Understanding ISIS. Strategic Caliphate-Building or Fanatic Apocalypticism?

Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1: How fanaticism almost destroyed IS

Chapter 2: How strategic behaviour facilitated the erection of the Caliphate

Chapter 3: Apocalypticism resurfaces

Conclusion

Appendix 1: Glossary

Appendix 2: Current territory

Understanding ISIS: Strategic Caliphate-Building or Fanatic Apocalypticism?

Introduction

“Nothing since the triumph of the Vandals in Roman North Africa has seemed so sudden, incomprehensible, and difficult to reverse as the rise of ISIS. None of our analysts, soldiers, diplomats, intelligence officers, politicians, or journalists has yet produced an explanation rich enough—even in hindsight—to have predicted the movement’s rise.”

Anonymous Middle East expert in The New York Review of Books¹

The group which calls itself the “Islamic State” (IS) has continuously challenged outsiders´ ability to gather a coherent understanding of its underlying motivations and future plans. Irritatingly, authors have derived different goals from its activities. One is the group´s motto “Remaining and Expanding”, another is bringing about the apocalypse.

This dissertation argues that apocalyptic ideology informs the group´s strategy. It finds that considering IS an essentially unideological power-seeking organization is misleading. Further, it demonstrates that this misunderstanding is a result of focusing the analysis on a period of time during which the actions IS took to pursue its ideological goals were in line with the actions an unideological power-seeking organization would have taken.

Those interpreting IS strategy as “Remaining and Expanding” have pointed to the group´s governance efforts and its deliberate, meticulously planned expansions. Reuter considers the IS leaders hypocrites who are debunked by their use of strategic planning, tactical lies, pragmatic reconfiguration of alliances and total internal control². They have adopted ideology instrumentally to build an alliance with fanatically religious followers³. Similarly, Pape depicts the conflict as essentially a politically-motivated Sunni insurgency, emphasizing that even suicide missions are not motivated by ideology but rather by efficiency⁴. Other authors who claim an instrumental adoption of ideology identify strategic incentives for violent extremism⁵ and point to consistencies with the behaviour of other militant groups⁶. A number of authors have suggested a variety of possible strategic rationales behind apparently self-defeating behaviour. Walter considers them deterrence strategies⁷. Thrall⁸ and Lewis⁹ point to improved internal cohesion through credible outside threats and enemy images. Atran¹⁰ and Al-Gharbi¹¹ emphasize the elimination of the grey zone between the Islamic and non-Islamic public through a radicalization of both sides. Moreover, Weiss and Hassan¹² as well as Atwan¹³ refer to Management of Savagery to claim that luring the enemy into direct fighting, brutality and retribution are considered recommendable in the strategic thinking of jihadists.

In contrast, those interpreting IS goals as apocalyptic have referred to contradictory behaviour such as beheading hostages, burning downed pilots alive and attacking the centre of Paris. While in line with its apocalyptic visions, these actions appear to foreseeably increase the number and commitment of the group´s opponents. Thus, they appear self-defeating, conflicting with the goal of “Remaining and Expanding”. Wood¹⁴ and Diez¹⁵ argue that IS´s dedication to hastening the apocalypse by fulfilling prophesied preconditions matters gravely to its strategy. Bergen has supported this claim, denying the group rationality¹⁶. Stern and Berger argue that the strategic logic of IS is at least heavily influenced by apocalypticism¹⁷. Filiu¹⁸, Todenhöfer¹⁹ and Rosenberg²⁰ have surmised that IS seeks to provoke the intervention of Western ground troops to realize an apocalyptic battle against the “crusaders” in Dabiq. Abbas argues that the Caliphate is primarily pursued as a sign of the nearing end times²¹. Other authors emphasizing the IS leaders religious zealotry include Orton²², Bale²³ and Landes²⁴.

Authors that have either fully discarded or embraced ideology as a motivational aspect have yet failed to explain a weighty contradiction. Whereas some behaviour of IS seems to be in line with strategic rationality, other behaviour is hard to explain by it. Similarly, some behaviour lends itself much more to interpretations that assume ideological motivations than other, apparently more rational actions. Stern puts the dilemma in a nutshell: “They actually, it seems to me, have two objectives. One is to goad us into a ground war. And the other is to run a state, and they are contradictory²⁵ ”.

