Climate Change as a Reason for Asylum. A just Claim?

Contents

List of Abbreviations

1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Formulation
1.2. State of Research
1.3. Topical Relevance
1.4. Scientific Approach

2. Climate Change and Migration
2.1. Conceptual History and Definitions
2.2. Legal Status of Climate Refugees
2.3. Hotspots for Climate-Induced Displacement
2.3.1. Island Nations
2.3.2. Tropical Coasts
2.3.3. Sahel

3. John Rawls' Conception of Justice
3.1. Justice as Fairness
3.2. Principles of Justice
3.3. Original Position
3.4. Law of People

4. Justice of Asylum for Climate Refugees
4.1. Judgement by Rawls' Principles of Justice
4.2. Climate Asylum Laws in Original Position

5. Conclusion

Literature

List of Abbreviations

BAMF Federal Office for Migration and Refugees

BMU Federal Office for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety

BVerfG Federal Constitutional Court

COP 21 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference

GFK 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Human Rights

IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

IDP Internal Displaced Persons

IOM International Organization for Migration

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NRC Norwegian Refugee Council

OECD Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development

UN United Nations

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WBGU German Advisory Council on Global Change

WHO World Health Organization

1. Introduction

The Committee further recalls that the obligation of States parties to respect and ensure the right to life extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life. States parties may be in violation of article 6 of the Covenant even if such threats and situations do not result in the loss of life. Furthermore, the Committee recalls that environmental degradation, climate change and unsustainable development constitute some of the most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life.¹

1.1. Problem Formulation

2019 was the year of climate change and climate activism. Whilst the Amazon and the Australian Bush were burning, weekly demonstrations and various new organizations of the environmental movement, such as the revolutionary “Rebellion for Life”² (Extinction Rebellion), have rapidly been spreading over the globe and effectively been using social media to successfully convey green politics into the public interest. Furthermore, they are more and more alluding to the particular important foreign-policy dimension depending the direct repercussions of climate change, which, in their opinion, will lead to mass migration of humans around the world.³ Since the start of 2020 this fight for ecological and economic sustainability and justice has been slowed down by the spread of the Coronavirus. It launched not only the worst pandemic the world has ever seen, but also the greatest economy crisis up to date.⁴ But as a positive side effect of this economy crisis, the global lock down of the industries in 2020 exhibits quite paradigmatically the high effectiveness of the active cutting of greenhouse gas emissions to keep the global temperature rise under 1.5 degree Celsius til 2100⁵ - this global nature conservation goal has been stated at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21) in Paris and can be seen as a special token for the globally combined nature conservation efforts of the over 150 participating nations.⁶

Regarding the effects of climate change, which are already noticeable today, January 2020 saw an United Nations (UN) landmark ruling: the Human Rights Committee judged, relating to article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Human Rights (ICCPR), that (prospectively) humans, who are forced to migrate because of climate change, can not simply be deported.⁷ Although the specific appeal of a Kiribatian family seeking asylum in New Zealand got rejected, this historic precedent acknowledges for the first time (in legal matters) the humanitarian situation of humans displaced by climate change that will be one of the great foreign-policy tasks of the 21st century, with predictions ranging from 25 million up to 1 billion environmental migrants til 2050, depending on temperature rise,⁸ and also implies a potential breach of the obligation of states parties in context of deportation to countries strongly effected by climate change such as Kiribati.⁹

The verdict of the UN Human Rights Committee poses the issue of a potential entitlement to asylum for humans experiencing climate-induced displacement. Thus this thesis is gonna examine this rather new topic of the political science: the future forced migration in the context of climate change and its consequences for the receiving countries and their legal systems. Consequently, for one thing in this work it will be tried to point out the causal correlation of climate change and migration and, moreover, on this basis tried to undertake reflections regarding a potential need for reformation of national and international refugee and asylum law in order to protect the affected people. Since justice is highly important for social cooperation and also currently being tested by not only the global resource scarcity and its resulting conflicts,¹⁰ but also, as shall be shown with this thesis, by the that very human-induced climate change, the focus of this work shall not be put on the potential implementation of climate refugees into the law of nations, but rather on the more philosophical question of justification regarding a potential asylum for the (prospective) victims of climate change. The leading question of this examination is thus gonna be, if the claim to asylum due to the persecution through human-induced climate change is a just claim – or just a claim. Because the abstract term of justice and its concepts, which vary depending on the author, could fill a thesis on its own, this work will use the specific theory of justice of political philosopher John Rawls and thus will, in pursuit of the main goal to concretely judge the obligation of states towards climate refugees on basis of an abstract justice term, outline his theory of “justice as fairness”.¹¹

