The aim of this essay is to investigate if the scanlonian approach to the old idea of contract can deliver a convincing account of political obligation. The author will argue that for most empirically existing states, it cannot.The paper will consider two versions of this approach: First, it will discuss a straightforward application of contractualism to the problem of political obligation, according to which we have a moral duty to obey those laws that we cannot reasonably reject (section II.). The author will argue that such an account is problematic, since gives rise to the possibility of reasonable disagreement when applied to real-world laws.
In section III., the analysis will therefore turn to another contractualist argument which was brought up by David Lefkowitz. His version seems to be stronger than the straightforward application, since it seems to take the possibility of reasonable disagreement seriously: He argues that, even though we might reasonably disagree over the content of certain laws, contractualism forces us to agree on democratic procedures. Therefore, we have a political obligation to obey laws that are outcomes of these procedures.
The author will argue that Lefkowitz’ argument merely shifts the problem, and that it is confronted with similar difficulties. In section IV., the paper will specify how both accounts should be understood in more general terms. In doing so, the author will draw on the classic a priori/ a posteriori distinction as well as on Laura Valentinis useful classification of ideal/ non-ideal theory.
Traditional contract-theory approaches to the problem of political obligation are usually seen as wanting. Thomas Scanlon’s contract theory - came to be known as contractualism - seems to overcome a lot of these old shortcomings: It is, for instance, non-voluntaristic in the sense that it avoids to take consent either personal or historical.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Two Contractualist Accounts of Political Obligation
- I. Introduction
- II. Contractualism and the Problem of Political Obligation
- III. Reasonable Disagreement
- IV. Non-ideal Theory and Reasonable Rejection
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This essay examines the applicability of Scanlonian contractualism to the problem of political obligation. It argues that, while Scanlonian contractualism is a compelling theory of morality, it struggles to provide a convincing account of political obligation for most existing states. The essay explores two contractualist arguments, one based on direct application of the principle of reasonable rejection, and another drawing on David Lefkowitz's suggestion that contractualism requires agreement on democratic procedures.
- The applicability of Scanlonian contractualism to political obligation
- The concept of reasonable rejection in political contexts
- The problem of reasonable disagreement in political decision-making
- The role of democratic procedures in contractualist accounts of political obligation
- The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory in political philosophy
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
- I. Introduction: This chapter introduces the topic of political obligation and the shortcomings of traditional contract-theory approaches. It presents Scanlonian contractualism as a potential solution to these shortcomings and outlines the essay's argument that Scanlonian contractualism struggles to deliver a convincing account of political obligation for most existing states.
- II. Contractualism and the Problem of Political Obligation: This chapter explores the relevance of Scanlonian contractualism to political obligation by drawing analogies between individual moral principles and a set of laws within a political community. It presents a straightforward contractualist account of political obligation, stating that there is a moral duty to obey the law if (and only if) it cannot be reasonably rejected.
- III. Reasonable Disagreement: This chapter analyzes the problem of reasonable disagreement that arises when applying the straightforward contractualist account to real-world laws. It uses the example of a tax system to illustrate how individuals might reasonably disagree on its fairness and legitimacy, making it difficult to establish a principle that could not be reasonably rejected.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
This essay focuses on key concepts in contemporary political philosophy, particularly those related to political obligation and Scanlonian contractualism. These include reasonable rejection, reasonable disagreement, democratic procedures, ideal theory, and non-ideal theory. The essay also explores themes related to the legitimacy of laws, the role of morality in political decision-making, and the challenges of applying abstract philosophical principles to concrete political issues.
- Citation du texte
- Maximilian Strietholt (Auteur), 2020, Two Contractualist Accounts of Political Obligation, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/919282
