The No Gun Ri Massacre. Forgotten War, Forgotten Nightmares

Table of Contents

1 Incident and massacre: How is a massacre defined?

2 Historical background & course of the war
2.1 End of World War II
2.2 No Gun Ri: Location
2.3 Korean War: Where it all began
2.4 7th Cavalry Regiment

3 Massacre
3.1 Flight of the refugees
3.2 U.S. airstrikes and killings on the railroad
3.3 In the twin tunnels
3.4 Casualties

4 Revealing the truth: Aftermath of the massacre
4.1 South Korean Petitions
4.2 AP reports
4.3 US - South Korean investigations
4.4 U.S. Department of the Army No Gun Ri Review Report and its fundamental problems

5 Conclusion
5.1 Future progressions
5.2 Present-day No Gun Ri

1 Incident and massacre: How is a massacre defined?

According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a massacre is defined as “the act or an instance of killing a number of usually helpless or unresisting human beings under circumstances of atrocity or cruelty” (1). Cambridge Dictionary also seems to endorse this idea, describing it as “the killing of a large number of people, especially people who are not involved in any fighting or have no way of defending themselves” (2). Although the precise definition of a massacre does not exist, we understand that two essential criteria must be fulfilled so that an incident can be universally accepted as a massacre:

i. The killing must involve a large number of people.
ii. Its victims must be unable to fight back or defend themselves.

For instance, the killings that took place in No Gun Ri, 1950, has undoubtedly been recognized as a massacre by the general public, whose details will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this report.

After the joint investigation of the U.S. Army and the ROK investigation team, the U.S. Department of the Army No Gun Ri Review Report (2001) was issued. Interestingly enough, the term “massacre” only appears twice during the entire 191-pages-long report, even these in forms of direct and indirect quotes. Usage of milder, neutral expressions, such as “killings” (18 times), “incident” (97 times), or “events” (112 times), replaces and often contradicts the incident’s conventional description as a massacre. If so, why would the U.S. government be unwilling to use the word “massacre”, purposely avoiding the word’s usage instead?

We will take a more profound look at the No Gun Ri Massacre by firstly analyzing its background information, secondly the details of the incident, and thirdly the aftermath of the No Gun Ri Massacre: The reaction from the U.S. government and what impact it has left on two countries and their people.

2 Historical background & course of the war

2.1 End of World War II

On August 15, 1945, Imperial Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces. Its surrender was only six days after the American nuclear bombings on two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, signalizing the official end of the Second World War. Following the defeat of the Axis Powers, their colonies were liberated and soon gained independence. Korea, bringing thirty-five years of its tragic history under Japanese rule to an end, was one of them.

The Korean post-war era, however, did not end up as a happily-ever-after scenario. The relations between the two military superpowers, the USA and the USSR, rapidly deteriorated into the state of Cold War, exposing the whole world to the hazard of WWIII. Korea, as well as the rest of the world, underwent an ideological conflict between communism and capitalism. This evoked the establishment of two separate governments, namely the People’s Republic of Korea (PRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), divided under the 38° Parallel.

2.2 No Gun Ri: Location

No Gun Ri* is located in Hwanggan-myeon, Yeongdong County, North Chungcheong Province, central South Korea (3). Despite its name, the victims of the No Gun Ri Massacre are not exclusively from No Gun Ri. Instead, they are composed of villagers from several nearby towns, including Chu Gok Ri (Jugok-ri) and Im Ke Ri (Imgie-ri) (see 4).

*Nogeun-ri according to modern-day notation. The term Nogeun-ri will be substituted by No Gun Ri throughout the text for the sake of minimizing confusion.

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Figure 1. Map of South Korea: The red marker indicates No Gun Ri's location.

2.3 Korean War: Where it all began

Before the outbreak of the war, various sources prove that the United States clearly underestimated the North Korean army and therefore overlooked the possible full-strength North Korean attack. The military editor of the New York Times addressed North Korean soldiers as “an army of barbarians.” Major General Charles Willoughby, who served in the Korean War, called them “half-men with blank faces” (Choe, Hanley & Mendoza, 2001, p.70). These uses of derogatory terms mirror the arrogance of the U.S., which rose to a new global superpower after WWII. The so-called Acheson Line even excluded South Korea, which was declared by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950 (5) to prevent further communization of the Far East (Choe et alia, 2001, p.64)

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Figure 2. The Acheson Line, drawn between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese archipelago.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel and waged war on the South. Due to the massive support from the Soviet Union, which offered North Korea a great deal of military training and its advanced military assets, the South Korean army was not a match for North Korean troops at first. The course of war did not change much even after the direct intervention of the UN in the Korean peninsula. Unprepared (see Choe et alia, 2001, pp. 21-22) and poorly equipped (see Choe et al., 2001, p. 62), the newly stationed American troops kept falling back. Consecutive defeat and retreat eventually set the U.S. military in severe panic and frustration. At the same time, countless civilians headed southward to Busan, South Korea’s final stronghold, where a defense line, the Pusan Perimeter, around the Nakdong River was formed, attempting to hold North Korean forces back (see 6). The No Gun Ri Massacre took place around this period of time.

