Economic leadership of the post-apartheid South Africa and its peace-making role in Southern Africa

Contents

1.Introduction
1.1 This work's interests
1.2 The term of "Southern Africa"
1.3 The matter of "dependence"

2. Regional disparities
2.1 Twelve countries – many differences
2.2 An overview of the dependences
2.2.1 Dependences on South Africa
2.2.2 World trade
2.3 Efforts to regional cooperation – SADC

3. South Africa's economic leadership
3.1 South Africa's way to its economic leadership
3.2 The situation after 1994: The shadows of apartheid
3.2.1 South Africa's role in the SADC
3.2.2 First conclusions: Cooporation but no equality

4. Conflicts in South Africa: The burden of unemployment, poverty, AIDS, and migration
4.1 Facts about unemployment in South Africa
4.2 An inefficient labour market
4.2.1 The limits of economic growth: Too much workforce, but a lack of talents
4.2.2 The informal sector: Chances and dilemmas
4.2.3 Impacts on the labour market by AIDS and migration
4.3 Macro-economic strategies to diminish disequilibria

5.1 Findings: In how far can South Africa contribute to a peaceful regional development?
5.2 Nachspann

6. Annex: Literatur, Fußnoten...

1. Introduction

1.1 This work's interests

"(...) THE SHEER SIZE AND POWER OF SOUTH AFRICA IS ITSELF A CAUSE OF REGIONAL INSECURITY." ¹

For Southern Africa, the decade of the 1990's was, according to many authors, a blessed one: Throughout the region, great peace-making processes and reforms have taken place. The abolishment of the apartheid in South Africa obviously has unlocked doors to freedom and peace for many people. Civil wars have ended after many years, and this development provides a new chance to fight social conflicts. The contrast of East and West has disappeared in the region, one-party systems could be peacefully transformed into democratic systems, and South Africa retrenched from Angola. And not least, Namibia became independent. Yet, no one could speak of a peaceful region when thinking about Southern Africa. Social conflicts are still existent, and even if civil wars have ended, many social dimensions destinating the social security seem not yet to be satisfied. In this case, the author Peter Meyns distinguishes between the "positive peace" and the "negative peace". ² - The first term includes a state of "social fairness and durable development", whereas the second one rather means a status quo of those countries without civil wars and a still-lasting social instability. This description can be applied to nearly all the countries of Southern Africa and on South Africa at a regional scale.

If we suppose that South Africa is the region's country with a decisive economic and stabilized social power in the region - that thesis will be proven later – we have to ask, how great its potential is to cause a regionwide "positive peace". On the other hand, South Africa's dominance could have a rather negative effect on the region's security as described in the quotation at the very beginning.

Of course, it is obvious that both theories do match with the real conditions. But the question is if the Post-Apartheid South Africa's policies admit such a positive development. Which has been its social development within the last ten years and in how far the neighbouring countries will benefit in one way or another from South Africa?

But this study will focus on two dimensions of security, defined by the authors Buzan and van Aardt in the beginning of the 1990's: On the one hand, there is the economic one, and on the other hand, there is the dimension of developing policies which additionally includes issues such as the way of diminishing unemployment, poverty and social disequilibria./2

In order to regard the specific South African conditions, both dimensions can be separately applied on South Africa and namely on the region of Southern Africa . Comparing both dimensions' development in post-apartheid South Africa to that of the region's in the same period, hints of positive impacts of the region caused by South Africa may be found.

1.2 The term of "Southern Africa"

The region of Southern Africa is a compilation of twelve neighbouring countries, which do have many things in common, but on the other hand, shows many differences as well treated in the next chapter. Some countries have been the result of civil wars and independence movements during the last decades, others have existed constantly for several hundred years such as South Africa. In terms of economic interactions between those countries, we may distinguish between interdependences and dependences. Up from the 19th century, South Africa has been establishing an economically strong, almost monopolist status within the region. The result of this development is the today's dependence on the vast majority of the Southern African states concerning their foreign trade. The following quotation from the apartheid era, therefore, has not lost much of its importance:

"Weithin unbekannt ist der hohe Grad der wirtschaftlichen Abhängigkeit der nördlichen Nachbarn Südafrikas von dem Land, das sie politisch bekämpfen. Dennoch hält man in Pretoria Handel und Hilfe aufrecht und trägt so erheblich zu einer relativen Stabilität des Kontinents bei."³

Thus, South Africa has been strongly involved in the regional trade even during the apartheid era, at that time maybe more than nowadays. But this statement also makes obvious that financial and economic ressources brought up in South Africa are an essential factor for stabilizing the region.

On the other hand, migration is a constituting part of the region's social development: "The story of Southern Africa is a story of migration" ⁴. - The social interdependence between the twelve states can only be understood by regarding migration which itself has a long tradition in the region.

1.3 The matter of "dependence"

Not only migration movements but also the issues of HIV/AIDS, poverty, illegal trade with drugs and weapons and not least ethnical conflicts are factors, which are caused mutually: They concern the issue of "human security" ⁵. - Author Peter Vale differs this term from that of "state security" which mainly regards military aspects of national security. In his opinion, national efforts of creating security, as it has happened throghout the whole history of Southern Africa, did form today's constellation of interdependences and dependences, with South Africa as an economic leader. /5

Generally spoken, the term of "dependence" is an asymmetrical case of interpendence. When we talk about the region of Southern Africa, it means that the so called "low developed countries" are more dependent on "developed". i.e. industrialized countries, than vice versa concerning important qualitative aspects. South Africa as the only UN-acknowledged industrialized country in the region, therefore, must cause significant dependencies on the other Southern African states. The following chapters try to describe the extensions of these regional dependences.

2. Regional disparities

2.1 Twelve countries - many differences

The region of Southern Africa consists of twelve countries in many aspects which turn out enourmous differences. One of the first significant differences concerns the countries' extensions of area: A glimpse on a political map of the region shows two relatively large countries compared to the others of the region: The Republic of Angola and the Republic of South Africa. Their areas are approximately three and a half times larger then that of Germany (Angola: 1,246,700 sqkm, South Africa: 1,219,912 sqkm) ⁶

Additionally, there is a range of smaller and very small countries surrounding South Africa in the north, such as Lesoto, Swaziland, and Malawi.

There is also a strikng inequality of population figures between those countries: All of them do have a very high population growth, which was from 1.2 per cent in Mauritius up to 3.2 per cent between the years of 1996 and 1997 ⁷. - But behind these figures there are also considerabe racial differences. In South Africa, for example, which has the highest total population among all the countries with 44.8 million people in March 2001 ⁸, the population is split into four groups: Africans, Whites, Coloureds, and Asians. The Africans do form most of the population (about over 75 per cent of total population ⁹ and its growth. Those countries which were ruled by white minorities, still today suffer from enormous social inequalities which have been provoced by a economic order ruled by Whites. There has been a traditional economic relationship between those states under South Africa's leadership, for example in form of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which is still existent today.

