Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a sustained effort has been undertaken to reform the American intelligence agencies. The establishment of a terrorism “czar”, with more authority than the Director of the CIA used to have as coordinator of the intelligence enterprise and with a supporting bureaucratic structure to this end should lead to more unified, coordinated and effective intelligence, in particular in the context of counterterrorism. The Intelligence Community has undergone previous organisational “centralisation” reforms, and yet, it failed to provide timely and accurate intelligence about the 9/11 terrorist threat. A series of legitimate questions therefore arise: is centralisation the wrong solution to the problem of intelligence effectiveness? Is rather decentralisation the key? Has structure any influence on the way intelligence agencies perform? Answering these questions would reveal whether the adjustments to the structure of the Intelligence Community are justified or, on the contrary, determined by empirical fallacies, such as the “quick-fix” reorganisation syndrome. In a broader context, it would be also useful to know whether and how the effectiveness of counterterrorism intelligence could be improved by means of organisational structure.
This research question implies the scholarly literature of two disciplines: organisation theory and political science (International Relations and Security Studies – Terrorism). The nature and functioning of organisations, in particular, decentralisation and its effects on effectiveness have been studied at the level of business and bureaucratic organisations, whereas studies on intelligence and its effectiveness are present within a broad range of security studies areas, including the newer – terrorism/ counterterrorism. Answering the above research question would therefore mean applying theories and evidence in the organisation theory and organisational behaviour literatures to the terrorism/ counterterrorism one.
At a glance
- Applies organisation theory to centralisation and decentralisation in counterterrorism intelligence
- Considers human intelligence and technology alongside structural alternatives
- 76 sources in the bibliography
Contents
I. Introduction
II. Theory
a) Organisation theory
b) Counterterrorism, intelligence, effectiveness
III. Reform
IV. Centralising / Decentralising the Intelligence Community
a) Precautions
1. Structure has nothing to do with Counterterrorism Intelligence effectiveness
2. Does centralisation make efficient intelligence?
3. Control variables
b) Decentralisation, network, effectiveness
V. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper examines whether and how organisational structure can improve the effectiveness of counterterrorism intelligence. It applies organisation theory to post-9/11 U.S. intelligence reform, asking whether centralisation, decentralisation or other factors better account for intelligence effectiveness.
- Organisation theory and the effects of structural change
- Counterterrorism intelligence and the challenges of identifying threats
- The 2004 intelligence reform and the Director of National Intelligence
- Arguments for and against centralised intelligence management
- Human intelligence and technology as alternative influences
- Decentralised networks and information sharing
Excerpt from the Book
a) Organisation theory
Classical theory of organisations argues in general for centralisation as the adequate structure to reach effectiveness, due to several advantages: coherence of action by eliminating loyalties to local constituencies, lower costs by doing away with expertise duplication, maximisation of hierarchical control and increased accountability, since top management is responsible to an elected official and accountable to laws democratically made.
Decentralised structures entail faster and better decisions, because they are made by those with the best and most immediate knowledge of problems, improve the quality of personnel, morale and motivation, ease burdens of communication channels and are more susceptible to change and innovation. “By encouraging diversity, decentralisation may also encourage innovation through experiment…by multiplying centres of decision, and access for sources of suggestion…by reducing the uses and scale of bureaucracy, decentralisation may diminish resistance to change.”
Beyond the advantages and disadvantages of the two types of organisational structure, there are special cases in which centralisation is not recommended: differentiation of units and complexity, leading to management overload and diseconomies of scale. Lawrence and Lorsch show that, when units, because of their particular tasks are highly differentiated, it is more difficult to achieve integration among them than when the individuals have similar ways of thinking and behaving. Centralisation of big and complex organisations might entail management overload: “There are limits to the manager’s knowledge, energy and psychological resources. The more managers defy their limits by increasing their span of control, the more they risk overloading themselves.” and diseconomies of scale. The latter are characterised by a very slow decision-making process “if most of the significant management decisions are made by those at the top of the hierarchy, the decision process slows down significantly – time lag – caused by the distance information has to travel and the volume of decisions to be made”. In addition, information will reach the top level, distorted: “inadequate, and frequently self-serving”. These eventually result in reduced central authority due to the lack of information:
“In a complex and changing environment …executives at the top of the organisational hierarchy find it increasingly difficult to understand “what’s going on” in the specialised units which the organisation has created to survive in a complex task environment. They may have the legal authority to manage these units, but they do not have the information or skills to exercise the situational authority required to do so.”
Chapter Summaries
I. Introduction: The paper sets out its questions about intelligence reform after 9/11 and explains its combination of organisation theory and security studies.
II. Theory: This chapter introduces organisational structures, effectiveness and change, then considers the role and limitations of intelligence in counterterrorism.
III. Reform: The chapter describes the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and the responsibilities and authorities of the Director of National Intelligence.
IV. Centralising / Decentralising the Intelligence Community: The main analysis considers objections to a structural explanation, arguments for centralisation, and the roles of human intelligence and technology. It then examines a decentralised network model and its implications for information sharing.
V. Conclusion: The conclusion returns to the relationship between organisational structure and counterterrorism intelligence effectiveness and reflects on the challenges of reform.
Keywords
intelligence reform, counterterrorism, intelligence effectiveness, organisation theory, centralisation, decentralisation, intelligence community, Director of National Intelligence, information sharing, organisational networks, human intelligence, intelligence technology, 9/11
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this paper about?
It examines how the organisational structure of the U.S. intelligence community may affect the effectiveness of counterterrorism intelligence.
What are its central topics?
The paper addresses organisation theory, post-9/11 intelligence reform, centralisation, decentralisation, human intelligence, technology and network-based information sharing.
What is the main research question?
The author asks whether organisational structure influences counterterrorism intelligence effectiveness and whether centralisation or decentralisation is a more suitable approach.
What research method does the author use?
The paper uses a theoretical and literature-based analysis, applying organisation theory and published arguments about intelligence to counterterrorism reform.
What does the main analysis cover?
It examines arguments that structure does not determine effectiveness, considers the case for centralisation and discusses human intelligence and technology before exploring a decentralised network model.
Which keywords characterise the paper?
Key terms include intelligence reform, counterterrorism, organisation theory, centralisation, decentralisation, information sharing and intelligence networks.
How does the paper address the Director of National Intelligence?
It describes the position established by the 2004 reform and considers its authorities over intelligence coordination, budgets, personnel and information.
Why does the paper discuss human intelligence and technology?
It considers them as factors other than organisational structure that may influence counterterrorism intelligence effectiveness.
What does the proposed network model involve?
The model involves agencies operating with independence from central hierarchy in areas other than policymaking, alongside electronic access to information and communication across organisational boundaries.
- Quote paper
- Stefan Meingast (Author), 2005, Intelligence reform and counterterrorism effectiveness, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/89129