Leseprobe
Table of Contents
Table of Figures
1. Introduction
2. The Role of the Government and the CCP in the Economy
2.1. Practical Operation of the Political System
2.2. Role of the SASAC
2.3. Appointment of Listed Companies
2.4. Key Policy Making Process
3. The Performance of the Government and the CCP in the Economy
3.1. Economical Factors
3.2.1. Economical Growth
3.2.2. Allocation of Economic Growth
3.2.3. Economical Internationalization
3.2. Social Factors
3.3. Specific Targets
4. Conclusion
5. Bibliography
Table of Figures
Figure 1: The Structure of the Chinese Political System
Figure 2: The Process of Appointments of SOE Leaders
Figure 3: Key Policy Making Process
Figure 4: Regional Disparities in China (2004)
Figure 5: Development of FDI in China
Figure 6: Development of Regional Disparities in Wages in China
Figure 7: China’s Human Development Index (HDI)
1. Introduction
The rise of China is one of the most important developments in the recent history of globalization. Since the beginning of the “Open Door Policy” (1978) initiated by Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) China emerged from an autarky central planned economy to the third biggest trading nation in the world and one of the most important destinations for foreign direct investments (FDI). It has shown that this impressive development has wide range effects on all members of the global community and confronts them with new challenges but also offers great chances.
When exploring the impressive recent Chinese development the question arises what role the Chinese government and in particular the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) played in the processes of decision making for political, economical and cultural policy changes. Furthermore, this study addresses the question whether the success of the recent Chinese development can be really seen as a success of the Chinese government and will look for means to measure the performance of the Chinese government.
2. The Role of the Government and the CCP in the Economy
Before analyzing the performance of the Chinese government and the CCP one has to understand the concept of the Chinese political system. Even though this subject has already been widely researched, the real relationship between the CCP and the government bodies still remains blurry. Most of these studies only focus on the theoretical structure of the political system. However, in the case of China we are confronted with a big difference between theory and practice. Therefore, this study first tries to focus on the practical relationship between the CCP and the Chinese government bodies.
2.1. Practical Operation of the Political System
By Art. 62 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the National People’s Congress (NPC) is the supreme organ of state power. Its permanent body is the Standing Committee of the NPC. However, in reality it faces strong challenges from the CCP and the State Council. The relationship between the CCP, the NPC and its permanent body as well as the State Council is very ambiguous and blurry. The preamble of the Chinese constitution sets the principle that “China persists in accepting the leadership of the China Communist party”. However, there is no specific legal or formal regulation concerning the relationship between these organs.
Figure 1: Structure of the Chinese Political System
illustration not visible in this excerpt
Source: own graph.
Hence, the question arises how the CCP is able to practise the Chinese leadership in all levels of the formal national power bodies. Since the CCP dominates the national power, it is possible for it to prohibit further discussions of disharmonic political topics. Therefore, there are no public discussions about the “true” power of the CCP. In practise, the CCP itself and all national power bodies abide the hierarchical organisation principles of the constitution of the CCP:
“Individual party members are subordinate to the party organization. The minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower-level organizations subordinate to the higher level. All party members and party organizations subordinate to the party's national congress and central committee.”
(Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Chapter 2, Art. 10).
Although there are no direct regulations referring to the relationship between the CCP and the national power bodies, the CCP can direct national power bodies by using party commissions. The CCP has the power to set up party commissions in each power body. By the principle that “all party members and party organizations have to subordinate to the party's national congress and central committee” (Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Chapter 2, Art. 10) the CCP has secured its leadership in an arched but clever way.
In fact the NPC and its permanent bodies neither have the responsibility to report their work to the CCP nor to follow the CCP’s instructions. However, both the party commissions of the NPC and its permanent bodies have to abide the CCP. Furthermore the party commissions of the NPC and its permanent bodies control firmly and closely the NPC and its permanent bodies. Therefore, the NPC as well as its permanent bodies, the supreme state power organs, have to submit to the CCP.
In general the NPC and its permanent bodies practise what the CCP favours or approves. The Party Commission of the Standing Committee of the NPC serves the CCP as an effective tool to control the Standing Committee of the NPC. After all the Party Commission is the formal and main institute for the Standing Committee of the NPC to report to or get approval from the CCP.
The principles and conclusion that we discussed above also apply to the State Council. The State Council is the executive body of the supreme organ of state power. It is responsible for the NPC and its permanent bodies. In reality the State Council is more powerful and more important than the Standing Committee of the NPC, even though it also has to submit to the CCP. The CCP uses the Party Commission of the State Council to control the State Council.
