The essay is a critique of Joseph Raz' concept of second order reasons, especially exclusionary reasons, as presented in chapter one of his 1975 book "Practical Reason and Norms". It is argued that exclusionary reasons as defined by Raz have strange consequences that disqualify them from serious consideration. A counterproposal lays out how decision problems can be more plausibly interpreted as conflicts of first order reasons. His examples are reinterpreted in light of the counterproposal.
Table of Contents
1. The Objective
2. Raz' Account of Second Order Reasons
2.1. Formalizing Reasons and the Whistleblowing Example
2.2. Where Raz Faces Problems
3. Second Order Reasons as First Order Reasons
3.1. The Counterproposal
3.2. Investing or not Investing, that is the Question: Ann's Example
3.3. The Example of the Complying Soldier and the Noncompliant Subordinate
4. Summary and Conclusion
Research Objectives and Core Topics
This essay critically examines Joseph Raz's theory of second-order and exclusionary reasons. The primary research objective is to demonstrate that Raz’s account of these reasons is not the most plausible way to describe deliberation and decision-making, as it leads to problematic outcomes. Instead, the author argues that second-order reasons can and should be reduced to first-order reasons to better align with rational decision-making processes.
- Critical analysis of the "exclusionary reason" concept.
- Evaluation of the "lexical order" of reasons in practical reasoning.
- Investigation of Raz’s illustrative examples (e.g., whistleblowing, investment, and military obedience).
- Development of a counterproposal based on first-order reason conflicts.
- Argumentation against relying on "feelings" or "unease" as justifications for non-first-order reasoning.
Excerpt from the Book
2.1. Formalizing Reasons and the Whistleblowing Example
This chapter serves to repeat and formalize Raz' descriptions. The example is based on Raz' story of Colin (cp. p. 39). Assume the company that hired you produces toxic food and you have the option to make this public in order to protect the consumers (W = whistleblow, act). On the other hand, this leads to an umcomfortable life for your family for the next years, due to press invasion, no employer will hire you again etc. Also, you once made a promise never to even consider options that are contrary to your family's interests. Following Raz, you have an exclusionary reason that sets aside a decision based on the merits of the case, because your family's well-being is at stake. For this to be an exclusionary reason, it must look like that (note that the SOR does not directly take side for a certain option, but rejects you should make a decision on the merits at all):
Summary of Chapters
1. The Objective: The author introduces the critique of Raz’s account of second-order reasons, suggesting they should be reduced to first-order reasons.
2. Raz' Account of Second Order Reasons: This chapter formalizes Raz's theory using the whistleblowing example and introduces the concept of 'force' to illustrate the ordering of reasons.
3. Second Order Reasons as First Order Reasons: The author presents a counterproposal, reinterpreting Raz’s examples of investment decisions and military compliance through the lens of first-order conflicts.
4. Summary and Conclusion: The final section reiterates that second-order reasons are dependent on first-order reasons and fail to provide a superior explanation for rational human behavior.
Keywords
Second-order reasons, exclusionary reasons, first-order reasons, Raz, practical reasoning, normativity, lexical order, deliberation, whistleblowing, decision theory, rationality, force of reasons, moral philosophy, justification.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the central focus of this academic essay?
The essay focuses on a critical assessment of Joseph Raz's theory of second-order reasons, specifically questioning their necessity and plausibility in explaining rational deliberation.
What are the primary themes discussed?
Key themes include the distinction between first-order and second-order reasons, the role of exclusionary reasons, the concept of a lexical ordering of reasons, and how individuals navigate conflicting moral and practical obligations.
What is the author's main thesis?
The author argues that second-order reasons are essentially redundant and can be more accurately and consistently described as conflicts between first-order reasons.
Which scientific methodology does the author employ?
The author uses analytical philosophical inquiry, specifically investigating the logical consequences of Raz's examples and applying a measure of "force" to test the coherence of his reasoning framework.
What does the main body of the work cover?
The main body systematically deconstructs Raz’s provided examples—such as the whistleblowing scenario, the investment case (Ann's example), and the military obedience case—to show that they do not necessitate a distinct second-order category.
Which keywords define the work?
Core keywords include second-order reasons, first-order reasons, exclusionary reasons, practical reasoning, rationality, and normativity.
How does the author treat the 'whistleblowing' example?
The author treats the whistleblowing example as a conflict of values where family interests and public safety can be compared via first-order reasoning, rather than invoking an exclusionary rule that forbids considering the merits of the case.
What is the author's critique regarding the military obedience example?
The author critiques Raz's reliance on the "feeling of unease" in the soldier, arguing that this feeling is merely a symptom of conflicting first-order reasons of similar strength, not evidence of a second-order exclusionary reason.
- Citation du texte
- Christoph Siemroth (Auteur), 2009, Against Raz' Notion of Second Order Reasons, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/126823
