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History of Western European Security Organisations
Cold War and European Integration (1948 - 1970)
D é tente and Second Cold War (1970 - 1989)
New World „ Dis “ -Order (1989-1999)
The Institutions of the European Security Organisations
Institutions of NATO
Institutions of WEU
Institutions of EU concerning CFSP and ESDI
The limits of an Security and Defence Identity
Europe ’ s global role
The Trans-Atlantic security framework
The question of neutrality
The question of leadership
Talking about security issues in contemporary Europe one has to understand the change of the meaning of security. In the time of the Cold War, with its „hot“ peaks, the Berlin Crisis and the Korean War, European security was determined by the ability to defend the Western Block borders and it was focused on military strength. With the policy of détente in Europe security the dimension of political dialogue was added. With the break down of the Communist system and the end of the superpower confrontation European’s security needed a new definition, politically and institutionally. For the European Union, already an economic „super-power“, this was the possibility to enlarge its agenda from solely economic and social integration into the fields of „high“ policy. In the 1990’s the European Union became more and more involved into foreign, security and defence policy and gradually created an institutional framework.
This papers discusses the possibilities and limits of an independent European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) in Europe. The first chapter briefly describes the development of Western Europe’s security organisations since 1946. The second chapter shows the institutional arrangements of the main European security organisations NATO, WEU and EU. In part three the limits for an autonomous European Security policy is briefly discussed.
History of Western European Security Organisations
A historic background of European security arrangements is needed to understand today’s configurations. In this chapter this time between Post-Second-War arrangement and today is divided in three periods. The first begins with the Brussels Treaty in 1948 and the begin of the confrontation between the US and the USSR in the Cold War until the process of rapprochement between the blocks in the early 1970’s. The second time is dominated by the policy of détente but also by the so called „Second Cold-War“ during the Reagan administration and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. This period ends with the Gorbachev’s rule and the dismantling of the Eastern Bloc. The period since 1989 confronts Europe with the first inter-state and civil wars since 1945 respectively 1956. What should be a „New World Order“ (President G. Bush) challenged and still challenges the Cold War security arrangements and institutions.
Cold War and European Integration (1948 - 1970)
The Treaty of Yalta laid the basis for a political division of Europe, which was described by Winston Churchill as the „Iron Curtain“. As a reaction to the Soviet take-over in the Central European states and the US-American reluctance to take responsibility for European security the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence was signed in Brussels in 1948 by five Western European Countries.1 One year later the North Atlantic Treaty was singed in Washington D.C. which included the US and Canada and further five European countries into a collective security organisation the NATO.2 NATO was merely a defence organisation and did not have political vision, like the UN or later the EEC, therefore it was no contradiction to include the authoritarian regime of Salazar in Portugal into the organisation.3
Parallel to this process the economic integration of Europe was pursued and led to the founding of the European Communities in Paris 1951 by Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The confrontation between the Eastern and Western block brought the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany within the Western framework on the political agenda. The first initiative was the French Plevén Plan which wanted to add to the existing communities an European Defence Community (EDC) and an European Political Community (EPC) including an European army. After this plan failed the Brussels Treaty was turned into the WEU and signed by Germany and Italy in 1954. This newly created organisation played only a role as a consultative organisation and lost its tasks to NATO, EC and the Council of Europe (in social and cultural issues).4
Détente and Second Cold War (1970 - 1989)
The absence of an direct military conflict between East and West for already 25 years in Europe changed slowly but surely the dimension of security in Europe. The policy of détente, especially pursued by France, which left the military integration of NATO in 1962 had its goal in reducing the tensions between the blocks and increasing security in Europe by political dialogue. Also Brandt’s „Ostpolitik“, which was targeted towards a normalisation of FRG’s relations especially to the GDR, Poland and the USSR.5 At the same time the EC undertook its first efforts to bring back political issues into its agenda again. Therefore the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established in 1972. This process was merely intergovernmental arrangement with no influence on the Treaties and the institutions. The ability of the European to speak with one voice became important in the Helsinki process which lead to the founding of the CSCE in1975.
