The Impact of Peace Agreements on Development

Is the Columbian Peace Agreement capable of achieving sustainable development (illustrated by its Comprehensive Rural Reform)?

Seminar Paper, 2020

32 Pages, Grade: 1,0












Adell, B. (2019) On the frontlines of sustaining peace in Colombia. Development Dialogue, Vol. 64: 65-71. Retrieved April 14, 2020 from:

Agencia Nacional de Tierras. (2020) Fondo de Tierras Para La Paz, Alcanzó El 1 Millón de Hectáreas. Retrieved May 19, 2020 from:

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Alexander, H.(2019) Farc leader announces return to war for Colombia. The Telegraph. Retrieved May 2, 2020 from:

Amnesty International. (2015) Ein Landtitel Reicht Nicht - Landrückgabe in Kolumbien Nachhaltig Durchführen. Retrieved March 29, 2020 from:

BBC News. (2016a) Colombia referendum: Voters reject Farc peace deal. BBC News. Retrieved June 6, 2020 from:

BBC News. (2016b) Colombia signs new peace deal with Farc. BBC News. Retrieved June 6, 2020 from:

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Casey, N. (2019) Colombia’s Peace Deal Promised a New Era. So Why Are These Rebels Rearming? The New York Times. Retrieved May 2, 2020 from:

Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2016) BASTA-YA! Colombia: Memories of War and Dignity. General Report Historical Memory Group. Retrieved May 7, 2020 from:

Colombia Reports. (2018) FARC. Colombia Reports. Retrieved Apr.15, 2020 from:

Contraloría General de la República. (2018) Segundo Informe Al Congreso Sobre La Ejecución de Los Recursos y Cumplimiento de Las Metas Del Componente Para La Paz Del Plan Plurianual de Inversiones. Retrieved April 23, 2020 from:ón+de+los+recursos+y+cumplimiento+de+las+metas+del+componente+para+la+paz+del+Plan+Plurianual+de+Inversiones+1+de+enereo+de+2017+a+30+de+marzo+de+2018.pdf/6a.

Correa, M. (2019) The Economic Impact of the 2016 Colombian Peace Treaty. Retrieved April 25, 2020 from:

Daniels, J. (2019) F ormer Farc commanders say they are returning to war despite 2016 peace deal. The Guardian. Retrieved June 8, 2020 from:

Demir, J. (2018) Understanding the cause of Colombia´s conflict: land ownership. Colombia Reports. Retrieved May 10, 2020 from:

Faguet, J-P., Sánchez, F., Villaveces, M-J. (2016) The paradox of land reform, inequality and local development in Colombia. LSE Research Online Documents on Economics. Retrieved April 10, 2020 from:

Faguet, J-P., Sánchez, F., Villaveces, M-J. (2018 ) La perversión de la reforma agraria por las élites latifundistas. Poder, desigualdad y desarrollo en Colombia. Documentos Escuela de Economia. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Vol.97: 1-49. Retrieved April 14, 2020 from:

FARC-EP International. (2013) Joint Communique #16. Retrieved May 24, 2020 from:

Fernandez-Osorio, A., Pachón Pinzón, R. (2016) Perspectivas de reconciliación en Colombia: caracterización del Acuerdo de Paz de 2016 con las FARC. Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, Vol.14 (1): 31-56. Retrieved April 3, 2020 from:

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (2020) The Multipurpose Cadaster will become a reality with the financial support of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Retrieved May 15, 2020 from:

GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal. (2018) Colombia Corruption Report. Retrieved May 28, 2020 from:

Gehring, D., Gehrmann, A. (2017) Ein Jahr nach dem Friedensvertrag in Kolumbien. Länderbericht Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Retrieved April 6, 2020 from:

Gil, L. (2020) Colombia’s government is using the coronavirus to weaken the historic peace agreement. The Washington Post. Retrieved June 4, 2020 from:

Góngora-Mera, M. (2019) Die ethnoterritoriale Strategie zur Verringerung von Ungleichheiten beim Landbesitz in Kolumbien: Historische Entwicklung und aktuelle Trends mit Schwerpunkt auf der Situation afroamerikanischer Gemeinschaften. Menschenrechte in Lateinamerika: 187-206.

