In his 1981 essay “Knowledge” published in “Philosophical Explanations” Robert Nozick deals with two major problems of epistemology: firstly what is knowledge or what does it mean to say that someone knows a proposition p? Secondly, what can we say to the skeptic who holds the view that we cannot know anything?
It was widely agreed among philosophers that knowledge is justified true belief. This standard analysis was defeated in 1963 by the brief but powerful essay “Is justified true belief knowledge?” by Edmund Gettier. Using thought experiments Gettier developed counterexamples to the standard analysis of knowledge by describing situations in which we would not say that someone knows "that p" although he has a well justified and true belief about p. In the following years philosophers tried to substitute or add to conditions of the standard analysis in order to find a theory which is strong enough to rule out Gettier counterexamples. This is what Nozick tries. After explicating his account of knowledge he shows how it can handle the skeptic’s objections.
In this essay I will first give a description of Nozick’s truth-tracking-theory of knowledge and what this means with regard to philosophical skepticism. After this I evaluate Nozick’s account and show that his theory is not as strong as it looks. My thesis is that Nozick overlooks that knowledge is more than true belief which varies with the truth value of p. Nevertheless, Nozick draws attention to an important connection which is in itself not sufficient for knowledge but which should be attended to by developing a theory of knowledge.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Robert Nozick’s Theory of Knowledge
2.1 The Conditions of Knowledge
2.2 The “possible world” Account
2.3 Skepticism and Nonclosure
2.4 The Skeptic’s Contradiction
3 Critical Assessment of Nozick’s Theory of Knowledge
3.1 The Cost of Giving Up the Closure Principle
3.2 The Circularity of the “possible world“ Approach
3.3 Truth-tracking is not enough: The Missing Link between Belief and Facts
4 Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This paper examines Robert Nozick’s "truth-tracking" theory of knowledge, evaluating its effectiveness in addressing epistemological problems and responding to philosophical skepticism. It investigates whether Nozick’s reliance on subjunctive conditionals and the "possible worlds" metaphor provides a robust account of knowledge that overcomes traditional Gettier counterexamples and skeptical challenges.
- Epistemological conditions of knowledge
- Nozick’s truth-tracking theory and subjunctive conditionals
- The role of "possible worlds" in epistemic analysis
- Skepticism and the critique of the closure principle
- Limitations of truth-tracking through counterexamples
Excerpt from the Book
3.3 Truth-tracking is not enough: The Missing Link between Belief and Facts
A more successful attempt at criticism involves demonstrating counterexamples to his core theory. We will see that truth-tracking alone is not sufficient because the theory is too weak to rule out every case in which no knowledge is actually involved. Let us consider an example:
A woman who lives in Cologne is on the metro on the way home from work and wants to find out whether the football team 1. FC Köln has won their match in order to be prepared for her son’s emotional situation when she arrives at home. The metro is full of people wearing scarfs in the color of the 1. FC Köln: red-white. She asks someone whether Köln has won and is told that they did. Hence she concludes and believes that 1.FC Köln won the match.
p = 1. FC Köln won the match.
1. She believes that 1. FC Köln won the match.
2. It is true that 1. FC Köln won the match.
3. If 1. FC Köln were not to have won the match, she wouldn’t believe that 1. FC Köln won the match.
4. If 1. FC Köln were to have won the match, she would believe that 1. FC Köln won the match.
All conditions are satisfied and following Nozick’s theory and our intuitions we conclude that she knows that 1. FC Köln won the match. Unfortunately this is not the whole story:
On the same day not only 1.FC Köln had a match but also “Fortuna Köln”. As a matter of fact the colors of Fortuna Köln are the same as for 1. FC Köln: red and white. Hence there are fans from both teams on the metro wearing red-white scarfs which cannot be differentiated by the woman. Purely by good luck she asks a fan of 1. FC Köln and not a fan from the other team. Let us assume that both teams won their match, so that fans of both teams would answer: “Yes, Köln won the match”.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: This chapter defines the core problem of epistemology, specifically the challenge posed by Gettier to the traditional definition of knowledge as "justified true belief," and introduces Nozick's response.
2 Robert Nozick’s Theory of Knowledge: This chapter details Nozick's four conditions of knowledge, his truth-tracking account using subjunctive conditionals, and his application of the "possible worlds" metaphor to counter skepticism.
3 Critical Assessment of Nozick’s Theory of Knowledge: This chapter analyzes potential weaknesses in Nozick's framework, specifically the implications of abandoning the closure principle, circularity concerns, and the insufficiency of truth-tracking.
4 Conclusion: This chapter synthesizes the main findings, acknowledging the ingenuity of Nozick’s approach while reaffirming that truth-tracking alone fails to account for the necessary link between facts and belief methods.
Keywords
Epistemology, Robert Nozick, Truth-tracking, Knowledge, Justified true belief, Gettier cases, Skepticism, Closure principle, Subjunctive conditionals, Possible worlds, Belief, Facts, Truth, Epistemic conditions, Counterexamples.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
The paper focuses on Robert Nozick’s 1981 theory of knowledge, specifically his "truth-tracking" model, and evaluates whether it successfully defines knowledge and addresses skeptical challenges.
What are the central themes of the work?
The work explores the conditions of knowledge, the abandonment of the closure principle, the use of subjunctive conditionals to link beliefs to facts, and the limits of externalist approaches to epistemology.
What is the main research question or objective?
The objective is to determine if "tracking the truth" is a sufficient condition for knowledge and whether Nozick’s theory remains robust when faced with specific logical and real-world counterexamples.
Which methodology does the author apply?
The author uses conceptual analysis and logical critique, examining Nozick’s framework against traditional philosophical problems, such as Gettier scenarios and Cartesian skepticism.
What topics are discussed in the main body?
The main body covers the formal conditions of knowledge, the mechanics of "possible world" metaphors, the debate over the closure principle, and the critical failure of truth-tracking in cases where luck plays a role.
Which keywords best describe this study?
Key terms include truth-tracking, knowledge, skepticism, closure principle, subjunctive conditionals, and Gettier cases.
How does Nozick define the "p-neighborhood"?
The p-neighborhood refers to the set of close possible worlds where the facts are similar to the actual world; Nozick uses this to determine if a belief is sensitive to the truth value of a proposition.
Why does the author argue that "truth-tracking" is not enough?
Through the Cologne metro counterexample, the author demonstrates that a belief can satisfy all of Nozick’s truth-tracking conditions purely by coincidence (good luck), which implies that truth-tracking lacks an adequate justification component.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Anonym (Autor:in), 2012, Does Knowledge mean to Track-the-Truth?, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/907040