An enlargement of EC’s activities over security and defence areas was very unlikely in this time due to the membership of the UK, which always stressed its Atlanticists commitments and Ireland which was the only neutral member. Therefore it is no wonder that the WEU still was in agony. The EPC was challenged by several international events like the Falkland War, were the EU members joined the UK and imposed sanctions against Argentina, and a common Middle East policy on the one hand, and on the other side by Poland after the imposition of Martial Law in 1981 and the Soviet Union after the invasion in Afghanistan, were no joint positions were found.6
During the aggravated confrontation between the superpowers in the early 1980’s, the achievements of détente were endangered and the Transatlantic relationship by the plan of SDI were disturbed.7 New plans to strengthen the European defence identity were launched. Whereas in 1982 the German-Italian Genscher-Colombo failed, in 1984 the Rome Declaration led to the reactivating of WEU as a consulting forum. In the Rome Declaration is stated that, "continuing necessity to strengthen western security, and that better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance".8
The negotiations between the United States and the USSR on the withdrawal of intermediate nuclear forces highlighted the need for even closer European consultation on defence. In 1987, the WEU Ministerial Council adopted the Hague Platform which set out general guidelines for WEU's future programme of work. In its preamble is stated: "We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act (SEA), which we all signed as Members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence." 9 It describes the European security policy as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. In the SEA the EPC was institutionalised and the European Commission was given the right to participate in meetings. The decisions of the SEA are the result of the compromise between Atlanticism vs. Integrationism, which was always the major obstacle for an independent European security policy.10
New World „Dis“-Order (1989-1999)
With the break down of the Communist system in 1989 the bipolarity in security policy ended. The need to defend their own territories as the main security aspect appeared minimal or non- existing. New security threats appeared on the horizon such as international crime, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, spread of nuclear weapons as well as humanitarian crisis. None of the existing organisations was prepared for these challenges. NATO with its traditional understanding of security was seen as an outlived organisation and only one organisation seemed to be able to focus the different aspects of security - economic, social, political and military in one organisation - the EC. The statement of the Luxembourg foreign minister Jacques Poos: „This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans“ is symbolic for the enthusiasm of this period. This was manifested institutionally in the Maastricht Treaty which replaced EPC with the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the WEU was singled out as the defence arm of the EU.11
In the same time the UN regained prestige in the Gulf War and the CSCE was formed into an permanent working organisation in 1994. Differing institutions competed over the same tasks. The challenges for these organisations came from the Balkan were Yugoslavia fell into pieces. The first step of the united Germany to give its economic position an equivalent political position, the singlehanded recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, created astonishment among the EC partners and ignited an extensive fire in former Yugoslavia. In the Bosnian War the EU as well as the UN were not able to negotiate peace and not until after an NATO intervention within an UN mandate an unstable solution was found. After the enthusiasm of the early 1990’s a time of resignation came to European Security policy as the leader of the German Green Party J. Fischer stated: „Europe has proved incapable of building its own common defence.“12
The willingness of the Europeans to show their own identity in security matters came not to an end but lost momentum. On the one hand the EU and WEU took more and more minor activities like de-mining in Croatia, control of the UN embargo against Yugoslavia in the Adrian and on the Danube, the administration of the Bosnian town of Mostar and the MAPE activities (building up police forces in Albania). Also the Amsterdam Treaty was a further step by introducing qualified majority voting into the second pillar of the European Union the CFSP. But with the Nordic-Alpine enlargement 1995 further neutral countries joined the EU, without joining the Brussels Treaty, this increases the divergence of membership in CFSP and WEU.13
The last important event influencing the European security arrangement was in 1999 the Kosovo War. After the failure of the UN lead Rambouillet talks and the retreat of the OSCE mission, NATO undertook airstrikes against the FRY without UN mandate. The CFSP played an important role in the double strategy of continued military engagement and negotiations with the FRY. This strategy in which the EU spoke with one voice (except of some Greek dissonance) led to the end of airstrikes in June 1999. The EU became also the leading force for the reconstruction of the Kosovo. In the same time the NATO enlarged to the East and included into its new strategic concept the establishment of an European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which was further developed at the Cologne and Helsinki Summit Declarations.14
The Institutions of the European Security Organisations
To understand the complexity of the present European security framework the institutional aspects of the security organisations has to be taken into account (also the UN and OSCE are left out). Concerning NATO the stress will be put on its main organs and the NATO activities concerning Eastern Europe (Partnership for Peace). In case of WEU the stress will be on the complexity of membership, the main organs and the relations to NATO and EU. In the EU part the focus will be on the second pillar and the most recent developments.
