China in the World Trade Organization. Fulfillment of Investment-Related Reform Commitments as per WTO Accession Protocol


Project Report, 2020

38 Pages, Grade: 1,0


Excerpt

Table of contents

List of abbreviations

List of figures

List of tables

1 Introduction
1.1 Problem and Objectives
1.2 Methodology

2 Domestic View: Economic Reform Era
2.1 Reform Developments between 1949 and
2.2 Reform Developments between 1976 and

3 International View: China in the WTO
3.1 WTO at a Glance
3.2 Accession Process
3.3 Accession Protocol and Investment-Related Reform Commitments

4 Compliance Analysis: Fulfillment of WTO Reform Commitments
4.1 Contemporary Legal Framework
4.1.1 New Foreign Investment Law (FIL)
4.1.2 Catalogues of Restricted Industries
4.1.3 Catalogue of Encouraged Industries
4.2 Compliance of Investment-Related Reform Commitments

5 Conclusion and Outlook

Reference list

List of abbreviations

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

List of figures

Fig. 2: Restricted Industries in the PRC (2011-2020)

Tab. 2: Selected reform commitments under the WTO Accession Protocol for China and WPAC Accession Report

1 Introduction

1.1 Problem and Objectives

"China's decision to join the WTO is momentous. One Chinese leader has said that this is the most important decision China has made since 1949. China has chosen openness rather than isolation. It has opted for reform rather than reaction."1

At the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), China strongly empha­sized their economical and societal self-reliance.2 This has changed in late 1978, when Deng Xiaoping proposed structural economic reforms and efforts to integrate China into international value chains in order to fight economic stagnation. China has been increasingly intermeshed with international trade and investment from then onwards, and an export-oriented economy has emerged.3 Observers oftentimes referred to China as the 'workbench of the world'.4

The PRC's 'open-door policy' was further deepened at the turn of the millennium when the entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was prepared. The above quote by Director-General Mike Moore underlines the significance of China's accession in 2001.5 Given the size of the Chinese market, the WTO accession was seen as an extraordinary opportunity towards liberalizing global investment and trade.6 However, China's WTO accession was also linked to concrete requirements for further opening up its economy regarding, inter alia, foreign direct investment, trade, law and administration.7

On the one hand, FDI into China (i.e., inward FDI) increased sharply in the years after economic reforms were initiated. According to UNCTAD, China attracted US$ 2.1tn between 1979 and 2018 and retains an FDI stock ofUS$ 1.6tnas of2018.8 Simultaneously, trade volume mounted from US$ 20.6bn in 1978 to US$ 4.6tn in 2018.9 The liberalization reforms and WTO accession were also accompanied by historical socio-economic developments, as several hundred million people have been lifted out of poverty.10 Undoubtedly, China has become an active participant in the international division of labor and hence dependent on a liberal world trade regime.11

On the other hand, China has been exposed to criticism that the requirements and obligations set out in the WTO protocol have not been fully met.12 China has faced backlash for the unequal treatment of foreign companies compared to domestic companies, for instance regarding market entry conditions, forced transfers of technology and know-how, the protection of intellectual property rights, the award of contracts in public tender procedures and access to financing.13 The PRC was also accused of strong state intervention and SOE subsidies to enable highly competitive prices in global trade, i.e. causing dumping prices.14 Arguably, this public opinion has gained even more traction due to the ongoing US-China trade war, with US-American pu­nitive tariffs on Chinese exports exceeding US$ 500bn by 2020.15

In light of the above, this paper shall examine whether China fulfilled its reform commitments as set out in the WTO Accession Protocol for China and its appendixes. Due to the fact that China's commitments to the WTO are extensive and the scope of the paper is limited, the paper shall focus on investment-related reform commitments (e.g. non-discrimination/national treat­ment, forced technology transfers, intellectual property regime, SOEs and subsidies) and focus less on reform commitments for trade liberalization.

1.2 Methodology

The second chapter presents a political-economic overview between 1949 and 1975 as well as 1976 and 2000, above all with regard to the 'opening-up reforms' based on the 'Four Moderni­zations' initiated by Deng Xiaoping from 1978 onwards.

