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Theoretical introduction to party formation in Post-Communist Countries
Political history of Slovakia (1867-1999)
Pre-communist history (1867-1945)
Communist history (1945-1989)
Transition process and formation of an independent Slovak state (1989-1992)
Political development since 1993
Present Party Configuration
Present Party Configuration
List of figures
In 1999 a challenging decade ended. The world turned its eyes again on the part of Europe that was hidden behind the ,,Iron Curtain" and under the low public interest in the other part of Europe. Since 1989 Western observer always tried to put the new independent states, emerging in the news in to categories, to make the evaluation of the process easier. Terms like Eastern Europe, Balkan, Baltics, Former Soviet Union, Central/Middle-Europe or the Visegrád-Group appeared in the newspapers and on geopolitical agendas. Despite all the similarities, like communist-rule for 40 - 70 years, the nearly simultaneously ,,withering away" of Communist rule and orientation to Western values and norms, a highly diversified political, social and economic landscape can be observed.
One of the most puzzling countries for Western observers seems to be Slovakia. A nation hidden for 45 years in the acronym CSSR demanded its right of self-determination right behind the boundary of the Western European metropolis Vienna in an area, which was regarded as the ,,abducted west"1. Whereas the ,,velvet divorce", as V. Havel described it, was widely admired, but the demand for an independent Slovak (and Czech) Republic was not understood. The last ten years political life in Slovakia were determined by wide political fragmentation, excessive nationalism, the domination of political life by one single person and the occasional occurring of political violence. These political incidents excluded Slovakia from the first tier of EU negotiation and the NATO membership in 1999, and moreover brought the country the label of an authoritarian state and comparisons with the regimes of Croatia and Romania.2
Many scholars studying the transition process in Central and Easters European countries state the political processes were mostly elite led. The mass movements in 1989 were rather accelerating the process than inducing it. The lacking of mass movement in the forming of the independent Slovak state is significant for the dispute about the future of Czechoslovakia, which was solely an issue of political elites. The political elites also formed the party systems and NGOs as their platforms for their political issues. The parties play a major role in the transition process, because the transition was the change from a mono-party-system3 to a pluralistic party system. Also the party's representatives in the legislative established and formed the new political institutions.4
This paper will give an overview over the present Slovak party-configuration. For deeper understanding the first part delivers a short introduction into the theory regarding party- division in post-communist democracies. This is followed by an outline of pre-communist, communist and post-transition history of Slovakia. In the third part the present party system is described and a visualised analysis of the present party configuration is presented.
Introduction into party formation theory for Post-Communist Countries
The studies of Lipset and Rokkan analysing the formation of party-systems in industrialised countries century lead to the analysis of the party-system in Slovakia. They state that the party system will crystallise around four major cleavages. These are centre/periphery, religious/secular, urban/rural and capital/labour. In the Western countries these cleavages developed during the industrialisation in the 19th and early 20th century and the dividing lines within the party system were continued, even major socio-economic changes altered the society. Not only the societal cleavages also the different programmes articulated, shaped the party system. In Western Europe the most parties today can be differentiated by their programmes and are categorised in the left-right scheme.5
It must be questioned if these patterns can be applied for the young democracies in Central Europe. In Western Europe this process was evolutionary in the long process of industrialisation. The development of a party system in Central Europe already started in the end of last or beginning of this century and democratic regimes were established in the inter- war period. Even totalitarian regimes or foreign rule during the Second World War interrupted the developments, the inter-war parties pre-communist legacies have to be taken into account. Slovakia like most transformation countries belonged to the periphery of Europe, and had the process of industrialisation and urbanisation took place after 1945. The formation of societal cleavages into a party system was oppressed by the leading role of the communist party. The rebirth of ethnicism/nationalism or the question of nation-state, especially in the new formed multi-ethnic Slovakia is a further factor making the upper model less applicable. To sum previous arguments up the Western left-right scheme is not useful for these countries, therefore different factors have to be taken into account for the evaluation of the party configuration.6
In young democracies the electorate choice is seldom based on pragmatic differences, the ability of parties to provide the individual or his group with advantages and the sympathy with the personality of the party's candidate decide the choice as well. Therefore the party- electorate relationship must be analysed and in this aspect three different kinds of parties can be distinguished: charismatic, clientelistic and programmatic parties.7 The question of nationalism, with its ethnic and cultural aspects, is expressed in the parties approach to citizenship. Two different definition of citizenship are used in Europe jus soli, which stresses the residence and jus sanguis stresses ethnic decent and cultural status.8 The freedom of the individual within the collective is characterised by its possibilities of political participation (,,political liberalism") and the individuals autonomy (,,social liberalism"). Parties promoting liberal norms endorse the individual for political participation and individual lifestyle.
Authoritarian parties instead prefer to call for governance of personal and moral conduct.9 The orientation of these parties is often evident by their political socio-technique, whereas authoritarian use political purge against their ,,enemies" (hard interaction), liberal parties are based on negotiations or democratic alliances (soft interaction).10. The cleavage of capital and labour mentioned above can be found in the parties values in social and economic spheres. This consists of following issues: state versus private ownership, the pace and extend of privatisation and the role of state in economic planing, which means in which extend the state intervenes in the economy. The social aspects are the extend of social programmes and the support of the state towards redistribution of income from rich to poor via tax programmes. These different factors find there extremes on the one side in free-market liberalism and on the other side in economic populism.11
The wave of ethnicism and nationalism in the post-Communist countries, especially in an multi-national country like Slovakia, makes it necessary to distinguish between the ethnic affiliation of parties electorate. There are parties represent the ethnic majority and parties representing the ethnic minority as well as parties which are able to attract votes of different ethnic decent.12 The collapse of the communist-system brought also a rebirth of religion in Central and Easter Europe. In many countries the church played a vital role in the dissident movement. Therefore some religious political groups demand an important role of the church in the democratic state, whereas lazistic parties promote a secular state with clear separation of state and church.13 The rejection of communism went hand in hand with the rejection of foreign (Soviet/Serbian) dominance in the transformation countries. This rejection was also intended as a re-orientation to Western Europe and the integration into European security and economic organisation. A simple and clear pro- and anti (Western-)European division among parties is very difficult, because whereas some parties are for an EU membership not all of them are for a NATO membership and vice versa. Also the stress on relations to other Central European countries and CIS countries has to be taken into account.14 The uprisings in 1989 were a clear result of the confrontation between the majority of the society and a minority of society, which collaborated with the state. This confrontation is often described in ,,us" and ,,them". Therefore it is important to take the party history and the biographies of party leaders into account. Some parties continue the structures and persons (but not always the norms and values) of the communist system, they are described as post-communist parties and others were founded in the dissident movement and will be described as dissident-movement parties.15 Following characteristics will be used to describe the Slovak party configuration:
- electorate - party relationship: charismatic, clientelistic or programmatic parties
- citizenship: universalist vs. particularist definition on ethnic status
- political and social governance: libertarianism vs. authoritarianism
- economy and social issues: economic populism vs. market liberalism
- ethnic group: majority party vs. minority party
- character of state: secular vs. religious
- foreign policy: pro-European vs. anti-European
- party history: dissident movement vs. post-communist
Parties do not act in an political vacuum. Even they are independent institutions their policy and their programmes are contested by the electorate in election rounds. Also mass- organisations, associations and other NGOs try to induce politics via influence in or pressure on parties. The relationship between parties and the political institutions is also a decisive factor for party configuration and development. On the one hand institutions (one chamber system, local or regional parliaments) and regulations (proportional or majority electoral system, thresholds, presidential or parliamental executive power) form the development of the party structure. On the other hand party representatives in legislative bodies are the creators and users of institutions. Therefore democratic institutions and parties are interdependent or in a less abstract language the ,,institutions reflect the interest of those who device them."16 The description and analysis of the current Slovak of party system is based on the situation in March/April 2000. Albeit this snap-shot a dynamic approach towards the historic, social- economical and institutional setting is essential. The following part will give a brief over-view over the country's political history from the Austrian-Hungarian Ausgleich 17 in 1867 to the most recent events in the 1990's.