Institutions of NATO
The basis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is Article 51 of the United Nation Charta, granting the partners individual and collective right of self-defence. Its goals are to protect peace by cooperation in political, economic and military fields. All decisions in NATO are taken in unanimously by the representatives of its member states15. The NATO does not has own military forces. In peace times the member’s forces are under national supreme command, only the integrated staffs and units, like air defence, early warning and the NATO fleets are under permanent NATO command. Since 1991 NATO also sees its activities in peacekeeping and crisis management by supporting the UN (contradictions to the Kosovo intervention) and the OSCE. Since the decision in April 1999 NATO is also undertakes out of area actions.16
The suborganisations of the NATO can be divided in three groups: - civil organisations, integrated military structure and command structure. The highest decisive body of NATO is the North Atlantic Council in which the head of states res. the of government („NATO-summit“) or the ministers of defence or of foreign affairs meet. The permanent working body is the Secretariat General (or International Staff) which is led by the General Secretary (since October 1999 George Robertson). The highest military body is the Military Committee (MC) in which the chiefs of staff of the member countries are represented. It is the superior body of the NATO high commands, the Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. The High Commanders are the highest military officers of all NATO forces.17
In 1996 it was decided to establish a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), which shall strengthen the „European defence identity“ inside NATO. CJTF will consist of multinational (combined) units of different arms (joined), which are made available for the specific task (task force). CJTF shall open the possibility for the European members to undertake tasks without the US and but with other PFP-members. PFP (Partnership for Peace) is a programme of military co- operation without security guarantees between NATO, the Transformation and the Neutral countries. The activities are co-ordinated by the EAPC (Europe-Atlantic Partnership Council), also this organisation has its tasks in peacekeeping, humanitarian actions and crisis prevention. This organisation even founded in 1997 became not active yet and was not able to offer the Central- and Eastern European countries an alternative to NATO membership.18
Institutions of WEU
Like NATO the WEU is in its origin a collective defence treaty. Until now the WEU was seen as the „European pillar“ of the NATO, but de-facto it was only a consultative forum. In the Treaty of Maastricht is stated that the „ WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. “ 19 Also this had no effects in every day life of the organisation. This goal was renewed in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) ("The Western European Union is an integral part of the development of the Union... “ ) 20, on the 50th anniversary summit of NATO in April 1999 and the at EU summits in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999).21
This draws the attention to the membership structure because membership of NATO and EU are not congruent. The WEU has four different kinds of membership:
Full members: Countries which are as well member of NATO and EU, these are Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, the United Kingdom, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain
- Associated members: Countries which are European NATO but not EU members, these are Czech Republic, Island, Norway, Poland, Turkey and Hungary
- Associated partners: Central and Eastern European countries, which applied for NATO and EU membership: Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuanian, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia
- Observers: EU countries which are not NATO members: Denmark22, Finland, Ireland, Austria and Sweden
The full and the associated members have in general the same rights, except aspects relating to EU. They form the WEU Transatlantic Forum which undertakes the dialogue between WEU and NATO. Its is also responsible to ensure the Atlantic dimension by strengthening the ESDI. These countries also form the WEAG (Western European Armaments Group) which now forms the European part of NATO. The goal of the associated partnership is aimed parallel to the association of these countries to the EU to prepare them in a security and defence related issues for the future membership. The observer status is left to the neutral countries, which despite their status take full responsibility in the civic WEU missions (e. g. Sweden is responsible for MAPE), but left out of any military commitments. The commitment of collective defence covers only the full members and excludes the case of aggression by another NATO country (the Greek - Turkish tensions).23
The highest body of the WEU is the WEU Council of the head of states res. governments. The regular decisive body is the Council of Ministers (of foreign affairs and defence). Here the political decisions are taken. There are several bodies which have a supportive task for the Council, these are the Satellite Centre (which is still insufficient equipped to fulfil ESDI tasks), the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the WEU Headquarters which is responsible for the regularly duties. The head of the Headquarters is the General Secretary, who also holds the post of the High Representative of the EU for CFSP Javier Solana in personal union.