1.2. State of Research

Since the researcher of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Essam El-Hinnawi first coined the term environmental refugee in 1985¹², there has been an increasing interest in research for the causal correlation of climate change and migration. Proceeding from there, scientists are even more and more starting to examine, and consequently imposing demands to politics, this environmental migration in regard to asylum laws and legal matters. Today there already exists a variety of studies and theories on the issue, with even an own bibliographic database (CliMig) specifically concentrating on migration, environment and climate change.¹³ Many non-governmental organizations (NGO), like Oxfam¹⁴ and Greenpeace¹⁵ or the intergovernmental International Organization for Migration (IOM),¹⁶ are arguing in their studies with horrifying numbers from an alarmist perspective and are primarily alluding to this causal phenomenon in order to raise public attention, while some researchers, such as Biermann and Boas,¹⁷ Afifi and Jäger¹⁸ or McAdam,¹⁹ are especially concentrating on climate refugees protection strategies and arguing for or against them, with some, like Black,²⁰ particularly demanding attention for legal matters regarding the refugee term in international law and the pro and contra of such institutional law reforms.

Regardless the stance on terms and strategies, all of this research shares the ability to present political strategies designed to actively manage the prospective humanitarian crisis of humans deeply effected by climate change, in form of reform ideas regarding the asylum law and more aimed (and general functioning) nature preservation politics (which is still the best strategy). This active handling of the situation has also been proclaimed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the 2010 Climate Change Conference in Cancun.²¹ Therefore, it is astonishing that the German government, in response to the ruling of the UN Human Rights Committee in January 2020, simply denied that climate refugees could be eligible to asylum or a refugee status, because (as shared by some in research) “most studies are indicating that environmental changes are a trigger, but not the sole cause of migration decisions”²², and that more research would be needed, without providing alternative protection strategies regarding migration, which in fact has already been done at length - not only by independent research, but also by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU),²³ in a working paper of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)²⁴ and in a 200-page environmental research plan compiled by the Federal Office for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU).²⁵

1.3. Topical Relevance

The state of research shows an increasing discrepancy between the opinion of science and the statement of the German government (paradigmatically for the general attitude of the G20 nations), which marks the particular relevance of this thesis. On the one hand, the publicly relevant purpose of this work is to call attention to this controversial misapprehension and on the other hand to point out the complicated legal consequences, which will assuredly emerge from this ignorance towards future climate refugees and their humanitarian situation. Considering the intended goal of limitation of temperature rise to 1.5 degree til 2100 under the aspect of today's renaissance of “king coal”,²⁶ politicians assuredly have to get used to the fact that this goal will not be achieved, comparing the relative low rest amount of 1100 billion tons of carbon equivalent of greenhouse gases, which can still be emitted til 2100, to the yearly emissions of approximately 50 billion tons in order to limit the temperate rise to 2.0 degree – to keep the temperature rise at 1.5 degree the amount shrinks to 400 billion tons or, in other words, 8 years and then all emissions have to be completely reduced to zero.²⁷ Thus the governments of the global north, which won't nearly be hit as hard by climate change effects as the global south,²⁸ will, sooner or later (hopefully sooner), have to face their responsibility towards humans displaced due to climate change caused by their action, in terms of justice depending a possible guided migration or other adaption and protection strategies.

1.4. Scientific Approach

Regarding the procedure, initially in chapter two the conceptional and definitional fundamentals of climate change and migration are gonna be expounded. Next to the rough depiction of the legal situation of persons effected, specific examinations will gonna be conducted for three of the most threatended regions, in order to develop a more extensive comprehension of the already occurring phenomenon. Chapter three will provide an elaboration of the theory of justice of John Rawls, with an own subchapter dedicated to his thoughts in the 'Law of People' regarding international law. Following this, the fourth chapter is gonna apply this freshly acquired understanding of justice onto the topic of climate change and migration relating to an asylum claim, mainly focused on the G20 nations due to these being the main contributors to climate change, and going to conduct an interpretation of Rawls' abstract theory to this concrete case, out of which hopefully insights will result regarding a future climate and asylum policy guideline, which acknowledges the extraordinary circumstances of the effected humans and is thought of from a perspective of justice. As for the scientific method of this thesis, there will be made use of a method mix consisting of theoretical and mostly quantitative empirical methods of the political sciences. The descriptive part will on the one hand focus on the theoretical depiction of the conceptual history, give priority to the evaluation of empirical studies regarding climate change and migration and thereby conducting three brief case studies. The depiction of Rawls' conception of justice will mostly be restricted to primary literature, but also call on some secondary literature to develop the proper understanding of his thoughts, in order to use his perspective of an egalitarian Liberalism as a projection surface for social justice in the discussion part regarding the claim to asylum for refugees.²⁹

2. Climate Change and Migration

In order to assess the leading question regarding the eligibility to political asylum for climate refugees under the aspect of justice and also due to the relatively new, but already frequently-explored and thus inconsistently used terms,³⁰ first there has to occur a determination and distinction of the fundamental term of environmental migration. This chapter will try to give an introduction into the history and the legal status of climate/environmental refugees/migrants and, on basis of scientific definitions, will try to establish an own operational definition of environmental migration and climate refugees in general to work with in regard to the scientific leading question. There will also be case examples provided for three future hot-spots of climate-induced displacement.

