An Integrated European Grand Strategy for the 21st century. A Seven Point Plan for a sustainable, peaceful and bright European future

Contents:

1. Recommended EU Strategy: An Integrated European Grand Strategy

2. Strategic Policy Options
2. a. The European Grand Strategy in further detail
2. b. hard power and confrontation: a deterrent European Army
2. c. emphasizing soft power: Global Gateway and Transatlanticism

3. Background
3. a. CSDP
3. b. Rise of China, Chinese Influence in the Global South and how to counter it
3. c. Hard and soft power according to Joseph Nye

Abstract:

This paper offers three grand strategy options for the European Union. Based on successful international cooperation and strategic autonomy, the central strategy option proposes an integrated seven-point-plan combining both hard and soft power to achieve a strong stance on the global stage to ensure a bright, peaceful and sustainable European future, both economically and ecologically as well as strategic independence in terms of peace and security.

1. Recommended EU Strategy: An Integrated European Grand Strategy

The recommended strategy is based on successful international cooperation and strategic autonomyⁱ, with a focus on security and defence cooperation.

Firstly, the EU has to continuously grow together. Internal conflicts around democracy, rule of law, human and people's rights and financing need to be resolved. Europe has to stand, think and act together to be able to act confidently and credibly outwards. State and societal resilience¹ need to be strengthened within the EU and with our partners to the south and east to be ready to take on the current challenges, sketched out below.

Secondly, the EU needs to strengthen multilateral ties and the political dialogue² with partners in NATO, OECD and beyond. When countering the threats linked to the rise in global influence of the People's Republic of China (PRC), it is essential to promote an integrated and well- coordinated approach based on both transatlantic cooperation and cooperation with partners in the Global South. The rise of Chinese influence on the African continent, for instance, constitutes a risk of losing access to a continent with enormous market opportunities, a rapidly growing young population and abundant resources.³ A common Africa strategy has to be elaborated and implemented. As China's direct financing, at first glance, comes with fewer conditions, a loss of Western influence and engagement result in a dramatic decline in stability, peace, and human rights.

Both economically and in terms of security, the EU relies on multilateral cooperation. The existing discussion fora shall be expanded and thoroughly deepened in order to strengthen ties and cooperation. In terms of military cooperation, the Parallel and Coordinated Exercises (PACE) project⁴ has shown that joint EU and NATO exercises and training have proved to be successful. This paper advises the continuation and expansion of such joint training programs.

Thirdly, the renewed European Grand Strategy shall answer one of the top priorities defined in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS): the security of the Union, meaning the addressing of security threats⁵. It is, therefore, necessary to ambitiously tackle the following security challenges: In the 2016 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence⁶ the HRVPⁱⁱ points out three crucial challenges, the EU has to answer in the form of The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)⁷. When properly executed together, the three objectives formulated in the 2016 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (IPSD) contribute to the security of the Union. Please find them below in Section 2.

The aspired effort of jointly countering hybrid threats by “fighting disinformation, [...] civil and medical preparedness and continued efforts on counter-terrorism and on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) issues”⁸ shall be continued.

Fourthly, the funding of the policies and their implementation shall be secured by utilizing the existing funds such as the European Defence Fund (EDF)⁹ and the off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF)¹⁰. A central issue in financing and funding is the lack of transparency and efficiency and the opacity due to several uncoordinated regulations. To ensure more transparent and efficient handling of these issues, this policy paper proposes a uniformization of financing and the creation of one single, comprehensive peace and defence fund.

Fifthly, global governance efforts should be prominently featured as well. Threats to liberal democracy, rule of law and human rights are on the rise as observers all over the world see a trend towards authoritarianism and democratic backsliding.¹¹ The EU should concentrate its efforts on preserving and protecting liberal democracies by strengthening civil societies, investing in political education, awareness and information globally and prioritizing democracies when it comes to trade and development, in accordance with the strategic autonomy approach mentioned below. This will render the coalition of liberal democracies stronger and more resilient toward attacks and threats of autocratic leaders and states. It is necessary to protect human rights and democracy, from a moral standpoint, but more importantly to reduce threats to the EU linked to radicalisation, illicit migration, drug and arms trafficking, terrorism and autocracy.