WEU has neither its own forces nor its own permanent command structures. The military units and Headquarters that could be made available to WEU on a case-by-case basis for specific operations have been designated by the WEU nations. A special role as forces answerable to WEU are a number of multinational formations, like the Eurocorps, EUROFOR and the Multinational
Division, which most of them also have agreements with NATO and/or are also designed for UN missions.24
Institutions of EU concerning CFSP and ESDI
The institutions of the EU related to foreign policy and security underwent the most significant changes the last years. The tasks of the CFSP are to strengthen the security of the Union, to safe common values, human rights protection, development of democracy and rule of law and protection of peace and international security regarding the principles of the Charta of the UN and OSCE. The security related activities are formulated in the Petersberg-tasks: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping missions and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peace enforcement. The CFSP has also the goal of a common consisted foreign representation without substituting national foreign policy. In other words the EU shall speak with one voice in international organisations (very important are the two permanent seats in the UN Security Council with right of veto) and international crisis (but everyone has the right to say something).
The instruments of CFSP are :
1. Common position: the Council can adopt common positions for the Union’s position on particular issues and the member states ensure, that their national policies are in line with the common position.
2. Joint actions: adopted by the council in certain situations requiring operational actions by the EU.
3. Declarations: give public expression to a position. This is a flexible instrument, which makes it possible, to react very quickly to sudden incidents.
4. common strategies: decided by the European Council where the member states have important interests. The strategy specifies its objectives, it’s duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the Union and the member states.25
The actors in CFSP inside the European Union are the European Council which defines the principles and general guidelines of CFSP and decides on common strategies. Council of the EU take the decisions for implementing CFSP on the basis of the Councils guidelines. The Presidency (rotating presidency of the member countries supported by the so-called Triumvirate26 ) represents the Union in matters of CFSP and takes responsibility for the implementation. The Presidency is assisted by the Secretary General of the Council, the High Representative. Due to the intergovernmental character of CFSP the Commission has only the right to take part in the Council’s meetings and should be fully associated with the work of CFSP, which usual means that the Commission has to supply the financial support. The Presidency shall be consulted by the European Parliament, which shall be regularly informed and may make recommendations. Finally the member states have to support the implementation of CFSP, can lay their proposal before the Council and have to ensure that its national policies are conform to the common positions. In general the decisions in CFSP are taken unanimously, but members have the possibility to refrain from participation27 (constructive abstention). Refraining countries do not have to take part in the actions but accept the Unions common position. In practice this allows a limited number of states to take initiatives without the full participation of all member states.28
Until the end of year 2000 the WEU shall be fully included into the second pillar of the European Union. Therefore new bodies will be established as it was decided on the Helsinki Council: a Political and Security Council, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. The EU also agreed on a common European headline goal, which means that the member states until 2003 will be able to deploy within 60 days forces being capable the so-called Petersberg tasks up to 60,000 persons. All together this shall „ equip the Union to respond effectively to international crises using all the tools at its disposal: diplomacy, economic measures, humanitarian assistance and, ultimately, the use of military forces. The ability to integrate these measures will set the EU apart and
allow it to play an international role consistent with its responsibilities and the expectations of its citizens.(Javier Solana) “ 29
The limits of an Security and Defence Identity
Europeanisation of foreign, security and defence policy has two dimensions. The first relates to the status, role and also the security resources in the international system. Whereas the second relates to the internal interaction between the member states. To understand the limits and thus the possibilities of a common policy in these areas four main areas have to be taken into account. External factors Europe’s global role and the Trans-Atlantic security framework. The interaction inside is restricted by two major goals the actors in CFSP have: the preservation of military neutrality and the will to influence CFSP and ESDI in national interests. In the latter case one has to distinguish between the „big three“ which are taking the leadership and the smaller states. In the following pages the focus will be on the first group, which were the motors or brakes EU’s development in security issues.30
Europe’s global role
With the „change of currency of power“ from merely military resources to economic resources after the Cold War system made the European Union a global player in security. Due to the underdevloped common foreign policy compared to the economic policy the single countries still play the major role in forming Europe’s global security policy. The CFSP is used by its members in general as a instrument of national foreign policy. The countries try to find partners for their national goals to give the proposal more weight or to share the costs. The other case is if the security of the Union is endangered. A good example for the first was the engagement of Portugal in the question of Eastern-Timor. Due to Portugal’s past the refugees in Portugal this was a major issue of its foreign policy. Lisbon used its Presidency and its right for proposals at the Council for its interests and reached that the EU members had a uniform position in UN Security Council and Assembly. Due to the input of Portugal the EU was quite active and prepared that the UNAMET mission came into being. Other examples are the ACP-dialogue with the former British, French and Portugal colonies and the San Jose dialogue with the Latin-American states, including Cuba. The second case is dominating the policy towards the states of Central Europe, the Baltics and Balkan, where the EU gives aid in finance, technology and expertise. Also the enormous help for Russia and the Ukraine (especially cooperation in nuclear questions) are mend to stabilise the periphery of Europe. The association agreements with Israel, the PLO autonomy office and the Maghreb states are directed to a economic stabilisation of this area, especially to condemn the danger of Islamistic take-over.31