The third chapter focuses on the WTO. After a brief overview of the WTO structure and the WTO accession process for China, the WTO Accession Protocol for China and its reform re­quirements will be examined in more detail. As such, the 'target state' of economic liberaliza­tion will be outlined, i.e. the investment-related commitments the Chinese government has agreed upon the WTO accession.

Based on this 'target state', the fourth chapter first presents the current legal framework for foreign direct investment, i.e. the New Foreign Investment Law (FIL). Finally, a compliance analysis will be conducted to determine the extent to which China has fully met its investment-related reform commitments since its entry into the WTO almost 20 years ago.

The fifth chapter answers the central research question and summarizes the results, together with an outlook into the future of China in the WTO.

In the following, publicly available (case) laws and WTO protocols (hereinafter "legal texts") shall be presented only once in the footnotes, while other sources will be quoted commonly upon usage.

2 Domestic View: Economic Reform Era

2.1 Reform Developments between 1949 and 1975

Starting from 1949, under the first paramount leader Mao Zedong, China made use of a cen­tralized social economy (or planned economy respectively) based on the Soviet model. At that time, China focused heavily on capital-intensive heavy industry, while light industry goods such as consumer goods were rationed.16 This approach contradicted the basic factor endow­ments that China had, being a capital-poor country with an extensive workforce at that time.17 Furthermore, state-owned enterprises (SOE) have operated comparably inefficiently and have not used the available capital in a way that maximized the economy's benefits.18

As early as 1963, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai designed the Tour Modernizations' (Chi­nese: mMiX) - a framework that was intended to bring sustainable modernization and to some extent a decentralization to the backward sectors of the Chinese economy.19 Under this framework, China should become an industrial nation by the year 2000.20 The Four Moderni­zations focused on the following:

(1) Agriculture: Introduction of budget responsibility by dividing local agricultural land into private agricultural plots, creating local responsibility for profits and losses. A fixed quota of agricultural products shall be transferred to the state to ensure food supply for the population, the remaining agricultural products shall be freely sold;21
(2) Industry: Establishment of numerous SOEs in urban areas, obliged to produce according to fixed state specifications. Workers shall benefit from the so-called "iron rice bowl", i.e. having a non-terminable employment contract with a fixed wage;22
(3) National Defense: Increase in military equipment and manpower to defend the PRC;23
(4) Science & Technology: Use of western standard technology to strengthen labor produc­tivity in the agricultural countryside and industrial cities, hence promoting sustainable growth.24

Aside from the above, key objectives of the Four Modernizations were the establishment of diplomatic relations with major economic powers, the deepened participation in international trade and a more liberated culture towards FDI.25

2.2 Reform Developments between 1976 and 2000

After important Communist Party officials died in 1976 (inter alia, Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai), Deng Xiaoping gradually paved the way to political power. He openly advocated Zhou Enlai's ideology of the Four Modernizations during speeches.26 On 13 December 1978, Deng Xiaoping gave a speech at the 3rd plenary of the 11th Central Committee about his vision for economic reform which eventually enabled him to become the second paramount leader of the PRC.27

Deng Xiaoping considered scientific and technological progress particularly important for in­creased labor productivity, long-term growth and improved living standards for the Chinese population. Hence, he himself assumed responsibility for this pillar within the Four Moderni­zations.28 One of Deng Xiaoping's most prominent policy decisions was the establishment of special economic zones (SEZ) in Shenzhen (Guangdong), Zhuhai (Guangdong), Shantou (Guangdong) and Xiamen (Fujian) to attract FDI and the technological knowledge of export-oriented companies.29 Moreover, the outlying province of Hainan was announced to be the fifth SEZ in the PRC.30

SEZs are delineated regions within the PRC that are equipped with special policies aligned to those of a free market economy, alongside flexible governmental measures to promote trade and investment. SEZs inherently specialize in manufacturing and the export of products. From 1979 onwards, investors within SEZs benefitted from several business incentives such as little import and export restrictions, preferential market entry conditions, less bureaucracy and tax rates as low as 15%.31 Needless to say, the proximity of Hong Kong to the above mentioned SEZs encouraged foreign investors to expand their business operations to Mainland China, given the fact that up to 95% of foreign capital stemmed from Hong Kong in the 1980s.32