Sixthly, this plan proposes a unified European arms industry. National protectionist policies¹² render the industry cluttered, cause a myriad of different communication, weapon and transport systems and inhibit an efficient European arms industry and military cooperation. Exemplary projects such as the NH90 and Tiger helicopters as well as the A400M show that European cooperation in this realm is possible and successful.¹³

Seventhly, this strategy shall include programs of educational and cultural exchange, both internally and externally. This can include international collaborative research, students' and workers' exchanges, international cultural festivals, projects and more. Following Joseph Nye's reflectionsⁱⁱⁱ on hard and soft power, this paper follows the notion that hard power alone, as explained below, is insufficient when developing an integrated strategy. Adding further elements of soft power into the strategic portfolio will allow for common standards and values to be integrated and deepened allowing for a better intercultural understanding and international cooperation with the EU as a driving force taking on the challenges of this century.

As implementation is key, a joint strategic board, composed of foreign and defence ministers, EU executives, NATO professionals and independent contractors with professional and academic backgrounds, in charge of implementation shall be formed to coordinate and supervise the implementation process.

2. Strategic Policy Options

2.a. The European Grand Strategy in further detail

Reiterating the 2016 EU Global Strategy¹⁴ (EUGS), the European Union's foreign and security policy should move towards a grand strategy characterized by strategic autonomy in a rules- based international order encompassing answers to the most pressing questions around the “security of the Union, state and societal resilience and global governance for the 21st century”¹⁵ as well as “energy security, migration, climate change, violent extremism, and hybrid warfare”¹⁶. In order for the strategic autonomy to be fruitful and implemented properly, the EU needs to continue to grow together and think, act, and present itself as one. An emphasis, however, has to be put on international cooperation, because strategic autonomy should not mean neo-mercantilist isolation but rather thinking of Europe as a forerunner and pioneer with a confident appearance on the global stage that is well-founded on economic, military and diplomatic capability.

In the third recommended policy, the IPSD was introduced. The following three objectives are to be considered the EU top priorities:

(a) Responding to external conflicts and crises, ideally meaning “conflict prevention” and “promoting peace [...] within a rules-based order”¹⁷ in civilian missions but also including the possibility of military action, always respecting international law;
(b) Capacity building of partners, including CSDP missions “with tasks in training, advice and/or mentoring within the security sector”¹⁸ to contribute to sustainable stability in conflict regions “in synergy with [.] development”¹⁹ policy;
(c) Protecting the Union and its citizens²⁰ by contributing to the “protection and resilience of its networks and critical infrastructure, the security of its internal borders, [.] civil protection and disaster response, [.] countering hybrid threats, cyber security and the [prevention of] of terrorism and [.] people smuggling and trafficking” ²¹ within and outside the borders of the EU.

When it comes to why this strategy is recommended, it is important to stress that the author of this paper believes that prevention is better than cure. The policies introduced above are to be used to prevent bigger threats and challenges in the future. An effort for global governance, a resilient civil society, promoting human rights and opening access to education and better markets in regions of conflicts, for instance, will ensure a better standard of living and might establish not only the absence of violence and war but even positive peace, preventing future criminality, radicalisation and migration, which in turn will prevent the emergence of threats and challenges to Europe. Furthermore, this strategy aims to feature both hard and soft power and combine them to provide the most integrated approach possible allowing for the EU to use the best-suited means whenever necessary.

Strategic autonomy as a concept helps the EU to work on an independent basis to tackle and resolve issues in terms of collective security and foreign policy. The EU could selectively seek partners to address the aforementioned threats, challenges and issues, but work alone, if necessary.²² Thus, the EU would engage the international community, wherever needed, but keep the independence to set out strategic goals, define obstacles and map out tactics on how to resolve them. This has the potential to make strategic autonomy effective and powerful. The Carnegie Council suggests that EU member “states should coordinate their strategic interests collectively and lead individually where they are most competent.”²³

The author of this policy paper believes this newly gained independence to be crucial in the 21st century, as the reliability of transatlantic partners remains questionable, migratory developments require urgent attention and the rise of China opens up new challenges. Nevertheless, the EU should under no circumstance forget its basic principles and those who share them. Strategic autonomy opens up the possibility of deepening the cooperation to a certain degree with states that are systematically reducing basic freedoms and human rights. Whilst cooperation is necessary or the lesser evil in certain isolated cases, the overarching dogma should be to always play by the rules.

2.b. hard power and confrontation: a deterrent European Army

Contrary to the recommended strategy, option two is all about hard power and confrontation. This strategic option argues for the creation of a European Army to be able to project strength, for the EU to be able to autonomously defend itself and, if necessary, not shy away from entering into armed conflicts with potential adversaries.