Political history of Slovakia (1867-1999)
In the second part the major political events in the territory of today's Slovakia are shown. Historic events, socio-political and socio-economical processes are only mentioned as far as they are needed for understanding today's political life.
Pre-communist history (1867-1945)
Until the end of the 1. World War Slovakia was a part of Hungary respectively of the Austro- Hungarian Empire.18 Unlike Croatia and Slavonia or Transylvania it never formed a unit with autonomous rights. With the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire the Slovaks became independent and formed together with the Czechs Czechoslovakia. Although the borders of the new founded state disregarded the right of self-determination of people (Germans in West Bohemia and Hungarians in South-Slovakia), they were approved in the Treaty of Versailles and Trianon in 1919 and 1920. The Slovak national identity developed quite late in the middle of 19th century, because the Slovak culture is based on peasants culture and since 1867 they were exposed to Budapest's Magyarisation (cultural assimilation of non-Hungarians) policy. In the 1840's the cultural organisation Matica Slovenska was founded, which until now plays an important role for the national Slovak movement. The Slovaks had social and economic disadvantages in this state and was underrepresented in the Hungarian parliament.19
The inter-war republic of Czechoslovakia is perceived as a stable democracy, which was surrounded by fascist or authoritarian regimes. The country was from beginning confronted with minority issues combined with irredentism of its neighbours Hungary and Germany. The foreign pressure, the centralist structure and the economic superiority of the Czech Lands (Bohemia, Moravia and former Austrian Silesia) left little space for Slovak interests. One major demand of the Slovaks, the necessary industrialisation was due to the Great Depression interrupted. Another demand was education in Slovak language and the fight against the high illiteracy, which quite successful and fostered the development of the national culture. These factors increased the alienation of the Slovak elites led by Catholic priests, like Hlinka, towards the Czechoslovak state and democracy. Hlinka's Peoples Party became the major political power in Slovakia and increasingly radicalised its demands.
The Munich Treaty in 1938 and the following dismantling of Czechoslovakia was the moment for the Slovak nationalists, to found their own state under Hitler's aegis. Slovakia won it's independence but lost Southern Slovakia and Trans-Carpathia to Hungary. Slovakia was a clerical-fascist state under the dictatorship of Monsignor Tiso, which officially was a pluralist democracy. However leftist parties like Social-Democrats and Communists were banned and its member prosecuted, the centre-right parties joined the Peoples Party or dissolved themselves. The during this dictatorship tensions with the remaining Hungarian minority grew, because they were exposed Slovakisation measures, also the majority of Jews were killed in German concentration camps with the help of Slovak collaborators. In summer 1944 the opposition of communist, social-democrats and liberals groups were able to overthrow the regime and to keep control over the country for a few month before the Wehrmacht re-gained control. Although this uprising was not successful to liberate Slovakia it strengthened the position of the Slovak representatives in Beneš's exile government and the guarantee of a federal structure in the future state.20
Communist history (1945-1989)
In 1944 -45 the Soviet Army liberated Slovakia from German occupation. Czechoslovakia was refunded on the territory of the inter-war state except of Trans-Caucasia, which became a part of the Soviet Union. The strong ethnic minorities in the state were one reason for its dissolution, therefore it was planned to create two mono-ethnic areas. The Sudeten-Germans (ca. 3 Millions) were expelled from Bohemia and the number of Hungarians in Slovakia declined from 760.000 in 1941 to 355.000 in 195021,. The new state should have a federal structure, with an autonomous separate parliament and government in Bratislava. In 1946 elections for the federal and the two republics parliaments were conducted. The traditional strong position of the communist party (CSCS) in Czechoslovakia made them the strongest party (38%) without manipulation of the election. Still in Slovakia the success of the communists was modest (together with the Social Democrats they received 30%) and the Slovak Democrats (a centre-right party coalition of the 1944 uprising supporters) had a majority with 62%. In 1946 the Czech regime was the most liberal within the Soviet sphere. The communist party used its strength (it was the only party existing in both parts of the country an infiltrated the major institutions and mass organisations) and played the Czech non-communist parties against the Slovak Democrats and reduced the Slovak autonomy and regional administration. In 1948 the Communists dissolved the Slovak Democratic party and prosecuted its members, and in Prague they sized power by their coup d'etat. In 1948 the state became the most Stalinist among the Soviet satellites.22
The Stalinist period of Czechoslovakia is characterised by three major processes. Firstly the persecution of possible opponents, like non-obedient party members, supporters of the Slovak cleric-fascist state and the Catholic Church, which was divided in an official ,,patriotic Church" and an illegal ,,Rome-Church", secondly by industrialisation and forced collectivisation and lastly by urbanisation. The two latter processes had a high effect on the Slovak society. It was turned form a rural and peasant society into a industrialised and urban society. In 1948 the majority of Slovaks lived from agriculture (59,8%), in the 1970s this number fell to 23,6 %. The industrialisation brought especially heavy and military industry to Slovakia and created a industrial monostructure highly dependent on supply from and purchase of the Soviet Union. The de-Stalinisation process in 1956 had no impact on Czech Republic, because of the good economic performance and the death of party leader Gottwald in 1956.23
In 1960's the CSSR underwent a noticeable decline of economic performance. The hesitating and half-hearted reforms failed and increased the tensions between hard-liners and reformers within the party. Young party members increasingly became more and more radical and they were supported by students and the intelligentsia. In 1968 a moderate successor of the first party secretary, the hard-liner Novotny was elected to lessen the tensions inside the party. This was the quite unknown Slovak first party-secretary A. Dubcek. The reformers build a strategic coalition inside the party with the victims of the Stalinist purges (like G. Husak) and Slovak nationalists demanding more autonomy. In early 1968 censorship was lifted and the dispute and excessive criticism was brought into public. The majority of the population reacted quite passive to these changes, especially workers and peasants but also medium-level apparatchiks did not participate in these changes. The Slovak nationalists, especially the from the re-vitalised Matica Slovenska were able to establish Slovak institutions and economic decentralisation.24
The changes the so-called Prague Spring happened within the socialist system, but the Soviet Union and some socialist brother countries, like GDR and Poland were afraid of the spreading of these events. Therefore troops of the Warsaw Pact invaded the CSSR in summer 1968 and substituted Dubcek by Husak (who was also Slovak). The following purges and the ,,normalisation" process did not exceed the harshness of its Stalinist predecessors but left deep traces in the society. Reformers were pushed out of the party and dismissed from their posts. Most of them had to accept manual work or emigrated. The government used its position to divide and rule the people, Slovaks against Czechs and workers against intelligentsia. The party was stirring up anti-intellectual mood. This prevented the re-emerge of reformers inside the party until the collapse of the system. This was in less extend the case in Slovakia because its political elite was less affected by the normalisation, many aspiring elite members influenced by the reforms remained in middle-level positions. The system did not undergo a severe crisis again until the mass protests in 1989 and stayed socio-politically ,,frozen".25
Transition process and formation of an independent Slovak state (1989-1992)