Hence, for a better understanding of the power of the CCP, the relationship between the CCP and the national power bodies needs to be analyzed. Furthermore, the way how the party commission achieves control of state organs is of major importance. Only by examining these relationships one can truly understand the processes of political, economical and cultural decision-making in China. The next chapters will address these questions.
2.2. Role of the SASAC
The Chinese constitution characterizes State owned enterprises (SOE) as the “leading force in the economy” (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Amendment Two, 1993, Art. 7). Based on this principle the Standing Committee of the NPC and the State Council authorize the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) to carry out the responsibility of an investor. The SASAC practices it’s power as a ministry level state organ in accordance with the “Company Law of the People’s Republic of China” and other administrative regulations.
The responsibilities of the SASAC are as follows:
- “Appoint and remove top executives of enterprises, and evaluate their performances through legal procedures;
- Dispatch supervisory panels to large enterprises on behalf of the state;
- Take charge of daily management of the supervisory panels;
- Supervise and administer the preservation and increment of the value of state-owned assets under the supervision of SASAC through statistics and auditing;
- Drafts laws, administrative regulations of the management of the state-owned assets and draws up related rules and so on.” (SASAC 2007)
2.3. Appointment of Listed Companies
The SASAC has the power to appointment SOE leaders according to the functions authorized by the State Council. However, the power of appointment is broadly considered as the most important power in the levels of state organs power. In China the CCP solely enjoys this power.
Figure 2: Process of Appointments of SOE Leaders
illustration not visible in this excerpt
Source: own graph
The organization department of the CCP is the party organ responsible for all important appointments under the leadership of Political Bureau of the CCP and its permanent body the Secretariat of Central Committee of the CCP.
The state organs such as the Standing Committee of the NPC or the State Council have the power to appoint SOE leaders by the constitution. In practices, the organization department of the CCP is under the leadership of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP which directly makes decision regarding the appointments of SOE leaders.
Sometimes the State Council makes an appointment suggestion to get approval or an agreement from the organization department of the CCP through the party commission of the State Council. If the appointment is of great importance, the organization department must submit the proposal to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP. The SASAC only has nominal appointment power for SOE leaders. She practices her power according to the decision of the organization departments and the State Council. Because the biggest SOE enjoy basically the same political position as the SASAC it is impossible for a minister to appoint their leaders. The appointment of the members of the party commissions of SOE is directly decided by the organization department of the CCP.
2.4. Key Policy Making Process
Compared to the important appointment power of SOE leaders, the SASAC has more freedom and power to decide or influence the significant policy-making process. It is day to day practice in China that important policy decisions by the ministry are reported or submitted to the high-level administrative body – the State Council. Although the State Council also has to report such significant policy decisions to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CCP, it is not as obvious as the appointment influenced by the CCP. Hence, it is widely believed that the SASAC plays a key role in the processes of significant policy making in China.
Figure 3: Key Policy Making Process
illustration not visible in this excerpt
Source: own graph
3. The Performance of the Government and the CCP in the Economy
The second part of this study focuses on the question whether the above described political system was beneficial for the Chinese process of transition. To answer this question empirical data of the last years of the performance of the Chinese government will be presented and analyzed. Government performance is defined as the role of the government in improving economical as well as social conditions and whether it was able to reach its own targets and goals.
Beforehand one has to bring to mind that these areas (economical, social, own targets) are affected by global factors that are difficult for Chinas government to influence. Nevertheless, the task of Chinas government can be seen in the “protection of its people and in maximizing the quality of living of the Chinese people” (Hirn 2005, p. 29). Therefore, the question lying ahead is, whether the Chinese government managed to control the process of transition or whether it is just a result of global trends and most important of all, whether the Chinese people benefited from the process of transition.
3.1. Economical Factors
The Chinese government proved to be very reformative regarding the transition of the Chinese economic system: By authorizing the development of private markets and opening the economy to international trade, the Chinese government accomplished an extensive transition (Heilmann, 1996, p. 11). Ideological policy approaches like during the area of Mao Tze-Dong (毛泽东) were replaced by practical and goal orientated policy measures focusing on an extensive development of Chinas economy by all means. Nothing fits better to describe this philosophy than the speech of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) at the third plenum of the 11th CCP where the basic decision was reached to shift the focus of government policy to economic reforms:
“It does not matter if the cat is black or white, as long as it catches the mice.” (Deng, 1978)
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