A 2017 opinion poll shows that a respectable majority of EU citizens support the idea of a European Army.²⁴ The idea of a European army isn't new.²⁵ In the past, there have been various approaches to installing such an army. With the creation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the off-budget fund of the European Peace Facility (EPF), we are now closer than ever.²⁶ The EPF enables the EU to enter into conflict or military cooperation outside of Europe without having to align with the host countries or supranational institutions, such as the African Union (AU). In the past, military action in Africa was for the most part coordinated with the AU, there were provisions in the EU legislature to ensure that. The off-budget status of the EPF was chosen specifically to bypass those and for the first time in EU history allows the Union to even trade and finance arms to whoever, whenever²⁷ - even to incalculable warlords or erratic militias.

Together with a newly installed, heavily financed and well-equipped European Army, these provisions could enable a stronger appearance and better-founded presence on the global stage. Europe could keep pace militarily and take on the bigger powers, if necessary.

Whilst the idea of a confrontative European Army remains heavily discussed and seems tempting to some, the author of this paper would like to argue against that. Europe's strength for a long time has been and continues to be its soft power.²⁸ The overall trend in Europe does steer towards militarization and with the creation of the above-mentioned funding possibilities such as the EDF or EPF, the EU gives itself more possibilities for military engagement all over the world. Nevertheless, the author wants to stress that a sustainable security policy can and should not be functionally implemented without an integrated approach including soft power and the tools and policies included in the policy recommendation. Furthermore, this second option would by far constitute the most costly in the long term.

2.c. emphasizing soft power: Global Gateway and Transatlanticism

The third strategic option relies heavily on soft power and offers a non-military and non-violent approach, largely based on economic partnerships and development policy. Critics of an approach based on autonomy might argue that the EU alone will be unable to prevail. Observers point out that Europe should “play to its strengths, from sanctions and diplomacy to soft power.”²⁹ What the EU needs are states that can be considered partners or even friends.

To achieve this situation, the EU should turn towards the Global South. With the Global Gateway^iv, the European Commission has paved the way to do exactly that. Until 2027, around 300 billion Euros are to be allocated to invest in “values-driven, high-standard and transparent infrastructure partnership to meet global infrastructure development needs”.³⁰

This third strategic option is composed of the following components:

Violence and military force should be the last option, only to be used in the case of utter emergency. Diplomatic and peaceful cooperation shall be the creed of this policy recommendation. It is necessary to always find the least violent way to achieve the goals set out below.

The EU needs to counter Chinese influence in the Global South by providing an attractive development policy. To tackle the “the most pressing global challenges, from fighting climate change, to improving health systems, and boosting competitiveness and security of global supply chains”³¹, the EU shall provide a financing scheme that is attractive to state leaders interested in participating in the values-driven environment of the Global Gateway and beyond. By both using the abundant EU funds and activating the private investment sector, state leaders shall receive offers more attractive than Chinese investments. As laid out in Section 3., these investments might not interfere in internal policies but are binding states to take positions in favour of the PRC in matters of world politics. As the EU is interested in not losing votes and support in UN bodies such as the UNSC^v or when other decisions on a global scale are met, the EU needs to have these states on board.

This could be ensured using the Global Gateway strategy's economic and diplomatic options by providing good solutions for financing of infrastructure, health, climate and security, as a viable alternative to the Chinese financing, and the ensuring of a good standard of living of the populations.

Furthermore, this strategic option calls for revisited and strengthened transatlantic relations. “The EU-US-China [power] triangle must not be equilateral, as a neutrality would be naive and dangerous.”³² Whilst it remains arguable whether the EU is on the same level of power as China and the US, the EU and the US along with all NATO partners must deepen their cooperation to counter the Chinese rise of influence. Nevertheless, this policy recommendation focuses on development, economy and diplomatic cooperation and tries to avoid any unnecessary use of force or violence.

3. Background

3.a. CSDP

“The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.”³³

3.b. Rise of China, Chinese Influence in the Global South and how to counter it

A central challenge the EU is facing today is the evolution of China over the last decades. Whilst a major part of the Western World has long underestimated the People's Republic and regarded China as little more than the “world's factory”³⁴, merely a place with cheap labour cost to mass-produce the innovations of Western minds, the world's most populated country remained heavily underrated for a long time and evolved to become a leader in innovation and efficiency - economically, politically and in terms of technology. With an ambition no greater than the revival and extension of the legendarily fabled Silk Road, the PRC has embarked on the mission to connect markets, policy, trade, finance, and people: the belt and road initiative (BRI), as of the end of 2020 including a staggering 138 countries³⁵ in participation or with ties to the BRI. Contrary to the old Silk Road, the BRI is not limited to Asia, Europe, and Africa, but targets the entire global south, too. The latest Latin American example is Nicaragua whose act of cutting ties with Taiwan in December 2021 has been welcomed by spokesperson calling it the "right choice in line with the global trend"³⁶. This shows that China is not only on its way to becoming a quasi-hegemon in Asia but has global ambitions as well.