A partly natural-given, partly political-caused disparity which also explains the current economic conflicts in Southern Africa is the availability and distribution of raw materials. Therefore, the fact that the Republic of South Africa is well-provided with abundant natural ressources is one of the main reasons that South Africa was and is on the region's top of economic power. As all region's countries with high raw material ressources (such as Angola, Botswana and Sambia), this sector contributes most to the national income ¹⁰. - Especially in the case of Angola, the importance of the raw material-exporting sector for its national economy is very obvious:

"Der gewaltsame Konflikt im Anschluss an die Wahlen von 1992 führte zu einem Rückgang der inländischen Produktion um 25% und zu einer beispiellosen Zerstörung der Infrastrukturanlagen und der wichtigsten Einrichtungen des Landes. 1994 betrug das Bruttoinlandprodukt (BIP) pro Einwohner etwa 410 US$, womit es sich gegenüber 1990 halbiert hatte. 1995 belief sich allein die Staatsschuld Angolas, welche auf 11,4 Milliarden US$ geschätzt wurde (davon 7,3 Milliarden US$ Zahlungsrückstand), auf 365% des BIP's. 1997 war das BIP pro Kopf wieder auf 450 US$ gestiegen.(...) 1997 erreichte die Erdölproduktion, welche infolge der Kämpfe, die 1993 in den Erdölgebieten der Provinz Zaire stattgefunden hatten, massiv zurück gegangen war, einen Rekord von 750.000 Barrel pro Tag. Im Dezember 1997 schätzte man die mit dem Erdöl erzielten Jahreseinnahmen auf ungefähr fünf Milliarden US$. Zur gleichen Zeit machte der Erdölexport 90% der Gesamtausfuhr des Landes und über 80% der staatlichen Einkünfte aus." ¹¹.

This quotation shows that economies of developing countries with a dominant raw materials sector may be capable of recovering some years after fatal impacts such as civil wars. On the other hand, many countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania, are entirely dependent on their agricultural sector and on raw material imports. In general, they belong to the world's poorest countries. In contrast to those countries with a raw materials sector, their income per capita is on a very low level (2001: Tanzania US$ 271, Mozambique US$ 200, Malawi US$ 166). ¹² - And in the case of Malawi, it has been even reduced compared to US$ 180 in 1996. ¹³

2.2 An overview on the regional dependences

2.2.1 Dependences on South Africa

These countries' situation cannot be improved as long as there is a lack of a decisive manufacturing sector, which could render them more independent from the South African imports. Instead, due to their high demand of manufacturing goods, they receive more imports from the region than vice versa ¹⁴ . - This may be one of the reasons, why the debit rate of exactly those countries with a negative trade balance exceeded 100 per cent in 1998. ¹⁵

As mentioned before, the strong economic relationship between South Africa and its neighbouring BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland) has led to the SACU in 1969. This relationship brought particular fiscal benefits to the member countries. Swaziland, which de facto imports goods only from South Africa, ¹⁶ has no direct access to the sea harbours, but during the Apartheid era more and more foreign companies shifted there: Swaziland guaranteed to them neutral and stable conditions and a good location nearby the Cape. ¹⁷

In the case of the Kingdom of Lesotho, its even total dependency on South African imports has led to ambivalent effects: Half of its agricultural goods must be imported, and 38 per cent of its GDP are being transferred from Lesothian miners working in South Africa. In contrast, the customs union allows Lesotho's most important industry the clothing industry to increase its exports to the SACU and to the United States. ¹⁸

Peter Meyns regards these countries which are on a high measure dependent on South Africa's exports as "captive markets" in South Africa's point of view . ¹⁹ But the examples of Swaziland and Lesotho show that there are at least two moments which destinate massively the economic relationship between South Africa and the region:

- 1) a high pressure of emigration to South Africa and
- 2) a limitation of their own market capacity for South African imports.

So it is a matter of South Africa's trade policies to cope with these two factors. The first aspect also concerns South Africa's job market which is still struggling with a high unemployment rate, whereas the second one has direct impacts on its -still high- exports to the region which itself can influence the growth of its manufacturing sector. Thus, Meyns considers South Africa's economic interests moving more and more into the context of a strong Southern African market instead of persuing a hard, protectionist attitude towards the region, as it still occurs. In contrast, for example, the clear tendency of a polarization of the regional trade makes foreign companies invest rather in South Africa than anywhere else in the region. ²⁰

2.2.2 World trade

Another burden to the countries is the couple of Free Trade Agreements made between South Africa and the European Union, which mainly concerns a customs-free trade with agricultural products such as fish and wine. Although the Free Trade Agreements have positive effects on the South African exports, the problems of the SACU countries may increase, as losses of customs and tax incomes are to be expected. ²¹ - So especially those countries of the region which mainly export agricultural products to South Africa will not be able to compete with the cheaper European imports.

In terms of a dependence on industrialized countries, the situation of Southern Africa's developing countries is comparable to the rest of Africa's developing countries. As most of the countries, they are well known to be procedures of primary commodities which are being deterred by massive price fluctuations on the world market. The manufacturing sector, by contrast, is responsible for a very small percentage of GDP. Lacking a developed manufacturing sector, African countries have not been able to use regionally the abundant supply of primary raw materials, nor have they been able to satisfy the growing regional demand for manufactured goods. Therefore, this sector depends heavily on imported imputs, notably in the form of technology, equipment and technical expertise, and moreover mostly involves assembling activities which are dominated, in most cases, by multinationals. ²² - The commodity pattern of Africa's trade is "asymmetrical", this means that a considerably high percentage of goods are destined to industrialized countries, whereas Southern Africans receive most of their manufacture goods by industrialized countries. In contrast, intra-African trade is negligable which is the result of their lack of foreign exchange to finance growing imports and other external obligations. ²³

2.3 Efforts to regional cooperation - SADC

Today, there are many forms of regional cooperation in Southern Africa which partly have traditional roots, such as those of the BLNS countries. Some attempts of the Southern African states to cooperate on economic levels in order reduce the negative effects of their disparities have been more or less successful, but at least we need to focus on one of them due to its excellent importance for the whole region:

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was formed by nine member states in Lusaka, Zambia, on 1 April 1980, following the adoption of the so called "Lusaka Declaration" ²⁴. - The SADCC which was directed against South Africa ²⁵, was a relatively loose cooperation of states which have been suffering from a massive dependence on South Africa. In contrast to other cooperation efforts, which often failed by their keen aims of a regional economic integration, SADCC had rather realistic objectives:

"Im Gegensatz dazu beschränkte sich die SADCC auf ökonomisch und finanziell machbare Projekte und Programme und setzte ihren Schwerpunkt auf gemeinsame Infrastrukturprojekte in den Bereichen Transport und Fernmeldewesen, Energie sowie Nahrungsmittelversorgung und Ernährungssicherung. Ausgewählt wurden solche Projektbereiche, die für alle Länder, die sich daran beteiligten, einen ersichtlichen Vorteil boten, ohne einen Souveränitätsverzicht abzuverlangen." / ²⁶

Concerning the transportation sector, the member countries, especially Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, tried to reduce their dependence on South African transport routes and harbours. ²⁷ - In the context of its "national strategy", the Apartheid regime of South Africa itself tried to interrupt some of these transport routes and to hinder a successful development of the SADCC, for example, by supporting rebel movements. ²⁸

