This paper shows that it is quite unlikely that voters are able to express their true preferences sufficiently.
In the first part I assume a voter who is aware of his own true preferences. However, the electoral system offers an incentive to vote strategically. In such a situation the voter is aware that he doesn`t express what he favours most, but what he thinks he can support without wasting his vote. I will show that it is possible to limit the incentive for voting strategically either by the choice of the electoral system or by the abolishment of polls.
The second part shows first that it is quite unlikely that a voter is able to identify his true preferences, either because of Hume`s problem of Induction or because of complexity. Complexity is enhanced when Media comes into the game, because voters have to consider both the argument and those who created the argument.
Therefore it is necessary to show, that Media has an incentive to collude. If one assumes Media to collude it doesn`t explain why voters` preferences are shaped. Preferences are shaped either due to media`s creation of mutual beliefs or by persuasion. Persuasion refers to complexity, because it is rather difficult to consider additionally the interests of those who created a certain media product.
However, votes are expressed and aggregated. But whose or what preferences are that?
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Strategic Voting as intended falsification of voters` true preferences
2.1 A critique on Lijphart`s disproportionality measure
2.2 Incentives for Strategic Voting under different Electoral Systems
2.3 How to reveal voters` true preferences
2.3.1 How to design the electoral system
2.3.2 A lack of information for more sincere voting?
2.4 Conclusion
3 Media as Instrument for shaping voters` expressed preferences
3.1 Why voters cannot express their true preferences
3.1.1 Hume`s Problem of Induction
3.1.2 The paradox of voting
3.2 How Media shapes voters` expressed preferences
3.2.1 Why there is collusion
3.2.2 Shaping voters` expressed preferences
3.2.2.1 The Creation of mutual beliefs
3.2.2.2 Persuasion
3.3 Whose and What kind of preferences are expressed?
4 Conclusion
5 References
Research Objectives and Topics
This paper examines why it is highly improbable that voters can effectively express their true preferences through democratic elections. It explores systemic obstacles, specifically the influence of electoral systems, strategic voting incentives, and the shaping of expressed preferences by media and external interests.
- The impact of electoral systems on strategic voting and preference falsification.
- The influence of media and think tanks on the formation and shaping of voter opinions.
- Epistemological and structural barriers, such as Hume’s Problem of Induction and the paradox of voting.
- The relationship between wealth concentration and the ability to influence aggregated preferences.
Excerpt from the Book
3.1.1 Hume`s Problem of Induction
Hume`s problem of induction reveals for science that causation is something that exists in the mind: „The supposition that the future resembles the past is not founded on arguments of any kind but is derived entirely from habit by which we are determined to expect for the future the same train of objects to which we are accustomed … Even after the observation of the frequent conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inferences concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience ”36.
Transferred to the argument why voters cannot express their true preferences Hume`s problem of Induction tells, that the voter cannot be sure, that a party won`t move its left-right-position in the future. Voting for party A in 1990 might cause a very different policy than voting for party A in 2002. So, how can a voter be able to identify which party to for?
Another example is the decision whether to procure an insurance or not, assuming that no accident happened yet: There is a decision to make, but how can he know a priori whether it`s worthwhile or not. In fact, he cannot, so his decision cannot represent his true preference. Because all decisions are affected by Hume`s induction problem no decision represents one`s true preference. This is why I want to dismiss this point of view in order to enable voters to identify their true preferences and not to eliminate that possibility by philosophy of science. Nevertheless, this might justify the following assumption, namely that voters have a short term view, due to difficulties in communating long-run advantages and higher risks that these will be realized.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: This chapter outlines the paper's thesis that voters are unlikely to sufficiently express their true preferences due to both electoral systemic constraints and complex external information influences.
2 Strategic Voting as intended falsification of voters` true preferences: The author critiques existing disproportionality measures and argues that various electoral systems create strong incentives for voters to vote strategically rather than sincerely.
3 Media as Instrument for shaping voters` expressed preferences: This section investigates how media, through collusion, persuasion, and the creation of mutual beliefs, actively shapes the preferences that voters ultimately express at the ballot box.
4 Conclusion: The author summarizes that because votes are heavily influenced by strategic considerations and external media narratives, disproportionality alone is insufficient to evaluate the quality of a democracy.
5 References: Provides the comprehensive bibliography of the cited literature.
Keywords
Strategic Voting, Preference Falsification, Electoral Systems, Media Influence, Public Choice, Hume’s Problem of Induction, Paradox of Voting, Mutual Beliefs, Persuasion, Political Propaganda, Think Tanks, Democratic Legitimacy, Collective Action.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core argument of this work?
The core argument is that voters are largely unable to express their true preferences due to inherent strategic incentives in electoral systems and the manipulative influence of media and professional think tanks.
What are the primary thematic fields covered?
The paper focuses on political science, specifically social choice theory, electoral system design, media economics, and the influence of interest groups on political opinion formation.
What is the primary research goal?
The goal is to determine whether citizens can truly express their preferences in elections and to assess whether standard metrics, like disproportionality, are adequate indicators of democratic influence.
Which scientific methods are applied?
The paper utilizes analytical argumentation, game-theoretic models (such as Nash Equilibria and prisoner’s dilemma scenarios), and theoretical foundations from epistemology and political economy.
What topics are discussed in the main body?
The main body evaluates various voting systems (Plurality, Borda Count, STV/IRV), analyzes how media captures public opinion through collusion, and explores how think tanks and money influence the political agenda.
Which keywords characterize this work?
Key terms include strategic voting, media capture, preference aggregation, electoral systems, and the paradox of voting.
How does Hume’s Problem of Induction specifically affect voting behavior?
The author applies this philosophical concept to demonstrate that voters cannot predict the future behavior of political parties based on past performance, rendering a purely "sincere" vote difficult to identify.
What role do think tanks play in the author's analysis?
Think tanks are identified as professional creators of "causal stories" that can sway public opinion and manipulate expressed preferences to suit the interests of those who fund them.
Why does the author suggest that abolishing polls might not solve the problem of strategic voting?
The author argues that voters would likely develop stable expectations about others' preferences anyway, creating a "self-fulfilling" cycle similar to an eigenvalue, which would continue to encourage strategic voting behavior.
- Citation du texte
- André Heinze (Auteur), 2006, Difficulties in expressing voters` true preferences, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/116411
