Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia - messengers of a coming revolution?

Structure

General Introduction
I. Preface
II. Question and Aim of the Thesis
III. Methodology and Structure
IV. Limits
V. Concepts and Definitions

First Part: Theorizing Islamist Rebellion
I. Theorizing Islamist Rebellion within a Local Context
1.) Criticizing the Socioeconomic Approach
2.) Hafez’s Political Process Approach
a.) Three Resources to effect change
b.)Hafez’s five patterns of rebellious conduct
II. Theorizing Islamist Rebellion within the Global Arena
1.) Constructivism in International Relations
2.) The Global Civil Society and the Power of Transnational Non-State Actors
3.) The International System as a Structure of Political Opportunities
a.) Constrains of the Constructivist Agenda
b.) The International System as a Structure of Political Opportunities
III. Concluding Remarks

Second Part: Empirical Analyses
A. Roots and Ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir
I. Preface
II. Introduction
1.) The Umma-Concept
2.) Islamic Movements: Between Nation and Umma
III. Origins of Hizb ut-Tharir
IV. Introduction to the Ideology of the Liberation Party
V. Organization and Political Methodology
1. Organization
2.) Political Methodology
VI. Attitude towards Violence
VII. Concluding Remarks
B. Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia
I. Preface
II. Geography and Focal Points
III. Radical Islam in the Post-Soviet Era
1.) Overview of Traditional Islam in Central Asia
2.) Religious Repression and Resurgence
IV. Emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia
V. Origins of Supporters
1.) Regions and ethnicity
2.) Class Profile
VI. Funding
VII. Hizb ut-Tharir’s Activities in Central Asia
1.) The Hizb ut-Tharir’s Strategy for Central Asia
2.) Propaganda
a.) Websites
b.) Print Media
3.) Demonstrations
VIII. Concluding Remarks
C. Risk Analyses for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan
I. Preface
II. Uzbekistan
1.) Introduction
2.) Targeting Hizb ut-Tahrir
3.) Andijan 2005, Uprising and Crackdown
III. Kyrgyzstan
1.) Introduction
2.) Targeting Hizb ut-Tahrir
3.) The Kyrgyz “Revolution” in 2005
IV. Conclusion

Annexes
Annex I
Annex II
Annex III
Annex IV

Bibliography
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources

In honour of my parents

Dedicated to my friends and former and current colleagues (e.g. Clivio, Jana, Mirella, Niovi, Matilda) who always supported me in my endeavour to write about a fairly unknown group of Islamists.

„ Tragedies are always discussed as if they took place in a void,

but actually each tragedy is conditioned by its setting, local and global”

Tariq Ali

Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia.

Messengers of a Coming Revolution?

General Introduction

I. Preface

“The dramatic irruption of radical Muslim movements onto the political scene has been a feature of the politics of the Middle East and of other countries for two decades past. It has become a major preoccupation of Western states since 11 September 2001, if not before. To understand such movements and to evolve a calibrated and informed response to them are a major challenge, intellectual and political, of modern times.”

Fred Halliday^[1]

Islam and Islamic movements have become a crucial political issue in Central Asia. The most prominent Islamic groups in Central Asia are the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT). After much of the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) infrastructure and capacity was destroyed during the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 its role in challenging the regime of President Karimov´s regime states has been taken over by the non-violent radical group Hizb ut-Tahrir.^[2] Unlike the IMU, the HuT is a true transnational organization that consists of semi-independent branches, only some of which are in Central Asia. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s ideology provides a mechanism for mobilizing collective action and is seizing the opportunity to promise the organization of a fair society under an Islamic caliphate. The Hizb-ut-Tahrir believes in winning over mass support, “the hearts and minds,” of Central Asian citizens, military members, and even government figures. When a secular government is sufficiently weakened, according to its doctrine, Hizb-ut-Tahrir will have the popular support to assume control establish a caliphate. This message likely resonates with Central Asian leaders, especially when taken in context with the successful overthrow of Kyrgyzstan’s President Akaev in March 2005.

II. Question and Aim of the Thesis

This thesis attempts to combine a issue-specific local focus with a global systematic approach providing two different explanatory concepts underlying the understanding of Hizb-ut Tahrir`s emergence in Central Asia and in particular in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in order to find out if the historical background, the ideology, the organizational structures, the aims and current activities of the movement are able to form the basis of a revolution that might sweep away the regimes in place in the region.