2.1. Conceptual History and Definitions

A causal correlation between the environment and migration in relation to a new scientific term was first implied by El-Hinnawi, as he described environmental refugees as humans “forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/ or seriously affected the quality of their life”.³¹ Primarily based on this historic definition by the Egyptian scientist in the UNEP, were most of the first estimations regarding prospective numbers by Jodi Jacobson (1988 10 million) of the World Watch Institute and University of Oxford Professor for Ecology Norman Myers (1993 25 millions), who even repeatedly corrected his number over 150 million in 1997, up to 200 million environmental migrants til 2050 in 2002.³² The following scientific debate has, therefore, been evolving quite simultaneously to the growing state of research regarding climate change and has been characterized by an increasing polarity in science regarding the refugee term in combination with environment or climate and the resulting consequences, with some researchers, like Richard Black and Stephen Castles, heavily rejecting the term in reference to the lack of empirical data³³ and because “it implies a mono causality which rarely exists in practice”.³⁴

The former Under Secretary General of the UN, Hans van Ginkel, stated on that front in 2005 that it “is a highly complex issue, with global organizations already overwhelmed by the demands of the conventionally-recognized refugees as originally defined in 1951. We should prepare now, however, to define, accept and accommodate this new breed of refugee within international framework”.³⁵ This implies that since El-Hinnawi, an intensifying scientifical and also increasingly political interest has been developing for the topic, with governmental and intergovernmental studies devoted to this newly founded field of research, such as the legal and protection policy research series of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), focusing mainly on the nexus dynamics between conflict or violence and disaster or climate change.³⁶

The IOM defines that environmental migrants, “based on sudden or progressing that considerable changes of the environmental and living conditions that govern their life, are forced or are feeling compelled to leave their home, be it occasionally or permanent, and who move inside their home country or out of its borders”.³⁷ This definition was firstly formulated under the aspect of the aspired inclusion of the human-induced climate change, and secondly to aim to include the definition of the Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement from 1998, which defines internally displaced persons (IDP), as such “who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border”.³⁸ The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) estimates the number of all IDP in 2018 at 41.3 million, of which 28 million were new deplacements and of which again 16.1 million, therefore more than half, were weather related disaster displacements mostly due to floods, storms and droughts.³⁹ One of the key findings of their Global Report on Internal Displacement notes that “the devastating power of extreme events highlighted again the impacts of climate change across the globe”.⁴⁰

The Atlas of Environmental Migration of the IOM, furthermore, characterizes environmental migration as a multi-causal phenomenon defined by these nexus dynamics that have been researched in the UNHCR study, which are affected by various factors, such as geophysical catastrophes, flooding, storms, landslides, droughts, extreme temperatures, conflagrations, destruction of ecosystems, sea level rise, casualties in industrial parks or land grabbing.⁴¹ Regarding these specific effects of climate change on migration is mentioned, although the empirical assessment of the numbers of effected people contains problems relating to the difficult data acquisition due to the complicated distinction to other environmental events, that they are on the one hand massively aggravating existing conflicts in relation to migration ambitions,⁴² and on the other hand could, for examples in cases of drought periods, lead to mass migration from rural to urban regions around the world, if adaptation strategies are lacking.⁴³

The notion of the term environmental refugee/migrant generally includes climate refugees as part of the environment, but an uniformly applying definition of the term climate refugee itself is lacking,⁴⁴ although there are some definition suggestions, for instance used in a Berkeley report to describe “individuals who are forcibly displaced (within or beyond their nation-state boundaries) by short- and long-term natural disasters and environmental degradation precipitated or exacerbated by the climate crisis, “⁴⁵ those meaning typhoons, hurricanes, wildfires, and tsunamis as short-term disasters and desertification, deforestation, rising temperature and rising sea-levels as long-term environmental changes.⁴⁶ Although the UNHCR is not endorsing the term climate change, because “it is more accurate to refer to persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change”⁴⁷, it is also used by other researchers, such as Biermann and Boas to define “people who have to leave their habitats, immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at least one of three impacts of climate change: rise in sea level, extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity”.⁴⁸