Like the use of CFSP as a instrument of national interests also the non-use can be seen in the same view. Also the EU has development and protection of democracy as well as the protection of human rights an its second pillar’s agenda, no activities towards the military regime of Algeria and Russia (because of the Caucasus War) were undertaken. The reason for this is obvious, no one has the interest to de-stabilise the periphery of Europe, for idealistic ideas. Also „free-riding“ of single countries like France together with Belgium in Central-Africa without consulting the other EU countries are significant for complexity and sensitivity of common foreign policy. Also inside of the EU the limits of a common policy are shown, when the interest of one specific country are touched, like in the case of the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Where Greece blocks the diplomatic recognition by the Union until today and counteracted with its sanctions against the state in the early 90’s the other members financial support.32
In general the CFSP until now is rather a supplement than a substitute for national foreign policy and if interest are conflicting countries tend to look for other partners or even disregard common interests. The EU is despite its economic power still an political „dwarf“. To the EU’s defence it has to be said that the CFSP is a gradually developing process and its permanent interaction „domesticated“33 the members foreign policy.
The Trans-Atlantic security framework
There is a broad consensus among the EU members, including France, that also in future the involvement of the US in European security is essential. It is also agreed among the NATO and EU members that a stronger European responsibility for security and defence is necessary. Since Maastricht (1992) it is clear that this organisation will be the WEU, which will stay the European pillar of NATO, but at the same time it will be integrated into the EU second pillar. Both organisations NATO and WEU have defence and peace-keeping (including out-of area tasks) on their agenda. „ The effectiveness of both organisations in peace-keeping and peace enforcement roles will be affected by the extent to which their activities interlock rather duplicate or interblock. “ 34 .
The question is now how to prevent the interblocking of these organisations. This was one of the main tasks of the NATO summit in April 1999 in Brussels. On the practical level the CJTF will play a major role as European forces within NATO, which can be deployed as task force for the WEU. This means that the command of the CJTF has two hats, one for NATO missions and one for WEU missions or in other words „separable but not separate“ force structure within NATO will be created.. Since only the US have air lift equipment for out-of area actions a regulation has to be found in which the WEU can loan this NATO equipment. This also means that the burden for NATO actions in future can be shared more equally between the US and the Europeans. This structure makes a doubled but equally working planning staff necessary. The close interrelation between NATO and WEU needs institutionalised direct relations between NATO and the EU which does not exist now.35
These arrangements on practical level can not work if it is not clarified on high political level when which institution will be active. In the material of the NATO summit or the recent EU Councils no definite answer is available. Sperling and Kirchner offer three different cases when the WEU will be active militarily. First: The US is general supportive, but chooses not to participate. Second: The US is uninterested. Third: The US is against. Fourth: The European want to act alone but the US wants to participate. The first two cases leave the action to the European and will not create problems between the organisations. The third case makes an single European action unlikely due to several reasons, the lacking of equipment, the pro-Atlantists within the EU (esp. the UK, the Netherlands and to less excess Germany and Italy) and the threat that the US will withdraw from Europe. In the last case the rivalry between the institutions, but even more between two security concepts could keep the Western states from taking action at all and endanger the consensus inside the ESDI. The activities towards the creation of a new European security framework have to prevent the latter case, by a clear work-sharing between NATO and WEU.36
The question of neutrality
An still unanswered question is the commitment and role of the neutral countries (Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden) in the Union’s security policy. All these countries had an military active definition of neutrality. This means that all countries have a tradition in taking part in UN peace keeping missions. On the one hand neutrality lost its security aspect (esp. in the case of Finland and Austria) with the dismantling of the Soviet Union and on the other hand the case of collective defence, as it is formulated in the Brussels Treaty, is of low probability. What does neutrality mean in the changed context? For Sweden and Finland this means an intensive military cooperation with the Baltic countries and engagement in WEU civil activities. Therefore only little opposition for a common security and defence identity is expectable. For Austria, which bears its sovereignty after the Second World War to its neutral status, the changed geographic position, from the eastern border to the centre of Europe, neutrality is questioned in general and joining NATO discussed publicly. Also Ireland has undertaken the first co-operations inside the PFP-programme. If this development continues into this direction and the EU keeps its flexibility, it showed in the case of Denmark, the non-NATO membership is no obstacle for taking part in EU’s second pillar. This is important for a future membership of Switzerland and opens the possibility to give the Baltics a security guarantee without enlarging NATO to the former Soviet Union territory.37
The question of leadership
Leadership in European security is often understood that one of the countries sub-ordinates the CFSP to its own national policy, mostly connected with the rebirth of German „Großraumpolitik“.38 Leadership in the European Security and Defence Identity does not mean hegemony of one country over the others. The regulation of constructive abstention, which needs the support of 10 member countries make these approaches impossible. Leadership has rather to be understood in the role of forming and shaping the direction of development in institutional sense and in content. The role as the motor of further integration until recent was played by the French-German axis, mainly based on the long term parallel rule and personal friendship of Mitterand and Kohl.