III. Methodology and Structure

The thesis is divided in two parts. The first part is dedicated to provide a theoretical framework. The framework used to guide the analysis of the growing influence of Hizb ut-Tahrir on a local level was adopted from Mohammed M. Hafez’s book ‘Why Muslims Rebel.’^[3] The local focus is theorizing Islamist rebellions in terms of repression and resistance using Hafez’s political process approach and presenting the five patterns he developed to predict the likelihood of a Muslim rebellion. The theoretical outreach referring to International Relations and thus the global arena is independent from the local focus and it’s concern is not to give an overview of realist and liberal international relation theories and their limits as far as transnational non-state actors are involved nor to engage with in-depth study of constructivist thinking per se but to provide and overview on constructivist theory as it relates to situate transnational networks in the global civil society and to explain Fiona B. Adamson’s criticism of mainstream social constructivism in conceptualizing the role of transnational networks and the role of religion and culture in international affairs and present her idea of the International System as a structure of political opportunities.

In the second part I focus on the empirical analyses of the theoretical approach of the question presenting the roots and ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir, its appearance, structure and activities in Central Asia and its implication in current events

IV. Limits

The aim and the limit of this essay is to find answers or at least directions for the above question by using the theoretical frameworks as guidance and by acknowledging that the explanation for a potential revolution in Central Asia is a highly complex topic which can not be simply explained by focusing one specific organisation, its ideology and the environment in which they are active. However, I am convinced that the value of such a non-holistic approach is to be find in subdividing a complex issue in several special fields of research in order to make it possible to provide guidance and knowledge in one area which in another moment in time has to be combined with the other researches to see the big picture.

Furthermore my ignorance of the Russian, Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Arab language has prevented me from exploring fully the source material. However, since the use of English by scholars is growing, scholarly work in English and sometimes German and French is not difficult to come by. A deeper problem is the fact that I am working from a fundamentally European, specifically German, background. Students studying Central Asia from the West cannot fully understand their perspective simply by reading articles, speeches, and studies.

V. Concepts and Definitions

For the thesis as a whole it is necessary to begin with defining terms that play a decisive role throughout the analysis: Islamists, moderates, radicals and repression. Other concepts such as Global Civil Society and geographical delimitations are provided within the respective chapters.

For the first three terms in questions I draw on definitions used by Hafez.^[4]

I provided an own definition for repression since Haez does not work with one. However I think a definition is essential in this context.

By “Islamism” and “Political Islam” I mean individuals, groups, organizations, and parties that see in Islam a guiding political doctrine that justifies and motivates collective actions on behalf of that doctrine. Many Muslims believe that their religion is a comprehensive one that regulates matters of worship (ibadat) and social relations (mu`amalat). Not all, however, translate this basic belief into a call for social and political action. Islamist are Muslims who feel compelled to act on the belief that Islam demands social and political activism , either to establish on Islamic state, to proselytize to reinvigorate the faithful, or to create a separate union for Muslim communities.^[5]

By “Moderates” I mean those individuals and groups that shun violence and insurgency as a strategy to effect social change and, instead, seek to work through state institutions, civic associations, or non-violent organizations to Islamize society and politics. “Radicals” are those who reject accommodation with the state regime, refuse to participate in its institutions, and insist on the necessity of violent revolution or mass mobilization to Islamize society and politics.

Repression is conceived as an effort by a government to suppress unrest or opposition through the use of judicial means, arbitrary arrests, torture and police or military action.

First Part: Theorizing Islamist Rebellion

I. Theorizing Islamist Rebellion within a Local Context

1.) Criticizing the Socioeconomic Approach

The prevailing explanation why Muslims rebel is that poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment, and psychological alienation stemming from failed modernization and excessive Westernization set the conditions for radical Islamism.^[6] The assertion of this thesis is that there is little correlation between economic deprivations and rebellion and is thus following Hafez assumption that socioeconomic explanations are unconvincing.^[7] As Naumkin confirms it cannot explain why radicalism is on the rise and able to mobilize supporters in some countries but not others where economic conditions are equally dire. Saudi Arabia, for example, is one of the wealthiest countries in the Middle East, but the Saudis are nevertheless among the strongest supporters of Islamic radicalism. On the other end of the spectrum, Mauritania is one of the poorest Muslim countries on earth but does not appear to be prone to religious extremism.^[8]