With regards to this puzzle, an insightful observation has been made by McCants. He agrees with Reuter that the group´s strategic planning and collaboration with self-interested allies conflicts with our imagination of apocalypticists, but concludes that apocalyptic motivations are not necessarily at odds with pragmatic, rational behaviour²⁶. Williams follows the same logic, claiming that apocalyptic motivations give room to efficient planning and administration²⁷. Similarly, Cockburn concludes that IS is run with ideological fanaticism as well as military proficiency²⁸. The insight that a fanatic is not necessarily a lunatic allows for a more nuanced analysis of the motivational underpinnings of IS.

Despite other possible primary goals, the debate has focused on strategic Caliphate-building and fanatic apocalypticism. This dissertation concentrates on these two. Few explanations have managed or even attempted to build a bridge between them. Furthermore, the relationship between the ideology and strategy of IS has seldomly found scholarly attention as a question in its own right. This dissertation contains a diachronic analysis of the relationship between the military strategy and ideology of IS with the central aim of assessing whether ideology is only utilized instrumentally or plays a motivating role. This analysis is divided into three chronological chapters that mark distinct phases of this strategy-ideology relationship. The first chapter shows how the ideological zeal of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) provoked local Sunni resistance. The second chapter details how the elaborately planned Syria expansion was facilitated by an evolution of ideological paradigms. The third chapter looks at the apparently self-defeating provocation and escalation which have increased the number and resolve of IS´s enemies.

To assess the evolution of ideology, this dissertation makes use of IS-published Anglophone material, in particular the group´s periodic online magazine Dabiq²⁹ . Dabiq is translated into several languages and serves the group´s propaganda and recruitment. Sources on the evolving military strategy and its underlying strategic paradigms include jihadist strategic literature such as the 2004 book Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Islamic Nation Will Pass³⁰ and the Valuable Collection for the Strategic Memorandum Series ³¹. Management of Savagery is reportedly widely circulated within IS³². It suggests strategies for the creation of a Caliphate. The Strategic Memorandum provides ideas on how jihadists can capitalize on the Arab Spring. Even though the books´ group-external authorship commands analytical caution, their recommendations provide frameworks to which the group´s behaviour can be compared. To throw further light on both the ideology and military strategy specifically in the first phase, the dissertation looks at intercepted communications. Firstly, letters exchanged between Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and Ayman Al-Zawahiri³³ show severe differences in opinion between centre and affiliate. Secondly, accusations brought forward by the group´s chief judge³⁴, Abu Sulayman Al-Utaybi, as well as an audio message of the official leader of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)³⁵, Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi, reveal the influence of apocalyptic beliefs on the military strategy within the first phase.

This dissertation argues that IS´s behavioural inconsistencies follow a pattern, such that different phases seem to speak in favour of different underlying rationales. Considering these differences as an IS “paradox” is primarily a result of neglecting the room which IS´s ideological motivations leave to strategic thinking - within the scope they determine. After its failures in the first phase, the group´s ideological emphasis shifted towards establishing the Caliphate, which IS believed to be a precondition to apocalyptic victory. Thus, ideological and strategic imperatives were aligned in strategic Caliphate-building activities, which were prevalent in the second phase. After the declaration of the Caliphate, apocalyptic believes came to the fore again and have motivated the fanatic, apparently self-defeating actions observed in the ongoing third phase. Therefore, formulating this conclusion in terms of the question, this dissertation argues that ideology informs the group´s strategy, having inspired one phase of mostly strategic Caliphate building, before and after which acts directly driven by fanatic apocalypticism prevailed. While a focus on the more strategic second phase has been at the heart of many interpreters of the group, this dissertation proposes that a recourse on the more evidently fanatic first phase can improve the understanding of the third phase, which mirrors its prevalence of fanaticism.

Chapter 1: How fanaticism almost destroyed IS

The Islamic State group has been known under a number of names. Simply put, IS originates from Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi´s Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād (The Organisation of Monotheism and Jihad), founded in 1999. After swearing loyalty to Osama bin Laden in 2004, the group that was by now resisting the American occupation of Iraq was called Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI and allied Sunni insurgents formed the umbrella organization Mujadhideen Shura Concil (MSC) in January 2006 and then replaced it with the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October. This dissertation will use the term IS for the present Islamic State group and all its earlier manifestations under the names of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), Daesh, ISI, MSC, and AQI. This is partly in accordance with the group´s self-reported history³⁶, the “roadmap towards Khilafah for the mujahidin”. It declares the group eight years old³⁷ (in November 2014), thus tracing it back to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), founded in October 2006. AQI and the MSC are considered direct predecessor groups to IS since it has been argued that they were largely dominated by former AQI leaders³⁸ and were only founded to rid the group of its reputation of being hijacked by foreigners such as the Jordanian Al-Zarqawi³⁹.