The first signs of dissident movement in Slovakia appeared in the mid eighties, when a Catholic laity movement under the leadership of Carnogursky started with processions outside the ,,patriotic Church". Whereas in 1985 the participation was only a few thousand it exceeded more than 500.000 believers in 1989. This movement stayed religious and did not challenge the authorities. Also in the late 1980's a political dissident movement was formed which consisted of political non-conformists, `68 reformers, intellectuals and representatives of cultural life. Prominent members were for example M. Kovac and A. Dubcek. This movement held contacts with the Prague dissidents of Charta `77 but acted independently. In 1989 after Gorbachev declared the so-called ,,Sinatra-doctrine", each country should be responsible for its future, the pressure on the communist regime grew. The dissident movements in Czech Lands and Slovakia acted more and more openly and were able to organise mass demonstrations. In November 1989 the pressure grew from outside (reforms in Hungary, Poland and Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall) as well as from inside by mass-demonstration especially in Prague. The regime saw its limited power, neither the exchange of Jacek by Adamec as Prime Minister nor the violent suppression of demonstrations did not improve the situation.26
The first round-table negotiations were offered by the government in November `89, therefore the Czech Civic Forum (OF) and the Slovak organisation Public Against Violence (VPN) were formed. The VPN movement attracted many middle-rank communists and technocrats, but lacked of major public support. The election of Havel as president and Dubcek as spokesman of the parliament, were the symbols of the end of the communist state. The first free elections since 1946 were conducted in June 1990 for the Czech and Slovak National Council and the federate House of Assembly of the new named state CSFR. The elections in June brought a clear success for the dissident movement and a defeat of the Communist party which won only 13,3% of the votes27. The success of VPN was less than expected because the Slovak dissident movement already fragmented. Very successful were the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) of the charismatic Catholic Carnogursky, the Slovak Nationalist Party (SNS) and a platform of the Hungarian minority. Also the first spin-off of VPN the Democratic Party (DS) entered the parliament. After this elections a VPN/KDH government was formed in Bratislava and a federate OF/VPN government in Prague.28
After the old system was dismantled the political elites had to building up a new state. On the one hand the dissident leaders were highly moralistic and idealistic persons, but lacked of political experiences and on the other hand their movements fragmented due to the low political unity. Especially the Slovak government was pressed by the question of the future status of Slovakia by nationalist within the ruling party and the radical SNS. Not only the question of the future constitutional arrangement also the issue of speed and extend of privatisation brought conflicts between Prague and Bratislava. In 1992 Slovakia already had a unemployment rate of 12% whereas in the Czech Lands it only exceeded 4%. The struggles between the government led by V. Klaus and V. Meciar in 1991 and 1992 drew more and more attention to the different development in both countries. In VPN the quarrels between different wings grew and led to the split of the party. The majority followed Meciar, who promoted more independence and a slower economic transformation and founded the Movement for a Democratic Slovkia (HZDS). The economic liberal wing joined DS or formed the Civil Democratic Union (ODU later DU). These political struggles were elite led and based on personal struggles between leaders which were not able to come along with each other.29
The elections in 1992 became a referendum about the nation state, Western integration and privatisation. The populist strategy of Meciar of intertwining this issues brought a great success for his party30. Also the two parties pressing most for formation of a confederation (HZDS) or for independence (SNS) had only 45% of the votes the new election law with a 5% threshold gave them a majority 60% of the seats. Therefore they were able to form a pro- independence government. The reluctance of the President (Havel) and the Prime Minister (Klaus) of the CSFR to work on a plan of a confederation of two equal parts, moved the Slovak government to vote for the independence in Summer 1992. Also the majority of the members of parliament and the population (in September `92 only 40% voted for independence in referendum like polls) never wanted an independent state it was founded in January 1993.31
Political development since 1993
The main actor on the political scene of Slovakia after 1993 is Vladimir Meciar, a former member of the KSCS, who was expelled from the party, being a radical opponent of the Warsaw Pact intervention in 1968 and since end of 80's active member of VPN. During his government Slovakia received a democratic constitution, a stable currency and working democratic institutions within half a year since summer 1992. Beside these achievements, making him ,,the father of Slovakia" (Meciar about Meciar)32, he used an authoritarian style to rule the country, disregarded the constitution and abused all constitutional uncertainties to improve his position. The fist period of Meciar legislation was dominated by populist and nationalist propaganda, tensions with the Hungarian Minority (10,6% of population), which were confronted with an assimilation policy, prolonging of the privatisation process and feud with president M. Kovac. This policy resulted in a strong polarisation of society but much more of the political elites. Therefore M. Kovac in spring 1994used his position successfully to motivate the opposition and defected HZDS members, for a vote of non-confidence against the government. In this case Kovac misused his power as president and adopted the political culture of ,,Meciarism". The new government, including the post-communist SDL and the Hungarian MKDH, led by KDH leader Dzurinda re-launched the privatisation process, but was stopped by the parliamental election in autumn 1994.33
The elections of 1994 brought again a relative majority for HZDS (34,9%)34 and the task to form a new government. Because of the cleavages between the political elites created by Meciar's and his team's policy a coalition with the post-communist SDL or the conservative KDH was impossible. Consequently a coalition with the nationalist SNS and the socialist ZRS (Association of Slovak Workers) was formed. This new government took increasingly form of a ,,democratura" or ,,clientcratura" of Latin-American type. People close to the government profited of the privatisation, the disregarding of minority rights concerned the Council of Europe and the Slovak Intelligence Service was used against inner and outer enemies of the state. Following three incidents were symptomatic for Meciar's rule. These were the language law, the kidnapping of president Kovac's son and a period of over one year without a head of state. The language law was directed against the Hungarian minority. It was supported by all parties except of the Hungarian Coalition (MK) and KDH. This did not allow the use of Hungarian language in business life, as official language in villages with Hungarian majority and names were only registered in Slovak language. This law conflicted with the international the agreements of the Council of Europe and with the Slovak Constitution. The protest of the Constitutional Court was ignored by the government. The case of the kidnapping of Kovac's son is the most incomprehensible event of this time. The involvement of members and the head of SIS (Slovak Security Service) seemed to be quite obvious and Meciar announced an amnesty for all suspects in this case. In 1997 President Kovac's term of office ended. The Slovak President should be elected by a 2/3 majority of the parliament, but due to the conflicts it was not able to do so. The only possibility out of this dilemma was to change the constitution which now allows the direct election of the president.35
The foreign political agenda of Slovakia was a double-edged one. On the one side Slovakia was able to cut its economic ties to the former Soviet Union and the Czech Republic and to shift the foreign trade to the EU36. Slovakia also participated in the Partnership for Peace Programme and applied for NATO and EU membership. On the other side the Western observers were bewildered, by Slovaks independent and strong cooperation with Russia, (in the contrary to the foreign policy of the other Visegrád countries). Due to this orientation and the upper events Slovkia was perceived by the Western politicians as the ,,pariah of Europe." Slovakia was excluded of the first tier of countries negotiating with the EU for joining and was refused to become NATO member, unlike the neighbouring countries Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary.37