2.4 7th Cavalry Regiment

The 7th Cavalry Regiment was subordinated to the 1st Cavalry Division of the Eighth U.S. Army (4) and is known to be directly responsible for the killings in No Gun Ri. Shortly after Japan’s surrender, the regiment was stationed in Japan as an occupation force from September 2nd, 1945 (7). Its first deployment in the Korean War was on July 22nd, 1950, approximately a month after the war’s eruption. After landing in the port city of Pohang, they were directly deployed to the war fronts formed under the city of Daejeon (Committee for the Review and Restoration of Honor for the No Gun Ri Victims(CRR), 2009, p.60). These reinforcements from Japan, however, were not enough to change the tide of war. Fear and suspicion arose among inexperienced American soldiers, and rumors about North Korean soldiers secretly blending in with South Korean refugees, infiltrating the defense lines, spread rapidly across the battlefront (Choe et al., 2001, p. 89).

Editorial Note: Figure 3 was removed due to copyright issues

Figure 3. Location of No Gun Ri and its nearby villages

3 Massacre

3.1 Flight of the refugees

On July 25th, 1950, civilians from several villages including No Gun Ri, Jugok-ri and Imgie-ri, were hurriedly evacuated by U.S. soldiers from the 7th Cavalry Regiment.

They heard that North Korean troops have arrived at Yeongdong, a city approximately 10 kilometers away from No Gun Ri. Following the rail tracks, which would have led them southwards to Daegu, the villagers soon encountered another group of refugees. In the end, an approximate number of 600 headed slowly southwards, guided by U.S. soldiers.

3.2 U.S. air strikes and killings on the railroad

At dawn on July 26th, after spending the night by a riverbank near the railroad, the villagers noticed that the troops have left (4). They continued walking South along the railways until halted by U.S. troops. A thorough examination took place as the soldiers searched and seized potential weapons such as kitchen knives or farm tools out of metal. The refugees took a break on the railroad while American troops, again, disappeared.

The bombing began unexpectedly. Hae-sook Yang, who was one of the massacre’s survivors, testified: “...we heard the shrieking sound of planes overhead. Terrifying noise. ...All of a sudden, a huge fireball slammed into my face. ...I looked down and I could see my eyeball hanging from a thread. ...The bullets from the plane were still raining down, but I couldn't get down because of my eye, dangling in the air. I begged, ‘Please, Mom, pull off my eye so that I could crawl under you.’ She couldn’t reach me. ...All the people around me were dead. I couldn’t believe how desperate I was to live.” (8)

The unceasing air raids and the following shootings by the cavalry set the civilians in panic. Forced to scramble over twisted iron bars and dismembered bodies, they sought refuge in the twin tunnels under the railway.

3.3 In the twin tunnels

What happened thereafter was a three day long nightmare, which genuinely represents the cruelty of war when inflicted on civilians. Having even set .30 machine guns, the M1919 Browning, (The U.S. Army, 2001, p.123), the U.S. troops began to fire vigorously towards the tunnels. This also included mortar fires, blasting the civilians near the entrance into pieces (Choe et al., 2001, p. 131). Hundreds of tightly-packed Koreans perished rapidly either by direct shootings or bullets ricocheting against the thick concrete walls. The remaining avoided being shot to death by piling up the dead and thereby building a human barricade. Some also hid under the corpses.

There have been several attempts to communicate with U.S. soldiers. Koo-hun Chung*, a seventeen-year-old at the time, recalled his cousin Koo-il, a university student who was capable of basic English, talking to the soldiers and begging for mercy. “The soldiers told him that they were shooting at us under orders,” claimed Koo-hun. Chang-rok Park, who was saved by the American soldiers, also testified: “I pleaded with them not to shoot... I rubbed my hands together, and I jumped up and down. I told them my parents were not bad people. But, of course, they didn’t seem to understand me” (Choe et al., 2001, p. 130). These efforts, however, did not desist the U.S soldiers from holding their fire. The shootings went on.

Since the refugees consisted of numerous groups of families, vast numbers of women and children were present. Some women were even pregnant and, eventually, had no choice but to deliver children inside the tunnels. The noise during the labor and the crying baby provoked the soldiers outside to resume shooting. Pressured by fellow Koreans who were fearful of losing their own lives, the father took the baby and plunged him into the stream, face down (Choe et al., 2001, p.132). Other infants were killed by U.S. gunfire or left to die, abandoned by their family members.

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