Graser, M., Bonatti, M., Eufemia, L., Morales, H., Lana, M.,Löhr, K., Sieber, S. (2020) Peacebuilding in Rural Colombia - A Collective Perception of the Integrated Rural Reform (IRR) in the Department of Caqueta (Amazon). Land, Vol.9 (2): 1-17. Retrieved April 30, 2020 from

Guereña, A. (2017) A Snapshot of inequality - What the latest agricultural census reveals about land distribution in Colombia. Oxfam International: 1-37. Retrieved May 12, 2020 from:

Higginbottom, A. (2005) Globalization, Violence and the Return of the Enclave to Colombia. Development, Vol.48 (3): 121-125. Retrieved May 30, 2020 from

Holland, A. (2020) Private Property Against Public Works: How Rights Affect Development in Ecuador and Colombia. Retrieved April 17, 2020 from:

International Center for Transitional Justice. (2009 An Overview of Conflict in Colombia. Retrieved Mai 16, 2020 from:

International Crisis Group. (2019) Crucial Reforms Languish as Colombia Seeks to Consolidate Peace. Retrieved April 16, 2020 from:

Janetsky, M., (2019) How To Keep The Colombian Peace Deal Alive. Foreign Policy. Retrieved June 1, 2020 from:

Jenssen, T., (2018) 10 things threatening the peace in Colombia. Norwegian Refugee Council. Retrieved June 1, 2020 from:

Jima Gonzalez, A., Paradela López, M., Serrano Ávila, A.(2018) Post-conflict Policies in Colombia. An approach of the potentiality of South-South Cooperation (SSC) in the peace process. Reflexión Política, Vol.20 (39): 7-23. Retrieved April 28, 2020 from:

Kraul, C. (2016) The battles began in 1964: Here’s a look at Colombia’s war with the FARC rebels. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved April 28, 2020 from:

Kroc Institute for international Peace Studies. (2018) State of Implementation of the Colombian Peace Agreement: Report Two. Retrieved May 7, 2020 from:

Kroc Institute for international Peace Studies. (2019a) Estado Efectivo de Implementacíon Del Acuerdo de Paz de Colombia 2 Años de Implementacíon. Retrieved May 7, 2020 from:

Kroc Institute for international Peace Studies. (2019b) Informe 3 Del Instituto Kroc - Hacía Una Paz de Calidad En Colombia. Retrieved May 24, 2020 from:

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. (2019c) State of Implementation of the Colombian Final Accord: December 2016 - April 2019. Retrieved May 7, 2020 from:

Kroc Institute for international Peace Studies. (2019d) Washington DC Seminar: The Colombian Peace Process After Two Years. Retrieved May 24, 2020 from:

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. (2020) The Colombia Barometer Initiative unites Peace Accord Matrix Methodology with contemporaneous monitoring and verification of the 2016 Colombian Accord. Retrieved June 5, 2020 from:

LaReau, R. (2016) Kroc Institute charged with technical verification and monitoring of historic Colombian peace accord. Notre Dame News. Retrieved May 19, 2020 from:

Long, T. (2015) Peace in Colombia? Lessons from the failed 1999-2002 talks. The Global Americans. Retrieved April 20, 2020 from:

Meernik, J., Demeritt, J., Uribe-López, M. (2019) As War Ends: What Colombia Can Tell Us About the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional Justice. Retrieved June 1, 2020 from:

Mora, T., Muñoz, J. (2008) Concentración de la propiedad de la tierra y producto agrícola en Antioquia. Ecos de Economía Vol.26: 71-108. Retrieved May 18, 2020 from:

Muñoz-Mora, J., Tobón, S., D’Anjou, J. (2018) The role of land property rights in the war on illicit crops: Evidence from Colombia. World Development, Vol.103: 268-283. Retrieved April 14, 2020 from:

Naucke, P., Maihold, G. (2015) Kolumbiens Weg zum Frieden. Die Verhandlungen zwischen der Regierung und der FARC-Guerilla bedürfen internationaler Begleitung. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - Aktuell. Retrieved April 6, 2020 from:

Noguera, F., Vargas, J. (2017) Peace and Sustainable Development in Colombia: The Role of Philanthropy in Building a Shared Future. Retrieved May 8, 2020 from:

Pabón, F. (2016) Colombia has a new peace agreement , but will it stick? The Conversation. Retrieved May 15, 2020 from:

Peace Agreements Database. (2016) Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace. Retrieved June 5, 2020 from:

Peña-Huertas, R., Ruiz-González, L., Álvarez-Morales, R., Parada-Hernández, M. (2017) Restitution Judges: A Starting Point for an Agrarian Jurisdiction as a Guarantee of Non-Repetition in Colombia. International Human Rights Law Review, Vol 6: 1-23 Retrieved April 21, 2020 from:

Presidential Advisory Office for Stabilization and Consolidation. (2019) Paz Con Legalidad. Retrieved June 3, 2020 from:

PwC. (2016) Doing Business in Colombia 2016. Retrieved May 30, 2020 from:

PwC. (2019) Doing Business in Colombia 2019. Retrieved May 30, 2020 from:

Rapp, J. (2017) Corruption in Colombia is among the worst in the region. The Bogota Post. Retrieved May 15, 2020 from:

Ruiz, P. (2020) The Colombian Peace Process Effort and COVID-19. Retrieved June 6, 2020 from:

Sanín, F. (2010) Land and property rights in colombia – Change and Continuity. Nordic Journal of Human Rights, Vol.28 (2): 230-261. Retrieved May 3, 2020 from:

Tamanaha, B. (2011) The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and Development. Cornell International Law Journal, Vol.44 (2): 209-248. Retrieved March 26, 2020 from:

Tejedor-Estupiñan, J. (2019) The implementation of the Peace Agreements and Development in Colombia. Revista Finanzas y Política Económica, Vol.11 (2): 229-233. Retrieved June 1, 2020 from:

The Heritage Foundation.(2020) 2020 Index of Economic Freedom. Retrieved May 19, 2020 from:

United Nation Development Program (UNDP). (2019) Human Development Report 2019: Inequalities in Human Development in the 21 St Century - Colombia. Retrieved May 6, 2020 from:

United Nation Security Council (UNSC). (2019a) Colombia’s Peace-Consolidation Efforts Need Firm Support as Former Guerrillas Plan to Take Up Arms Again. Retrieved June 1, 2020 from:

United Nation Security Council. (2019b) United Nations Verification Mission in Columbia. Retrieved May 21, 2020 from:

Upadek, C. (2016) Rucksackreise durch das neue Kolumbien. Deutschlandfunk. Retrieved April 26, 2020 from:

Van Leeuwen, M., Van Der Haar, G. (2016) Theorizing the Land-Violent Conflict Nexus. World Development, Vol.78: 94-104. Retrieved May 9, 2020 from:

Van Vliet, G., Ramirez, E. (2019) Delays in the Implementation of the Rural Dimension of the Final Peace Agreement in Colombia : A View from the Departments of Caquetá and Putumayo. Retrieved May 6, 2020 from:

World Bank. (2019) Colombia’s Multipurpose Registry Will Become a Reality with World Bank Support. Retrieved May 29, 2020 from:

World Commission on Environment and Development. (1987) Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future - Brundtland Report. Oxford University Press. Retrieved April 28, 2020 from:


Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten


For more than 50 years, Colombia has suffered a civil war that took the lives of thousands and forced millions to leave their homes.1 The war originated from the inequalities within the country that drove the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army (Spanish acronym FARC) to oppose the government.2 The FARC was formed by uprising peasants and members of the Colombian communist party and was hence strongly left-wing oriented.3 The government has always been positioned on the far right and was supported by various paramilitary groups.4 The war deepened existing inequalities and illegal groups gained significant power by means of corruption and drug trafficking.5 In the 1980s, Colombia’s metropolis Medellín was considered the world’s most dangerous city.6

It was only after five decades that in 2016 an agreement could be reached between Timoleón „Timochenko“ Jímenez - the leader of the FARC - and the former president of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos.7 For the first time a bilateral ceasefire has been achieved.8 Millions of Colombians found hope in this agreement for the end of rural deprivation due to lasting peace.9

But is a peace agreement capable of achieving such an outcome?