The so-called ,,Meciarism" polarised the society to such an extend, that all opposition parties, regardless of their political agenda worked together to defeat the coalition in the 1998 elections. The threshold in the election law led to the formation of two coalitions38. The first coalition (SDK, Slovak Democratic Coalition) consists of five liberal and Christian parties (KDH, DS, DU, SDSS and SZS) under the leadership of former Prime Minister Dzurinda. The second coalition (SMK, Slovak Hungarian Coalition) included three Hungarian parties with different political orientation. These coalitions were accompanied by the post-communist SDL and a new founded political party founded by R. Schuster, called SOP (Party for Civic Reconciliation). The opposition was supported by a round-table of NGOs, including trade unions, Catholic laity organisations and other, non-political associations, called OK'98. In the parliamental election the opposition parties were able to gain a higher share of votes, than the governmental coalition. The HZDS again was had a relative majority and was even able to increase its number of votes, but due to the high turnout of 84% its share decreased.39 After the success in the elections Dzurinda formed a coalition out of 10 parties spreading the whole political spectrum and which was only united by a common political ,,enemy" and the will to overcome the country's political isolation.40
The struggle between the government and the opposition, especially with its leader Meciar, went into a second round with the first direct elections of the president. The two major candidates were the former mayor of Kosice (from 1983-86 and 1994-99) R. Schuster (an ethnic German), the official candidate of the government parties and V. Meciar who was supported by HZDS.41 In the second round of the election in May 1999 Schuster won 57,2% of the votes and Meciar 42,7%. The reaction of the Western press about Meciar's ,,fall from grace" was quite euphoric, like T. Garton Ash's statement: the ,,...velvet revolution in Slovkia took place in 1999".42
After the successful elections the government had undertake tasks to lead Slovakia out of the miserable situation it was led in the previous years. Dzurinda's government had following main points on its agenda. The foreign policy was directed towards a re-vitalisation of the cooperation with the neighbour and the Western European countries. The government expressed its will to join the EU together with the other Visegrád Countries and the NATO as soon as possible. It also had to regain the trust of foreign investors in the Slovak economy, which was shook by corruption scandals and unclear economic policy. Increasing foreign direct investment is needed to fill the high trade and budget deficit and to re-launch the privatisation process. This affects the strategic branches (banks, facilities, telecommunication, ...) and the remaining heavy industry combinats (steel works in East and Central Slovakia and mines). Other tasks for the government are to fight the high unemployment, which is the highest in Central Europe (20,1 % end of 1999) and which reaches in some towns over 35%. This also limits the governments scope to restructure the economy.43
Also the solution of the minority issue were a pressing problems for the government. The Council of Europe and the EU forced Slovakia to revise its language law and educational regulations concerning the Hungarian minority, which is also the main demand of the Hungarian parties in the ruling coalition. Much more delicate is the issue of the Romani minority which desolate social conditions create disturbances in domestic politics and also in foreign relations.44 The government also eliminates leading HZDS and SNS party members from state institutions and from the diplomatic service. This so-called ,,de-Meciarisation" is seen by the opposition as witch-hunt and undemocratic procedure.45 The low ideological and programmatic consensus among the coalition parties lead to increasing tensions inside the government. The leaders of the parties within SDK fight for their independence against Dzurinda, who wanted to turn SDK from a coalition into a party. Also rumour spread by Meciar, that SDL and SOP are willing to form a new government with the opposition party HZDS. These struggles inside the government make it nearly impossible for Dzurinda to undertake the necessary reforms and lead to a declining popularity of the government. Moreover also President Schuster uses his independent position as president of all Slovaks to criticise the governments policy, but much more the politicians behaviour. Whereas the establishment of SDK was seen as a sign for a consolidation of the Slovak party spectrum, the fragmentation seems to carry on further. The possibility of a referendum launched by the opposition against the government and following early elections lead to the mushrooming of new parties. In the last half year five new political parties were founded.46
Present Party Configuration
In this party the Slovak parties are described. Their ideological and programmatic agenda is evaluated by the criteria given in the second chapter. The term party will be used for all organisations running for elections, also there is a clear difference between ,,movements" which are rather ideological amorphous bodies addressing a large as possible segment of electorate regardless their political philosophy, whereas parties appeals ,,appeals to a much more defined group of voters through a unified political ideology."47 In the present Slovak political system it is still difficult to give a clear evaluation of political programmes of parties. Due to the weak affiliation of electorate or social strata to specific parties, most political organisations rather resemble movements than political parties in the Western meaning. The parties are still very much dependent on their leader's charisma and programme, although observer criticise that they are lacking of long term visions.48
In this chapter only parties, which are or were represented in the National Assembly from 1994 until now, except of the Green Party (SZS)49, are described. In the end of this part the newly founded parties are introduced, but not evaluated.
Parties in government:
- SDK: The Slovak Democratic Coalition is a platform founded by smaller parties to overcome the 5% threshold. The member parties (KDH, DU, DS, SDSS and SZS) are still existing and have their own parliamental clubs. The leaders of the member parties also present their independent (often differing) views in publics. The attempt of P.M. and party leader Dzurinda turn it into a real party failed.50
- KDH: The Catholic-Democratic Movement is the oldest existing party in the Slovak party system. The party is successor of the catholic laity movement of the late 80's, which was in opposition to the communist system. Beside the important role of the charismatic party founder and leader Carnogursky (who was imprisoned for his religious activities), the party attracts attention by its clear political programme. The stronghold of the party are the rural areas especially in the North of the country. Concerning the question of citizenship and nationalism the party has a very moderate point of view, as it was the only ethnic Slovak party opposing Meciar's language law. Due to studies of Krivy and Gorzelak the party is in favour of the creation of a free market economy. Due to its roots the party is promoting a stronger position of the Church, but has no radical religious programme. KDH's foreign policy goals are to join the EU as soon as possible, a stronger cooperation with the neighbour countries, especially Russia. However since the NATO intervention in Kosovo, KDH opposes joining this organisation. The party is challenged by a split between secular and religious members, since the KDH member Dzurinda founded SDKU.51
- DU: The Democratic Union was founded by HZDS defectors, between the elections of 1992 and 1994. The party has a clear liberal-democratic programme, in favour of political liberalism and for the creation of a free-market with social elements. Regarding ethnic relations and the question of citizenship, the party and some of its leading members used regularly nationalist propaganda against Hungarians and Romani. In case of foreign-policy the party is an unrestricted supporter of Slovakia's integration into the Western economic and security framework. DU is a decidedly secular party and has its electorate mostly in the cities of Kosice and Bratislava. The party electorate resembles the winners of the transformation process The majority of the party members has a dissident, a few a Nomenklatura background.