Duo to the enormous global and regional political and economic changes in the 1990's, SADCC shifted in aims towards a development integration. /28 - In 1992, SADCC changed its name into SADC (Southern African Development Community). Today, SADC has 14 member states, namely: Angola, Botswana, République Démocratic du Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Moçambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. ²⁹

The establishment of a development integration has been finished in 2000 by the ratification of its programme by the member states. ³⁰ - Compared to the role of the SADCC, the SADC tries to strengthen its influence on the economic regulation in the region by structural reforms: In contrast to the governments-based coordination of sectoral activities and programmes, SADC has now adopted a more centralised approach through which 21 Coordinating Units have been grouped into four clusters, namely: Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; Infrastructure and Services and Social and Human Development and Special Programmes. ³¹

The most significant problem of the SADC today is the difference of the economic development of the member states: Half of them belong to the Least Developed Countries (LDC), which means an economic split line between the SADC member countries. ³² - The SADC, therefore, needs to respect their limited possibilities in order to participate in a common free trade zone as well as the risks of free trade agreements with the EU for the LDCs. ³³

3. South Africa's economic leadership

3.1 South Africa's way to its economic leadership

In order to find out the dependences and interdependences and to analyze today's situation of economic and social interactions in Southern Africa, it is necessary to state the the importance of raw material ressources' relative to conflicts and economic structures in the region.

As mentioned before, the region of Southern Africa in general is well-provided with raw materials, but there are strong differences according to their spread. Precisely: South Africa has one of the most abundant reserves of raw materials in the world. The raw materials being mined in South Africa are Coal, Chrome, Platinum, Vanadium, Uranium and further important products. ³⁴

The establishment of a regional economy had begun during the second part of the 19th century when sources of gold and diamonds were found. ³⁵ - The state of Southern African had not yet been formed but settlers of Boer and British origin were fighting for an imperial dominance in the region. ³⁶ - Consequently, the "South African War" broke out which lasted from 1899 until 1902. Boer people tried to defend their Oranje and Transvaal Free States against the dominating British led by Lord Roberts and Kitchener. However, Boer people had to surrender by signing the Agreement of Vereeniging on May 31st, 1902. ³⁷

In a similar way, conflicts between the imperialist powers, especially Britain, Germany, and Portugal, have determined the territorial partition within Southern Africa. Thus, today's South African territory is the result of rather occasional events which have ocurred among the imperialist powers.

Additionally, a model of labour migration of male workers coming from the Southern African countries has been established which is unique with a reference to the whole African continent: It shows South Africa's growing influence on the region in the late 19th century. ³⁸

Cross-border migration had shown various appearances. At one end of the spectrum is the highly regulated and formalized mine contract labour system which was installed between 1890 and 1920 and which continues to the present. On the other hand, there are various kinds of informal, unregulated, or clandestine movements across borders. South Africa has been receiving both kinds of migrants for decades. ³⁹ - Especially on the farms and in the mining industry, more and more contract workers from outside South Africa (mostly from the BLS countries and Mozambique) have been recruited. ⁴⁰

Simultaneously, the South African railway transport system has been consistently build up massively, planned, carried through and directed by the imperialist "British South Africa Company" (BSAC). Its main purpose was to link the mining sites (even in Rhodesia, Botsuana and other mining places in the region) with the sea harbours in Mozambique and South Africa. ⁴¹ - Mining companies which have been involved in the region (such as the "Anglo American Corporation of South Africa"), have increased their invests and gained regional and international influence within this sector. - ⁴²

The system of labour migrants persits until this day. On the one hand, this situation intensified the dependence of some region's countries on payments of migrated workers to their home countries. ⁴³ - Concerning their economic status, it has been mostly the better choice for labour migrants than working at home even in the Apartheid era: The better working conditions as well as the perspectives of a qualification were the crucial "pull factors" which induced them go to South Africa. ⁴⁴

3.2 The situation after 1994

3.2.1 The shadows of apartheid

The factors shown above have boosted South Africa to its dominant position in the region as it appears today. In our days, the economic status of South Africa is the best of the Black Continent and the 28th largest in the world . ⁴⁵

Nevertheless, a look on the distribution of South Africa's national income reveals an image of disequilibria among the four population groups even in the post-Apartheid era: Blacks constitute 75 per cent of the population and receive only 33 per cent of national income, by an average per capita income of US$ 1,950. In contrast, the whites represent 12.8 per cent of the total population but capture 54 per cent of the national income by an average per capita income of U$18,700 (1997). ⁴⁶

The next chapter will give more insight to these conflicts. It is especially the South African labour market which represents massive racial as well as gender disequilibria.

Obviously, the abolishment of the institutional apartheid in 1994 could not yet form a fair economic system in South Africa: Therefore, South Africa itself is still facing an enormous inequality among its population groups in addition to its challenge of regional integration.

" The extent of institutional transformation required a local government in post-Apartheid South Africa dictated a transformation period of at last six years (1994-2000). This is because the most significant legacies of apartheid were to be found in South Africa's distorted special economy. Even now it may be argued that the transformation is not really complete and that only the systems and the structures have been transformed. " ⁴⁷

The solution of these problems requires a range of "adjustments" of both South Africa's economic order and its cooperation policies, as Ahmad Aly recommends ⁴⁸.

3.2.2 South Africa's role in the SADC

One of these strategies does concern South Africa's embedding into regional arrangements (such as SADC, SACU and the RMA [Rand Monetary Area]) with the BLNS countries. ⁴⁹

South Africa refused a double membership of the the competing regional organizations SADC and Comesa (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa). Instead it joined SADC in 1994. ⁵⁰ - Thus, South Africa's interests preferred development strategies rather than a trade orientated regional policy focussed by Comesa. ⁵¹

But nevertheless, the weight of South Africa's membership obviously makes a re-constellation of regional arrangements become necessary. Regarding the co-existence of Comesa and SACU, some commentators propose the establishment of two regional cooperation bodies in Southern and Eastern Africa and a harmonization of relations between the Comesa and the SADC. ⁵² - In its new role, South Africa already has been able to underline its stabilizing role within the SADC: The membership of The Democratic Republic of Congo has been initiated by mutual economic interests both of the SADC member states and Congo. It even was a merit of South Africa that the riots in Congo lasting until its SADC membership could be stopped. But also new conflict lines within the SADC have been provoced by Congo's adoption. ⁵³

At this point of view, South Africa actually seems to strive for a new partnership-oriented role towards the SADC. Its policies of destabilsation, which have been conducted in the 1980s ⁵⁴ have now turned into hopeful cooperation efforts. Another issue, of course, is South Africa's relationship to come with the SACU countries. SACU policies always have been dictated by South Africa, which had a protectionist attitude towards the SACU countries. / ⁵⁵ - South Africa, whose exports were dependend on the SACU market due to its sanctions in the Apartheid era, kept its customs on a high level towards those countries. ⁵⁶ - So the trade exchange between South Africa and the SACU countries never have been fair in terms of harmonized customs, so regarding the time to come, it is up to South Africa's SACU policies, if economic gaps in the SACU region will be widened.