Regarding the more precise distinction between migrants and refugee, Lucassen writes that “the cause of mobility differs between the two groups. While economic motivations prevail among labour migrants, persecution, war, indiscriminate violence, or massive natural disasters drive refugees from their homes”.⁴⁹ Although at this point depending the nexus dynamics may be arguable, to which extent the climate-induced displacement might be due to economic motivations, but in the style of Biermann and Boas, and with regards to the verdict of the UN Human Rights Committee, for the operational definition of climate refugees in this work applies as well that “by using this term, the protection of climate refugees will receive the legitimacy and urgency it deserves“.⁵⁰ Thus can conclusively be stated, considering the nexus dynamics of climate and migration and the dimensions of flight vs migration and environment vs climate, that climate refugees are forcibly displaced humans fleeing the destruction of their habitat due to the short- and long-term impacts of climate change, which triggers environmental changes comprising of extreme weather events, sea-level rise, desertification, increasing water scarcity and rising temperatures. The aspect of whether this movement involves a border crossing is left out, because, as is also going to be part of the later discussion in terms of justice, it is difficult to argue, why protection strategies should differ between refugees crossing borders and those fleeing inside the country.⁵¹

2.2. Legal Situation of Climate Refugees

Besides the problematic of causality regarding the term of climate refugee in context of the nexus dynamics of climate and migration, there exists the currently politically and legally disregarded problematic of the asylum eligibility of climate migrants, which increases in importance as the climate change progresses and forces people to migrate across international borders and thus provokes legal conflicts regarding the status of climate refugees, which is indeed already happening, such as in the internationally considered case of Kiribatian family, who were on trial before the UN Human Rights Committee, because New Zealand rejected their asylum claim.⁵² Today there are only two nations in the world (Finland and Sweden), who have incorporated measures regarding the acknowledgment of climate refugees into their national legislation,⁵³ and currently climate refugees surprisingly “are not recognized as a problem in any binding international treaty nor is there an international body charged with providing for climate migrants or even counting them.”⁵⁴ But more and more political actors are starting to allude to the complex situation and directing the political discourse in that direction, for instance as Australia’s Labor Party is proposing an international coalition to accept climate refugees from the Pacific or Australia’s Green Party is tabling a migration amendment bill in regards to climate change.⁵⁵

The Berkeley report on climate refugees argues that “refugees and migrants are entitled to the same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, which must be respected, protected, and fulfilled at all times. However, migrants and refugees are distinct groups governed by separate legal frameworks”⁵⁶ and the distinction thus contains a high potential for legal conflicts regarding the protection status. The term refugee is specifically defined in the multilateral UN treaty of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (GFK), as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”.⁵⁷ Given the rather new history of climate change science, it is not surprising that neither this historic convention, nor the 1969 Refugee Convention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the 1984 Cartagena Declaration of Refugees (which however both already cover the flight from events seriously disturbing public order), were originally formulated with regards to the protection of future climate refugees.⁵⁸ Since, there has been occurring a rethinking on the part of the UN that persecution in a sense of the GFK could also be given through climate change in the context of natural disasters, especially when some population groups are withheld protection and aid measures in such situations,⁵⁹ as described in the January 2020 Human Rights Committees verdict that the Kiribatian family “faced as a result of the State party’s decision to remove him to the Republic of Kiribati a real risk of impairment to his right to life under article 6 of the Covenant”,⁶⁰ - “due to the impact of climate change and associated sea level rise on the habitability of the Republic of Kiribati and on the security situation in the islands”,⁶¹ and thus newly establishing the possibility of interpreting the persecution mentioned in the GFK as generated through the home countries failure to render assistance.

Problematic regarding the recognition of being persecuted in such ways is also the inconsistency and variety of complicated implementations of the refugee term of the GFK into the different national asylum laws of states. For instance, the German refugee law, while depending on the reference to the GFK in article 16a of the German Basic Law, differs between the entitlement to asylum and the refugee status, nevertheless both contain the exact same protection status and legal position,⁶² but a general definition of political persecuted humans is missing, or is respectively based on pure case law of the Federal Constitutional Court (BverfG).⁶³ The non-willingness of the German government to engage in a relevant discussion unnecessarily exacerbates the situation for the legal system.⁶⁴ Arising thereby, and this brief analysis of the legal situation of climate refugees in general illustrates quintessentially the necessity to correlate the abstract refugee term of the GFK to the concrete situation of climate-induced displacement, and also a general lacking of motivation of states to incorporate climate refugees into the national asylum law. Under this aspect it becomes quite clearly, why the term climate refugees is often used as a deliberate and aimed provocation towards governments and officials to create new relevant institutions,⁶⁵ which is also occurring in this work for the same reasons.