- DS: The Democratic Party, by its programme and electorate's strata and values very is close to the DU. It is more radical concerning creation of a free market, the pace of privatisation and for foreign direct investment in strategic industries. The party has a clear dissident history, as it is a early spin-off of VPN founded in 1990.52
- SDSS: The Slovak Social Democratic Party was formed in 1990 by reform-members of the KSCS. The party is for the creation of a social-market-economy and uses as political sociotechnique negotiations. The party joined in the 1994 elections the post-communist SDL in the coalition ,,Common Choice" (SV) and changed in 1998 to the SDK coalition. Its political programme differs to its present coalition partners.53
- SOP: The Party for Civic Understanding was founded in 1998 as a platform of independent candidates with the former mayor of Kosice, R. Schuster as chairmen. The party used Schuster's popularity to enter the parliament and put the government of Meciar to an end, therefore SOP can be seen as a charismatic party. The positions of the party regarding the citizenship are universalist, as it can be seen that leading party members like Schuster are no ethnic Slovaks. The party rejects authoritarian rule and is for the creation of a social market economy. In the question of privatisation it is in favour of privatisation of strategic companies, but into Slovak ownership, for example by mass privatisation. The party is pro- Western in the question of NATO as well as EU membership. Many members of SOP made their political experiences before 1989 and have a Nomenklatura background.54
- SDL: The Party of the Democratic Left is the major successing party of the Slovak KSCS. In contrast to the KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia) and ZRS the party perceives it self as a social-democratic party and it refuses authoritarian rule. In the minority issue SDL is conspicuous by its nationalist attacks against the Hungarian government members. The economic programme of SDL is pro state interventionism, thus the party is against further privatisation and for state programmes to fight unemployment. The electorate is mostly in those areas in which the late industrialisation took place and the party represents mostly the losers of the transformation process. The SDL is supporting the government's activities to achieve EU membership as soon as possible, but is against a NATO membership.55
- MDK: The Hungarian Democratic Coalition is a coalition of three ethnic Hungarian parties. The member parties are the Christian-Democratic MKDH, the post-communist MOS and the association Együttélés. MKD expressed its loyalty to the Slovak state and refuses irredentism or seperatism. Their minority interessts reach from the respect of minority rights over cultural autonomy to regional autonomy These parties represent a broad political spectrum and compete in local and regional elections for the votes of the Hungarian minority, but act as a united force in the National Assembly and government. All three organisations are for social and political liberalism, but are disunited in the question of type of economy.56 MDK promots Western integration and a strong co-operation with the neighbouring countries, espescially Hungary.
- MKDH: The Hungarian Christian-Democratic has the same roots as KDH and can be seen as a dissident party demanding moderate religous state.
- MOS: The Hungarian Civic Party is the successor of the Hungarian minority organisation CSEMADOC, which worked already in the CSSR. Therefore the party can be seen as a postcommunist organisation.
- Együttélés (Co-existence) This association is not only representing the interests of the Hungarian minority it is also the political mouthpiece of the Ruthenians and Poles in Slovakia. This party bases its power mostly on local politicians, therefore its political spectrum is very wide.57
- HZDS: The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia is the main successor of VPN. Also VPN was originaly a dissident movement many party members joined. Many if its members were victims of the normalisation in 1969. Due to these facts HZDS has as well dissident, anti- communist and post-communist legacies. The strong role of the party leader V. Meciar and the lacking of a clear party programme characterise it as a charismatic party. Many members or friends of the HZDS leaders gained profit in the privatisation process, therefore it has also elemenst of a clientelistic party. HZDS always had postulated a very nationalistic policy and disregarded the minority rights of the Hungarian and Romani minority granted by the constitution. The HZDS government was characterised by the frequent violation of the rule of law and abuse of power, which is charcteristic for the authoritarian policy of the party leaders and the attitude of the electorate. Until now the HZDS parliament club is reluctand to participate in the committee work.
HZDS promotes a strong state influence in the economy and demands a limited privatisation and no foreign direct investment in the strategic industry. The position in foreign policy changed after the elections from a neutralistic, EU-critic position to a decicive pro-EU postistion. It sees Slovakia in the role of a mediator between Russia and Central Europe. In case of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the party expressed that it sees this as an act of ,,American imperialism". The programme stresses Christian ethics and a stronger role of the Church in the state. The strongholds of HZDS are areas in Central and North Slovakia, espesically those areas in which Hlinka's ,,ludaks" (People Party) had their strong positions. These areas are characterised by little or medium industrialisation, low educational level and ethnic homogenity.58
- SNS: The Sloval National Party percieves it self as the successor of Hlinka and the interwar clerical-fascist dictator Tiso. It was founded in 1990 Matica Slovenska a activists. The nationalist agenda unites former dissidents with former communist party members. Since the party was founded it changed its political agenda and also exchanged its electorate. Until 1993 the parties major goal was the creation of an independent Slovak state and attracted urban and educated electorate. Since the 1994 elections the party practiced nationalistic, racist and xenophobic populism.59 The value profile of the electorate shows the preference of hard interaction. SNS was in the same areas strongest party where also the HZDS had its best results. The party is a decidedly supporter of a free market, but surprisingly the electorate is equaly supporting state-interventionism, social market and free market. The SNS is a neutralistic and ideological secular programme.60
- ZRS: The Association of Slovak Workers developed out of SDL and is against privatisation as well as the creation of a free or social market economy. The party has its strongholds in areas of single-factory towns and is the mouthpiece workers in these districts, therefore it can be seen as clientelistic party.Concerning the question of authoritarism vs. liberalism the party is more radical than SDL. ZRS is an ethnic Slovak party and joined in Meciar government its ethnocentric policy. The party is general pro-Western but is not willing to give concessions concerning its clientel to EU-membership.61
Since September 1999 followin parties were founded.
- Smer: (Direction) Smer is a spin-off of SDL attracting the voters with nationalist and state interventionist propaganda. In recent surveys this party reached 14% and the party leader expressed his will to cooporate with the HZDS.
- SDS: The Slovak Democratic Centre was founded by the former HZDS member Mjartan, who wants to form an elitarian party of experts. The programme of the party is not clear until now, but the party leader expressed that he sees the possiblity for a coalition with SDK as well as with HZDS.62
- SDKU: The Slovak Democratic and Christian Union is the party founded by Prime Minister Dzurinda after he failed to turn the SDK into a party. This party tries to attract the electorate of the liberal parties DS and DU as well of Dziurinda's former party KDH.63
- DJRS: The Party of Democratic Unity of Roma was founded by 14 different cultural and social organisations of the Romani minority. Its leaders expressed that neither the government nor the HZDS are willing or able to solve their eminent social problems.64
Present Party Configuration
To show the position of the parties concerning the ideological and programmatic agenda (as far a existing) a graphic apporach is taken. The suggestions of Kitschelt65, how to visualise post-communist party configurations are adaptable in limited extend, due to Slovakia's multi- dimensional party cleavages. In the following graphs five of the seven factors, mentioned in the second part are shown. The ethnic orientation of the parities is not shown, because except of SOP all have a clear ethnic electorate base, which is evident by the parties name. The second factor left out is the role of church in the state, as despite KDH and MKDH (beeing decidely religious) and HZDS (beeing of mixed type) all parties are secular.