Being the oldest democracy in South America, the rule of law has existed in Colombia for a long time.10 Paradoxically, Colombia is known for its quite resilient constitution from 1991 and its extensive legislative framework.11 But previous agreements, reforms and laws have not been able to end the conflict.12

Against this background, this paper intends to examine the relationship between law and development using the peace agreement as an example. As it is a more recently issued law, the agreement is well suited for the examination. Changes that have occurred after its enactment can be traced back to it more easily and illustrate how law affects development. Answering this question is relevant not only because the entire political process revolves around peace building, but rather due to the opportunity it provides to assist countries in similar situations.

The paper will focus on Chapter One of the Agreement. Addressing all six chapters and their impact on development would exceed the scope of this paper and is consequently omitted. Chapter One contains the Comprehensive Rural Reform (CRR) and attacks the root causes of the armed conflict. This is why it is the part of the Agreement most likely to achieve sustainable development.13 When speaking of sustainable development, I am referring to a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.14

In order to understand whether such a development can be achieved through a peace agreement, the paper is structured into four main sections. Following the introduction Colombia’s historic background will be discussed to create an understanding of current issues in the country’s development. Second, I am going to outline the content of the CRR and see whether it addresses the named problems. Section 3 shows how far the implementation process of the CRR has gone so far. For this presentation, primarily the data collected by the Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies will be used. The Institute has been assigned by both parties to monitor the Colombian peace process and report to those involved in peace building.15 In the final part I will analyze the implementation progress and explain causes for delays. Thereafter a conclusion about how the peace treaty is impacting the development will be drawn.


When dealing with Colombia’s development several issues must be known first. For this purpose, this part will explain how the major problems have shaped Colombia's history and their impact on development.

Colombia’s politics have been strongly divided since its independence in 1821, which repeatedly caused armed conflicts.16 One of the reasons for this was the inequality of land distribution, which has existed since the country´s colonial period and is significantly higher than the average of Latin America.17 The Spanish colonial rulers did not settle all parts of the country, which already caused imbalances in population density.18 These inequalities remained after independence, since the large estates were handed over to Colombia’s rural elites.19

Most of these elites are large landowners, referred to as latifundistas, coming from the Spanish term latifundia which describes lands that are larger than 500 hectares.20

Due to their enormous economic power, they are able to influence elections and direct political activities according to their will – if necessary, by means of corruption.21 This weakens democracy and leads to unilateral development with neglected rural areas.22

On the other side of the scene there are the smallholders and the rural poor, who do not possess any land at all. Therefore, they are not capable of cultivating anything that would provide them with a regular income.23 In order not to end up in poverty, they frequently have no other choice but to make themselves dependent on the latifundistas or to engage into criminal activities.24

Resulting from these grievances, in 1948 protests against the conservative government which acted primarily in the interests of the latifundistas,25 escalated and ended in the first civil war, known as "La Violencia", lasting for almost ten years.26 Over the course of this period, several left-wing guerrilla groups emerged, including the FARC-EP (1964), which campaigned for a fairer distribution of land and the protection of the Colombian lower class from government violence.27 In order to combat these “communists”,28 an ally of the Colombian government and right-wing paramilitaries, attacked the FARC’s territories. Many Colombian civilians were killed in the subsequent street fights.29

In other words, Colombia inherited an extreme inequality that ended up in unstable political institutions, which intensified and provoked armed conflicts.30 Inequality is thus both a cause and a consequence of the armed conflict.