3.3 First conclusions: Cooporation but no equality

All those hints we have found in the first three chapters point out that South Africa does have a potential to provide more security for the region by political as well as by economic means. South Africa is not being accused by the world community due to apartheid any more. ⁵⁷ - Even the end of the Cold War changed South Africa's global position. Its SADC membership brought a responsibilty for the whole region to South Africa as the only hegemonial power in the region.

Nevertheless, South Africa efforts to regional cooperation still seem to struggle with the impacts of the apartheid era. As mentioned before, the transformation from the apartheid up to a democratic system mainly ocurred on a political level, whereas the matter of racial disparities still is an unsolved issue. The next chapter will refer to this problem.

As Peter Meyns underlines, that economic gap between South Africa and the rest of the region is, together with the unipolar system of dependences and interdependences, a historical as well as a post-apartheid phenomenon. ⁵⁸ - Even more important appears South Africa's integrating function as a mediator between the SACU member states in order to help preventing or at least to decrease sources of conflicts in the region.

The principles of a regional peaceful cooperation initiated by Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki's term of the "African Renaissance" ⁵⁹ make understand that South Africa's foreign policies now focus on an economic, social and cultural improvement for the benefit of the whole continent. These objectives seem to be wishful thinking rather than a realistic programme, which can be conducted within the next decades due to following primacies:

1) - The disparities among the South African will not decrease under a dominating South Africa. Dependences focus the intra-regional trade between the SACU countries and South Africa.
2) - As history shows, South Africa always has pursued its own economic interests rather than a regional integration. This trend also may also be pursued in the Post-Apartheid times.
3) - The legacies of apartheid challenge South Africa in many ways and may be a factor of instability for the whole region.

It is obvious that the first two aspects do indicate the quality of a regional cooperation's potencial by South Africa. But the third point yet has been neglected in this work and therefore needs to be discussed, in order to find an answer to the question: What kind of a regional cooperation may be possible, in how far do interior conflicts in South Africa diminish its integrating potential?

4. Conflicts in South Africa:The burden of unemployment, poverty, AIDS and migration

4.1 Facts about unemployment in South Africa

As in barely no other social sector, South Africa's racial disparities appear as obviously as they do in the the labour market. And a spectacular unemployment rate shows impressively that many conflicts dating from apartheid times are still lasting and yet are unsolved.

The total unemployment rate of March 2004 in South Africa is 27.8 per cent, which is a slight reduction towards 2003 with 28.4 per cent. ⁶⁰

But behind these figures, great regional and racial disparities are hidden. The highest unemployment rate with more than 30 per cent in 2004 ocurred in the regions of Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal , whereas the Western Cape province shows the lowest one where the unemployment rate fell from 20.7 per cent in 2003 to 16.9 per cent in 2004 ⁶¹. - It is significant that the highest unemployment occurs in the former Homelands as well as in the rural townships with particular unemployment rates of about up to 50 per cent and more. ⁶² - These figures show that unemployment and poverty mainly concern black and coloured people who rarely receive job trainings. ⁶³

The unemployment figures referring to population groups and gender aspects also provided by Stats SA allow to understand that the unemployment rate among Africans is the highest among the four South African population groups (29.2 per ecnt of the black males in March 2004). The rate among white males was 3.8 per cent at the same time with the largest gap towards the other groups. Another result of that publication is that the women's unemployment rate exceeded that of men in each population group. In the case of black females, the unemployment rate was even rising between March, 2003 and March, 2004. They also have got the largest unemployment rate gap towards the males of their population group at around 8 per cent. ⁶⁴ - So, African black females constitute the most disadvantaged population group within South Africa referring to its employment opportunities. Regarding their disastrous employment situation, South Africa's challenge to compensate employment disparities may require more efforts by its employment policies then ever before.

4.2 An inefficient labour market

4.2.1 The limits of economic growth: Too much workforce, but a lack of talents

The South African labour market is at least confonted with two factors which can make the unemployment crisis increase:

- 1) The growing workforce in South Africa 64 with a large amount of black untrained youths. ⁶⁵
- 2) The declining absorptive capacity of the South African economy. ⁶⁶

Both factors can be easily proven by statistical figures:

In 1995, only 56 per cent of South Africa's economically active population were employed in the formal sector. This contrasts with the 74.3 per cent employed in the 1960's and illustrates the magnitude of the current economc instability to cater for the annual increases in the labour force. In the early 1960's, more than 90 per cent of new entrants into the labour market could find employment in the formal sector. In the 1970's this figure fell just to over 60 per cent. At the beginning of the 1980's it has dropped to 19.4 per cent and at the beginning of the 1990's it finally was 8.5 per cent. ⁶⁷

Not considering at this point that the South African labour market is divided into a formal and an informal sector which is not published by official statistics, the question is why people get less facilities to enter the formal sector. Bernd WIese considers an economic crisis in the 1980s as one of the reasons, why employment has been reduced in the mining, agricultural and in the industrial sector, and land flight has been increased in regions with lacking employment opportunities. ⁶⁸. Generally spoken, the rural areas of the old homelands are over-populated as well as over-saturated in terms of labour supply. Outside the old homelands, commercial farming has become less and less labour intensive. ⁶⁹ - In the case of the mining sector (which also contributes most of South Africa's GDP ) the downturn in employment has been caused by low gold prices since 1986. ⁷⁰ Christian Rogerson, in contrast, regards a couple of reasons resposible for South Africa's weak employment performance:

These range from the negative impacts of macroeconomic strategies on employment creation to political complications, labour market inefficiencies, the action of trade unions, low productivity of capital and labour, high poulation growth rates, lack of skill among a large segment of the population, sanctions and capital flight, and institutional factors such as the overregulation of the economy. At the heart of the problem is, however, the falling rate of national economic growth since the mid-1960's (...). ⁷¹

Concerning the workforce skills, Stats SA underlines that there were about 500,000 skilled vacancies at any time, and these were to be filled by about four additional but less skilled jobs which would be created for each new skilled worker. In contrast, only 1 per cent of current job seekers have received training as means to find a job. ⁷² - So, the majority of the South African workforce which is not sufficiently skilled for the requirements of many companies, cannot occupy the vacant jobs. Instead, unemployed oftenly are compelled to look for an employment opportunity within the informal sector.