In the following graphs the geometric left or right do not resemble poltical left or right. The same relates the use of above and below. The first factor analysed is the parties poltical past. The extreme on the left of the axis shows party with clear post-communist past. The right resembles clear dissident past and the demand of poltical de-communistation. The parties in the centre have mixed-past of their members. The HZDS is difficult case. Also it is the successor of the main dissident movement VPN, it attracted many members of the former Nomenklatura. The splitt-offs of the party were mainly of dissident members (DS, DU), therefore the party is settet left of the centre, but the broad variety of members background is suggested. In all following graphs the government parties are shown in white colour and the oppsiton parties in grey.
illustration not visible in this excerpt
Figure 1: Classification of parties in communist and dissident history
In the second graph shows the parties attitudes towards the type of economy the party is promoting and its attitude towards Western integration are visulaised. On the extreme left are those parties with state-paternialist economic, in the centre parties with social-market economic and on the right parties with free-market economic agenda. Espescially SNS is a diffcult case, because the electorate prefers different economy than the party promotes. On y- axis those parties are shown above, which are decidedly pro-EU and pro-NATO and below those promoting political neutralism. Due to its former policy HZDS is set below SDL and KDH, also all three are pro-EU and against NATO-membership.
illustration not visible in this excerpt
Figure 2: Party configuration: criteria international integration and type of economy
The third graph shows the party spectrum in its position concerning the question of citizenship and minority rights which are expressing their degree of nationalism (x-axis) and on the y-axis their position in the dimension of liberalism or authoritarianism. On the top those parties are set prefering negotiations and whose electorate has a value orientation towards soft-interaction. On the bottom parties are set using political purge as socio-technique and whose electorate preferes hard interaction. On the very left are those parties which have a definition of citizenship based on ethnic origin, disregarding minority rights and use nationalist/racist populism. On the left those parties with universalist defintion of citizenship are set and those promoting tolerance towards ethnic minorities. The MKD is a difficult case, because their attitude towards these features are rather connected with their demands (extrinsic motivation) than wiht political will (intrinsic motivation). Since MDK also tries to represent the interest of the other minorites it is set on the right side.
illustration not visible in this excerpt
Figure 3: Party configuration after Political and Social Libertarianism and Economic Policy
The analysis of the party configuration demonstrates three major charactersticas of the present Slovak party configuration. First the history of the party and its members is compared to the other Visegrád countries of minor importance. The ,,us" and ,,them" of the communist time and ,,velvet revolution" period is overshadowed by the question where were (or are) you for or against Meciar. Second the parties which joined the Meciar government have common features in theree fields. They prefer authoritarian rule, have a nationalist agenda and their xenophobia is expressed by limited willingness to join the Western community. In this case it is interesting that the SDL is in most issues close to HZDS, but the ,,Meciar-factor" seems to be a cleavage deeper than ideological similarites. The third point shown by the graphs are the programmatic likeness between the three major SDK parties (KDH, DS, DU), except of the question of role of the church, wich is no important issue in Slovak politics. Therefore it is obvious that the struggles between the coalition members derive rather from struggles between their leaders than from programatic disunity. This and the existence of two charismatic parties (HZDS, SOP) reveals that the Slovak politcal system is still very much personalised.
The development of the Slovak party system since 1990 is characterised by a high dynamic. Several new parties emerged and several parties merged or formed coalitions. The process of further fragmentation has its reason in the low ideological unity inside of movement-type parties and personal struggles between political actors. The first process is a sign that some movements develop a more programmatic profile, wheras the second shows that personal interests are still more important than party programmes. This is typical for the low level of ideolgic discussions in Slovak (Central European) policy.
For the formation of a stable democratic system a consolidation of the party system is crucial. Therefore it is needed to overcome some of the dominant cleavages. These are the dispute about the type of economy, the question of governance (authoritarian vs. liberal), the attitude towards the European integration and question of nationalism and citizenship. The first factor is dominating in developed Western democraties and defines the left-right scheme. The other three are characteristic features which distinguish pro-Meciar from anti-Meciar parties.
The dominance of this dividing-line limits the choice of possible coalition partners. This strengthens the position of small and marginal parties. When the political actors are able to surmount this trench a process of consolidation could be induced. In long terms this could lead to a stable pluralistic party system, which is less susceptible for the temptations of populist politicians.
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List of figures
Figure 1: Classification of parties in communist and disside nt history
Figure 2: Party configuration criteria international integration and minority policy/nationalism
Figure 3: Party configuration after Political and Social Libertarianism and Economic Policy
illustration not visible in this excerpt
1 M. Kundera, form Timothy G. Ash; Mitteleuropa? Aber wo liegt es?; in: Transit; Winter 98/99; Wien; p. 136
2 ibid. p. 135
3 Czechoslovakia officialy had a pluralist party system within the National Front and under the leading role of the KSCS.
4 see C. González Enriquez; Elites and Decommunisation in Eastern Europe; in: Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe; 1998; London, New York; p. 282 and J. Higley, J. Pakulski, W. Wesolowski; Introduction: Elite Change and Democratic Regime in Eastern Europe; in: Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe; 1998; London, New York p. 7
5 S. Lipset and S. Rokkan; Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction; in Party Systems.Continuety and Change,; 1967; New York; p. 1-64 and Herbert Kitschelt; Fromation of party cleavages in post-communist democracies; in: Political communication; Vol 1, No4, 1995; London; p.448
6 for nationalism and xenophobia see: V. Havel, Die Schrecken des Postkommunismus (speech at George Washington University, at. 22.04.93), in Moral in Zeiten der Globalisierung,1998;Hamburg, p.33-35; K. Dawisha and B. Parrot; Research guidelines for country-studies; Politics, power, and struggle for democracy in South-East Europe; 1997; Camebridge/UK; p. 453- 455 and G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, A. Kuklinski, l. Zienkowski; Eastern and Central Europe 2000, published by: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities; 1995; Luxembourg; p. 47 and L. Holmes; Post-Communism; 1997; Camebridge/UK; p.282-283; Kitschelt p.463 and T. Sasinska-Klas; Changes on the Polish Left: Exit the communist party, enter the socialdemocratic; in: From Eastern to central Europe; 1990; Guelph; p. 200 - 203
7 see Kitschelt p.448 - 455
8 see Kitschelt; p. 458 and Z. Sokolewicz; Citizenship, Nationality, and the Civil Society, in European Enlargement and Identity; 1997; Kraków; p. 105
9 see S. Whitefields and G. Evans; The Ideological Bases of Policial Competition in Eastern Europe; paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the Americal Political Science Association; 1994 and Kitschelt p. 458
10 The enemy can be real existing opponents, like minorities, social strata or political competitiors but also ,,virtual" enemies, like the Western , the Jews, the Mafia. see G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, ...; p. 59 - 61 and V. Krivy (1); Profile of Party Adherents. Value Orientations; in: Current Problems in Slovakia. Report of the Sociological Survey; Mai 1994; Bratislava, p. 41-45
11 see G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, ... p. 61 and L. Holmes; p. 210-218
12 see Kitschelt p. 463
13 see L. Holmes p. 278-279, and G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, ...; p. 63
14 see. L. Homes p. 309 - 325
15 for the division of ,,us" and ,,them" see P. Sztompka; Civilizational Incompetence: The Trap of Post-Communist Societies; in: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 22; 1993; p. 39 for post- communist parties see K. Dawisha and B. Parrot; p. 455 and A. Toeffel; Parteienbildung und Parteiensysteme in Ostmitteleuropa im Vergleich; Essay for Eastern-Europe Seminar at the University of Vienna; 1998
16 see K. Dawisha and B. Parrot; p. 454 as well J. Higley, J. Kullberg, J. Pakulski; Elites, institutions and regimes in East-Central Europe; script prepared for panel session: Political Elites in East-Central Europe; 1995; Warszawa; p. 1-5 and direct quote from B. Geddes; A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe; in: Comparative Political Studies; 1995; p. 239
17 re-establishment of the Hungarian Kingdom within the Habsburg Empire
18 The question if before the Magyar settlement in the Carpathian Basin in the 9. th century Slovaks settled in this area is a dispute between nationalists of both people but not subject of this paper.