In the 1980s, the FARC-EP continued growing and henceforth decided to no longer only fight in rural areas, but to target larger military troops in urban regions as well. In order to finance their operations, they took advantage of the flourishing drug trade and committed numerous kidnappings for purposes of extorting ransom money. As a follow, their influence on the countryside prospered.31 By 2001 they reached their peak with a military force of more than 20,000 combatants.32

Several efforts of the Colombian government to respond to the demands of the FARC failed.33 Neither a more equitable distribution of land could be achieved, nor did the state’s presence in rural areas increase.34

This can be explained by the fact that it was in the interest of the latifundistas to preserve their privileges.35 Taking advantage of their political influence they ensured that land reforms were carried out in their favor, so that inequalities remained.36 According to Faguet et al. (2018), this so-called “latifundia effect” counteracted about 59 to 80 percent of positive outcomes of land reforms, providing the latifundistas with even more land and more power.37 Consequently, better infrastructure and supplies were never provided, poverty increased, and inequalities grew. Evidence for that can be found in Colombia’s Gini coefficient – the most widely used indicator for measuring inequality – that has steadily risen since 1984.38 In 2001, 0.4 percent of all landowners owned 61.2 percent of all registered lands.39 Colombia therefore was caught in a vicious circle.

By 2015, over 6.2 million Colombians had been coercively displaced by the armed conflict and were thus internal refugees without any entitlements for support.40 With this development, Colombia is the country with the largest number of internally displaced people worldwide.41 Following the displacements and illegal occupations of land, it was impossible to further update the cadastral system, so that today 66 percent of it are invalid and another 28 percent inaccurate.42 Hence, due to a lack of titles, the area of land that is not legally owned amounts between 30 and 50 million hectares, which equals the size of Sweden.43

Without legal ownership, less investment takes place44 and more (violent) disputes over land tenure occur.45 The economy suffers and the population's confidence in the government shrinks.46 This was further affected by the enormous corruption in the country, which according to newspapers is "amongst the worst in the world".47

Several efforts to resolve the conflict have been unsuccessful.48 Main causes for those failures have been actions that weakened the government’s trust in the FARC, for instance the kidnapping of politicians that made it impossible to compromise at that time.49 However, the situation changed when former President Manuel Santos (2010-2018) dedicated his presidency to the peace process and reached an agreement with the leaders of the FARC-EP after four years of negotiations. The "Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace" (hereafter “Final Agreement”) was signed on 24th November 2016.50 The agreement contains 578 stipulations, divided into six chapters and aims at bringing a lasting peace to Colombia.51 With 310 pages it is the longest agreement signed since 1989 and one of the most complex ones as well.52

Additionally, in 2018 new presidential elections were held, which President Iván Duque won with 53.9 percent of the votes.53 He ran for the right-wing conservative party Centro Democrático, which has been founded in 2013 by former president Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010).54 During his presidency, Uribe pursued a strict anti-FARC-EP policy and expanded the state’s military presence which significantly reduced the FARC’s forces.55

Summarized this means, Colombia's peace agreement has to address extreme inequalities in land distribution and consider millions of internally displaced people in order to maintain the ceasefire in the long term and thereby benefit the country's development.


In the following the content of the CRR is outlined and it is reviewed whether it addresses the problems described. The Peace Agreement contains six chapters, each one of them being crucial for the achievement of peace. However, this paper will only focus on Chapter One titled “Towards a New Colombian Countryside: Comprehensive Rural Reform”. The CRR extends from page 10 to 33 of the agreement and has already been completed 2013 in the early stages of the negotiations.56

As stated on page seven of the Final Agreement, the CRR aims to "foment structural change in the countryside, closing up the differential that exists between rural and urban areas and creating conditions of well-being and quality of life for the rural population".57 In this part I will examine what kind of measures the CRR contains and whether they provide efficient guidelines to overcome Colombia's root problems and thus pave the way for sustainable development.

The focus will be on those measures of the CRR that are considered most effective in addressing the above-mentioned problems. Hence, the following explanations of the CRR's contents are not conclusive.

The first and most extensive part of the CRR mainly concerns the access and use of land.58 It includes the creation of a Land Fund, in which land is collected and freely distributed to the people in need.59 In carrying out this fund, priority is to be given to severely affected regions and victims of the armed conflict, in particular those who have been forcibly displaced.60 The sources providing land for the fund include amongst others distribution of unexploited public lands, donated properties or land that would be “acquired or expropriated for reasons of social interest or public utility”.61 This includes Expropriation of latifundias, although the policy could also affect owners of land of less than 500 hectares. Expropriation and redistribution of latifundias could help to overcome the unequal land ownership which should again raise the standard of living and stop the oppression of small farmers. Politicians would thus have to fight for the small farmers' votes, so that political competition increases. This is supposed to lead to more investment in public goods, such as education, health and food supplies and benefit rural development.62