4.2.2 The informal sector: Chances and dilemmas

The informal sector is obviously a phenomenon which has much to do with the rising poverty in Southern Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. Poverty is defined by the World Bank as "the inability to obtain a minimal standard of living", given that poors can be employed as well as unemployed people. ⁷³ - Levin states, that a lack of opportunity, a lack of education and a lack of exposure to the labour market characterize the poor. - ⁷⁴

Even in the case of South Africa, factors such as a lack of "physical infrastructure" in urbanizing areas, like health care, clean water and sanitation facilities, limit living conditions and employment opportunities to the poor. ⁷⁵ - A source of local conflict is, as experiences show, that rural black communities suffer from poor productivity and from a lack of continuity at decision-making and often from weak management of development resources. Therefore, a rapid improvement of the poors' situation becomes less and less realistic. ⁷⁶

The concept of the informal sector is that the modern (particulary manufacturing) sector is not able to absorb the growing supply of labour in developing countries. Finding opportunities outside the modern sector, therefore, had to be found in order to ensure survival. ⁷⁷

As mentioned before, the growth of the informal sector is fraught by the problem of definition, as informal economy is not included in the official statistics. Consequently, all figures referring to the workforce involved in the informal sector only can be estimated more or less precisely. According to estimations, the share of South Africa's employed in the informal sector increased from 30 per cent in the 1960s up to 50 per cent in 1990. ⁷⁸ - By absolute numbers, people engaged in informal economic activities could have been estimated to between three and five million in the early 1990s with blacks the overwhelming majority in racial composition. ⁷⁹ - Levin states that the growing share of the informal sector has been the result of the poor overall performance in both the jobs' and incomes' fronts of the formal sector. ⁸⁰ - In contrast, an increasing performance of the formal sector would cause a growing job market and a decline of the informal sector.

Even if the informal economy is a product of a widespread poverty and of the inability of many people to enter the formal sector's labour market, its increase may be considered positive and benefitial for the poor, according to some authors:

Informal, small businesses help poor "provide with cheap clothing, shoes, furniture and so on". ⁸¹

Policies seem to have acknowledged the importance of the informal sector, even if it is "not suitable for use as engine of growth for the economy at large". ⁸² One reason certainly is that legislative deregulation processes provoce a complex small-business development with a diminishing structural differentiation between formal and informal enerprises. ⁸³ - Besides its crime-preventing and safety-providing effects, Levin additionally regards the informal sector as an opportunity of self-employment which finally gives chances to enter the formal sector. ⁸⁴

4.2.3 Impacts on the labour market by AIDS and migration

Another conflict distressing the South African labour market is migration. As we have stated before, migration is a historical and traditional phenomeno in Southern Africa: Its conflict potencial has dramatically increased since the end of apartheid and is today and has become a special burden concerning the relationship between South Africa and its neighbouring countries as this quotation says:

"Conflict generally arises where there is a scarcity of resources. In South Africa, a third of the adult population is unemployed. In this situation, people want to blame somebody or something. In the past, it was easy to target the apartheid state as the source of one's misery. With the advent of a democratic government - foreigners have become scapegoats". ⁸⁵

However, rising agressions against immigrants even could not stop the large number of refugees coming to South Africa. As with the number of people involved in the informal sector, it is virtually impossible to know how many undocumented migrants have arrived South Africa nor where they have come from. The figures most often cited by the South African state amounts to four to eight millions in the country at any one time, but this rate may be an exaggeration. ⁸⁶

Regarding its disastrous labour market situation, South Africa's government had passed a Refugee Act in 1998, which prohibits immigrants without a refugee status to take any kind of employment in South Africa. ⁸⁷ The passing of that act followed controversial discussions,but it nevertheless has beenit is being regarded as a positive instrument for selecting skilled immigrants as well as for keeping the contract labour system on a status quo, favouring the interests of the mine companies. ⁸⁸ The act also can be understood as a reaction to the high emigration rates of young skilled South African citizens, being compelled by a high state of uncertainity, in view of an annual increasing rate of 20-25 per cent (referring to inofficial estimations cited by Ahmad Aly, p. 29).

Concerning the impacts by HIV/AIDS on the workforce, projections by the University of Stellenbosch draw a disastrous development:

As a result of HIV/AIDS the labour force could be 3.9 million smaller in 2015 than in a no-AIDS scenario, but still marginally larger than in 2000. The epidemic could, therefore, for all the wrong reasons, alleviate to some extent South Africa's unemployment crisis. However, this will be outweighted by the overwhelmingly negative effect of a prevalence of HIV/AIDS among especially skilled and highly skilled members of the workforce. By 2015 a quarter of the skilled workforce could be HIV positive, along with just over 18 per cent of the highly skilled workforce. ⁸⁹ These figures underline that HIV can easily be transmitted to all groups of population in South Africa.

So, apart from the fact that the impacts of a widespread HIV epidemic do affect all social aspects in a negative way, the situation of the South African labour market inevitably will become even worse by a dramatic loss of skilled workers with regard to the decades coming.

4.3 Macro-economic strategies to diminish disequilibria

In view of those those negative tendencies in its labour market, the plans of the South African government to reduce unemployment appear too euphoric: According to the 2002 statements by Mr Max Isulu, head of the party's economic transformation committee, the African National Congress (ANC) wants to cut South Africa's joblessness rate by half within twelve years. The ANC's vision of halving the rate of unemployment by 2014 was achieveable. ⁹⁰

Other projections say that unemployment rate might be reduced to a "normal level" of about 2 per cent only by the year of 2020. ⁹¹ These projections which mainly affect South Africa's young generation negatively, refer to reports of low economic growth, slightly sinking exports and a stagnating formal labour market. ⁹² Facing these projections and the consequences of globalisation on South Africa's economy, the ANC resolved at its 51st national conference in December 2002 to 'deal with the effect of unemployment through a comprehensive public works programme linked to urban renewal and the integrated rural development strategy'. ⁹³

This programme is supposed to realize some of the central aims of the ANC's economic policy to mould a strong, dynamic and balanced economy that is directed towards, inter alia, eliminating the legacies of apartheid poverty and inequality, democratizing the economy, creating poductive work opportunities for all South Africans at a living wage, initiating growth to improve the quality of life especially for the poor and fostering a 'balanced' regional economy. ⁹⁴

The key sectors being focussed by the so-called 'Long-Term Economic Restructuring Programme' which already has been initiated by the ANC in 1993, are agriculture and industry. ⁹⁵ - Poverty, maldistribution of land and unemployment are expected to be reduced by land reforms as well as by creating more job opportunities in the rural areas. ⁹⁶ - In contrast, the focus in the industrial sector lies on an improvement of its international competitiveness of the exporting manufacturers, p.e. by flexibilizing production, and on boosting black business. ⁹⁷

Another strategy on a local level is the so-called 'South Africa local economic development' (LED). ⁹⁸ There are some definitions of this instrument, but generally spoken, it is a process, by which local government and/or community-based groups manage their existing resources and enter into new partnership arrangements with the private sector, or with each other, to create new jobs and stimulate economic activity in a well defined economic zone. ⁹⁹

In so far, LED can be regarded as a result of administrive and fiscal decentralisation processes in South Africa to a sub-national sphere, though South Afica's legislative aims on decentralisation. The smallest LED units are municipalities, led by so-called 'local governments', which might benefit by LED strategies such as growing business sectors in their areas and strengthen their competitiveness towards other areas. ¹⁰⁰ - Naudé emphasizes that the future of regional development might depend on the performance of the new system of local government. ¹⁰¹ - Especially in the case of black communities, a successful LED could be a key to more employment and to better life conditions, as communal financial resources may be managed more efficiently.

