The 'national interest' and the transformation of Hungarian foreign politics in the 1980s

Contents

1. Introduction

2. Preconditions: The Hungarian model and the Soviet bloc after 1956

3. The crisis of the 1980s: Growing internal and external constraints

4. Leaving the Socialist camp on tiptoe: Hungary, socialist internationalism, nationalism and Europe
4.1. The dialectics of the national and the international: ‘National Interest’ versus ‘Socialist Internationalism’
4.2. Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’, the Brezhnev doctrine and the Hungarian Model
4.3. Identity Politics: National revival, European traditions and the end of communism

5. Conclusion

6. Bibliography

Abbreviations:

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1.Introduction

Hungary is widely regarded as a success-story of transformation in Eastern Europe. A stable democracy, the rule of law and a prosperous market economy contribute to make the country one of the most advanced candidates for the EU’s upcoming enlargement. Most scholars explain this favourable development with Hungary’s legacies of domestic reforms since 1968 which facilitated the ultimate transformation from communism to market and democracy in the late 1980s.^[1]

I intend to turn the focus of this paper on Hungary’s external relations in this period. In my opinion, the foreign policy debate of the 1980s is an often neglected issue in the discussion of Hungary’s transformation and deserves greater attention. In particular, the new elite that came into power in 1990 attempted to play down the impact of their predecessors foreign policy which laid the basis for Hungary’s present position in the international system already before the installation of a democratic system and a full market economy. This is a striking difference in comparison to the other transition countries where the ultimate breaking with the Soviet bloc and an unambiguous orientation towards Europe took place only after an elite change through the first free elections. Consequently, the perceptions and strategies of the late Hungarian communist leadership as the protagonist of transformation must be in the centre of analysis. For this purpose I will concentrate on the development of key issues in the Hungarian foreign policy debate in the 1980s, international reactions, and the later extension to a domestic debate with the repercussions on reform policies in the main part of this paper. This discourse analysis is important for two reasons: Firstly, it helps to understand the paradigmatic changes in thinking among the Hungarian leaders and its repercussions on policies at that time.^[2] Secondly, it shows up the basic difference in quality and extent between Hungary’s re-nationalisation and westernisation and similar developments in other East European countries at that time with Hungary’s explicitly European dimension of national revival.

For the dominant role Moscow played in coordinating her satellites foreign politics the change of Soviet objectives is an important factor in the analysis. In fact, only since the mid-1980s something like autonomous Hungarian foreign policies could be observed. Furthermore, I would like to demonstrate the close interdependence of domestic reforms and foreign politics which accelerated transition under the pressure of the domestic and international crisis of communism in the 1980s and through the opportunities of Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’. In this respect I will explain the impact of Hungary’s national legacies that led to an early breaking with the Soviet bloc and a drive towards European integration unlike other countries in Eastern Europe which chose a more cautious detachment from Moscow and different forms of ‘national communism’ in the first phases of transition. This unique development will be illustrated by comparing the Hungarian development with other East European regimes.

2. Preconditions: The Hungarian model and the Soviet bloc after 1956

‘Our politics is economics and our economics is foreign trade.’

This famous saying of János Kádár, when asked by a Western visitor to characterise the Hungarian model, concisely highlights the complex interdependence of domestic politics, the economy and external relations in the period after 1956. The legacies of 1956 and the Kádár era with Hungary’s unique situation in the Soviet bloc which will be outlined in this chapter are essential in understanding Hungary’s transformation in the 1980s.^[3]

The major starting point for an analysis of developments within the Eastern bloc and Hungary as a part of it is the Soviet perspective on her interests connected with the region. For the USSR Eastern Europe was ‘the most domestic of the foreign policy issues’.^[4] The existence and conformity of the communist states in Eastern Europe were important for the Soviet Union, for several reasons: Firstly, the East European satellites secured a buffer zone for possible confrontations with the West. Secondly, they embodied the Soviet claim to the global validity of communist ideology, particularly for the benefit of China, who was challenging Soviet supremacy. Thirdly, they enhanced the USSR’s political and military weight in international relations; and fourthly, these countries were important economic partners supplying the USSR with essential machinery and foodstuff. Thus, both basic economic and hard security needs played a role besides the less tangible importance of ideological supremacy and great power status.^[5] Thus, especially the external relations of the East European countries were closely coordinated and monitored by the Soviet leadership making any independent initiatives of single countries virtually impossible.

Eastern Europe was also a field of experiments in reform, mainly in the area of economics, on the one hand to take into account the East European ‘national peculiarities’ but on the other hand to some extent also to test different models for a general renewal of communism.^[6] This was especially the case during the Khrushchev and Gorbachev periods.^[7] For Hungarian reform communism, which I will outline in the following, the ‘national’ aspect was emphasised, whereas the general validity of the model was explicitly negated in order to avoid any challenge to Soviet ideological supremacy as in 1956.