The Chinese government was aware that a sound legal framework within the PRC constitutes a necessity for FDI inflow and, as a result, technology and know-how transfers.33 Thus, the Chinese government has passed a number of FDI-related laws, including the:

(I) Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures from 1 July 1979 (hereinafter also "E JV Law");34
(II) Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises from 12 April 1986 (hereinafter also "WFOE Law");35
(III) Law on Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures from 13 April 1988 (hereinafter also "CJV Law").36

Although these legal frameworks encouraged foreign investors to enter the Chinese market, critics quickly pointed to the legal vagueness and the lack of a domestic legal counterpart. In the end of the 1980s, the democracy movement in China - and especially the Tiananmen Square incident - have led to a slowdown in FDI and trade as these events casted doubt on the legal security for investors.37

In summary, overall trade volume surged from US$ 20.6bn to US$ 474bn between 1978 and 2000, while FDI inflows rose from practically zero to US$ 40.7bn during the same period.38

3 International View: China in the WTO

3.1 WTO at a Glance

The WTO was founded in 1995 by 76 member states with the so-called 'Marrakesh Agreement', replacing its precursor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).39 The WTO pur­sues the goal of facilitating international trade through harmonized trading conditions and legal dispute mechanisms.40

The process of a WTO membership typically takes several years, and contractual classifications of the acceding nation determine the subsequent treatment in terms of tariff lines and imple­mentation deadlines.41

Firstly, each member of the WTO receives the so-called 'Most Favored Nation' status (MFN status), i.e. member states must treat all other member states equally in terms of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers.42 In turn, this means that member states must not be favored or discrim­inated based on, inter alia, political relationships or strategic reasons.43 This results into access for emerging economies as well as developing economies to developed economies, and hence promotes the economic 'catching-up' of emerging and developing nations.44

Secondly, self-declared developing economies are granted 'special and differential treatment' (S&D) provisions by the WTO. Under these provisions, developing countries are given more rights, i.e. longer time periods for implementing WTO agreements and commitments. Devel­oped countries are given the possibility to favor developing countries for supportive reasons.45

Thirdly, a classification into market economies (MES) and non-market economies (NME) is used, especially for the handling of trade disputes.46 The WTO and its member states assume thatNMEs, due to the possibility of extensive state subsidies benefitting the price-setting, could undercut fair prices on the world market. WTO member states can use alternative (price) valuation methods for NMEs to identify dumping prices and, if necessary, assign higher duties thereon.47 As of today, the WTO counts 164 member states.48

3.2 Accession Process

China was a signatory of the GATT until the establishment of the PRC in 1949.49 China tried to rejoin the GATT in 1986 with the established 'Working Party for the Accession of China' (WPAC), yet its liberalization efforts were considered insufficient at that time.50 In order to promote trade with China, the USA awarded MFN status to China annually in the 1980s, even though China was not part of the GATT. Years of negotiations followed for the WPAC, and in the meantime the GATT was reorganized into the WTO.51

The Chinese government was increasingly keen to achieve accession to the WTO. The disman­tling of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers would allow China to intermesh even closer into the multilateral trading regime, and hence would strengthen its international competitiveness.52

Opinions on China's admission to the WTO were divided, mainly into three different camps:

(1) Accession and post verification: Here, the opinion was that China should be granted acces­sion to the WTO in form of a provisional membership. The desired liberalization reforms should then be examined retrospectively to evaluate if a full WTO membership shall be granted or denied.53
(2) Accession only with reform commitments: Here, the opinion was that China should commit itself contractually to necessary reforms in the course of its WTO accession. The advantage of this option would be that it would strengthen and promote China's domestically adopted liberalization reforms. It was argued that the longer China was not part of the WTO, the less likely the actual implementation of the domestic liberalization reforms would be. Moreover, conservative politicians opposing the liberalization efforts (i.e. some local politicians and ministries) could face 'defeat' due to the renewed reform commitment towards the WTO, and China would continue its liberalization course more likely.54
(3) Accession only after reforms: Here, the opinion was that China could only enter the WTO if the liberalization reforms were already being proactively implemented by China. As long as China had no free market economy and no liberal democratic principles, China should not join the WTO. This way, China would need to demonstrate its willingness to liberalize and go into 'advance payment'.55