The declaration of a state, the ISI, happened during the first months of the Anbar Awakening, a tribal uprising that successfully ended the group´s occupation of Anbar Province (August to December 2006). The momentum of the “Anbar Awakening” carried forward and led ISI into an existential crisis. The group was expelled to the Mosul area, where it later managed to resurrect.

Despite the dramatic impact of the Awakening, the group did little to prevent it. On the contrary, ISI´s behaviour strongly contributed to the underlying alienation of local Sunnis. Phillips⁴⁰ identified three factors that account for the rising hostility: The insistence on marrying ISI members into prominent local families, interference with tribal black market activities, and the imposition of rigid Salafism. The group reportedly broke fingers of smokers, demanded women to wear a niqab⁴¹, and violently opposed local Sufi traditions. Williams⁴² and Neumann⁴³ point out that non-Iraqi Arabs enforced these prescriptions. This additionally alienated the cultural sensibilities of the local population. According to Phillips, the population was further appalled by the fact that ISI targeted Shia but could not protect Sunnis from their retribution. In addition, Filiu emphasizes that the Sunni population did not want to be a base for global jihad as associated with Al-Qaeda and the Jordanian Al-Zarqawi⁴⁴.

Local Sunnis were excessively labelled traitors or apostates and assaulted; an internal memo of a member criticized that oppression seemed to be more important to the group than the insurgency⁴⁵. Resistance was only met with more violent assertiveness.

So why did ISI ignore all warning signs that gave notice of the growing local resentment and why did it pursue such a merciless strategy in the first place? Based on his study of confiscated studying captured internal documents of the group, Shapiro pointed to preference diversion within the group and a lack of control on the side of the leadership⁴⁶. As insightful as his analysis of organizational shortcomings is, he mostly overlooks another important factor worthwhile exploring: ideology. The first issue of Dabiq, IS´s periodic online magazine, starts with quoting Al-Zarqawi: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah´s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq”⁴⁷. Dabiq, a northern Syrian town close to the Turkish border, is evoked as the setting for an apocalyptic showdown between good and evil. Al-Zarqawi thought of his group as the core of the Islamic army at this battle⁴⁸. According to the Dabiq magazine, the idea of such a cosmic struggle, won by the forces of Islam, has been held since Al-Zarqawi´s days⁴⁹, who also stated “We fight here, while our goal is Rome […]”⁵⁰. Al-Zarqawi went as far as publishing communiqués that detail the fulfilment of specific predictions for the apocalypse, made by the famous jihadi theorist Al-Suri⁵¹. Here, the expectation of a sectarian war before the apocalypse played a key role: Al-Zarqawi envisaged an apocalyptic struggle against the Shia⁵², heralding the approaching end times.

It is not easy to determine whether Zarqawi has adopted this apocalyptic ideology instrumentally to pursue more secular goals or whether he was indeed motivated by these. Neumann indicates that the emphasis on apocalyptic elements within his ideology was primarily an instrument to aid his violent political aims . Zarqawi indeed provides a strategic rationale in a letter to Al Qaeda Central (AQC) . Targeting Shia indiscriminately is supposed to provoke a violent response, allegedly leading to a sectarian civil war which would then awaken the sleeping Sunni masses in face of the threat of extermination. This will provide AQI with the role of “leading the [Islamic] nation into a battle”.⁵³