The experience of the 1956 national and anti-totalitarian popular uprising was the major rationale for János Kádár’s reform policies. The 1956 revolution represented merely one of many special Hungarian national legacies: The memory of the 1848 revolution, which was suppressed by Russian troops, the abortive 1919 communist Soviet Republic, the ‘trauma of Trianon’ in 1920 with the loss of substantial parts of Hungarian territory and population, and the post-war Moscow-led Stalinization of Hungary fostered the population’s traditional nationalist, anti-Russian and anti-communist feelings. Hungarians perceived their situation as a communist ally of the Soviets as a forceful integration of a culturally Western country into a backward Slavic bloc. These long-standing notions could hardly be contained under the surface of Hungary’s so-called ‘national consensus policies’ after 1956, as outlined in the following.

Having secured his leadership, reorganized the disintegrated party and the state apparatus, János Kádár, whose power had been established by Soviet tanks, started a cautious reform programme, mainly in the field of economics. The ‘New Economic Mechanism’ (NEM) of 1968 introduced some market elements into the command economy. Planning was decentralized, production became more profit-oriented and a private second economy, mainly in agriculture and the service sector, was established.^[8] In addition to the economic benefits of NEM which secured constantly rising incomes, a high standard of living and a broad choice of food and high quality consumer goods Hungarians also enjoyed more personal freedom than most of the other East Europeans. Kádár’s 1961 slogan ‘Who is not against us is with us’^[9] stood for Hungary’s post-Stalinist de-politisation of the society and the ‘social contract’ between rulers and the ruled.^[10] Loyalty to the regime was not questioned or required to be demonstrated, passiveness was acceptable, indoctrination stood at a low level and persecution had to be feared only for active dissidence. Since the 1970s travelling to Western Europe had became possible without major restrictions. Hungary had turned from pre-1956 ‘Gulag communism’ to Kádár’s ‘Goulash communism’.^[11] The Kádár leadership sought legitimacy without mass mobilization but through consumption. Concessions to consumption and free travel as well as the opportunity to engage in private sector business in order to secure additional income were meant to turn the population aside from participating in political activities which might undermine the system. Thus, preventing another popular uprising against the communist system was the major motive for these policies.

In the context of these reforms, also the role the communist party changed. The ideological focus was no longer on being the vanguard of the workers but rather being technocratic managers of the economy and arbitrators of the different ‘non-antagonistic interests in society which had evolved out of the increasing socialist division of labour’.^[12] This differentiation of society developed in Hungary’s mixed economy more clearly than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the interaction within the Soviet bloc was still based on party interests rather than national or economic interests.^[13] However, the leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) only did become the major protagonists in the reform debates of the 1980s due to their changed role developed in the 1960s and 70s.

In applying their model of communism the Kádár leadership always needed to consider Moscow’s interests, as mentioned. According to J.F. Brown and other authors, the main objective of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe was to secure ‘cohesion with viability’.^[14] Cohesion in this respect meant a close synchronisation of ideology and politico-economic systems in Eastern Europe with the USSR. Viability mainly stood for economic efficiency, especially as a means to legitimise communist rule and thus reduce the need for costly Soviet support or even intervention. Cohesion and viability were interdependent and to a large extent in conflict. Stricter control and communist orthodoxy would lead to political instability and economic problems, whereas greater leeway for national peculiarities would impede Soviet control and could question her ideological superiority.^[15]

During the process of de-Stalinisation Khrushchev had put more emphasis on viability; the Soviet empire rather became a ‘socialist commonwealth’.^[16] The experience of the events of 1953 in East Germany and 1956 in Poland and Hungary had demonstrated the narrow basis of the communist leaders’ legitimacy and the importance of improving economic efficiency to secure political stability. Thus, a certain degree of diversity became permissible, especially in the economy. Unlike Romania or Albania, which defected from Soviet hegemony at that period Hungary avoided any challenge to Soviet teachings.

The crushing of the Prague Spring by a Soviet-led intervention force and its subsequent justification with the Brezhnev doctrine marked the beginning of a new era in Soviet-East European relations. Moscow started to stress cohesion again in favour of viability, but at this stage a return to the tight Stalinist model was unthinkable. Soviet-East European relations in the Brezhnev era were somewhere between the hierarchical and the imperial model.^[17] A new orthodoxy was imposed on the satellites. Hungary’s NEM seemed in this respect like a Khrushchevian anachronism.^[18] Since Kádár had constantly supported Soviet foreign politics and also taken part in the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia^[19] the reforms could proceed and even be expanded. The proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine had somehow clarified the limits of the Soviet’s tolerance. Some authors such as Bialer and Valenta claim that Hungary’s greater leeway in domestic affairs was to a large extent based on her proven willingness to fight Soviet tanks.^[20] However, it was constantly emphasized, that the NEM was not a ‘model’ intended to be followed by others, a mistake made by the reformers of the Prague Spring of 1968.