19 see K. Kocsis, E. Kocsis-Hodosi; Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin; 1994; Toronto-Buffalo; p. 14-16 and Hungarian Ethnic Cleansing (Magyarization); in: offical homepage of Slovakia; Bratislava as well as S. Wolchik (1); Democratization and political participation in Slovakia; in: The consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe; 1997; Cambridge; p. 198 -199
20 see J. Rothschild; Return to diversity, A political history of East Central Europe since World War II; 1989; New-York - Oxford; p. 78 -81, D Olson; Democratisation and political participation: the experiance of the Czech Republic; in: The consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe; 1997; Camebridge; p. 31and S. Wolchik (1) p. 199-201 also D. Paul, M. Simon; Poland Today and Czechoslovakia in 1968; in: Problems in Communism; Sept-Oct 1981; p. 38
21 The reduction has different reasons: one the one side about 170.000 Hungarians mainly of Bratislava and Košice were expelled to Hungary or Czech Lands, many Jews belonged in 1941 census because of their Hungarian language to this ethnic group and in the Slovak citizenship was given for Hungarian denying their ethinic origin (Slovakisation). see J. Bugajski; Nations in Turmoil; 1995; Boulder, Colorado; p. 79; and K. Kocsis, E. Kocsis- Hodosi; p. 17
22 see J. Rothchild; p. 91 and D. Paul and M. Simon, p. 40
23 see J. Rothchild; p. 91 - 92 and P. Lewis; Potential Sources of Opposition in the East European Peasantry; 1979; Baltimore- London, p. 279 as well as D. Olson; p. 31 see also G. Eckiert; p. 127
24 see J. Rothchild, 280-281; G. Eckiert; p. 127-131 and S. Wolchik (1) p. 202-204 as well as D. Paul, M. Simon; p. 28 -29
25 see Higley, Kullberg, Pakulski; p. 7-8 J. Higley, J. Pakulski, W. Wesolowski; Introduction: Elite Change and Democratic Regime in Eastern Europe; in: Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe; 1998; London, New York p. 6-8 and L. Brokl and Z. Mansfeldova; Czech and Slovak Political and Parliamentary Elites; in: Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe; 1998; London, New York; p. 131
26 see l. Holmes; p. 76-77 and S. Wolchik (1); p. 207-208
27 results for elections in June 1990: VPN: 29,3 %; KDH: 19,2%; SNS: 13,9 %; KSS: 13,3%; Hungarian Party: 8.7% and DS: 4,4%; from: S. Wolchik (2) ; Czechoslovakia: Politics, Economics and Society; 1991; London; p. 72-75
28 for foundation of VPN interesting insider-information in: D. Stoll (1); interview with Vladimir Meciar: "1989 was beautifuls";; in: Centraleurope; 09/12/99; Washington D. C; see also: S. Wolchik (1); p. 208 and C. González Enriquez; p. 282 as well as J. Higley, J. Kullberg, J. Pakulski; p. 12-14
29 statistic data from: Bank Austria; ,,Eastern Europe: An Overview"; in East-West Report;; Nr. 3; 1997; Wien, see Kullberg, J. Pakulski; p. p. 16 and L. Holmes, p. 287 -288 as well as S. Wolchik (1); p. 210
30 Results of the 1992 elections: HZDS: 37,3%; SDL: 14,7 %, KDH: 8,9%; SNS: 7,9 %, MKDH: 7,4%, SDSS: 4%, ODU: 4%; MOS: 2,3% and DS: 2,3 % from RFE/RL: ,,Resarch Report", June 19; 1992, Washington D.C.
31 see T. G. Ash; p. 139; and L. Brokl and Z. Mansfeldova; p. 56-57
32 see D. Stoll (1),
33 for the situation of the Hungarian Minority see: K. Kocsis, E. Kocsis-Hodosi;
34 results of the 1994 elections: HZDS: 34,9%, SDL+SDSS: 10,4, KDH: 10,1%; MK (Magyarski Koalitia): 10.3%; DU: 8,57; ZRS: 7.3; SNS: 5,4%; DS: 3,4 % from: TASR; 1994 Parliamentary Election in the Slovak Republic; ; 27/09/194; Bratislava4
35 for the situation of the Hungarian Minority see: J. Duplain; Ethnic Hungarian Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe,; in: WRITENET Paper; 1996; p. 12 and G. Nieuwsma; Lessons in Democracy: Slovakia, Its Minorities And The European Union ; in: Centraleurope; 12/11/1999 ; Washington D.C. see: Frank Altmann, Dr. Mario von Baratta, Dr. Wolf-Rüdiger Baumann, ...; Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2000; 1999; Frankfurt/Main and p. 731, also T. G. Ash; p. 139-141; L. Brokl, Z. Mansfeldova; p. 52
36 Slovak foreign trade: In 1992: wiht Eastern and Cenral Europe (incl. CZ): 66% , with EU: 22%. In 1997: with Eastern and Central Europe (incl. CZ) 40%, with EU: 49 %: from G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, ...; p. 19 and Altmann, v. Baratta,...; p. 730
37 cited from: T. G. Ash; p. 139-142, also see Baylis p. 107, and D. Stoll (2); interview with Vladimir Meciar: "The Hens Aren`T Laying Eggs";; in: Centraleurope; 10/12/99; Washington D. C; S. Wolchik; p. 197
38 5% for one party, 8% for a coalition of 2 or 3 parties; 10% for a coaltion with more than 4 pariies, see S. Wolchik; p. 221
39 results of the 1998 elections: HZDS: 27,0%; SDK: 26,3%, SDL: 14,7%, SNS: 9,1%, SMK: 8,1%, SOP: 8,0% and ZRS: 1,3% from Altmann, v. Baratta, Baumann; p. 729-p.731
40 for SDKsee M. Shafir for Radio Free Europe; When Four Times Five Might Equal Zero; in: Centraleurope; 08/09/1999; Washington D.C. 57; for SMK see A. Reisch; "Hungarian Ethnic Parties Prepare for Czechoslovak Elections"; in: RFE/RL Research Report,; 1 (18), 1998; München; for OK'98 see: CNN; Hillary Clinton praises democracy in Slovakia ; in: Slovakia Today (www.slovakia.org); October 1999; Bratislava and also see European Comission; 1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Slovakia's progress towards accession; 1999; Bruxelles/Brussel; p. 9 and Altmann, v. Baratta, Baumann; p. 729 - 732 as well as Stoll (2).