However, no employment programme conducted by the public policies can work without some given conditions we have mentioned before. ¹⁰² - Instead, macroeconomic policies need to be supplemented with strategies to promote employment creation and eventually draw more people into the mainstream of economic activity. ¹⁰³ - Therefore, Levin points out three objectives to be pursued by South Africa which flow into some employment growth, namely recovering the overseas markets lost by sanctions in the Smith apartheid regime, finding new export markets and adding labour value in order to export more goods in a intermediary or final form. ¹⁰⁴

5. Findings: In how far can South Africa contribute to a peaceful regional development?

Altogether, South Africa's policies obviously focus their efforts to strengthen the private sector especially on local levels. This can be regarded as a relatively effective mean to diminish conflicts. Respecting the informal sector as a way for the unskilled poor to have an employment opportunity, policies may help disadvantaged population groups to improve their life conditions. So, interior conflicts and social inequalities provoced by apartheid are still a grave burden but recent economic and administrative reforms may be a hopeful step ahead. As in most cases, future will show if South Africa really moves towards a "positive peace" as we have mentioned in the beginning.

In contrast, there is no evidence that the established system of economic dependences in Southern Africa might change in terms of a balanced regional trade. In addition, Peter Meyns stresses that the market of the region is limited for South African exports and that South Africa itself might not be able to provide a regionwide growth. ¹⁰⁵ - Ahmad Aly, in contrast, underlines that subregional integration must be conducted by the regional private sector rather than by governments which tend to fail with their integration efforts. ¹⁰⁶ - Simultaneously, he has no doubt that South Africa's economy is strong enough for a regional cooperation leadership, however, it would be a matter of survival for the small countries as well as that of mutual benefits. ¹⁰⁷

In economic terms, South Africa has obviously become a regional hegemony, which has got a potencial for successful regional integration whereas hopefully, apartheid legacies do barely have any relevance. However, its challenge is to integrate the LDC countries in the same way as the other countries of the region and to provide a fair integration.

But yet, South Africa's lasting conflicts considerably do concern the smaller states due to their dependences. The new deal with immigrants arriving in South Africa, along with resentments by its people, can make new conflicts arise. For example, as we have found out, some countries' economic growths obviously depend on labour migrants being transferred to South Africa. ¹⁰⁸ - So, South Africa's policy does have enormous impacts on the economic and social situation of those countries which Meyns calls "spillover effects". ¹⁰⁹ - Regarding the issues of HIV/AIDS, unemployment, poverty, migration and other conflicts we have not treated in this work, all countries are being affected mutually, and even South Africa has trouble to liberate itself from these burdens. All these factors are barriers against a peaceful regional development and need to be implemented into the regional cooperation's strategies. Maybe, there are some positive "spillover effects" in the region if South Africa really succeeds in fighting its interior conflicts and disequilibria.

Even if there might be evidences that "the new South Africa is as unwilling a regional partner as was the old South Africa" ¹¹⁰, some authors, such as Ahmad Aly, share the opinion that South Africa's leading cooperation role is a kind of mission resulted by the end of apartheid. The establishment of a new democratic South Africa has become possible in so far as the leaders believed in common and mostly Christian values. According to their responsibilities to destinate Southern Africa's peaceful future at a large extent, South Africa's policies should keep on beholding their importance for the region.

5.2 Nachspann

"All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others".

In diese widersprüchliche Kurzformel hat Georg Orwell 1945 in seiner "Animal Farm" das Phänomen der sozialen Ungleichheit in der modernen Gesellschaft gebracht.

Eine Fülle von Kulturen trägt der südafrikanische Boden, aber unter ihnen sind einige wenige dominierende Kräfte, die sich weitgehend ungehindert entfalten konnten: Die Herrschaftskulturen der Nachkommen der weißen (überwiegend britischen und niederländischen) Siedler.

Im Laufe der letzten Jahrhunderte überlagerte mit dem zunehmend angelsächsischen Einfluss die anglikanische Variante des Christentums die bis dahin in Südafrika lebendigen Naturreligionen. Auffallender als in anderen Teilen der christlich- abendländischen Welt sind es in der Tendenz die angelsächsisch geprägten Staaten wie insbesondere die U.S.A., deren offiziöse politische Kultur sich augenscheinlich in einem Feld bewegt, das zwischen Bibeltreue und göttlichem Missionsgedanken, Weltbeglückungsstreben und ausgeprägtem Nationalbewusstsein angesiedelt ist.

So ist es zu verstehen, dass sich das Konzept eines sanften Hegemon, wie es das Südafrika der Post-Apartheid-Ära pflegt, vorzugsweise in neutestamentarischen Bildern ausdrückt.

Eines dieser Bilder ist das bekannte biblische Gleichnis vom guten Hirten in Bezug auf seine Schafe: Die Vorstellung eines Heilsbringers versinnbildlicht für die Regierenden etwas von ihrem Selbstverständnis in Bezug auf hegemoniales Verantwortungsbewusstsein, das Südafrika gegenüber seinen Nachbarstaaten idealerweise anstreben möchte – ein geradezu charismatisch wirkender Auftrag:

"I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. The hired hand is not the shepherd who owns the sheep. So when he sees the wolf coming, he abandons the sheep and runs away. Then the wolf attacks the flock and scatters it. The man runs away because he is a hired hand and cares nothing for the sheep.

"I am the good shepherd; I know my sheep and my sheep know me – just as the Father knows me and I know the Father – and I lay down my life for the sheep. I have other sheep that are not of this sheep pen. I must bring them also. They too will listen to my voice, and there shall be one flock and one shepherd. The reason my Father loves me is that I lay down my life – only to take it up again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have authority to lay it down and authority to take it up again. This command I received from my Father.”

(John 10 / New International Version ; Quelle: www.av1611.org/niv.html , letzter Zugriff am 06.03.05 )

"DARAUF SPRACH JESUS ZU IHNEN:...ICH BIN DER GUTE HIRTE. DER GUTE HIRTE SETZT SEIN LEBEN FÜR SEINE SCHAFE EIN. DER MIETLING ABER, DER KEIN HIRT IST UND DEM DIE SCHAFE NICHT GEHÖREN, SIEHT, WIE DER WOLF KOMMT; ER LÄSST DIE SCHAFE IM STICH UND ENTFLIEHT...ICH BIN DER GUTE HIRTE; ICH KENNE DIE MEINEN UND DIE MEINEN KENNEN MICH, WIE MICH DER VATER KENNT UND ICH DEN VATER KENNE. ICH SETZE MEIN LEBEN EIN FÜR DIE SCHAFE. ICH HABE NOCH ANDERE SCHAFE, DIE NICHT AUS DIESEM SCHAFSTALL SIND. AUCH DIESE MUSS ICH FÜHREN; SIE WERDEN MEINE STIMME HÖREN, DANN WIRD ES EINE HERDE UND EIN HIRTE SEIN. ...DAS IST DER AUFTRAG, DEN ICH VON MEINEM VATER ERHALTEN HABE." (Johannes 10, 7-19)

Ob das Land am Kap der Guten Hoffnung gegenüber der Vielzahl der ihm angegliederten Volksgruppen (Multilateralität) und angesichts der großen globalen Probleme und Herausforderungen, denen auch Südafrika seit Beginn des Massenzeitalters sich zu stellen hat, jemals dieses geradezu archaische Versprechen einzulösen vermag?