The debate on whether and in what form China should join the WTO took place in universities, think tanks and government circles, which underscores the tensions involved.56 On 18 Septem­ber 2001, the WPAC and all negotiating parties agreed on the terms for China to join the WTO after more than 15 years of accession negotiations.57 China was categorized as a developing economy and hence could benefit from 'special and differential treatment' .58 As of 2001, China was also considered to be aNME. As outlined in option (2) above (Accession only with reform commitments), it was agreed that China would be subject to contractual commitments to reform.

3.3 Accession Protocol and Investment-Related Reform Commitments

With more than 900 pages overall, the WTO Accession Protocol for China and its annexes are the longest of their kind.59 The WTO Accession Protocol for China is divided into Part I (Gen­eral Provisions), Part II (Schedules) and Part III (Final Provisions), outlining the provisions China has to embrace until given dates.

The WTO Accession Protocol is supplemented by the WPAC Accession Report which contains a comprehensive list of the commitments China agreed to reform.60 In turn, the WTO Accession Protocol for China and the WPAC Accession Report are supplemented by China's schedule of concessions and commitments on goods (documents WT/ACC/CHN49/Add. 1 in conjunction with WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.l)61 and China's schedule of specific commitments on services (doc­uments WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 in conjunction with WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.2.).62

The commitments can be categorized into investment-related commitments and trade-related commitments. In the WTO Accession Protocol for China itself, many provisions are rather trade-related rather than investment-related, while the WPAC Accession Report also highlights investment-related commitments in greater detail. Taking into account the limited scope and primary research target of this paper, the following illustrations shall focus on selected provi­sions and commitments that are investment-related.

Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten

Tab. 1: Selected reform commitments under the WTO Accession Protocol for China and WPAC Accession Re- port63

Under Part I.2.(C) (Transparency) of the WTO Accession Protocol for China, China was obliged to disclose any legal texts in English for WTO members, foreign enterprises and foreign individuals. Foreign investors should be able to freely access relevant legal information in order to be aware of their rights.

Pursuant to section ILL (Non-Discrimination) of the WPAC Accession Report in conjunction with Part 1.3. (Non-Discrimination) of the WTO Accession Protocol for China, it is agreed that foreign individuals and foreign-funded enterprises must not be treated less favorable to domes­tic individuals and domestic-funded enterprises. As such, the principle of national treatment shall be established. This is one of the key principles China agreed to upon acceding the WTO which can be repeatedly found in sections/paragraphs thereafter.

Pursuant to section IV.9. (State Trading Entities) of the WPAC Accession Report in line with the required non-discrimination as per WTO Accession Protocol for China and the WPAC Ac­cession Report, the access to raw textiles as well as the trading of fertilizer and oil should be equal between domestic and foreign companies. Moreover, as per section II.6 (State-Owned and State-Invested Enterprises) of the WPAC Accession Report, it was argued that China shall no longer have direct influence on human, finance and material resources of domestic or foreign companies. This was also applicable to operational activities such as supply chains, manufac­turing and marketing. Access to financing should be equal to all market participants, regardless whether they are domestic or foreign. Lastly, under Part 1.10. (Subsidies) of the WTO Accession Protocol for China, it was agreed that China must disclose any subsidies to privately-owned and state-owned enterprises. Many of the then prevailing subsidies as per Article 3 of the WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement shall be eliminated.64

Pursuant to section II.2. (Foreign Exchange and Payments) of the WPAC Accession Report in conjunction with Art. VIII Section 2 (Avoidance of restrictions on current payments) of the IMF's Articles of Agreement,65 no IMF member state - including China - shall impose and enforce restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions without prior approval of the IMF. China has agreed to the provisions of Art. VIII Section 2 of the IMF's Articles of Agreement back in December 1996.66

As per section IV.8. (Trade-Related Investment Measures) of the WPAC Accession Report, China had to, inter alia, eliminate forced technology transfer requirements and not interfere in the production plans of automotive companies. Similarly, section VI. (Trade-RelatedIntellec­tual Property Regime) of the WPAC Accession Report highlighted that China shall increase its efforts to contain and penalize copyright and trademark infringements, in line with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (also the "TRIPS Agree­ment").67 This can be seen as an attempt to further adapt the Chinese legal system to the inter­national standard.

