Two Contractualist Accounts of Political Obligation

Abstract or Introduction

The aim of this essay is to investigate if the scanlonian approach to the old idea of contract can deliver a convincing account of political obligation. The author will argue that for most empirically existing states, it cannot.The paper will consider two versions of this approach: First, it will discuss a straightforward application of contractualism to the problem of political obligation, according to which we have a moral duty to obey those laws that we cannot reasonably reject (section II.). The author will argue that such an account is problematic, since gives rise to the possibility of reasonable disagreement when applied to real-world laws.

In section III., the analysis will therefore turn to another contractualist argument which was brought up by David Lefkowitz. His version seems to be stronger than the straightforward application, since it seems to take the possibility of reasonable disagreement seriously: He argues that, even though we might reasonably disagree over the content of certain laws, contractualism forces us to agree on democratic procedures. Therefore, we have a political obligation to obey laws that are outcomes of these procedures.

The author will argue that Lefkowitz’ argument merely shifts the problem, and that it is confronted with similar difficulties. In section IV., the paper will specify how both accounts should be understood in more general terms. In doing so, the author will draw on the classic a priori/ a posteriori distinction as well as on Laura Valentinis useful classification of ideal/ non-ideal theory.

Traditional contract-theory approaches to the problem of political obligation are usually seen as wanting. Thomas Scanlon’s contract theory - came to be known as contractualism - seems to overcome a lot of these old shortcomings: It is, for instance, non-voluntaristic in the sense that it avoids to take consent either personal or historical.