China now has become Africa's largest trading partner, when taking the entire continent into account.³⁷ By 2025, the Chinese Export-Import Bank aims to invest more than 1 trillion USD in Africa.³⁸ The Chinese model of not “interfering” in local politics is extremely successful in Africa, among democracies but even more so among de facto dictatorships. Unlike Western development programs, China does not expect state leaders to follow binding conditions on human rights and liberal democratic progress in exchange for funding.

Europe and the US, however, should not lose sight of the African continent. Besides an ever­growing population (in the next 30 years, the continent's population is expected to grow by almost 1 billion, leading to East and West African populations each exceeding that of Europe by 2050 ³⁹ ) and abundant natural resources, the market opportunities in Africa are enormous: “Consumer expenditure is expected to reach $2.1 trillion by 2025 and $2.5 trillion by 2030. The World Bank estimates that the African food market alone could be worth $1 trillion by 2030, more than tripling the current $300 million market”⁴⁰

Between 2021 and 2027, the EU aims to provide and antipode to Chinas strategy of making smaller or unallied countries dependent to China financially, economically, and politically: The Global Gateway.⁴¹ Until 2027, around 300 billion Euros are to be allocated to invest in “values- driven, high-standard and transparent infrastructure partnership to meet global infrastructure development needs”.⁴² Built upon the six principles to render the investments sustainable, secure, transparent and on eye-level, the EU wants to reach out to states in need of investment, interested in a sustainable partnership in a value-based community instead of being dependent on the embodiment of an unpredictable loan shark on state-level.

“The EU-US-China [power] triangle must not be equilateral, as a neutrality would be naive and dangerous”⁴³, argues Peter Beyer, the coordinator of Transatlantic Cooperation of the German Federal Foreign Office. He points out, how trust and the ability to cooperate are strategic advantages of democracies, saying that the EU should use these advantages to a much better effect. In the end, his argument shows, Western countries, together, are far better than China, in terms of economy alone.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the economic interdependencies with China cannot be left out of the picture.

3.c. Hard and soft power according to Joseph Nye

Joseph Nyes makes a distinction between hard and soft power, defining hard power as “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will.”⁴⁵ Hard power, therefore, heavily relies on coercion. Soft power on the other hand is defined by Nye as the ability to use cooperation instead of coercion by shaping other's preferences through appeal and attraction, for instance by approaching one another culturally, sharing political values and cooperating diplomatically.⁴⁶

Section 4. List of References

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¹: General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (2016): Council conclusions on implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence. Available online at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22459/eugs-conclusions-st14149en16.pdf

²: EEAS (2020): EU-NATO cooperation - fact sheet. p. 3. Available online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu nato factshee november-2020-v2.pdf

³: Tiboris, Michael (2019): Addressing China's Rising Influence in Africa. Chicago Council on Global Affairs. p. 2. Available online at: https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/report addressing-chinas- rising-influence-africa_20190521%20%281%29.pdf

⁴: EEAS (2020): EU-NATO cooperation - fact sheet. p. 3. Available online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu nato factshee november-2020-v2.pdf

⁵: Smith, Karen E. (2017) A European Union global strategy for a changing world? International Politics. ISSN 1384-574. p. 12

⁶: Council of the European Union and the HR/VP (2016): Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. p. 2. Available online at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22460/eugs- implementation-plan-st14392en16.pdf

⁷: EEAS (2021): The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Available online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en

⁸: EEAS (2020): EU-NATO cooperation - fact sheet. p. 2. Available online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eu_nato_factshee_november-2020-v2.pdf

⁹: Directorate-General for Defence Industry and space (2021): Factsheet: European Defence Fund. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/defence-industry-space/system/files/2021- 06/DEFIS%20_%20EDF%20Factsheet%20_%2030%20June%202021.pdf

¹⁰: Council of the European Union (2020): Council reaches a political agreement on the European Peace Facility. Available online at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/18/council-reaches-a- political-agreement-on-the-european-peace-facility

¹¹: see also: Bermeo, Nancy (2016): On Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy 27(1): pp. 5-19; Lührmann, Anna & Lindberg, Staffan (2019): A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?, in Democratization, DOI:10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029; Cassani, Andrea (2021) Autocratisation by Term Limits Manipulation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa Spectrum 2021, Vol. 55(3). pp. 228-250.