6. Annex

Literatur

- Aly, Ahmad A H M (1997): Post-apartheid South Africa: The implications of regional cooperation in Africa, in: Less, Madeleine (Hrsg.) (1997): Africa Insight, vol 27 no 1, 1997, S. 24 ff.
- Crush, Jonathan (2003): South Africa: New Nation, New Migration Policy?, Washington. abrufbar unter http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=131, letzter Zugriff am 6.3.2005.
- Levin, M. (1995): The (urban) poor and Employment creation. In: Less, Madeline (Hrsg.) (1995): Africa Insight.An independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa. Vol 25, No.3, Pretoria. S. 172 ff.
- Meyns, Peter (2000): Konflikt und Entwicklung im Südlichen Afrika. In: Grundwissen Politik, Bd. 27, Opladen. Möllers, Hein (2003): SADCC: Southern African Development Coordination Conference - 1980-1992, abrufbar unter www.issa.rg/laender. Letzter Zugriff am 18.02.2005.
- Naude, B W (2003): Local government transformation in South Africa: Challenges for local economic development in a globalising economy. In: Less, Madeleine (Hrsg.) (2003): Africa Insight. Vol. 33, no. 3., Johannesburg. S. 50.
- Rogerson, Christian M. (1995): The Employment Challenge in a Democratic South Africa. In: Lemon, Anthony (Hrsg.) (1995): The Geography of Change in South Africa, Chichester.
- South African Institute of Race Relations (Hrsg.) (2003): South Africa Survey 2002/2003, Johannesburg.
- Sturmfall, Florian (1987): Südafrika - Land zwischen Sturm und Stille, München.
- Wiese, Bernd (1999): Südafrika mit Lesotho und Swasiland. Stuttgart.
- Wischnewski, Hans-Jürgen (Hrsg.) (1996): Afrika. Von Kairo bis Kapstadt. 4. Aufl., Stuttgart.
- Vale, Peter/ Natlosa, Khebele (1996): Beyond and Below: The Future of the Nation-State in Southern Africa, Belvelle.

Fußnoten

[...]

---

¹ Vale und Khabele 1996, S.380.

² aus: Meyns 1999, S. 93.

³ Sturmfall, S.19.

⁴ Vale und Khabele 1996, S 66.

⁵ vgl. Meyns, S. 95.

⁶ vgl. Länderprofile auf www.issa.org, letzter Zugriff am 16.02.2005

⁷ Quelle: Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung, Weltbevölkerung 1997.

⁸ Quelle: http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/default.asp, letzter Zugriff am 16.02.2005

⁹ vgl Meyns, S.111.

¹⁰ vgl. Meyns, S.112.

¹¹ Wischnewski S. 55.

¹² vgl. Länderinfos auf www.issa.org, letzter Zugriff am 16.02.2005.

¹³ vgl Meyns, S. 113.

¹⁴ vgl. Aly, S. 24.

¹⁵ vgl. Meyns, S.114.

¹⁶ vgl Meyns, S.116.

¹⁷ vgl Wischnewski, S. 378.

¹⁸ vgl Wischnewski, S. 196.

¹⁹ Meyns, S. 114.

²⁰ vgl. Meyns, S. 119.

²¹ Quelle:Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/TMLGO6,4,0,Aktuelle_Aspekte_der_EUEntwicklungspolitik.html, letzter Zugriff am 17.02.05.

²² Aly S. 26.

²³ vgl. Aly, S. 27.

²⁴ Quelle: SADC, http://www.sadcreview.com/sadc/frsadc.htm, letzter Zugriff am 18.02.2005.

²⁵ vgl. Aly S. 26.

²⁶ vgl. Möllers.

²⁷ vgl Meyns, S. 108. Vgl. auch Sturmfall, S. 19: "Südafrikas Wirtschaftskraft kommt nicht nur der eigenen Bevölkerung, sondern auch den Staaten zugute, die dem Land am Kap der Guten Hoffnung den erbitterten Kampf angesagt haben. Zimbabwe, das ehemalige Rhodesien, das - einst ein blühendes Staatswesen - seit der Machtübernahme durch den Marxisten Mugabe von einer Krise in die andere stolpert, wickelt 95 Prozent seiner Exporte nach Übersee über die Schienenwege und Häfen Südafrikas ab. Bei den Importen verhält es sich ähnlich. Was Simbabwe an Erdöl braucht, kommt aus Südafrika, dass auch in entscheidendem Masse das Eisenbahnnetz ausrüstet. Die Telefone in Harare und Balawayo sind in die Wahl- und Relaisstationen von Johannesburg eingegliedert."

²⁸ vgl. Möllers.

²⁹ vgl. SADC.

³⁰ vgl Möllers.

³¹ Quelle: SADC

³² vgl. Möllers.

³³ vgl. Möllers: Ein Problem, vor das sich die SADC in den kommenden Jahren gestellt sieht, resultiert aus dem Cotonou-Abkommen. Dieser Vertrag zwischen der EU und den Staaten Afrikas, des Pazifik und der Karibik (AKP) hat den seit 1975 bestehenden Lomé-Vertrag abgelöst. Das Cotonou-Abkommen sieht im Grundsatz nur reziproken Marktzugang vor, d.h. die AKP-Staaten müssen ihre Zölle und sonstigen Handelsbarrieren im gleichen Maße abbauen wie die EU. Ein nicht-reziproker Marktzugang ist ausschließlich den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern (LDC) vorbehalten. Alle anderen sollen in regionalen Wirtschaftspartnerschaften (Repa) mit der EU Handelserleichterungen auf Gegenseitigkeit vereinbaren, wie es bereits der Freihandelsvertrag der EU mit Südafrika vorsieht.

³⁴ vgl. Meyns, S. 111.

³⁵ vgl. Meyns, S. 99.

³⁶ vgl ebd.

³⁷ Quelle: DTV (1990): dtv Lexikon, Band 3, München. S. 141

³⁸ vgl. Meyns S. 99: Als Autor wird hier auch Samir Adin zitiert, der ein südliches "Afrika der Arbeitsreservate" einem "Afrika des Handels" gegenüberstellt.

³⁹ vgl. Crush.

⁴⁰ vgl. auch Crush: Commercial farmers also relied heavily on outside labor, much of it clandestine. Migrants crossing borders illegally were channeled to commercial farms by the apartheid state. While South Africa's apartheid system generated many refugees, it was not until the 1980s that South Africa itself became a mass recipient when over 300,000 Mozambicans fled the civil war in that country and settled in South Africa. Most of these refugees were subsequently integrated into local communities.

⁴¹ vgl Meyns, S. 101.

⁴² vgl. ebd.

⁴³ vgl. Wischnewski S. 196: Im Fall Lesothos seien demnach 40 Prozent aller Männer Wanderarbeiter und von ihren Lohnüberweisungen bestreiten viele Familien daheim ihren Lebensunterhalt.

⁴⁴ vg. Sturmfall, S. 20.