As relative economic deprivation such as in Central Asia, Naumkin refers specifically to Uzbekistan as an example stating that it has become a hotbed for the most ferocious Islamic movements in Central Asia, despite the fact that its decline in living standards has been less than that of some other Central Asian countries in the post-Soviet period.^[9]

Rebellion in the sense above refers to the effort consciously undertaken by movement organizations to acquire and allocate resources for sustained violent opposition to an incumbent regime. Hafez underlines that Rebellion is different from riots, sporadic and spontaneous mass upheavals, or occasional terrorism. It refers to broader planning that involves organizational structuring, ideological formulations, and programmatic steps to acquire resources and allocate them to resist and established order through recurrent violence and mass mobilization.^[10]

2.) Hafez’s Political Process Approach

Hafez puts forward a political process approach to Islamist Rebellion developed largely in response to the above criticism of the socioeconomic theories of Islamist movements which mechanically link grievances to collective action. It begins with the premise that it is neither necessary for Islamists to be contended to become moderate nor sufficient for Islamists to be deprived to become rebellious.^[11]

a.) Three Resources to effect change

Hafez analyses the political environment in which Islamists operate, the mobilization structures through which Islamists acquire and allocate movement resources, and the ideological frames with which Islamists justify and motivate collective actions. According to him to engage in collective action - be it peaceful or violent – Islamists must be empowered with resources that enable them to compete with, or “put up a fight” against, powerful opponents.

There are at least three resources that Islamists could command to effect social and political change:

- Material and organizational resources
- Legitimacy and identity resources
- Institutional resources

Material and organizational resources provide Islamists with the capacity to mobilize people for marches, demonstrations, and strikes, as well as for terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Legitimacy and identity resources, in turn, provide leaders and organizations with the ability to appeal to an audience beyond the core activists who make up the movement in its formative stages. The moral authority to command people is an indispensable resource for aggrieved groups seeking to effect cognitive and behavioural changes in society or mobilize the broader public for peaceful elections or violent disruption.

Institutional resources, in their turn, enable Islamists to publicize their goals and views through prominent channels, to exert pressure through elite ties, and to initiate change through legislation.^[12]

The political process approach further contends that movement strategies involve more than decisions concerning how to exert influence and effect political change; movement strategies also involve decisions about what types of organizations to adopt and how to appeal to potential members. To respond to a repressive environment, for instance, social movement actors may choose to organize activists in clandestine cells dispersed across a national territory.

Under a pluralistic system, on the other hand, social movements might form inclusive parties or public interest associations to take advantage of institutional resources and emphasize the possibility of “making a difference” through “proper” channels of conflict mediation.^[13]

Therefore, an investigation of movement strategies must account for the spread of different mobilization structures and ideological frames in the movement in response to opportunities and constraints.^[14]

Finally Hafez states that the political process approach rather than being an outcome of fixed circumstances treats social and political struggles as a dynamic of interaction, adaptation, and unintended consequences that are likely to shape the strategies of movements over time.

Thus Hafez points out that rather than ask why a movement becomes rebellious, a more appropriate question become what is the process by which a movement becomes rebellious.^[15]

b.)Hafez’s five patterns of rebellious conduct

In sum, the precepts of the political process approach suggest at least three dimension to the study of potential rebellious Islamic movements strategies; political environment, mobilization structures, and ideological frame. The interaction between these factors is the key to understand the strategic orientation between moderation and rebellion of Islamist movements. Hafez restricted his study on two countries: Algeria and Egypt.

However, he formulates testable propositions based on his findings which will serve within this thesis to confirm or remove doubts about the rebellious prospectives of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia.

Proposition 1:

If, in early state-movement interactions, the ruling regime provides Islamists access to the institutionalized political system, Islamists will avoid violent strategies and accommodate the state regime. If, however, the ruling regime denies Islamists meaningful access to the system, they are likely to opt for nonaccommodative strategies. Institutional exclusion contributes to the outbreak of rebellion; however, it is not sufficient to cause rebellion. The timing and targeting of state repression matter as well.

Proposition 2:

If state repression is pre-emptive-applied before the Islamist opposition has had a chance to acquire material and organizational resources, develop mass organizations, and engage in popular mobilization-mass rebellion is less likely to occur, irrespective of how economically deprived or political aggrieved the opposition. If, however, repression is reactive, Islamists are likely to resort to violence and rebellion to defend their organizations and cadres.