41 Also SDK officially supported Schuster, M. Kovac a DS member run also for presidency (this is symptomatic for the low disciplin within the leading party)
42 T. Garton Ash; p.136; for elections see: The New York Times; Slovak Election Offers Choice of Democratic Gains or Isolation; in: Slovak Today; April 1999; Bratislava; Agence France Press; Rudolf Schuster - Communist Apparatchik Turned Diplomat; in: Slovak Today; May 1999; Bratislava and Altmann, v. Baratta, Baumann; p.731
43 data from: K. Miller; Kysuce Coping With 25% Unemployment ; in: Centraleurope; 08/02/ 2000; Washington D.C. see I. Remias (2); Cabinet Presents Program to Parliament Economic - recovery and functional democracy priorities ; in: Slovak Today; 19/11/1998; Bratislava and TASR; Address of Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda to the nation on Slovak Radio on January 1, 1999.; in: Slovakia Today; 02/01.1999; Bratislava
44 Visa requirements for Slovaks were introduced for example by Finland, Great Britain, Belgium, because of Romani, who seeked for political asylum in these countries. For resent developments in the ethnic relations between Slvoaks and Hungarins resp. Romanis see: G. Nieuwsma; The Eoconomist; Slovaks v Czechs on gypsies; on the official homepage of Slovakia:http://www.slovakia.org/society-roma2.htm; Bratislava and Klara Orgovanova; The Romani minority in Slovakia; on the official homepage of Slovakia:http://www.slovakia.org/society-roma.htm; Bratislava
45 resent events see: D. Domanovsky(4); Vasaryova Appointment Leads To Renewed Accusation That Government Is Victimizing HZDS-Chosen Diplomats ; in: Centraleurope; 05/04/2000; Washington D.C. and M. Lesko for Transition Magazine; De-Meciarization is feasible; in: Slovakia Today; October 1998; Bratislava also C. Togneri; Slovak News 1999 Year in Review; in: Slovak Spectator (www.slovakspectator.sk); 06/01/2000; Bratislava.
46 see L. Nicholsonová; SDK Asked To Remember Reponsibility To Slovakia; in: Slovak Spectator; 24/09/1999 ; Bratislava and L. Nicholsonova, T Nicholson; Scandals And Resurgent Party Loyalties Have Led To Calls For A Shakeup Of The Slovak Cabinet; in: Slovakia Today; 20/07/1999; Bratlislava also Reuters (1); Slovak Premier's Party Signs Crucial Unity Pact ; in: Centraleurope; 24/12/ 1999; Washington D.C.; for Schuster see: D. Domanovský (2); Schuster Speech Faults Cabinet ; in: Centraleurope ; 12/11/1999; Washington D.C.
47 definition of Ivo Samson from the Slovak Foreign Reaseach Institute in: I. Remias; HZDS on verge of radical reform ; in: Slovak Spectator; April 1998; Bratislava
48 CTK (Czech News Agency) (3); Slovaks Lukewarm About Slovakia's Independence in: Centraleurope ; 05/01/2000; Washington D.C.
49 The Green Party is a marginal party. It is only represented in the parliament because it joined the SDK.
50 see Reuters (1); Slovak Premier's Party Signs Crucial Unity Pact ; in: Centraleurope; 24/12/ 1999; Washington D.C. and M. Shafir for RFE/RL; When Four Times Five Might Equal Zero; in: Centraleurope; 08/09/1999; Washington D.C.
51 for party history see: Wolchik; p. 227 and Reuters (2); Slovak Left, Christian Democrats Finding Common Interests; in: Centraleurope; 16/03/2000; Washington D.C.; D. Domanovský (3); Carnogurský Faces Foes On All Sides; in: Slovak Spectator; 10/02/2000; Bratislava; for evaluation of the party programme and the value provile if its electorate V. Krivy (1); Profile of Party Adherents. Value Orientations; in: Current Problems in Slovakia. Report of the Sociological Survey; Mai 1994; Bratislava; p. 79 and see G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, ... p. 63
52 and V. Krivy (2); Slovensko a jeho regiony: vzorce volebneho spravania a ich sociokulturne paozadie; 1994; Bratislava and see G. Gorzelak, B. Jalowiecki, ... p. 63; also L. Nicholsonová; SDK Asked To Remember Reponsibility To Slovakia; in: Slovak Spectator; 24/09/1999 ; Bratislava and Shafir for RFE/RL
53 Due to the coalitons in 1994 and 1998 the party joined very little informations are available.
54 see TASR; SOP Chairman Schuster about Attacks on SOP; in: Slovak Today; March 1999; Bratislava and L. Nicholsonová as well as M. Pisarova, T. Nicholson; Coalition Partners Angered By SDL's Lone Wolf Behavior; in: Slovak Spectator; 07/09/1999; Bratislava
55 see Krivy (1) p. 78 -80 and Gorzelak, Jalowiecki, ... p. 63 as well as Reuters (2) and M. Pisarova, T. Nicholson
56 The study of Krivy shows that 32% of electorate in 1994 were in favour of a state- paternialist type of economy, 48% for social market economy and 20% in favour of free market..
57 Because the Hungarian parties established a coalition for the last two election on national level very little information about the three member parties is available. see Reisch ; Duplain and Wolchik p. 206 as well as D. Stoll (3); Hungarians Replace "Autonomy" Rhetoric with "Decentralization"; in: Slovak Spectator; 09/01/1998; Bratislava
58 Krivy (1) p. 78-83 and D.Stoll (2) also I. Remias (1); HZDS on verge of radical reform ; in: Slovak Spectator; April 1998; Bratislava and European Commission; p. 15 for
59 The party Leader Slota made following remarks: ,,The solution of the Gypsy problem is a small court and a long whip" or ,,...only Meciar can protect us from the evil Hungarians" from The Economist.
60 for recent events see: CTK (Czech News Agency) (4); Slovak Nationalists Provoke AntiHungarian Incident ; in: Centraleurope; 11/11/1999; Washington D.C. and CTK (1); HZDS, SNS Sign Opposition Agreement ; in: Slovak Spectator; 02/03/2000; Bratislava also D. Domanovský (4); Tiso Plaque Awakens Dark Past ; in: Slovak Spectator; 06/03/2000; Bratisalva. For analysis of party programme and value profile of supporters see: Krivy (1) p. 79-82 and Gorzelak, Jalowiecki, ... p. 63
61 Krivy (1) p. 79-81
62 For Smer and SDS see: CTK (Czech News Agency) (1); Slovakia's Mjartan Dreaming About Elite Party --; in: Slovak Spectator 20/12/1999; Bratislava
63 CTK (Czech News Agency)(2); Slovak PM Leaves Christian Democratic Movement; in: Centraleurope; 15/02/2000; Washington D.C.
64 see RFE/RL; Slovak Romany Parties Agree On Unification ; in: Slovak Today; September 1999; Bratislava
65 see Kitschelt p. 462
- Quote paper
- Robert, Pernetta (Author), 2000, The Current Slovakian Party System, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/97318