For deeper understanding the different concepts of security architecture of the „big three“ is briefly introduced. The UK is still influenced by its very conservative and military related security policy, which was always dominated by an Anglo-American friendship. Britain was until recently the country which prevented further deepening of the Union in the second pillar. Since the meeting in Saint-Malo a British-French axis is established. This British U-turn in foreign policy is due to the will of the Blair government to take the role of leadership in the EU and due to common interests of military and nuclear powers UK and France. France was always a promoter of a strong European dimension of defence policy and worked for an strengthening of the Union. On the other side France pursued beside the common policy a very strong independent foreign policy in its spheres of interest: the francophone Africa, were still has military bases. Since the 1950’s the most important partner for
France in Europe was Germany. This relation seemed to be cooled down since the Schröder is Chancellor. The unified Germany is a economic giant but still a dwarf in security issues. Also the definition of security in Berlin is a political and economic one, therefore a strong engagement in multilateral forces does not weaken Germany’s position and sovereignty. Germany is still very close connected with the USA in all military related issues. The inability to take part in peace keeping and peace enforcing actions seems to be overcome since the Kosovo engagement of the Bundeswehr.39
The intergovernmental character of the second pillar makes it necessary for each of the „big three“ to find an alley among the other two. It also makes it impossible to act against on of the three countries. Therefore leadership rather can be understood in diplomatic ability to bring the other countries behind ones position.
In conclusion of the facts and the ideas presented and discussed above, following statements for a European security framework can be developed. As already stated several times the „currency of power“ and its sources changed in the Post-Cold War period from merely military power towards political diplomatic ability and economic strength. Also the nature of security altered and so did the threats to it. Economic, social and political stability is at least equal important than the aspect of defence. These changes already made the EU to a security organisation. The EU answered to its responsibility with the establishment of the second pillar of the Union including CFSP and ESDI.
The development has two driving forces: the will of the EU members to shape actively a sphere of security around EU-Europe and international crisis which challenge the EU. The instruments of decision making and the institutional frameworks as well as the actions are developed in a „try and error“ method. The development of the second pillar takes place within two contradictions: firstly the continuation of the Trans-Atlantic ties vs. autonomous European defence and security policy and secondly preserving of national sovereignty (intergovernmentalism) vs.institutionalising security („Brusselsisation“) issues. The first contradiction is solved at the moment in the way that the emancipation of Europe in security and defence issues does not substitute the Alliance commitment. In plain words: „with the US, without the US but not against the US“. The second is solved by the preservation of intergovernmentalism with strengthened institutions. Due to their intergovernmental character decisions relating ESDI and CFSP take long time. This will make the (W)EU a slowly reacting institution, but one were all instruments of security are in one hand.
The (W)EU has overlapping tasks with the other security organisations, the NATO, the OSCE and the UN. A clear task-sharing between NATO and WEU is needed to prevent competition between the institutions. After the single-handed NATO engagement in the Kosovo War the commitment towards UN and OSCE has to be renewed.
The member states used CFSP (and likely so they will use ESDI) as an instrument for their national interests. This rises the question of leadership in Europe. The present institutional framework makes the domination by one single nation impossible. Leadership rather has to be understood in the ability of an axis to form the institutional arrangements of the Union and to find qualified majorities for taking actions.