Proposition 3:

If state repression is selective – targeting only leaders and core activists – mass Islamist rebellion is less likely to occur. If, however, repression is indiscriminate, it will likely expand Islamist violence and induce mass rebellion.

Proposition 4:

If the political system denies the Islamist movement substantive access to state institutions and violently represses that movement, Islamists are likely to adopt exclusive, loosely structured organizations and promote antisystem ideological frames.

Proposition 5:

If rebellious Islamist movements splinter into exclusive, loosely structured organizations that adopt antisystem frames, their rebellions are likely turn into protracted conflicts and produce patterns of anticivilian violence.

However, before comparing Hizb ut-Tahrir`s situation against the patterns in the above countries in question the theoretical focus will be extended to the field of International Relations and thus the global arena by providing and overview on constructivist theory as it relates to situate transnational networks in the global civil society and to explain Fiona B. Adamson’s criticism of mainstream social constructivism in conceptualizing the role of transnational networks and the role of religion and culture in international affairs and present her idea of the International System as a structure of political opportunities.

II. Theorizing Islamist Rebellion within the Global Arena

In international relations, constructivist theories have been central to the revival of interest in global civil society. During the Cold War and most of the history of international relations, the research agenda was dominated by state centred approaches.^[16] In the constructivist framework, power is rather constrained and state interests reshaped through international normative structures created by the multiple interactions of states and non-states actors operating in global civil society. The following sections outline briefly constructivist ideas as such and define the role of transnational networks operating in global civil society.

1.) Constructivism in International Relations

Constructivism is the view that prioritizes ideas over materials and is the view that claims human action and interaction, corresponding to the dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world, shapes the material world.^[17] In recent years, especially by the end of the Cold War, a great appeal has been given to the constructivist approach. A great literature has been formed on this theory especially in the post-Cold war period.^[18] We have experienced “the constructivist turn in IR theory” in which the proponents of this theory have opened up “the black box of interest and identity formation,”^[19] and have argued that the state interests emerge from the interactions among the states and the international system. Constructivism is a theory that stands between positivist/materialist modern and idealist/interpretive post-modern IR theories and attempts to build a bridge between them.^[20] It aims to show how the subjective, intersubjective and material worlds interact in the construction of reality, and the interactions between the structures and agent’s identities and interests.^[21] Accordingly, constructivist theory claims that the social relations are established in reciprocal bases among the actors interacting, and it cannot be pure objectivity between the knowledge and reality.

In contrast to its neorealist and neoliberal theories, constructivism does not take interests and identities as given. Power and interests are not unimportant but they are constituted by ideas and identities. State interests are socially constructed.^[22] Thus, international politics is contingent to the historical and social context.

The identity plays a critical role in the creation of the boundaries of subjectivity in this equation.

As Wendt portrays^[23] core assumptions of constructivist IR theory can be formulated as follows:

- States are the principle units of analysis for international political theory;
- The key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material;
- State identities and interests are an important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature of domestic politics.

The argument of “the mutual constitution of agents and structure, states and international system” underlies at the very beginning of constructivism.^[24] Thus, drawing upon conclusions about the nature of the state and the nature of the international system, independent of each other, is impossible in constructivist theory.

2.) The Global Civil Society and the Power of Transnational Non-State Actors

Rather than Wendt’s focus on the interactions between states, constructivist theory was extended to give a central role to transnational non-state actors reacting on the appearance of a transnational sphere or so-called Global Civil Society.

As Olesen puts it:

“Globalization was apparently pulling up the national tent pegs of civil society, pushing it into a global sphere where individuals and social movements interact across physical, social, political and cultural distances.”^[25]

Chandler rightly states that network theory has been one of the most important developments in

linking change in state policy to the activity of non-state actors in global civil society.^[26] He cites Keck and Sikkink who are arguing that: ‘network theory links the constructivist belief that international identities are constructed to empirical research tracing the paths through which this process occurs.^[27] According to Chandler network theory builds on the work of theorists, like Paul Wapner, who have emphasised the new nature of non-state campaigning groups, seeing them not as traditional lobby or pressure groups, organised around changing state policies, but as ‘political actors in their own right.’ Wappner argues:

“The best way to think about transnational activist societal efforts is through the concept of ´world civic politics.` When activists work to change conditions without directly pressurising states, their activities take place in the civil dimension of world collective life or what is sometimes called global civil society.”^[28]

Rather than pressurising the state through traditional means, new social movements and activist networks rely on the power of information and ideas. In this way the end of the Cold War provided credible evidence of the role of non-state actors in the development of state identities and interests.