Even though this openly stated rationale should not be disregarded entirely, this dissertation argues that such unideological explanations fall short of fully ⁵⁴ accounting for Zarqawi´s actions. Firstly, he explains this rationale in a letter to Al Qaeda. While Zarqawi had strong incentives to remain within the Al Qaeda organization to attract international jihadists, he knew well that bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri rejected apocalyptic believes – which Al-Zawahiri made clear in his subsequent response . Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that he attempted to sell his plans to his nominal superiors without alienating them. Secondly, even his attempt to deliver a strategic rationale contains paragraphs of barely hidden dogmatic sectarian views that express a fanatic hate towards the Shia , ⁵⁵ who resemble “the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom” . Thirdly, the letter should be seen in context to his other statements, which as shown have without ambiguity expressed apocalyptic ideas. Fourthly, other strategic decisions made by Al-Zarqawi are difficult to explain by sound strategic thinking. For example, against all lessons which insurgents have learned and spread in history , he wasted the lives of over a thousand fighters by trying to hold Fallujah in a pitched battle.⁵⁶

In combination, vested objections to considering Al-Zarqawi a level-headed strategist and the ruthless, eventually self-defeating rigidity of his group imply a genuine ideological commitment to purifying Sunnis and exterminating Shia. According to Neumann, his apocalyptic beliefs informed his operational decisions .⁵⁷

Al-Zarqawi’s immediate successor perhaps even more embodies the the apocalyptic character of ISI´s leadership. Abu Ayyub Al-Masri is quoted in Dabiq similarly to Al-Zarqawi: “[…] we will not rest from our jihād until we are under the olive trees of Rome, after we destroy the filthy house called the White House” . However, in Al-Masri´s case, his reported actions allow for much less doubt with ⁵⁸ regards to his apocalyptic drives. ISI´s chief judge Al-Utaybi, upon his defection to AQC, made explosive claims : Al-Masri and other leaders held apocalyptic believes that lead to overhasty and flawed decision-making. They believed that the Mahdi would appear in less than one year and reasoned they would win the rule over Iraq within three months. Therefore, in a dangerously venturesome move, ⁵⁹ all forces were ordered into the field, and forbidden to withdraw. Al-Masri even had group members erect pulpits for the returning Mahdi. Besides such useless dispatches of personnel and ⁶⁰ inappropriate tactical decisions, his apocalyptic beliefs made Al-Masri announce the state immaturely without significant support. Al-Utaybi asserts that Al-Masri entirely lacked leadership capabilities. Being fed with preselected information, he was dislodged from the actual events. ⁶¹ He further placed no emphasis on selecting a proper leader for the state, ⁶² stating that he could be tested for a while and replaced if considered recommendable. The leader he chose, Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi, mirrors his apocalyptic thinking in an audio statement where he evoked the expectation of a battle against the “Romans” at Dabiq . Considering Al-Masri an ineffective leader, the bounty placed on him by the U.S. dropped from $5 million to $1 million . His example demonstrates how an apocalyptic drive lies at the bottom of the group´s behaviour.⁶³

[...]

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¹ Anonymous author, ‘The Mystery of ISIS’, Review of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan and ISIS: The State of Terror by Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger. The New York Review of Books, 62:13 (2015), retrieved (04.11.2015) from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/08/13/mystery-isis/

² Christoph Reuter, Die Schwarze Macht: Der »Islamische Staat« und die Strategen des Terrors (München, 2015), p. 204

³ Ibid., p. 329

⁴ Robert Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’, Guest lecture at Emory University, E-Publication (26.03.2015), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-Dd6mtZA5k

⁵ Barbara Walter, ‘The Strategic Incentives for Violent Extremism’ (Blog entry), E-Publication (2015), retrieved (18.01.2016) from: http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/02/03/the-strategic-incentives-for-violent-extremism/

⁶ Reyko Huang, ‘The Islamic State as an ordinary insurgency’, The Washington Post, E-Publication (14.05.2015), available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/14/how-the-islamic-state-compares-with-other-armed-non-state-groups/

⁷ Barbara Walter, ‘The Strategy of ISIS: Logic or Lunacy?‘, Blog entry (03.02.2015 available at https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2015/11/16/the-strategy-of-isis-logic-or-lunacy/

⁸ Trevor Thrall, ‘Not-So-Senseless Violence: There's a logic to the Islamic State group's horrid beheadings’ , U.S. News, E-Publication (08.12.2014), available at http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2014/12/08/the-logic-of-islamic-state-group-beheadings

⁹ Carly M. Lewis, ‘ISIS: The Logic Behind the Beheading’, E-Publication (10.10.2014), available at https://whatcanyoudowithanthropology.wordpress.com/2014/10/10/isis-the-logic-behind-the-beheading/