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Western European Union (6); WEU, an instrument at the service of European Security and Defence; WEU homepage:(http://www.weu.int);
Western European Union (7); About Western European Union: Structure; WEU homepage:(http://www.weu.int);
Western European Union (8); WEU Transatlantic Forum; WEU homepage:(http://www.weu.int); Western European Union (9); NATO and WEU; WEU homepage:(http://www.weu.int); Western European Union (10); Multinational Forces Answerable To WEU; WEU homepage:(http://www.weu.int);
Western European Union (11); Remarks by Dr. Javier Solana, WEU Secretary General and High Representative of the EU for CFSP on the occasion of the official launching of the Political and Security Committee; Brussels, 1st March 2000 WEU homepage:(http://www.weu.int); Western European Union (12); Franco-British summit: Joint declaration on European defence Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998; WEU homepage (http://www.weu.int); ?; ? Western European Union (13); Anglo-French Summit: Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence
London, November 25, 1999; WEU homepage (http://www.weu.int);
Western European Union (14); 73rd Franco-German Summit: Declaration on Defence and Security Toulouse, 29 May 1999; WEU homepage (http://www.weu.int);
Western European Union (15); 74th Franco-German Summit: Statement by the Franco-German Defense and Security Council; Paris, November 30, 1999; WEU homepage (http://www.weu.int);
Abbildung in dieser Leseprobe nicht enthalten
Reflection on European Security and Defence Identity
- Source of power was redefined in the 90’s: economy, diplomacy + military
- → Seciurty has a different nature now: social, political, economic + defence
- Security policy changes has to change as well: from Article 5 to Petersberg - tasks · EU already is a security organisaton: second pillar of the Union CFSP and ESDI
- ESDI works within two contradictions:
a) Transatlantic commitment vs. European autonomous defence policy
b) National sovereignity vs. Instituionalism present answer to a) European pillar of NATO = WEU = security institution of EU present answer to b) intergovernmentalism with stronger institutions and Senior CFSP
- Interblocking or Interlocking
task-sharing between NATO and WEU
renewed committment to UN and OSCE mandate
- Leadership in Europe
„big three“ as motor and actors but still qualified majority and „constructive abstention“
CFSP : Common Foreign and Security Policy ESDI: European Security and Defence Indentity
- To safe common values, fundamental interests independence and integrity of the EU. · Strengthen the security of the EU in all ways
- Preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance of the United Nations Charter, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, and the objectives of the Paris Charter. · Promote International cooperation
- Develop and consolidate democracy
- humanitarian and rescue tasks · peacekeeping tasks
- combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peace enforcement
Questions I was not able to answer in my paper:
- What is the glue keeping the Europeans together in security issues, after the loss of the Soviet threat?
- What will be the consequences for the Central- and Eastern European countries concerning the second pillar when they join the EU ?
1 The Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxemburgm the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
2 Therse countries were Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal
3 WEU (eds.) (1);The History of WEU; WEU homepage:
4 see Sjursen H.; The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?; in:arena Working Papers 99/34 (http: www.sv.uio.no/arena/publications/wp99_34.htm); 1999; p. 3 and Altmann, F., Baratta M., Bauman W-R., ; Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2000; 1999; Frankfurt/Main; p. 1043 and see WEU (1) Robert Pernetta - 3 - 10/05/2000
5 see La Serre de F.; France: the impact of Francois Mitterand; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK); p. 22 and Rummel R.; Germany’s role in CFSP: „Normalität“ or „Sonderweg“; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK); p. 41; for Denmark see: Heurlin B.; Denmark: a new activism in foreign and security policy; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK); p. 167
6 see Hill C.; United Kingdom: sharpening contradictions; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK); p. 72 and Keatinge P.; Ireland and common security: stretching the limits of commitment?; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK); p. 209 and Nuttall S.; The Comission: the struggle for legitimacy; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK);p. 136-137
7 The plan of Strategic Defence Initiative would have only protected the North American continent and in that way endangered the nuclear balance which guaranteed peace in Europe for more than 30 years.