As Risse and Ropp argue:

“…the turnaround of Soviet foreign policy as an enabling condition for the peaceful revolutions of 1989 resulted at least partly from the fact that the Gorbachev leadership was itself heavily influenced by Western liberal ideas spread through transnational actors and coalitions…the peaceful transformation [in Eastern Europe] was brought about by dissident groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia with the transnational human rights networks empowering and strengthening their claims.”^[29]

For leading global civil society theorist, Mary Kaldor, global civil society is a less a definition of which organisations or institutions are included or excluded but ‘the global process through which individuals debate, influence and negotiate’ with centres of power.^[30] The constructivist constructions of global civil society thus turns states from self-interested and self-directed subjects,^[31] to members of an international society where they are subject to the ideas spread and promoted by transnational movements.

Over the last decade, the growth of international human rights norms is the leading example, held to demonstrate the strength of constructivist approaches in giving transnational movements a central role: ‘because international human rights norms challenge state rule over society and national sovereignty, any impact on domestic change would be counter-intuitive.’^[32] The assumption that human rights norms challenge nation-state interests therefore asserts that norm changes can not come solely from state agency but must also stem from the influence of transnational non-state actors.

The extended constructivism approach thus argues that transnational actors in a global civil society promote ideas into norms and establishing norms as state practice. As Adamson points out over the course of the 1990s, research on the role that norms and ideas play in world politics burgeoned. Studies showed that coordinated transnational campaigns by transnational networks, behaving according to their moral convictions and principles and promoting their ideas in effective ways, could affect significant changes in international politics.^[33]

These coordinated actions had, it appeared, resulted in such changes in world politics as increased compliance to human rights norms by states, the demise of apartheid in South Africa, strengthened environmental protectionism, and a reduction in the acceptability of using land mines in conflict zones around the world.^[34]

According to what was said above the constructivist turn in international relations revealed that states lost their role as epicentre of international norm setting “transnationally operating non-state actors” became key players in the promotion of normative agendas in world politics and thus key players in international politics.

3.) The International System as a Structure of Political Opportunities

The above system is the output of Fiona B. Adamson’s critic on mainstream constructivist agenda in the aftermath of September 11.

Even though acknowledging in general the role of transnational non-state actors as outline above according to Adamson, mainstream constructivists appear to be ill-equipped to shed light on recent developments in world politics such as the use of violence by ideologically motivated actors and transnational networks or the role of religion and culture in international affairs.

She states that ironically, it is the work of someone far removed from the social constructivist research agenda -Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations-who generated the most public debate in the 1990s on the role of ideational factors in world affairs while the ‘‘meat and bones’’ of the mainstream constructivist research agenda -the benign power of international norms, global civil society, and strategies of communicative action, argumentation, and persuasion-appear to have lost some of their sway.^[35]

a.) Constrains of the Constructivist Agenda

Adamson argues that the failing of social constructivism to grapple with some of the issues that have come to the fore in world politics over the past several years is the result of two theoretical limitations that have constrained the constructivist research agenda:

- To the first she refers to as ‘‘the liberal bias’’ of mainstream social constructivism, in which constructivists concerned with normative change in world politics have overwhelmingly focused their attention on a relatively narrow range of cases- on the actions, discourses, beliefs, and strategies used by liberal actors promoting liberal norms in the international system.^[36] They have, thus, universalized strategies of norm promotion through the study of only a small subset of the contending norms and actors that compete for attention in international society and have lost sight of the fact that liberalism is only one possible ideological framework that can be used for framing political action.

- The second limitation she sees in the current research agenda is a lack of theory regarding the relationship between individual agents and a global ideological structures - a disconnect between the structural theories of the international system and the micro-practices of individual actors involved in the promotion of normative agendas in world politics. This disconnect has led to a rather apolitical view of ‘‘norm entrepreneurs’’ as being essentially free-standing moral agents, acting on individual conscience, rather than actors who are deeply embedded within particular ideological and geopolitical configurations in world politics.

