NATO, the Arctic and climate security: Strategic Concept for a global threat

NATO, the Arctic and climate security: Strategic Concept for a global threat

It is frequently said that “the world has changed” whenever big events (especially wars, though consequences of climate changes as floods and storms are to be considered nowadays) happen and we all have to adapt to the consequences provoked by those ugly situations. We are living a new moment in world history that saddens us all because it is happening within the European continent. But the truth is that the first quarter of the 21st century has not been of exception from other centuries in what concerns wars, tensions and conflicts around the world¹. Nonetheless, this dark episode in European and world history is waking up NATO from its “brain-death” as French President, Emmanuel Macron, stated back in 2019. While this reflection is being written, the 73rd anniversary is commemorated on 4th April and meetings are being held in Brussels (6th and 7th April 2022). The Washington Treaty 1949 created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after the Second World War to defend its members against the Soviet Union, which seemed to be the only threat at that time². The allies committed to keep and maintain democracy and the rule of law so that it would help them, and next members, to work collectively for defence and security through dialogue and cooperation with a specific goal: to live in peace. Since then, the world has been constantly changing and many have been the situations and threats (civil wars, invasions, terrorism) that obliged the organisation to adapt and review its strategies and actions. According to NATO 2030, many are the threats and challenges in this changing global world and changing world order. This organisation still remains, in the midst of global turbulence through those 70 years, as the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on issues such as territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members. In that sense, climate change and its effect are to be considered threats and ability to adapt to those new circumstances (storms and floods) is necessary as they affect and have direct impact in communities’ security (indigenous and non-indigenous).

Following this idea, the purpose of this reflection is to identify the need for NATO to define its role and strategy for the Arctic region in the next Strategy Concept document. If it is not to allow “security vacuum” in the Arctic, as sated by the Secretary General on 25th March of 2022 at Bardufoss Air base in Norway, it is expected that this specific region, which has not been referred in NATO´s documents³, will get the deserved attention now.

In order to understand the importance of the region for NATO, the reflection is divided in two parts. Firstly, the evolution of the presence and its lack in official documents regarding climate change as a threat, as well as the purpose of having a Strategic Concept. Secondly, the ups and downs of the Arctic through time, interlinking climate change and increasing competition in the region. And finally, the conclusion will allow to tie the importance of defining a NATO role and strategy in the next document for the good of the Arctic and humanity, where traditional and non-traditional security meet each other.

The Strategic Concept is considered a key document, having a second place after the Washington Treaty 1949. It aims to define the Alliance strategy in a military and political way according to the challenges and threats identified. The Strategic Concept has been reviewed every decade since the end of Cold War⁴. The aim is for the Alliance to be prepared for the future as mentioned in the NATO´s website⁵. This kind of document also reinforces the commitment to “the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as well as to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, with the main priority of assuring and maintaining international peace and security” (Strategic Concept, 2010, p. 6). Meaning that three core tasks must be fulfilled by all members: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security.

While we are waiting for the upgrade of this new strategy, in 2020 a document entitled “NATO 2030: making a strong alliance even stronger”⁶ was released in a confusing moment for this organisation, that is trying to redefine an identity and position in an accelerated global world with many threats and challenges. This document allowed the Secretary General to structure and define priorities by remaining strong militarily and politically and by strengthening the Alliance within a more global approach.

As we have been witnessing, the concept of security has been evolving and has a holistic perspective. In that sense, and considering the public and private consultation held in 2021, it is hoped that the results and recommendations will be taken into consideration (such as the report of Jean-Charles Larsonneur⁷ ) during the strategy construction which will, undoubtedly, give more importance to environment security linked to human security (and not only to gender, as defined in NATO 2030⁸ document) as per consequence of climate change which is identified by United Nations as a threat multiplier. The Arctic region is expected to be part of the new Strategy Concept as deterrence is also relevant in that region. Trying to find a balance between traditional and non-traditional security is a challenge considering climate threat as a global security issue. The data now available will allow to improve and adapt Madrid Strategic Concept in regard to climate change and environment security, officially added in the Strategic Concept 2010, despite its recognition as potential threat had occurred in 1969, as mentioned by Causevic, but was not integrated in the organization agenda until 2010 (2017, pp. 72-73) because it is still perceived at a national level. The author of the article “Facing an Unpredictable Threat: Is NATO Ideally Placed to Manage Climate Change as a Non-Traditional Threat Multiplier?” also informs that since 2010, much have been done regarding environment security and the different Secretary Generals have discussed this subject in: 2010 with the creation of the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) to focus on the emerging security challenges; in 2013 the Green Defense for more effectiveness and change in use of energy; and in 2014 with the Wales declaration and adoption of Resolution 427 on Climate Change and International Security, at NATO Parliamentary Assembly, to reduce pollution. This recent introduction of environment security in NATO`s discussion shows the awareness of linkage between climate change and Arctic within the organisation as a matter of security and of protection of sovereignty, not only at a regional level but also at a global level.

