it prevents the organization from effectively addressing internal human rights issues and regional challenges like those in Burma.
How does the author characterize the role of China for ASEAN?
The author views China as both a critical investment competitor and a stabilizer that helped avert a deeper regional collapse during the crisis, forcing ASEAN to re-conceptualize its relations with Beijing.
- Quote paper
- M.A. Sandra Tauer (Author), 2006, Assessing ASEAN's Performance and Potential - 'Why has it been imperative for ASEAN to embark on a process of reform and 'reinvention' since the regional crisis?', Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/62817