Adamson outlines that these two shortcomings are ultimately intertwined in that the liberal bias of the constructivist research agenda reflects the ideological structure of global liberalism within which it is embedded-a structure that has not yet been self-reflexively theorized about by liberal constructivists.^[37]

As a means of overcoming these limitations, Adamson proposes a model of the international system that can be used to situate norm entrepreneurs explicitly within the broader sets of global ideological structures shaping the processes of normative mobilization. She argues that the international system, is best conceived of as neither a socially thin Hobbesian anarchy, on the one hand, nor a fully developed Habermasian public sphere, on the other, but rather as an evolving, but still only partially institutionalized ‘‘global structure of political opportunities.’’^[38]

Such a framework provides a possibility for beginning to map out the types of systemic-level political opportunity structures that individual agents draw upon in their attempts to promote normative change in world politics. Adamson’s is aware that the concept of political opportunity structures, of course, has been widely used as a means of mapping institutional and ideological environments in the study of domestic social movements and contentious politics.^[39] However, the concept is also increasingly finding its way into IR as a means of theorizing about transnational social movements.^[40] But it has yet to be fully embraced by IR theorists as a means of theorizing about the structure of the international system itself. She is though intending to provide social constructivists with a means of integrating the literatures on top-down and bottom-up approaches to normative change in world politics, while also providing the possibility for a more robust theoretical statement about the role that structural power and political ideology can play in the diffusion and contestation of international norms.

Adamson affirms that a macro level ideological structure of ‘‘global liberalism,’’ with its geopolitical and institutional underpinnings and concomitant political opportunity structures, currently dominates the world, but she also points out that Political Islam is a contender in many regions, with its own geopolitical and institutional underpinnings and its own global circuits that may overlap geographically but operate relatively independently of the circuits and networks that define the structure of global liberalism.^[41] She points out that in a sense, these two overarching ideological frameworks constitute distinct ‘‘life worlds’’ within the same international system, providing their own competing sets of systemic-level discursive opportunities for differently situated norm entrepreneurs. Neither can systemic level structure be reduced to either its cultural or its geopolitical underpinnings; nor can either structure be studied in terms of being ‘‘located’’ in one particular region of the world. Both structures are composed of networks and institutions that are global and that overlap and interpenetrate various states and regions.

[...]

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^[1] Hafez, 2003: XIII

^[2] Naumkin, 2003: 3 and 4

^[3] Hafez Mohammed, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).

^[4] Hafez, 2003: 4

^[5] This definition is thus going beyond those groups that have as a core programme the establishment of Islam as a state religion and the implementation of Islamic law (see for example Walker, 2003: 22)

^[6] See for example Ansari 1984; Davis 1984; Dekmejian 1995 for the Arab World and Rasizade, 2002 for Central Asia

^[7] Hafez, 2003: 9-19

^[8] Naumkin, 2005; see also Baran, Starr, Cornell, 2006: 43

^[9] Ibid; for a more detailed research regarding the linkage between relative deprivation and Islamism in Central Asia see Walker, 2003.

^[10] Hafez, 2003: 9

^[11] Ibid: 19

^[12] Hafez p.20

^[13] Ibid

^[14] McAdam et al., 1997

^[15] Hafez, 2003: 21

^[16] Roche, 2004: 79

^[17] Adler, 1997: 322

^[18] For instance see: Adler, 1997; Checkel, 1998, Wendt, 1992, 1994; Weldes, 1996; Ruggie, 1997.

^[19] Checkel, 1998: 326

^[20] Adler, 1997: 323

^[21] Ibid: 330

^[22] Erdem, 2004: 137-138

^[23] Wendt, 1994: 385

^[24] Banchoff, 1999: 261

^[25] Olesen, 2005: 419

^[26] Chandler, 2005: 53

^[27] Ibid

^[28] Wapner, 1995:312

^[29] Risse and Ropp, 1999:268

^[30] Kaldor, 2003:79

^[31] Roche, 2004: 24

^[32] Risse and Sikkink, 1999:4

^[33] Adamson, 2005: 547

^[34] see for example: Sikkink 1991; Wapner 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999

^[35] Adamson, 2005: 547

^[36] as Human Rights see above page 12

^[37] Adamson, 2005: 548

^[38] Ibid

^[39] see, for example, Tarrow 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001

^[40] Keck and Sikkink 1998:31

^[41] Adamson, 2005:548