Shall we remind that the Arctic area had strategic importance during the Cold War being highly militarized at that time. It was the shortest flight area for US and Soviet bombers. After this period and after the collapse of the USSR, a signal of cooperation approached the Arctic countries following the idea of a peace and cooperative zone expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987⁹. Gradually, NATO allies have turned their attention into other regions of the globe. The Arctic was no longer strategic and was forgotten. For the rapporteur Jean-Charles Larsonneur it was “a genuine desire to make the region one of peaceful cooperation” (2021, p. 3).

The 21st century placed this region again as an important spot. This time as a victim of the climate change, done by external anthropogenic activities that are making the temperature rising three times more in the Arctic comparing to the rest of the world, according to reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). That circumstance is changing in numerous ways the region which consequences are: melting-ice and warmer currents from the Atlantic Ocean (known as Atlantification of the Arctic) that will affect the rise sea level and, in its turn, allows navigability that will increase commercial transit (shorter than the Canal Suez, idem, p.4) and consequently expand economic opportunities with a ride to natural resources, more fishing and conflicts regarding territorial claims (extension of continental shelf). This interconnected scenario is placing back the Arctic region as a strategic spot where Russia and China (the latter claiming to be an Arctic country) have been, in this first quarter of this century, increasing investments and research. In what concerns Russia, the country has been remilitarizing, specifically since 2007. The rapporteur Jean-Charles Larsonneur highlights the Arctic Strategy 2035 of Russia, released in 2020, where there is a clear emphasis in the “necessity of guaranteeing Russia´s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and “the goal of developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as a globally competitive national transport corridor” (Klimenko, 2020 as cited in idem, p. 11).

The Arctic is changing in many ways. Remembering Norwegian Minister of Climate and Environment statement in 2017 “What happens in the Arctic does not stay in the Arctic” (Vidar Helgesen), a statement that applies also in security context.

The military cooperation between NATO and Arctic states has been increasing its partnership with USA and NATO with many growing exercises in the Arctic, namely Cold Response in Norway, the only country in the world with permanent military headquarters North of the Arctic circle (Brekke, 2022; Coffey and Kochis, 2021). As Partners for Peace and Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE, launched in 2003 by United States¹⁰ ) Finland and Sweden¹¹ have been closely participating in NATO´s exercises Cooperation, the core of the Arctic Council, is followed by the Alliance and its partners in that location. Meaning that at this moment members are meeting in Brussels (6th and 7th April 2022) and there is even more will from Sweden and Finland to acquire full membership. “ Disagreements within the Alliance about which role would NATO play” (Bye as cited by Buchanan, 2021; Coffey and Kochis, 2021) shall not be an issue in this time of crisis, where vacuum is not acceptable in the Arctic, bearing in mind that “the Arctic remains a vital strategic region for Euro-Atlantic security” (Charron, 2020). Like Janus, the Alliance can look at the past and to the future, combining expertise and knowledge to be applicable and adaptable to new threats and challenges.

Now that, according to Causevic, NATO has “mastered in traditional security” (2017, p. 80), the Alliance needs to accelerate efforts to update climate and Arctic strategies¹² (they are both intertwined and Indigenous Peoples´ security shall not be forgotten) in order to be able to respond in a coherent way to non-traditional security with a holistic perspective, reinforcing what was written above: find a balance between traditional and non-traditional security for global security. The Secretary General declared that “The Madrid Strategic Concept will reflect the new security environment, recommit to our values, and reaffirm our unity, ensuring that our Alliance is fit for the future¹³ ”. Accordingly, it can match the uniqueness of NATO, for its longevity, and the uniqueness of the Arctic, for its exceptionality aligned with the values of this organisation.

Céline Rodrigues, Universidade Portucalense, 08 de abril de 2022

References

Brekke, K. (202). NATO in the Arctic: Three Suggestions on NATO and Security in the Arctic. Civita. https://civita.no/notat/nato-in-the-arctic-three-suggestions-on-nato-and-security-in-the-arctic/

Bye, H. (2021, June 15). NATO Summit: Little reference to the Arctic, but Region still in the radar. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/nato-summit-little-reference-arctic-region-still-radar).

Causevic, A. (2017). Facing an Unpredictable Threat: Is NATO Ideally Placed to Manage Climate Change as a Non-Traditional Threat Multiplier? The Quarterly Journal. 16(2), pp. 59-80. DOI: https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.16.2.04

Charron, A. (2020). NATO and the Geopolitical Future of the Arctic. Arctic Yearbook2020.