2.3. Hotspots for Climate-Induced Displacement

This subchapter will, referring to scientific data and prognoses, try go give an overview of the regions already and prospectively most effected by the impacts of climate change and thus most vulnerable for climate-induced displacement. Thereby, the depiction is bound to the environmental changes of the acquired operational definition, namely extreme weather events, sea-level rise, desertification, increasing water scarcity and rising temperatures, and orientates itself towards the hotspot-regions of the 2019 World Risk Index, which analyzes the catastrophe risk of the countries in the world relating to extreme weather events in a context of climate change.⁶⁶

2.3.1. Island Nations

The most transparent and one of the most dangerous threats of climate change to humankind is the rise of the sea water level. Observations of greenhouse gas emissions and the consequent global warming demonstrate, as a big part of the cryosphere (glaciers, Arctic sea ice, permafrost, major ice sheets) is thawing to some extent, affecting sea level directly, the sea level rise of the 20th century exceeds that of the century before by at least 1 millimeter annually – a human-induced trend that has been observable for the past 50 years.⁶⁷ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts an increase of 0,3 to 1 meter, possible up to 2 meters in some regions,⁶⁸ with low-lying coastal regions, such as river deltas and islands, obviously being most effected – 40 million inhabitants of developing and threshold countries are already threatended by floodings, a number steadily increasing given the demographic growth in these regions.⁶⁹ Especially vulnerable to natural disasters and resulting humanitarian catastrophes, manifesting in a tendency across continents towards high or very high catastrophe risks for such regions, are pacific island nations like Vanuatu (56,71%), the Solomon Islands (29,36%) or Kiribati (14,64%), which became widely known through the UN Human Rights Committees verdict in January 2020 - in comparison the catastrophe risk of Germany is only at 2,43%.⁷⁰

The particular threat for these island nations is not solely comprised of the fact that they are directly affected by the rising sea level, as most of the land area of these 22 small island nations in the South Pacific, which themselves inhabitant already about 7 million people, is situated just a few meters above sea level,⁷¹ but also resulting from the higher sea level are more often occurring tropical storms with increasing intensity, as well as the long-term destruction of coastal habitats through these storms and floodings, which entail the salinization of the once fertile acreages and the blending of the anyhow sparsely existing ground water and salt water, making agriculture impossible and seriously endangering the freshwater supply of these islands.⁷² Furthermore, coastal erosion, partly due to the rise in intense and frequent rainfall, will threaten the food supply and push people to migrate inside and (sooner or later) across borders to become climate refugees.⁷³

That is why countries like Kiribati, which is especially endangered with most of its 100,000 inhabitants living on a land area lower than 2 meters above mere sea level,⁷⁴ and Tuvalu (2 meters mean elevation) are enacting several initiatives in a direct response attempt to battle the impacts of climate change, such as the reclamation of coastline lost to erosion and storms or the establishment of sea defenses on all islands⁷⁵ - but also a guided migration is part of the protection strategies of future climate refugees, with governments looking into buying areas of land on potentially receptive host countries, like Kiribati for instance already planned to buy as a last resort 6,000 acres of land in Fiji.⁷⁶ Despite the ambitions of these nations to battle the simple disappearance of their country due to the direct impacts of climate change, some of its inhabitants already feel themselves compelled to migrate as climate refugees, as shown in the prominently rejected case of the Kiribatian fisher family applying for political asylum in New Zealand “on the basis of changes to his environment in Kiribati caused by sea level rise associated with climate change”.⁷⁷

The immediate threat of the rising sea level poses a never before seen challenge to the international community of states of various Atlantis-like experiences, where some islands in the 21st century could literally completely sink into the ocean. This danger becomes more and more mundane, given the improbability of achievement of the climate goals limiting the temperature rise to 1.5 degree Celsius (respectively 2.0 degree) under the aspect of the current yearly greenhouse gas emissions.⁷⁸ If there won't be a strict change of environmental politics in this decade and “if no measure of moderation is taken and if no effort is made to protect the groups at risk, then they will have no alternative but to emigrate”,⁷⁹ resulting in a future mass migration from low-lying island countries.