Moreover, pursuant to section IV.10. (Government Procurement) of the WPAC Accession Re­port in line with the required non-discrimination as per WTO Accession Protocol for China and the WPAC Accession Report, public procurement processes must be conducted and awarded transparently and equally between domestic and foreign enterprises, relying on market econ­omy principles.

[...]


1 Moore (2000), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2MfhfvZ.

2 Cf. Potter (1993), p. 6.

3 Cf. Li (2017), pp. 338f. and cf. DER SPIEGEL (1992), pp. 178f, URL: https://bit.ly/2ZSQhCc.

4 Cf.EBigetal.(2013),p.7.

5 Cf. Moore (2000), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2MfhfvZ.

6 Cf. Li (2017), p. 344.

7 Cf. USTR (2020), p. 3, URL: https://bit.ly/2ZU90xp.

8 Cf. UNCTAD (2020), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2ZV8e3e and cf. UNCTAD (2019), p. 1, URL: https://bit.ly/2XLbdIP.

9 Cf. State Council of China (2011), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2zMmZup and cf. China Today (2019), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/3cqLT04.

10 Cf.Kroeber(2016),p. 198.

11 Cf. Ahmad (2015), p. 127.

12 Cf. USTR (2020), p. 3, URL: https://bit.ly/2ZU90xp.

13 Cf. Dezan Shira & Associates (2019a), p. 6, URL: https://bit.ly/2Rngbcm.

14 Cf. Morrison (2019), pp. If, URL: https://bit.ly/3dlDA6L.

15 Cf. USTR (2020), p. 18, URL: https://bit.ly/2ZU90xp.

16 Cf. Chang (1996), p. 386.

17 Cf.Lietal.(2012),pp.57ff.

18 Cf.Kroeber(2016),p.226.

19 Cf.Vogel(2011),p.94.

20 Cf. Potter (1993), p. 7.

21 Cf.Vogel(2011),pp.94ff.

22 Cf.Vogel(2011),pp.94ff.

23 Cf. ibid.

24 Cf. ibid.

25 Cf. Vogel (2011), p. 479 and cf. DER SPIEGEL (1992), pp. 178f, URL: https://bit.ly/2ZSQhCc.

26 Cf. Deng (1978a), n. p., URL: https://on.china.cn/3gB796B (Realize the Four Modernizations and never seek hegemony, from 7 May 1978) and cf Deng (1978b), n p., URL: https://bit.ly/2XFbPzm (The working class should make outstanding contributions to the Four Modernizations from 11 October 1978).

27 Cf. Deng (1978c), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/3eyGJAo (Emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future from 13 December).

28 Cf. Vogel (2011), p. 122.

29 Cf. Vogel (2011), p. 398.

30 Cf. Stoltenberg(1984),p.637.

31 Cf. Stoltenberg(1984),p.643.

32 Cf. Wren (1982), n. p., URL: https://nyti.ms/36Leltz.

33 Cf. Potter (1993), p. 8 and cf. Yu (2019), pp. 43f.

34 Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures. Adopted 1 July 1979 at the 2nd Session of the 5th National Peo­ple's Congress. Amended 15 March 2001 at the 4th Session of the 9th National People's Congress in accordance with the Decision to Revise the Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-foreign Equity Joint Ventures. The latest version can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2TR5VKw.

35 Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises. Adopted 12 April 1986 at the 4th Session of the 6th National People's Congress. Revised 31 October 2000 at the 18th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress by the Decision on Revision of the "Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Enter­prises with Sole Foreign Investment". The latest version can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/3cldr6G.

