Free will is one of the most fundamental presuppositions that we make in our everyday lives. At the same time, free will belongs to the concepts that are most difficult to integrate into a scientific idea of how the world works. This contrast has haunted philosophers for centuries, and although it seems that almost everything has already been said about this topic, there has been an animated debate in recent decades. In this paper, I would like to consider two of the positions adopted in this debate.
At first, I would like to explore John Searle's interpretation of free will as a sequence of several moments of indeterminacy ("gaps") between the reasons for our actions and the actions themselves. I think the best way to understand his conception is to see it as an attempt to unite two different ideas about the relation between reasons and actions. On the one hand, the realist conception of Searle's philosophy presupposes that the reasons for our actions must have real causal power and are not only post facto justifications. On the other hand, Searle's understanding of rationality implies that reasons alone cannot be sufficient causes. In "Rationality in Action" Searle tries to bring both ideas together through the notion of an agent-self. I will argue that this attempt is problematic, not only because it leads our conception of free will towards a very unsatisfying choice between epiphenomenalism and natural indeterminism, but also because Searle cannot explain convincingly how the existence of indeterminacy in our brains could explain free will.
The second part of the paper is an attempt to develop an alternative notion of free will, relying on two influential articles by Harry Frankfurt and Peter Strawson. The basic idea is that when we are interested in free will, we are not primarily interested in causal origins, but in self-determination, which is also the main presupposition in the practice of holding people responsible. With this perspective in mind, I will finally return to the questions of the natural foundations of free will and its compatibility with a deterministic conception of nature.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Free Will as Indeterminacy
Reasons and Causal Explanations
The Agent-Self
Objections
Free Will as Self-Determination
Second-Order Desires and Valuing
Reactive Attitudes and Responsibility
Choice and Determinism
Conclusion
Objectives & Core Themes
This paper examines the compatibility of free will with a deterministic conception of nature. It critically assesses John Searle’s "gap" theory of indeterminacy and develops an alternative framework based on self-determination, responsibility, and the evaluation of desires.
- The critique of natural indeterminacy as a sufficient explanation for free will.
- The role of the agent-self in bridging reasons and causal explanations.
- Self-determination through Harry Frankfurt’s theory of second-order volitions.
- The social and moral dimension of responsibility in Peter Strawson’s and Jay Wallace’s theories.
- The reconciliation of choice and agency within a deterministic framework.
Excerpt from the Book
Free Will as Indeterminacy
One of the fundamental assumptions of Searle's theory of rationality is that the reasons, decisions and actions of rational agents are not simply parts of a causal chain, but are separated by different "gaps". This assumption is based on a psychological experience: if we look at our actions in retrospect, we do not think that our decisions are sufficient to cause actions. In our experience, having a reason for an action is not enough to actually make us act. If we look into the future, we experience these gaps as our ability to choose between several decisions and actions in the future.
Searle states that rational agents must have three of these gaps: the first gap must be between the reasons for an action and the making of the decision, the second between the decision and the onset of the action, and the third between the onset of the action and its continuation (in case of complex actions). All these gaps are psychologically expressed in the feeling that we as agents can intervene. For example, we feel that reasons do not compel us to make a certain decision, but that we still have to make the decision ourselves. Searle's thesis is that these gaps are what we mean when we talk about free will.
He emphasizes that this conception of ourselves as free agents is unavoidable, because we act, in Kant's words "under the idea of freedom". Thus, even a convinced determinist who sits in a restaurant cannot just wait for his desires to cause the decision for a certain meal, but he actually has to make a choice himself. Even his refusal to choose would be an exercise of freedom. For Searle, rational actions and free will are connected insofar as we must understand rational actions as the result of our choices, which excludes the idea of sufficient causation.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: The chapter sets the stage for the debate on free will, contrasting the scientific view of determinism with the everyday presupposition of freedom, and introduces the paper's dual approach: Searle’s indeterminacy theory and a self-determination model.
Free Will as Indeterminacy: This section critiques John Searle's "gaps" model, analyzing his attempt to ground agent-self theory in natural indeterminacy and addressing the resulting philosophical and empirical challenges.
Free Will as Self-Determination: This chapter shifts the focus from natural facts to human practice, utilizing Frankfurt’s concept of second-order volitions and the social responsibility frameworks of Strawson and Wallace to redefine free will.
Choice and Determinism: The author concludes that the existence of determinism is not an automatic obstacle to self-determination, provided that intentional states remain valid explanations and our desires are our own.
Conclusion: The author summarizes the findings, reiterating that free will is best understood as a matter of practical self-determination rather than an outcome of natural indeterminacy.
Keywords
Free Will, Determinism, Indeterminacy, Self-Determination, Rationality, Agent-Self, Second-Order Desires, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, Frankfurt, Searle, Strawson, Agency, Volition, Moral Sentiments
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the central focus of this paper?
The paper explores the tension between the belief in free will and the scientific assumption of a deterministic world, arguing for a shift toward an account of free will based on self-determination rather than physical indeterminacy.
What are the primary themes discussed?
The key themes include the ontological status of the "agent-self", the importance of higher-order desires in human action, the social practice of holding others responsible, and the compatibility of choice with deterministic laws.
What is the core research question?
The research asks how we can reconcile our self-conception as free, rational agents with the potential truth of determinism in nature.
Which scientific or philosophical methods are utilized?
The author uses conceptual and philosophical analysis, evaluating theories from thinkers like John Searle, Harry Frankfurt, Peter Strawson, and R. Jay Wallace to dissect the internal logic of free will arguments.
What is covered in the main body of the text?
The body analyzes John Searle’s theory of "gaps" in decision-making, followed by an exploration of Frankfurt’s second-order volitions and Strawson’s reactive attitudes as alternative foundations for agency.
Which keywords characterize this work?
Key terms include Free Will, Determinism, Self-Determination, Agent-Self, and Moral Responsibility.
How does Searle's "gap" theory relate to quantum indeterminism?
Searle suggests that indeterminacy in our brains could provide a foundation for free will, though the author points out that this raises difficult questions about why such a gap would exist specifically in our minds but not in the rest of nature.
Why does the author argue that Frankfurt’s model is superior for everyday experience?
The author contends that Frankfurt’s model allows for the "gradual limitations" of free will—such as those caused by addiction or intense emotions—which are far more relevant to our lived experience than abstract metaphysical questions about determinism.
- Quote paper
- Moritz Deutschmann (Author), 2007, Free will, indeterminacy, and self-determination, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/78387
