Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent the engine of Germany’s economy. Despite the fact that business magazines and newspapers appear to favor covering large international companies, public awareness of formerly in the background operating enterprises has risen within the last years. People are increasingly aware of the im-portance of smaller businesses. They notice that not only do smaller companies secure employment and wealth in their specific region of operation, but they also provide the overall economy with more employment than their multinational counterparts.
An important group of SMEs are the so-called family enterprises. A significant proportion of family enterprises have become global players themselves and have even ex-celled, in their particular field, to world market leaders. Besides Porsche and Villeroy & Boch, as two typical German examples of formerly small family enterprises which have developed continuously from regional to worldwide-operating businesses, many others could be named to illustrate this stunning development of family-owned businesses.
Paralleling the successful development of family businesses, researchers and practitioners alike have drawn their attention to the nature and particularity of family businesses.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Definition
1.2 Research Objectives
1.3 Course of Investigation
2 Setting the Family Business Framework
2.1 Definitions of Family Business
2.1.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Dimension
2.1.2 Family and Firm Dimension
2.2 Theories for Governing Family Enterprises
3 Setting the Performance Framework
3.1 Determining Performance according to Theory
3.1.1 Owner-Manager Conflict
3.1.2 Majority-Minority Conflict
3.2 Definition of Performance
3.3 Agency Conflicts in Family Enterprises
4 Setting the Financial Framework
4.1 Theories of Capital Structure, Investments and Finance
4.2 Investing Capital
4.3 Funding Capital
4.3.1 Empirical Evidence for Financing of Family Enterprises
4.3.2 Modern Financing Instruments and Family Enterprises
4.4 Managing Capital
4.4.1 Financial Management Techniques
4.4.2 Risk Management
5 Summary and Conclusion
Research Objectives and Core Themes
This thesis investigates whether the unique governance structures of family enterprises, when examined through the lens of Agency Theory, contribute to competitive advantages from a financial perspective, specifically focusing on capital funding, investment, and management strategies.
- The role of Agency Theory in explaining performance differentials between family and non-family firms.
- Evaluation of "family enterprise premium" through financial strategies.
- The impact of long-term investment horizons on capital budgeting and risk management.
- Analysis of funding choices, including internal resources versus modern financial instruments.
- The influence of family control and ownership structure on performance outcomes.
Excerpt from the Book
3.3 Agency Conflicts in Family Enterprises
It has become clear that three questions need to be answered in order to assess the influence of agency conflicts on family performance.
Firstly, the owner-manager and the majority-minority conflict have to be looked upon separately. Secondly, it needs to be examined what the theories described imply for the family business performance and what they suggest for the strength and direction of each conflict. Finally, the result for conflict I has to be compared to the result of conflict II and an overall conclusion has to be drawn about the empirically observable influence of agency conflicts on family businesses performance.
The two conflicts exhibit different levels of influence on firm performance. Family enterprises tend to be affected more by a majority-minority conflict and less by an owner-manager conflict. Ownership and control often fall together in family enterprises. The goals of the manager and the owner are thus identical which reduces monitoring and other contracting costs to a very low level in the case of agency conflict I.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: This chapter defines the research problem, objectives, and the scope of the study regarding the performance of family enterprises compared to their non-family counterparts.
2 Setting the Family Business Framework: This chapter reviews definitions of family businesses and identifies key governance theories, providing a foundation for understanding the family-enterprise system.
3 Setting the Performance Framework: This chapter establishes how performance is determined by theory and explores how agency conflicts specifically impact family firms.
4 Setting the Financial Framework: This chapter examines capital structure, investing strategies, funding sources, and management techniques from a financial perspective within family businesses.
5 Summary and Conclusion: This chapter synthesizes the research findings and concludes that while family enterprises may benefit from lower agency costs at the investment level, they often lag behind in modern capital management practices.
Keywords
Family Enterprises, Agency Theory, Performance, Capital Structure, Financial Management, Investment Strategy, Funding, Ownership, Governance, Shareholder Value, Risk Management, Competitive Advantage, SMEs, Patient Capital, Profitability
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this thesis?
The thesis explores the financial performance and competitive advantages of family enterprises compared to non-family firms by applying Agency Theory to their governance and financial strategies.
What are the central thematic fields covered?
The work covers definitions of family businesses, performance frameworks, capital structure theories, investment behavior, funding sources, and financial management practices.
What is the central research question?
The study seeks to determine whether activities in funding, investing, and managing capital in family enterprises can explain their observed competitive advantages and performance superiority.
Which scientific method is used?
The thesis utilizes a literature-based theoretical analysis, combining Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory, and empirical findings to examine the financial perspective of family firms.
What topics are discussed in the main part?
The main part analyzes the "family enterprise premium puzzle," modern versus traditional financing instruments, and capital management techniques like risk assessment and financial planning.
Which keywords characterize this work?
Key terms include Agency Theory, family enterprise performance, capital structure, shareholder value, and patient capital.
How do agency conflicts differ in family versus non-family firms?
In family firms, the unity of ownership and control often reduces owner-manager (Agency Conflict I) costs, although potential majority-minority (Agency Conflict II) conflicts may remain significant.
Why do family firms often resist modern financing products like private equity?
Resistance often stems from the desire to retain family control, a lack of familiarity with modern financial terms, and potential "cultural clashes" between family owners and external investors.
How does the "time horizon" affect family business investment?
Family firms often prioritize long-term entrepreneurial legacy over short-term capital market evaluation, allowing them to engage in investment projects that others might avoid.
What is the significance of "survivability capital"?
It refers to the pooled financial resources of the family, which provides a competitive advantage by protecting the enterprise from economic downturns and funding new ventures.
- Quote paper
- Oliver Bruemmer (Author), 2008, Governing family enterprises and implications for performance - a financial perspective, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/88309