Through the fund the government wants to make three million hectares available in twelve years.63

Another key element of the CRRs’ first part is the updating of the General Cadastral Information System until 2023 and with it a large-scale titling process for small- and medium-sized rural properties.64 The updated cadastral system is intended to promote a more productive and sustainable use of land, more effective tax collection and more transparent regulations on land ownership in general.65 This is supposed to clarify property rights and avoid further violent disputes about land tenure.66

The acquisition of the titles had been possible before but has always been tied to high costs.67 The titles, which are provided with the CRR, are now supposed to be free of charge.68 It is planned that “the national government will title […] 7 million hectares of small and medium-sized rural properties”.69

In order to resolve existing disputes between landowners and to protect property rights more effectively, a special agrarian jurisdiction is planned to be established.70.

The second part of the CRR includes the establishment of so-called “Development Programs with a Territorial-Based Focus” (Spanish PDET).71 These special development programs are focused on the regions most affected by the armed conflict and the areas of Colombia where poverty is the highest.72 The PDETs involve both local and departmental authorities for the development of sub-regional planning, as well as for the development, implementation and monitoring in the affected areas.73 Their aim is to achieve an equitable relationship between rural and urban areas in which cultural or gender differences in the population are not neglected.74 In order to implement the PDETs, several “Action Plans for regional Transformation” (Spanish PATR) will be prepared for each territorial zone.75 The PDET’s goals will have to be included in the National Development Plan (NDP).76

Finally, the CRR contains numerous national plans to boost the development of rural areas. These include plans for an improved infrastructure (roads, electricity and internet) as well as for social development, for example through better health and education services, formalization and securing of labor rights or improved water and food supply.77 They are supposed to be implemented within the next 15 years. However, there is a five-year time limit to set the necessary frameworks.78

The aforementioned measures target Colombia's most fundamental problems, which is why I believe that once implemented, they are suited for achieving sustainable development.


In this section, the progress made in the implementation of the CRR's stipulations is presented. Most of the data used has been collected by the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies which has been assigned in August 2016 by the Colombian government and the FARC to monitor the implementation process.79 In this context, the Kroc Institute has developed its own Peace Accord Matrix (PAM)80 and with it a methodology to identify current achievements and difficulties.81 Among others, Kroc obtains its data from government institutions, surveys, universities, municipalities and NGOs.82 Since the approval of the peace agreement, a report on the current implementation status has been published annually, accompanied by brief reports including the most recent findings affecting the implementation.

Comparing the implementation process of the entire agreement and Chapter One, it is noticeable that the latter falls far behind. While 23 percent of the entire agreement has been completed and 13 percent are at an intermediate level, the CRR only reports a completion rate of three percent and eight percent at intermediate level as of April 2019.83 While 66 percent of the entire agreement are situated at a minimal implementation level or have not yet been put into practice at all, this rate stands at 89 percent for CRR.84 The most significant achievements in the entire implementation have been the ceasefire (Chapter Three), and the transformation of the FARC into a democratic political party (Chapter Two).85 While these achievements are remarkable, it is the implementation of the CRR that is of particular interest to us. According to the mentioned data, it seems to be lacking in progress which is why we will have a more detailed look at it now.

Of the 29 stipulations in sub-chapter 1.1 "Access and Use. Non-productive land. Land titling. Agricultural frontier and protection of reserve areas.” as of yet 87 percent have only been implemented at a minimal level or not at all.86

The planned land fund was created by Decree Law 902 of 2017 and has made 1,000,000 hectares available for allocation by March 2020.87 About 68 percent (678,007.38ha) of those come from unexploited, state-owned properties and about 23 percent (226,830.87ha) were taken from the national agricultural fund.88 Only about three percent (27,332.69 ha) constitute properties that have been privately owned before.89 An allocation of the available land has barely taken place.90


1 (Amnesty International, 2015) p.2.

2 (Colombia Reports, 2018).

3 (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016) p.123.

4 (Jima Gonzalez, Paradela López & Serrano Ávila, 2018).