36 Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures. Adopted 13 April 1988 at the 1st Session of the 7th National People's Congress. Revised 31 October 2000 at the 18th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress by the Decision on the Revision of the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Sino-for­eign Cooperative Enterprises". The latest version can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/3gG5MUb.

37 Cf. Potter (1993), p. 2.

38 Cf. UNCTAD (2020), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2ZV8e3e and cf. State Council of China (2011), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2zMmZup.

39 Cf. Alexandroff/Gomez (2002a), p. 1.

40 Cf. Ostry (2002a), p. 11 and cf. Biddulph (2002), p. 170.

41 Cf. Ostry (2002b), pp. 131f.

42 Cf. WTO (2020a), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2UcdqMv.

43 Cf. ibid.

44 Cf. ibid.

45 Cf. WTO (2020b), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2XKPYqy.

46 Cf. Puccio (2015), p. 4, URL: https://bit.ly/2MdZCwfand cf. Morrison (2019), pp. If, URL: https://bit.ly/3dlDA6L.

47 Cf. Morrison (2019), pp. If., URL: https://bit.ly/3dlDA6L.

48 Cf. WTO (2020c), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2MilNz6.

49 Cf. Gertler (2002), p. 29.

50 Cf. Alexandroff/Gomez (2002b), p. 231.

51 Cf. ibid.

52 Cf. Drysdale (2000), p. 99.

53 Cf. Alexandroff/Gomez (2002b), pp. 23If.

54 Cf. ibid.

55 Cf. Alexandroff/Gomez (2002b), pp. 23If.

56 Cf. Alexandroff (2002), pp. 21 If.

57 Cf. Alexandroff/Gomez (2002b), p. 231.

58 Cf. Alexandroff (2002), p. 229.

59 Accession of The People's Republic of China. Decision of 10 November 2001. WT/L/432 from 23 November 2001 (01-5996). The original version can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2XjRrF8 and cf. Alexandroff/Gomez (2002b), p. 231.

60 Report of The Working Party on the Accession of China. WT/ACC/CHN/49 from 01 October 2001 (01-4679). The original version can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2XjRrF8.

61 Goods Schedule (Schedule of Concessions and Commitments Annexed to the GATT1994). WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.l from 01 October 2001 and WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.l from 10 November 2001. The origi­nal versions can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2XjRrF8.

62 Services Schedule (Schedule of Specific Commitments Annexed to the GATS). WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 from 01 October 2001 and WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.2 from 10 November 2001. The original versions can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2XjRrF8.

63 Own illustration based on: Accession of The People's Republic of China. Decision of 10 November 2001. WT/L/432 from 23 November 2001 (01-5996). The original version can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2XjRrF8 and Report of'The Working Party on the Accession of China. WT/ACC/CHN/49 from 01 October 2001 (01-4679). The original version can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2XjRrF8.

64 Cf. WTO (2020d), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/2yOHc2a.

65 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Adopted at the United Nations Monetary and Fi­nancial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 22, 1944, last amended effective January 26, 2016 by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 66-2, adopted December 15, 2010. The original version can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2zM5B98.

66 Cf. IMF (1996), n. p., URL: https://bit.ly/3gyiCDI.

67 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Annex to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization from 01 January 1995. The original version can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2TVRswX and cf. USTR (2020), p. 39, URL: https://bit.ly/2ZU90xp.

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Title
China in the World Trade Organization. Fulfillment of Investment-Related Reform Commitments as per WTO Accession Protocol
College
Carl von Ossietzky University of Oldenburg
Course
China in the World Economy
Grade
1,0
Author
Year
2020
Pages
38
Catalog Number
V889206
ISBN (eBook)
9783346189523
Language
English
Tags
China, WTO, Reform Commitments, WTO Accession Protocol, Reformverpflichtungen, IP Rights, Reciprocity
Quote paper
Lukas Lindemann (Author), 2020, China in the World Trade Organization. Fulfillment of Investment-Related Reform Commitments as per WTO Accession Protocol, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/889206

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