Free will is one of the most fundamental presuppositions that we make in our everyday lives. At the same time, free will belongs to the concepts that are most difficult to integrate into a scientific idea of how the world works. This contrast has haunted philosophers for centuries, and although it seems that almost everything has already been said about this topic, there has been an animated debate in recent decades. In this paper, I would like to consider two of the positions adopted in this debate.
At first, I would like to explore John Searle's interpretation of free will as a sequence of several moments of indeterminacy ("gaps") between the reasons for our actions and the actions themselves. I think the best way to understand his conception is to see it as an attempt to unite two different ideas about the relation between reasons and actions. On the one hand, the realist conception of Searle's philosophy presupposes that the reasons for our actions must have real causal power and are not only post facto justifications. On the other hand, Searle's understanding of rationality implies that reasons alone cannot be sufficient causes. In "Rationality in Action" Searle tries to bring both ideas together through the notion of an agent-self. I will argue that this attempt is problematic, not only because it leads our conception of free will towards a very unsatisfying choice between epiphenomenalism and natural indeterminism, but also because Searle cannot explain convincingly how the existence of indeterminacy in our brains could explain free will.
The second part of the paper is an attempt to develop an alternative notion of free will, relying on two influential articles by Harry Frankfurt and Peter Strawson. The basic idea is that when we are interested in free will, we are not primarily interested in causal origins, but in self-determination, which is also the main presupposition in the practice of holding people responsible. With this perspective in mind, I will finally return to the questions of the natural foundations of free will and its compatibility with a deterministic conception of nature.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Introduction
- Free Will as Indeterminacy
- Reasons and Causal Explanations
- The Agent-Self
- Objections
- Free Will as Self-Determination
- Second-Order Desires and Valuing
- Reactive Attitudes and Responsibility
- Choice and Determinism
- Conclusion
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This paper explores the concept of free will and aims to examine two distinct interpretations: free will as a series of indeterminacies between reasons and actions and free will as self-determination. The paper critically evaluates John Searle's theory of free will as indeterminacy, highlighting potential issues with his concept of the "agent-self" and the implications of indeterminism in nature. It then proposes an alternative framework based on the work of Harry Frankfurt and Peter Strawson, emphasizing the significance of self-determination in our understanding of free will and its connection to moral responsibility.
- The nature of free will and its relation to determinism
- The role of reasons and causal explanations in understanding actions
- The concept of the "agent-self" and its implications for free will
- Self-determination as a foundation for free will and moral responsibility
- The compatibility of free will with a deterministic conception of nature
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
- Introduction: This chapter introduces the central topic of the paper, free will, highlighting its importance in everyday life and the ongoing philosophical debate surrounding its definition and compatibility with a scientific understanding of the world. It outlines the two main interpretations of free will that will be explored in the paper: free will as indeterminacy and free will as self-determination.
- Free Will as Indeterminacy: This chapter examines John Searle's theory of free will as a series of indeterminacies, or "gaps," between reasons for actions and the actions themselves. It explores Searle's argument that these gaps are essential for understanding rational agency and how they relate to the concept of the "agent-self." The chapter also discusses potential problems with Searle's theory, including the implications of indeterminism in nature and the difficulty in explaining the difference between a decision and mere chance.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
Free will, determinism, indeterminacy, rationality, agency, agent-self, self-determination, moral responsibility, reasons, causal explanations, actions, intentional states, neurobiology.
- Quote paper
- Moritz Deutschmann (Author), 2007, Free will, indeterminacy, and self-determination, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/78387