2.3.2. Tropical Coasts

Not only low-lying island countries, but mainly all tropical coastlines of the world in general face an increasing threat through climate change – they “can be inherently dangerous places to live even today, because of their rapidly changeable nature”,⁸⁰ and thus it is not surprising that climate change and its additional environmental changes comprising of extreme weather events, sea-level rise, desertification, increasing water scarcity and rising temperatures, are vigorously aggravating the already dangerous living conditions in some of most densely populated and also poorest regions on earth, such as the coastal areas of Bangladesh (18,78% catastrophe risk), the Philippines (20,69%) or the countries of Central America (Guatemala 20,69% - El Salvador 15,11%).⁸¹

The climate change is going to further exacerbate the already complicated water supply in risk areas, whilst bringing the procedures regarding the water supply to its limits, which have been established over decades in order to cope with progressing urbanization, which already imposes challenges for the water infrastructure, and demographic explosion with a more and more water consuming agriculture, for instance on the Asian continent.⁸² Bitterly ironically, the extremely densely populated Southeastern Asian region is especially vulnerable to natural disaster like floodings, with Myers estimating 26 million climate refugees for Bangladesh, 20 million for India and even 73 million for China, mostly due to prospectively long-term floodings of big river deltas, such as the Ganges or the Pearl River.⁸³ Although not unfamiliar with monsoon rains and floods, in 2019 India alone already accounted for 2,7 million internal displacements due to disasters, following a particular intense monsoon season accounting for the second highest account of displaced persons due to disaster events in the world, of which 1,5 million were new displacements since 2018 owing to the worst floods in a century.⁸⁴

The same problems are approaching Bangladesh, which for instance is sensationally being projected to lose approximately 17 percent of its complete area by 2050, displacing an enormous estimated 20 million people, because of partial submersion by floodings and other hazards due to climate change,⁸⁵ mainly resulting in the obliteration of the general basis of existence of many humans whose livelihoods depend on fisheries through the ,,flooding of wetlands, contamination of aquifers and agricultural soils, and lost habitat for fish, birds and plants”.⁸⁶ Considering that “the consensus on climate scenarios for Bangladesh is that the temperatures will rise by 2.6º–4.8ºC by 2100”,⁸⁷ it becomes easy to accept the fact that these environmental changes will further influence the Bangladesh monsoon season and lead to the inundation of the river deltas, because of sea level rise and changed river flows, probably more than any other mainland county.⁸⁸

[...]

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¹ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Human Rights Committee): Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016, 07.01.2020, p.10 (https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f127%2 fD%2f2728%2f2016&Lang=en called 21.07.2020).

² Extinction Rebellion Hannover: Hope Dies – Action Begins, Bielefeld 2019, p. 13.

³ Cf. Extinction Rebellion UK: Declaration of Rebellion, 31.10.2018 (https://extinctionrebellion.uk/declaration/ called 22.07.2020).

⁴ Cf. Masters, Jonathan: Coronavirus - How are Countries Respoding to the Economic Crisis?, 04.05.2020 (https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/coronavirus-how-are-countries-responding-economic-crisis called 21.07.2020).

⁵ Cf. McGrath, Matt: Climate change and coronavirus - Five charts about the biggest carbon crash, 06.05.2020 (https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-52485712 called 21.07.2020).

⁶ Cf. Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit: Die Klimakonferenz in Paris (https://ww w.bmu.de/themen/klima-energie/klimaschutz/internationale-klimapolitik/pariser-abkommen/ called 27.07.2020).

⁷ Cf. Godin, Melissa: Climate Refugees Cannot Be Forced Home U.N. Panel Says in Landmark Ruling, 20.01.2020 (https://time.com/5768347/climate-refugees-un-ioane-teitiota/ called 21.07.2020).

⁸ Cf. IOM: Migration, Climate Change and the Environment, Geneva 2009, p. 10. (https://www.iom.int/jahia/webda v/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/compendium_climate_change.pdf called 27.07.2020).

⁹ Cf. ICCPR (HRC), 07.01.2020, p. 10.

¹⁰ Cf. Kuprian, Anita/Opitz, Anja/Alexander, Siedschlag/Jodok Troy: Grundelemente der internationalen Politik, Wien 2007, p. 77.

¹¹ Rawls, John: A Theory of Justice, Oxford 2000, p. 3f.

¹² Cf. El-Hinnawi, Essam: Environmental Refugee (United Nations Environment Programme), Nairobi 1985, p. 4.

¹³ Cf. Universität Neuenburg: CliMig (https://climig.com/ called 29.07.2020).

¹⁴ Cf. Oxfam Deutschland: Migration und Flucht vor dem Klimawandel, Berlin 2016 (https://www.oxfam.de/system/files/oxfam_migration_und-flucht-durch-klimawandel.pdf called 29.07.2020).

¹⁵ Cf. Jakobeit, Cord/Methmann, Chris: Klimaflüchtlinge. Die verleugnete Katastrophe (Greenpeace), Hamburg 2007 (https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/klimafluechtlinge_endv_0.PDF called 29.07.2020).

