When a person is employed in a particular position, it is expected that he will work hard and perform well, regardless of his status. In the sector of Academia there are several incentives to work hard, such as promotion to full professorship and increases in the salary. Furthermore, there is also the opportunity to attain tenure, which would guarantee employment for life. As such, tenure provides possibly the strongest incentive to pursue good work.
This type of job security, however, is often criticized, as a decline of effort and productivity are expected after tenure is awarded.
This paper will investigate whether there are incentives for academics to continue to work hard, and not to slack off after tenure is granted. It will commence by explaining, the academic tenure system, in chapter 2 to understand the whole purpose of the idea of tenure, followed by an analysis of two models, in chapter 3 and 4, which will explore the role of tenure as incentive to exert effort in consideration of job security.
The first model, analysed in section 3, is a theoretically solved principal -agent problem by A. Dnes and N. Garoupa. It analyses how the participants will act and how incentives should be set so that efficient work will result. The second model, by S. Li and H. Ou-Yang, analysed in chapter 4 investigates empirical data to determine if academics work hard even if after tenure has been obtained.
Finally to end this paper the main results will be summarised and relevant conclusions will be drawn.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The academic tenure system
2.1 Reasons for tenure
2.2 The process of granting tenure
2.3 Revocation of tenure
3. Model of academic tenure and contractual damages
3.1 Basic model
3.1.1 Stage 3: Department decision
3.1.2 Stage 2: Incentive compatibility constraint
3.1.3 Stage 1: Participation constraint
3.2. Cognitions
4. Empirical model of incentive, performance and academic tenure
4.1 The analysis and data set
4.2 Findings of the study
4.3 Acquired implications of tenure
4.4 Result of the analysis
5. Conclusions
Objectives and Core Themes
This paper investigates the incentive structures within the academic tenure system to determine whether professors maintain high levels of productivity after receiving life-long job security. By synthesizing both theoretical modeling and empirical data, the research addresses the concern that tenure might lead to a decline in effort (slacking off) and explores how implicit and explicit incentives mitigate such behavior.
- Analysis of the principal-agent problem in academic tenure
- The role of contractual damages in maintaining work incentives
- Evaluation of empirical productivity and citation impacts post-tenure
- Distinction between explicit monetary incentives and implicit reputational incentives
- Assessment of tenure as a mechanism for academic freedom versus productivity
Excerpt from the Book
2. The academic tenure system
Tenure is a form of job protection that professors have from their colleagues, and the special problems created by an academic democracy. Originally, it was conceived to protect faculty members' subsistence from politically and religiously powerful individuals outside of universities, as academics were often confronted with people who disagreed with controversial research findings and teachings. Tenure was established to avoid pressure on university administrations to terminate the employment of, or discipline professors.
Academic tenure is generally considered to be the main goal of most professors, and assistant professors. Since without tenure, as general rule, faculty members must retreat, or seek other academic employment, after five to seven years of service. Tenure is also a desired as it is status symbol.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Outlines the research problem regarding whether tenure creates a disincentive for academic performance and introduces the two models (theoretical and empirical) used for investigation.
2. The academic tenure system: Details the historical purpose of tenure as a safeguard for academic freedom and describes the current process of granting and revoking tenure.
3. Model of academic tenure and contractual damages: Explores a theoretical principal-agent model to analyze how wage setting and contractual damages can effectively maintain effort after tenure is granted.
4. Empirical model of incentive, performance and academic tenure: Presents an empirical investigation of productivity and citation impacts among economists to determine if actual output declines after obtaining tenure status.
5. Conclusions: Synthesizes findings from both the theoretical and empirical sections, confirming that incentives for hard work persist even under the job security provided by tenure.
Keywords
Academic tenure, job security, principal-agent problem, research productivity, citation index, explicit incentives, implicit incentives, contractual damages, academic freedom, performance, university administration, salary, tenure track, career incentives, academic democracy.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research?
The paper examines whether the job security inherent in academic tenure leads to a decline in professional effort or if mechanisms exist to ensure that academics continue to work hard post-tenure.
What are the central thematic areas?
The core themes include the historical justification for tenure, theoretical models of incentives, the role of contractual damages, and empirical evaluations of faculty research productivity.
What is the primary objective of the work?
The goal is to determine if tenure creates a "slacking off" effect and to identify what specific incentives (monetary or reputational) effectively prevent such a decline in academic performance.
Which scientific methods are employed?
The paper uses a comparative approach: it applies a theoretical principal-agent model to analyze incentive compatibility and contrasts this with an empirical study of productivity data and citation impacts.
What does the main body cover?
The main body breaks down the theoretical framework of Dnes and Garoupa regarding contractual damages and the empirical analysis by Li and Ou-Yang, which measures publications and citations before and after tenure.
Which keywords characterize this work?
Essential keywords include academic tenure, job security, incentive structures, research productivity, and implicit/explicit incentives.
How does the theoretical model account for dismissals?
The model introduces the concept of a court that may award contractual damages, creating a scenario where universities and professors can negotiate optimal contracts that prevent shirking.
What is the significance of the citation index in the empirical study?
The authors argue that the citation index is a more objective and meaningful measure of research quality than a simple count of publications, as it reflects the actual impact of an academic's work.
Does the author conclude that tenure reform is necessary?
The author suggests that tenure reform is not necessarily a "panacea," as existing incentives already appear to maintain high levels of professional output even within the current tenure system.
- Quote paper
- Tanja Hauser (Author), 2006, Incentive properties of academic tenure, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/76283