⁴⁵ vgl. Aly, S. 27: Exceeding $120 billion in 1994, South Africa's GDP accounts for one third of Africa's total GDP. Im Vergleich mit der Region stellt der Autor fest: The total GDP of all the countries in Southern Africa represents barely one fifth of South Africa's GDP.

⁴⁶ Aly, S. 28.

⁴⁷ Quelle: Naude, S. 50.:

⁴⁸ vgl Aly, S. 28.

⁴⁹ vgl Aly, S. 29.

⁵⁰ vgl. Möllers.

⁵¹ vgl ebd.

⁵² vgl. Aly S. 29.

⁵³ vgl. Möllers.

⁵⁴ vgl. Meyns, S. 109.

⁵⁵ vgl. Meyns, S. 118.

⁵⁶ vgl. Meyns, S. 119.

⁵⁷ vgl. auch Sturmfall: Demnach wurde auch Südafrika von denjenigen Ländern an den Pranger gestellt, die ihren eigenen Bürger weit weniger Freiheiten gewährten als Pretoria den Schwarzen.

⁵⁸ vgl. Meyns, S. 95.

⁵⁹ vgl. Möllers.

⁶⁰ Alle offiziellen statistischen Erhebungen zu Südafrika sind nachzulesen bei "Stats South Africa" unter www.statssa.gov.za. Zur Definition der Arbeitslosigkeit heisst es: „Stats SA defines the unemployed as those in the economically active poulation who: - have not worked during the last seven days prior to being interviewed; - work to work, and are available to start work within a week of interview by Stats SA; and - have taken active steps to look for work or to provide themselves with self-employment in the four weeks proceeding the interview“.

⁶¹ vgl. ebd.

⁶² vgl. Wiese, S. 109.

⁶³ vgl. ebd.

⁶⁴ vgl. Rogerson, S. 171: Demnach wachse die Arbeitskraft in Südafrika um etwa 2,7 Prozent jährlich. Weiter heißt es, dass die schwarze Bevölkerung fast 85 Prozent aller Arbeitslosen in Südafrika ausmache. Die Arbeitslosigkeit unter Frauen und Jugendlichen sei nahezu doppelt so hoch wie die der Männer und der älteren Arbeitnehmer.

⁶⁵ vgl. Wiese, S. 109.

⁶⁶ Rogerson, S. 173.

⁶⁷ Levin, S. 172. Hier sei aber angemerkt, dass Statistiken bis in die 90er Jahre hinein nur für die von dem Apartheidsregime anerkannten "weißen Südafrika" ohne die ehemaligen Homelands galten. Desweiteren kann von unterschiedlichen Definitionen von "unemployment" ausgegangen werden, weil Arbeitslose oftmals als solche nicht eindeutig identifizierbar sind, vgl. auch Levin, S. 173. Ein solcher Vergleich ist also grundsätzlich mit Vorsicht zu betrachten.

⁶⁸ vgl. Wiese, S. 109.

⁶⁹ vgl. Levin, S. 173

⁷⁰ vgl. Wiese, S. 109.

⁷¹ vgl. Rogerson, S. 175.

⁷² vgl. South African Institute for Race Relations, S. 211.

⁷³ vgl. Levin, S. 173.

⁷⁴ vgl. Levin, S. 174.

⁷⁵ vgl. Levin, S. 175.

⁷⁶ vgl. Rogerson, S. 176.

⁷⁷ Levin, S. 175.

⁷⁸ vgl. Wiese, S. 109.

⁷⁷ vgl. Rogerson, S. 177.

⁸⁰ vgl. Levin, S. 175.

⁸¹ vgl. Rogerson, S. 180.

⁸² vgl. Levin, S. 175.

⁸³ vgl. Rogerson, S. 180.

⁸⁴ vgl. Levin, S. 175.

⁸⁵ Meyns, S. 123.

⁸⁶ Crush.

⁸⁷ vgl. ebd.

⁸⁸ vgl. ebd.

⁸⁹: Quelle: South African Institute for Race Relations, S. 211.

⁹⁰ vgl ebd.

⁹¹ SAMLAM, vgl. Wiese, S. 109.

⁹² vgl. Hofmeier, Ralf/Andreas Mehler (Hrsg.) (2002): Afrika-Jahrbuch 2002. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Afrika südlich der Sahara, Opladen. S. 354 ff.: Der Export, der in den vergangenen Jahren stark zulegen konnte, nahm auf Grund des Kursgewinns des Rand etwas ab. So gingen die Exporte von Gütern und Dienstleistungen im Jahre 2002 in konstanten Preisen von 1995 um 1,4 Prozent zurück (2001 R 167,523 Mio.: 2002 R 165,217 Mio.). Im Jahr 2001 war der Export noch um 2,5 Prozent gestiegen. Der Anstieg des Goldpreises auf über 300$ pro Feinunze konnte der Wirtschaft gewisse positive Impulse geben, da Südafrikas Exporterlöse immer noch um ca. 10-15 Prozent vom Gold bestimmt waren. Insgesamt hat sich aber der Bergbau nicht von seiner strukturellen Krise befreien können, denn das BIP des Bergbaus sank um 0.6 Prozent im Berichtsjahr. Hingegen wuchsen die Landwirtschaft und das Verarbeitende Gewerbe jeweils um 4 Prozent, der Transport und Kommunikationsbereich um 6,1 Prozent , der Handel um 2,5 Prozent und die Finanzdienstleistungen um 3,7 Prozent (Angaben in Marktpreisen von 2002): Die Beschäftigungssituation war angesichts der gesamtwirtschaftlich schwachen Wirtschaftswachstums weiterhin desolat. Zwar konnten im formellen Sektor einige Arbeitsplätze hinzu gewonnen werden (September 2002 gegenüber September 2001 + 21,935 ohne Landwirtschaft), doch insgesamt stieg die Arbeitslosigkeit auf einen neuen Höchststand (weit gefasste Definition: Februar 2002 / 40,9 Prozent gegenüber Februar 2001 / 37 Prozent ).

⁹³ vgl. South African Institute for Race Relations, S. 211.

⁹⁴ Rogerson, S. 183.

⁹⁵ vgl. Rogerson, S. 194.

⁹⁶ vgl. ebd.

⁹⁷ vgl. Rogerson, S. 197.

⁹⁸ vgl. Naude, S. 53.

⁹⁹ ebd.

¹⁰⁰ vgl. ebd.

¹⁰¹ vgl. Naude, S. 56.

¹⁰² vgl. auch Levin, S. 176: There is an almost universal acknowledgement that property functioning markets, appropriate education systems, public policies which encourage entrepreneurship and individual incentives, and effective but relatively limited government intervention are essential elements of an effective economy. These elements are equally important in both a supply-side and a demand-side approach in macroeconomic policy.

¹⁰³ ebd.

¹⁰⁴ vgl. ebd.

¹⁰⁵ vgl. Meyns, S. 120.

¹⁰⁶ vgl. Aly, S. 30.

¹⁰⁷ vgl. ebd.

¹⁰⁸ vgl. auch Meyns, S 122, wo Lesotho als ein solches Land exemplarisch dargestellt wird.

¹⁰⁹ Meyns, S. 112.

¹¹⁰ Meyns, S. 94.