Coffey, L. and Kochis, D. (2021, June 10). NATO Summit 2021: The Arctic Can No Longer Be an Afterthought. Issue Brief No. 6086. The Heritage Foundation https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/nato-summit-2021-the-arctic-can-no-longer-be-afterthought

Depledge, D. et al (2019). Why we need to talk about military activity in the Arctic: Towards an Arctic Military Code of Conduct. Arctic Yearbook2019.

Khorrami, N. & Raspotnik, A. (2022, March 29). Great power competition is coming for the Arctic. NATO should prepare. World Politics Review. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30434/for-nato-russia-ukraine-war-forecasts-tensions-in-the-arctic

Koivurova, T. (2022, March 2). The war on Ukraine: consequences for Finland and the Arctic. The Polar connection. https://polarconnection.org/ukraine-finland-arctic/

NATO. (2010). Strategic Concept 2010 https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf

NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY. (2017, May 17). "What happens in the Arctic, does not stay in the Arctic” - climate change in the Arctic will have global consequences and cannot be ignored. https://www.nato-pa.int/news/what-happens-arctic-does-not-stay-arctic-climate-change-arctic-will-have-global-consequences

NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY. Larsonneur J.-C. (2021). Security challenges in the High North. Report. https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-10/016%20DSCTC%2021%20E%20rev.%202%20fin%20-%20SECURITY%20HIGH%20NORTH.pdf

NATO. (2022). Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Bardufoss, Norway for Exercise Cold Response. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_193681.htm?selectedLocale=en

U .S. European Command Public Affairs. (2021, November 10). Military Leaders Discuss Arctic Security, Cooperation in Annual Forum. U.S. European Command. https://www.eucom.mil/pressrelease/41759/military-leaders-discuss-arctic-security-cooperation-in-annual-forum

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¹ According to the International Crisis Group there are 10 conflicts to watch in 2022 (https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/10-conflicts-watch-2022). For more details about conflicts and data see Uppsala Conflict Data Program (https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia).

² It is relevant to enhance that “This is only partially true. In fact, the Alliance’s creation was part of a broader effort to serve three purposes: deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.” (NATO. (n.d). A Short History of NATO https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm)

³ According to Buchanan “there is a lack of reference to that region in the documents, with only one mention to High North in 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué” (Bye as cited Buchanan, 2021) (Bye, H. (2021, June 15). NATO Summit: Little reference to the Arctic, but Region still in the radar. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/nato-summit-little-reference-arctic-region-still-radar).

⁴ For more information see: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm

⁵ See: https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

⁶ Unfortunately, no Portuguese personality participated in the elaboration of this document.

⁷ Larsonneur, J-C. (2021, October 9). Security Challenges ion the High North. Report. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-10/016%20DSCTC%2021%20E%20rev.%202%20fin%20-%20SECURITY%20HIGH%20NORTH.pdf)

⁸ According to Brekke the “Arctic is not high on the Agenda for the NATO 2030 initiative”. (Brekke, K. (2022). NATO in the Arctic: Three Suggestions on NATO and Security in the Arctic. Civita.https://civita.no/notat/nato-in-the-arctic-three-suggestions-on-nato-and-security-in-the-arctic/), (p. 2).

⁹ The eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and United States) created the AEPS that became in 1996 the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration). The Russia is the Chair (2021-2023) of the Arctic Council. The Joint Statement of 03rd March suspended all activities with Russia due to the invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, Russia has been excluded from other forums and meetings since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, Joint Statement (https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/).

¹⁰ In this context, “cooperation takes place in three major areas: cooperative security, healthy societies and vibrant economies” (U.S Department of state. (N.D). Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (E-PINE) https://www.state.gov/enhanced-partnership-in-northern-europe-e-pine/)

¹¹ Since the invasion of Ukraine, the discussion of Sweden and Finland being full members of NATO is on the table and both countries have their poll passed the barrier of 50%. (Cook, L. (2022, April 6). NATO Chief says Finland, Sweden welcome to apply to join https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/NATO-chief-says-Finland-Sweden-welcome-to-apply-17061474.php)

¹² Facing this lack of strategy some scholars have been arguing and recommending different options such as: 1) Arctic Military Code of Conduct (AMCC): the authors of the Briefing Note considered it would be of relevance to define redlines (Depledge, et al. 2019); 2) According to Khorrami and Raspotnik one possibility would be direct contribution from NATO to the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) developing hybrid partnerships and agreements (2022, p. 5). Both authors highlight also the importance of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), a regional security group that include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden with the goal of strengthening participants’ national defence, exploring common synergies and facilitating efficient common solutions, as mentioned in the NORDEFCO website. https://www.nordefco.org/Files/nordefco-vision-2025-signed.pdf

¹³ In: https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/