5 (Kraul, 2016).

6 (Upadek, 2016).

7 (BBC News, 2016b).

8 (Kroc, 2018) p.34.

9 (Casey, 2019).

10 (PwC, 2016) p.12.

11 (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009) p.2.

12 (Sanín, 2010) p.239.

13 (International Crisis Group, 2019) p.1.

14 (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987) p.41.

15 (LaReau, 2016).

16 (Faguet, Sánchez, Villaveces, 2016) p.2.

17 (Sanín, 2010) p.234; (Oxfam International, 2017) p.13.

18 (Demir, 2018).

19 (Demir, 2018).

20 (Faguet, Sánchez, Villaveces, 2018) p.7.

21 (UNDP, 2019) p.1.

22 (Tejedor-Estupiñan, 2019) p.230.

23 (UNDP, 2019) p.1.

24 (Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2019) p.94.

25 (Góngora-Mera, 2019) p.192.

26 (Meernik, Demeritt, Uribe-López, 2019) p.3.

27 (Góngora-Mera, 2019) p.195.

28 (Pabón, 2016).

29 (Amnesty International, 2015) p.2.

30 (Demir, 2018).

31 (Kraul, 2016).

32 (Colombia Reports, 2018).

33 (Sanín, 2010) pp.238, 239.

34 (Sanín, 2010) pp.238, 239.

35 (Demir, 2018).

36 (Mora & Muños, 2008) p.87.

37 (Faguet, et al., 2018) pp.31-33. 41.

38 (Guereña, 2017).

39 (Higginbottom, 2005) p.122.

40 (Amnesty International, 2015) p.2.

41 (Góngora-Mera, 2019) p.200.

42 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2020); (World Bank, 2019).

43 (Demir, 2018).

44 (Holland, 2020) p.1.

45 (Faguet, et al., 2016) p.14.

46 (UNDP, 2019) p.1.

47 (Rapp, 2019).

48 (Naucke & Maihold, 2015) p.1; (Colombia Reports, 2018).

49 (Long, 2015).

50 (BBC News, 2016b).

51 (Peace Agreements Database, 2016); (Kroc, 2019a) p.15.

52 (Fernandez-Osorio & Pachón Pinzón, 2019) p.48.

53 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020) p.3.

54 (Góngora-Mera, 2019) p.201.

55 (Noguera & Vargas, 2017) p.11.

56 (FARC-EP International, 2013).

57 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.7.

58 (Final Agreement, 2016) pp.14-21.

59 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.14.

60 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.16.

61 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.15.

62 (Faguet, et al., 2018) p.17.

63 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.14.

64 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.19.

65 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.19.

66 (Peña-Huertas, Ruiz-González, Álvarez-Morales, Parada-Hernández, 2017) p.3.

67 (Faguet, et al., 2016) p.14.

68 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.17.

69 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.17.

70 (Final Agreement, 2016) pp.17-19.

71 (Final Agreement, 2016) pp.22-24.

72 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.22.

73 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.23.

74 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.22.

75 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.23.

76 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.23.

77 (Final Agreement, 2016) pp.24-33.

78 (Final Agreement, 2016) p.24.

79 (LaReau, 2016).

80 (Kroc, 2020).

81 (Adell, 2019) p.65.

82 (Adell, 2019) p.71.

83 (Kroc, 2019c) p.2.

84 (Kroc, 2019c) p.2.

85 (Colombia Reports, 2018).

86 (Kroc, 2019a) p.24.

87 (ANT, 2020).

88 (ANT, 2020).

89 (ANT, 2020).

90 (Kroc, 2019a) p.34.

Excerpt out of 32 pages


The Impact of Peace Agreements on Development
Is the Columbian Peace Agreement capable of achieving sustainable development (illustrated by its Comprehensive Rural Reform)?
University of Münster  (Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät)
Seminar: Law Development & Climate Change
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ISBN (eBook)
ISBN (Book)
Peace Agreement, Development, Colombia, FARC, Rural Reform
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Marie Isabel Filitz (Author), 2020, The Impact of Peace Agreements on Development, Munich, GRIN Verlag,


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- It only takes five minutes
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