¹⁶ Cf. IOM: Migration, Climate Change and the Environment, Geneva 2009 (https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/ shared/shared/mainsite/activities/env_degradation/compendium_climate_change.pdf called 29.07.2020).

¹⁷ Cf. Biermann, Frank/Boas, Ingrid: Climate Change and Human Migration: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees; in: Brauch, Hans Günter: Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace Vol. 8 (Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict), Berlin 2012, p. 291-300.

¹⁸ Cf. Afifi, Tamer/Jäger, Jill: Environment, Forced Migration and Social Vulnerability, Berlin 2010.

¹⁹ Cf. McAdam, Jane: The emerging New Zealand jurisprudence on climate change, disasters and displacement; in: Migration Studies Vol. 3 Number 1 2015 131-142, Sydney 2015.

²⁰ Cf. Black, Richard: Environmental refugees: myth or reality?, UNHCR Working Paper 34, Brighton 2001 (https://www.unhcr.org/en-lk/3ae6a0d-00.pdf called 29.07.2020).

²¹ Cf. Costa, María Máñez/ Scheffran, Jürgen: Die Flucht vor dem Klimwandel, Hamburg 2016, p. 2. (https://www.cli mate-service-center.de/imperia/md/content/csc/Migration___Klimawandel_pdf.pdf called 29.07.2020).

²² DW: Bundesregierung - Kein Asyl für Klimaflüchtlinge, 22.01.2020 (https://www.dw.com/de/klimafl%C3%BCchtl inge-gibt-es-nicht-die-bundesregierung-sieht-kein-asylrecht-f%C3%BCr-migranten/a-52111701 called 30.07.2020).

²³ Cf. WBGU: Zeit-gerechte Klimapolitik – Vier Intiativen für Fairness, 2018 (https://issuu.com/wbgu/docs/wbgu_politikpapier_9?e=37591641/68740308 called 30.07.2020).

²⁴ Cf. BAMF: Klimamigration Definitionen, Ausmaß und politische Instrumente in der Diskussion, Nürnberg 2012 (https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/WorkingPapers/wp45-klimamigration.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11 called 30.07.2020).

²⁵ Cf. BMU Umweltforschungsplan 2010: Rechtsstellung und rechtliche Behandlung von Umweltflüchtlingen (https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/461/publikationen/4035.pdf called 30.07.202th0).

²⁶ Edenhofer, Ottmar/ Jakob, Michael: Klimapolitik – Ziele, Konflikte, Lösungen, München 2019, p. 32.

²⁷ Cf. Ibid, p. 40.

²⁸ Cf. Law, Tara: The Climate Crisis is Global, but These 6 Places Face the Most Severe Consequences, 30.09.2019 (https://time.com/5687470/cities-countries-most-affected-by-climate-change/ called 21.07.2020).

²⁹ Ingo Pies, p. 1.

³⁰ Cf. Aufenvenne, Phillip/Felgentreff, Carsten: Umweltmigranten und Klimaflüchtlinge – zweifelhafte Kategorien in der aktuellen Debatte, Osnabrück 2013, p. 22f.; in: Felgentreff, Carsten/Geiger, Martin: Migration und Umwelt, IMIS-Beitrag 44/2013, p. 19-44.

³¹ El-Hinnawi, Essam: Environmental Refugee (United Nations Environment Programme), Nairobi 1985, p. 4.

³² Cf. Gemenne, Francois/Ionesco, Dina/Mokhnacheva, Daria: Atlas der Umweltmigration, München 2017, p. 28.

³³ Cf. Black, 2001, p. 10f.

³⁴ Castles, Stephen: Environmental change and forced migration, UNHCR Working Paper 70, Oxford 2002, p. 5. (https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ff3f8022.pdf called 30.07.2020).

³⁵ Piguet, Etienne: Climate change and forced migration, UNHCR Working Paper 153, Neuenburg 2008, p. 9. (https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4c2325630.pdf called 30.07.2020).

³⁶ Cf. UNHCR: In Harm's Way - International protection in the context of nexus dynamics between conflict or violence and disaster or climate change, Geneva 2018, p. 21f.; in: Legal and Protection Policy Series (https://www.unhcr.org/5c1ba88d4.pdf called 30.07.2020).

³⁷ Gemenne/Ionesco/Mokhanacheva, 2017, p. 17.

³⁸ IDMC: Internal Displacement – Who are IDP? (https://www.internal-displacement.org/internal-displacement called 30.07.2020).

³⁹ Cf. IDMC & NRC: Global Report on Internal Displacement (in 2018), Geneva 2019, p. 5. (https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2019-IDMC-GRID.pdf called 30.07.2020).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Cf. Gemenne/Ionesco/Mokhanacheva, 2017, p. 48f.