¹⁰ Scott Atran, ‘Mindless terrorists? The truth about Isis is much worse’, The Guardian, E-Publication (15.11.2015), retrieved (15.12.2015) from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/15/terrorists-isis

¹¹ Musa Al-Gharbi, ‘ISIL’s barbaric acts are highly effective propaganda’, Aljazeera America, E-Publication (23.02.2015), available at http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/2/why-did-isil-burn-the-jordanian-pilot.html

¹² Hassan Hassan, ‘Isis has reached new depths of depravity. But there is a brutal logic behind it’, The Guardian, E-Publication (18.02.2015), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/08/isis-islamic-state-ideology-sharia-syria-iraq-jordan-pilot; Michael Weiss & Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York, 2015), p. 40 ff.

¹³ Abdel Bari Atwan, Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate (London, 2015), p. 147, 153-5

¹⁴ Graeme Wood, ‘What ISIS Really Wants’, The Atlantic Monthly, 315:2 (2015), pp. 78-90, 92, 94; p. 80

¹⁵ Georg Diez, ‘Medieval Fantasies? Islamic State Pursues Apocalyptic Logic’, Der Spiegel, E-Publication (19.03.2015), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-islamic-state-strategy-to-draw-west-into-final-battle-a-1024438.html

¹⁶ Peter Bergen, ‘Why does ISIS keep making enemies?’, Cable News Network (CNN), E-Publication (18.02.2015), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/16/opinion/bergen-isis-enemies/

¹⁷ Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York, 2015), p. 225

¹⁸ Jean-Pierre Filiu, ‘Defeating ISIS: From Strategy to Implementation‘, The Washington Institute, video lecture (23.09.2014), available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/defeating-isis-from-strategy-to-execution or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qS8rD4NYtYU; Rukmini Callimachi, ‘U.S. Seeks to Avoid Ground War Welcomed by Islamic State‘, The New York Times, E-Publication (07.12.2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/world/middleeast/us-strategy-seeks-to-avoid-isis-prophecy.html?_r=0

¹⁹ Laura Höfken, ‘"Vier Giftpillen für den Ernstfall": So reiste Autor Todenhöfer in den Islamischen Staat‘, The Huffington Pos t, E-Publication (16.04.2015), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.de/2015/04/16/giftpillen-ernstfall-todenhofer-is_n_7077150.html

²⁰ Joel C. Rosenberg, ‘Islamic Extremists are Trying to Hasten the Coming of the Mahdi‘, National Review, E-Publication (11.09.2015), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/423852/radical-islam-iran-isis-apocalytpic-messiah-mahdi

²¹ Cited (email communication) in Stern & Berger, ISIS, p. 221

²² Kyle Orton, ‘A Response to Criticism: Why the Ex-Saddamists in the Islamic State Matter‘, blog entry (10.08.2015), available at https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/08/10/a-response-to-criticism-why-the-ex-saddamists-in-the-islamic-state-matter/

²³ Jeffrey Bale, ‘Refusing to take Islamist Ideological Double Standards‘, video lecture (20.05.2015) from Conference ‘#GenerationCaliphate: Apocalyptic Hopes, Millennial Dreams and Global Jihad’ at Boston University, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5jq_8SBlaF8

²⁴ Richard Landes, ‘Globalization as a Millennial Praeparatio Califatae: A Problematic Discussion’, video lecture (13.05.2015) from Conference ‘#GenerationCaliphate: Apocalyptic Hopes, Millennial Dreams and Global Jihad’ at Boston University, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gmeYJiHltQ

²⁵ Rukmini Callimachi, ‘U.S. Seeks to Avoid Ground War Welcomed by Islamic State‘, The New York Times, E-Publication (07.12.2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/world/middleeast/us-strategy-seeks-to-avoid-isis-prophecy.html?_r=0

²⁶ William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York, 2015), p. 155

²⁷ Michael Williams, ‘ISIS as a Strategic Actor: Strategy and Counter-Strategy’, The Mackenzie Institute, E-Publication (15.04.2015), available at http://mackenzieinstitute.com/isis-strategic-actor-strategy-counter-strategy/

²⁸ Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (London/New York, 2014), p. 137

²⁹ Dabiq magazine, al-Ḥayāt Media Center (July 2014-April 2016, see bibliography), issues 1 – 14, available at http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-stat e-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq

³⁰ Abu Bakr Naji, Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass (William McCants, trans.). John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. E-Publication (23.05.2006), available at https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf

³¹ Abdullah bin Mohammed, Valuable Collection for the Strategic Memorandum Series, Al-Ma’sada Media. E-Publication (30.06.2012), available at https://archive.org/details/mdhkrh-strtjyh

³² Michael Weiss & Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York, 2015), p. 41

³³ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, ‘Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi (English translation)’, E-Publication (undated), available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2; Council on Foreign Relations; ‘Letter from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden’, E-Publication (01.02.2004), available at http://www.cfr.org/iraq/letter-abu-musab-al-zarqawi-osama-bin-laden/p9863

³⁴ JustPaste.it, ‘This is the message written by Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi who was the Highest Judge in #ISI to AQC’, E-Publication (17.05.2014), available at http://justpaste.it/fhsu

³⁵ Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi, “The Believers are a Single Brotherhood,” Al-Furqan Media Establishment, E-Publication (11.01.2009), available at http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/4434/AOB20090110.pdf,

³⁶ Dabiq, issue 1, p. 34-41

³⁷ Dabiq, issue 5, p. 25

³⁸ Dean Yates, ‘Senior Qaeda figure in Iraq a myth: U.S. military’, Reuters, E-Publication (18.07.2007), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-qaeda-idUSL1820065720070718; Mahan Abedin, ‘Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq: Fact or Fiction?’, The Jamestown Foundation, E-Publication (28.03.2006), available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=717#.VzNT0oSLSM8 ; Jacob N. Shapiro , The Terrorist´s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton, 2013), p. 87

³⁹ Bruno Schirra, ISIS - Der Globale Dschihad: Wie der „Islamische Staat“ den Terror nach Europa trägt (Berlin , 20) , p. 80-1; Atwan, Islamic State, p. 45

⁴⁰ Andrew Phillips, 'How al Qaeda lost Iraq', Australian Journal of International Affairs, 63:1 (2009), pp. 64-84; pp. 72-3

⁴¹ International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq after the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape’, Middle East Report 74, E-Publication (30.04.2008), available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/074-iraq-after-the-surge-I-the-new-sunni-landscape.aspx, p. 3; Amit R. Paley, ‘Shift in tactics to revive struggling insurgency’, The Washington Post, E-Publication (08.02.2008), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/07/AR2008020703854.html, p. 2008

⁴² Williams, ‘ISIS as a Strategic Actor’

⁴³ Peter Neumann, Die Neuen Dschihadisten: IS, Europa und die nächste Welle des Terrorismus (Berlin, 2015), p. 79

⁴⁴ Filiu, ‘Defeating ISIS’

⁴⁵ Shapiro, The Terrorist´s Dilemma, p. 85-6

⁴⁶ Shapiro, The Terrorist´s Dilemma, p. 82

⁴⁷ Dabiq, issue 1, p. 2

⁴⁸ Neumann, Die Neuen Dschihadisten, p. 88

⁴⁹ Dabiq, issue 4, p. 3

⁵⁰ Dabiq, issue 4, p. 4

⁵¹ Stern & Berger, ISIS, p. 224

⁵² Stern & Berger, ISIS, p. 24

⁵³ Neumann, Die Neuen Dschihadisten, p. 85

⁵⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Letter from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden’

⁵⁵ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, ‘Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi (English translation)’, E-Publication (undated), available at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2

⁵⁶ Al-Zarqawi is accurately called a “fanatical Shia-hater” in Schirra, ISIS, p. 70

⁵⁷ Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Letter from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama bin Laden’

⁵⁸ Anonymous author, ‘The Mystery of ISIS’

⁵⁹ Neumann, Die Neuen Dschihadisten, p.88

⁶⁰ Dabiq, issue 4, p. 4

⁶¹ McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse, pp. 31-5; Brian Fisherman, ‘The first defector: Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, the Islamic State, and al-Qa`ida’, CTC Sentinel, 8:10 (2015), pp. 24-26; JustPaste.it, ‘This is the message written by Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi who was the Highest Judge in #ISI to AQC’

⁶² Al-Baghdadi, “The Believers are a Single Brotherhood http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/4434/AOB20090110.pdf, p. 4

⁶³ Mike Mount, ‘Reward for wanted terrorist drops’, Cable News Network (CNN), E-Publication (13.05.2008), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/13/pentagon.masri.value/index.html