¹²: Bergstrom, Ola et al. (2008): ANTICIPATING RESTRUCTURING IN THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY. A study coordinated by BIPE. p. 40

¹³: ibid., p. 40

¹⁴: EEAS (2016): Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy. Available online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs review web 0.pdf

¹⁵: Smith, Karen E. (2017) A European Union global strategy for a changing world? International Politics. ISSN 1384-574. p. 12

¹⁶: EEAS (2018): A Global Strategy for the European Union - Overview. Available online at: A Global Strategy for the European Union - European External Action Service (europa.eu)

¹⁷: Council of the European Union and the HR/VP (2016): Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. p. 3. Available online at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/22460/eugs- implementation-plan-st14392en16.pdf

¹⁸: ibid., p. 3

¹⁹: ibid.

²⁰: ibid.

²¹: ibid.

²²: Vaské, Cameron (2018): Refining Strategic Autonomy: A Call for European Grand Strategy. Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. Available online at: https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics online/refining-strategic-autonomy-a- call-for-european-grand-strategy

²³: ibid.

²⁴: Miklus, Wilhelm (2021): The creation of the European Army. Conference on the Future of the European Union. Available online at: https://futureu.europa.eu/processes/EUInTheWorld/f/16/proposals/142?locale=en

²⁵: Shin, Francis (2021): Is the EU about to build its own military capacity? Atlantic Council. Available online at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-the-eu- about-to-build-its-own-military-capacity-thanks-to-germany-the-jurys-still-out/

²⁶: International Crisis Group (2021): How to Spend It: New EU Funding for African Peace and Security. Africa Report N°297. Edited by International Crisis Group. Available online at: https://d2071andviD0wi.cloudfront.net/297-eu-au-funding-2021.Ddf

²⁷: Gantenbein, Gian D. (2021): How the EPF Might Invigorate Germany's Ambitions in Africa. The European Peace Facility. A Controversial Off-Budget Fund With Major Policy Implications, München, GRIN Verlag, Available online at: https://www.grin.com/document/1022709

²⁸: Walt, Stephen M. (2021): Exactly How Helpless Is Europe? Foreign Policy. Available online at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/21/exactly-how-helpless-is-europe/

²⁹: Kuper, Simon (2021): Europe won't become a military power. What's more, it shouldn't. Financial Times. Available online at: https://www.ft.com/content/23b475f4-68eb-4f8e-9403- e7883deef510

³⁰: European Commission (2019): Global Gateway. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global- gateway en

³¹: ibid.

³²: Beyer, Peter (2021): Forging the new west. p. 32. In: Federal Foreign Office (2021): Forging the New West. Analyses and Essays on the Future of the Transatlantic Partnership.

³³: EEAS (2021): The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Available online at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en

³⁴: The Economist (2021): China is th e world's factory, more than ever, available online at: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/06/23/china-is-the-worlds-factory- more-than-ever

³⁵: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2021): Belt and Road initiative (BRI), available online at: https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html

³⁶: BBC News (2021): Nicaragua cuts ties with Taiwan in favour of Beijing, available online at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59574532

³⁷: Tiboris, Michael (2019): Addressing China's Rising Influence in Africa. Chicago Council on Global Affairs. p. 1. Available online at: https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/report addressing-chinas- rising-influence-africa_20190521%20%281%29.pdf

³⁸: Ibid., p. 2

³⁹: Paice, Edward (2022): By 2050 a quarter of the worlds people will be African, In The Guardian, available online at: https://www.theguardian.com/global- development/2022/jan/20/by-2050-a-quarter-of-the-worlds-people-will-be-african-this-will- shape-our-future

⁴⁰: Tiboris, Michael (2019): Addressing China's Rising Influence in Africa. Chicago Council on Global Affairs. p. 1. Available online at: https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/report_addressing-chinas- rising-influence-africa 20190521%20%281%29.pdf

⁴¹: European Commission (2019): Global Gateway. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global- gateway_en

⁴²: ibid.

⁴³ Beyer, Peter (2021): Forging the new west. p. 32. In: Federal Foreign Office (2021): Forging the New West. Analyses and Essays on the Future of the Transatlantic Partnership.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Nye, Joseph S. (2003): Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power. In: International Herald Tribune

⁴⁶ Nye, Joseph S. (2004): The Benefits of Soft Power. Available online at: https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/the-benefits-of-soft-power All sources have last been checked the 06/02/2022.

ⁱ See Section 3. for details

ⁱⁱ HRVP: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission, and Head of the European Defence Agency United Nations Security Council

ⁱⁱⁱ See Section 3.

^iv See Section 3.

^v United Nations Security Council