⁴² Cf. Ibid, p. 50-52.

⁴³ Cf. Ibid, p. 61.

⁴⁴ Cf. Biermann/Boas, 2012, p. 291.

⁴⁵ Othering & Belonging Institute University of Berkeley: Climate Refugees – The Climate Crisis and Rights Denied, Berkeley 2019, p. 3.(https://belonging.berkeley.edu/system/tdf/climate_refugees.pdf?file=1&force=1 called 02.08.2020).

⁴⁶ Cf. Ibid.

⁴⁷ UNHCR: Climate Change and Disaster Displacement (https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html called 02.03.2020).

⁴⁸ Biermann/Boas, 2012, p. 292.

⁴⁹ Lucassen, Jan/Lucassen, Leo: Migration – Migration History, Berne 1999, p. 14.

⁵⁰ Biermann/Boas, 2012, p. 292.

⁵¹ Cf. Ibid.

⁵² Cf. ICCPR, 2020, p. 1f.

⁵³ Cf. Costa/Scheffran, 2016, p. 7.

⁵⁴ IOM: Migration and Climate Change, Geneva 2008, p. 37. (https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs-31_en.pdf called 03.08.2020).

⁵⁵ Cf. Biermann/Boas, 2012, p. 292.

⁵⁶ Othering & Belonging Institute University of Berkeley, 2019, p. 3.

⁵⁷ UNHCR: Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva 1968, p. 2 (https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf called 03.08.2020).

⁵⁸ Cf. Biermann, Frank/Boas, Ingrid: Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees; in: Global Environmental Politics, Volume 10, Number 1, pp. 60-88 (Article), February 2010, p. 72-73 (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227627225_Preparing_for_a_Warmer_World_Towards_a_Global_ Governance_System_to_Protect_Climate_Refugees called 03.08.2020).

⁵⁹ Cf. UNHCR Deutschland: Umwelt, Klimawandel und Flüchtlingsschutz (https://www.unhcr.org/dach/de/was-wir-tun/umwelt-klimawandel-fluechtlingsschutz called 03.08.2020).

⁶⁰ ICCPR, 2020, p. 9.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Cf. Tiedemann, Paul: Flüchtlingsrecht – Die Materiellen und verfahrensrechtlichen Grundlagen, Heidelberg 2015, p. 68-69.

⁶³ Cf. Ibid, p. 134-135.

⁶⁴ Cf. DW, 2020.

⁶⁵ Cf. Biermann/Boas, 2012, p. 292.

⁶⁶ Cf. Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft: Weltrisikobericht 2019, Berlin 2019, p. 6.

⁶⁷ Cf. Gornitz, Vivien: Rising Seas – Past, Present, Future, New York 2013, p. 186-187.

⁶⁸ Cf. Gemenne/Ionesco/Mokhanacheva, 2017, p. 68.

⁶⁹ Cf. Ibid.

⁷⁰ Cf. Weltrisikobericht 2019, p. 56.

⁷¹ Cf. Jakobeit/Methmann, 2007, p. 16.

⁷² Cf. Jakobeit/Methmann, 2007, p. 17.

⁷³ Cf. Othering & Belonging Institute University of Berkeley, 2019, p. 8.

⁷⁴ Cf. Gornitz, 2013, p. 197.

⁷⁵ Cf. Othering & Belonging Institute University of Berkeley, 2019, p. 8.

⁷⁶ Cf. Gornitz, 2013, p. 198.

⁷⁷ Buchanan, Kelly: New Zealand: „Climate Change Refugee“ Case Overview, July 2015, p. 3. (https://www.loc.gov/ law/help/climate-change-refugee/new-zealand-climate-change-refugee-case.pdf called 03.08.2020).

⁷⁸ Cf. Edenhofer/Jakob, 2019, p. 32.

⁷⁹ Piguet, 2008, p. 8.

⁸⁰ Gornitz, 2013, p. 220.

⁸¹ Cf. Weltrisikobericht 2019, p. 56f.

⁸² Cf. Ibid, p. 28.

⁸³ Cf. BAMF, 2012, p. 32.

⁸⁴ Cf. IDMC, 2019, p. 38.

⁸⁵ Cf. Othering & Belonging Institute University of Berkeley, 2019, p. 11.

⁸⁶ Cf. Othering & Belonging Institute University of Berkeley, 2019, p. 11.

⁸⁷ The World Bank: Groundswell – Preparing for Internal Climate Migration, Washington DC 2018, p. 144. (https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29461 called 03.08.2020).

⁸⁸ Cf. Ibid.