8 Bonvicini G.; Regional reassertion: The dilemmas of Italy; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK); p. 96 and WEU (1)
9 quoted form WEU (1)
10 see Sperling J., Kirchner E.; Recasting the European Order: Security architectures and economic cooperation; 1997; Manchester (UK); p. 2-3 and Allen D.; Conclusions: the European rescue for national foreing policy; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK), p. 298
11 see Sjursen H.; p. 4 and WEU (2): The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance; WEU members declaration: Maarticht, 10 December 1991 form WEU homepage:
12 for OSCE see: Altmann, F., ...; p. 1002 see also Sjusen H.; p. 5. Quote from Muravchik J.; Why Die for Danzig?; in: ?;p. 45
13 for WEU and EU activities see: WEU (3); Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE); WEU homepage: and WEU (4); Coordination with other international organizations and with bilateral donors ; WEU homepage: ; December 1999
14 for Kosovo events see: Altmann, F., ... p. 415 - 422 for NATO: ibid. p. 991-992
15 The member states are Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. (France and Spain are only in the civil organisations integrated)
16 NATO source and Altmann F., ..., p. 989 - 995
17 see NATO handbook: (http//: www.nato.int./docu.handbook/1998/index.html Chapter 10, 11, 12
18 see NATO handbook, Chapter 14 and Altmann F., ..., p. 993
19 quote from WEU (2)
20 quote from WEU (5); WEU Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996; Madrid, 14 November 1995 from WEU homepage:
21 see WEU (6); WEU, an instrument at the service of European Security and Defence; WEU homepage: , Sjursen H. p. 5-8 and Altmann, F., , p. 1036 - 1037
22 Due to the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish population in 1992, the defence policy was excluded from the compromise (the so-called „Edinburgh agreement“) which Denmark singed in 1993. Therefore Denmark is only an observer in the WEU. from Heurlin B.; p. 170 - 172
23 see WEU (7); About Western European Union: Structure; WEU homepage: and WEU (8); WEU Transatlantic Forum; WEU homepage: ;WEU (9); NATO and WEU; WEU homepage: ;for Greece see: Tsakakoyannis P.; Greece: the limits to convergence; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK), p. 189
24 see WEU (7) and Altmann F., ..., p. 1036-1037 also see WEU (10); Multinational Forces Answerable To WEU; WEU homepage
25 see Altmann F., ..., p. 1047 - 1049
26 The Triumviat are the Presidency keeping country and its predecessor and sucessor. This was introduced to grant more stability and to support new or small members to fulfil their tasks.
27 For Denmark defence related positions are not binding and its Presidency does not cover ESDI issues.
28 see ibid. p. 1047 - 1049, Sjursen H. p. 5-10 and Nuttal S., p. 138 - 140
29 see Altmann F. p. 1049 and Western European Union (6); WEU, an instrument at the service of European Security and Defence; WEU homepage:(http://www.weu.int), quotation from WEU (11); Remarks by Dr. Javier Solana, WEU Secretary General and High Representative of the EU for CFSP on the occasion of the official launching of the Political and Security Committee; Brussels, 1st March 2000 WEU homepage:
30 see Sperling J. and Kirchner E. p. 51 -52 and Sjursen H. p. 12
31 Vasconcelos de A.; Portugal: pressing for an open Europe; in: The actors in Europe’s foreign policy (eds. Hill C.); 1996; London (UK); p. 276 - 278, also Sperling J. and Kirchner E. p. 38 -41 also Allen D. p. 297-298
32 ibid. p. 296, for Chechnya see Sperling J. and Kirchner E. p. 42 and for Macedonia see Tsakakoyannis P. p. 195 - 198
33 The „domestication“ can be a challange for the furture Central and Eastern European members like Poland, which persues under the protection of NATO a „moraly hazardeous“ foreign policy against Russia.
34 quotation from Sperling J. and Kirchner E. p. 58, also Agence France Press; Clark welcomes European Defense Identity, Insists NATO Retain Lead Role; in: centraleurope; 24/04/2000;
35 ibid. p. 68-71 and WEU (9)
36 from Sperling J. and Kirchner E. p. 71 - 73,
37 for Austria: from the statements of E. Busek (former foreign minister of Austria) at: „Kulturelle Dimension Europas“; podium discussion with W. Bartuszewski and E. Busek in Kraków; 12/04/2000;
38 see the article from Tsepkalo V.; The Remaking of Eurasia; in: ?; ?; ?, p. 114
39 see Sperling J. and Kirchner E. p. 237- 241, 245- 258