In the wake of the Polish crisis of 1970/71 Hungary proved her ability to prevent contamination from the ‘Polish disease’. Only in 1972 and 1974-75 did the economic reforms slow down when the Soviets and some conservative members of the Hungarian leadership succeeded in removing the most radical reformers around Rezsö Nyers from the Politburo.^[21] Hungarian reformers were accused of pro-Western orientation, nationalism and ‘philistine attitudes’.^[22] But this was only a slight foretaste of the upcoming ideological conflict in the 1980s.

In assessing Hungary’s development in the 1960s and 70s special attention needs to be given to János Kádár as the protagonist. Through his sensible policies and modesty of personal style he gained both popularity within Hungary and respectability as an elder statesman in the Soviet bloc and also internationally. Skilful, both flexible and stubborn, he negotiated for favourable terms for Hungary with the Soviets.^[23] Kádár enjoyed the confidence of Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Andropov for his policies.^[24] He personified Hungary’s political and economic continuity and stability.

Hungary with her reformed economy was increasingly turning from being a liability to the Soviet Union into an asset. Economic success secured both political stability and gave legitimacy to the communist system.^[25] Kádár’s Hungary seemed to have achieved viability without challenging cohesion, an achievement hardly matched by the other countries of the bloc (save the GDR). In the late 1970s there were even articles in the Soviet press which cautiously praised the general merits of the Hungarian model, especially in agriculture.^[26]

Hungary was to play an increasingly important role as a supplier of high quality industrial goods and foodstuffs to the Soviet Union and the other CMEA countries. In exchange the Soviet Union secured the supply of raw materials and energy at low prices. Hungary increasingly matched the economic importance of the GDR and Czechoslovakia within CMEA. Like the other CMEA countries Hungary’s industry had been shaped since the late 1940s on the lines of the Soviet model. Although an integration of CMEA into common planning structures under Soviet command had failed in the early 1960s^[27] all East European satellites heavily depended on subsidized Soviet deliveries of raw materials and their purchases above world-prices for their specialized, uncompetitive and comparatively low quality products. The small CMEA members were artificially locked into the system of non-convertible Transfer-Roubles (TR). The Soviet Union in contrast could spread and diversify her imports of manufactured goods among her allies or if necessary by purchase from the world market in exchange for hard-currency oil exports. Thus, Hungary and the other East European countries depended one-sidedly on CMEA and the USSR. The unfavourable terms of this relationship were tacitly accepted by the Soviet leaders. Implicit trade subsidies (through prices lower than on the world market for oil sales and higher for purchases of East European products) were perceived as the necessary costs of building and securing the Soviet dominated bloc.^[28]

Hungary’s relationship with her socialist neighbours, especially with Romania, but also with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia was tainted by the Trianon legacy which had brought considerable Hungarian minorities under the authority of these countries. These countries in particular, but also the orthodox GDR, suspiciously observed the course of the Hungarian model, in fear of renewed nationalist revisionism.^[29] Budapest eagerly tried to refute such an impression and consequently also avoided any expression of concern with regard to discrimination against the Hungarian minorities, particularly in Ceausescu’s Romania.

After achieving superpower status and nuclear parity with the USA the strategic significance of Eastern Europe as a military buffer zone and primary target of Soviet politics declined. Soviet foreign politics was now focused on building up its global military capacities and recruiting clients worldwide.^[30] Moreover, through Ostpolitik and the Helsinki process the Soviet Union saw her claim to hegemony and the territorial changes after World War II safeguarded. Nevertheless, Eastern Europe’s importance in economic, political, ideological and military terms for the Soviet Union prevailed. Moreover, the East Europeans were pressed to contribute to the Soviet efforts to support socialist movements in the Third World in order to build a system of world socialism. Unlike the GDR or Bulgaria, Hungary played only a minor role as a Soviet proxy worldwide by offering training facilities for military personnel from allied Third World countries.^[31]

With regard to the USSR’s strategic planning in Europe Hungary had never played a significant role. As part of the secondary ‘southern tier’ of the Warsaw Pact together with Bulgaria and Romania it contributed only a minor share to the common military capacities.^[32] Nevertheless, membership in the pact and the stationing of Soviet troops in the country could not be challenged on any account for the experience of 1956, when prime minister Nagy announced his country’s withdrawal from the pact and proclaimed neutrality.^[33] Thus, the 1956 legacy again marks a difference to other Eastern countries such as Albania or Romania which could dare to defect from the pact or withdrew from active participation.

In the wake of growing détente between the Great Powers but also between the USSR and Western Europe in the 1970s Eastern Europe’s role as an mediator of East-West relations was enhanced. Kádár began to be known as an enthusiastic supporter of détente and a useful mediator in dealing with Western Europe or Yugoslavia.^[34] After a long international isolation and expulsion from the United Nations from 1956 to 1962 Hungary eagerly sought rehabilitation with the West.^[35] Kádár travelled extensively through Western Europe and the USA or received high-ranking Western politicians in Budapest in quick succession.^[36] In addition, the importance of Hungary as an economic link between West European countries and the Soviet Union was growing. The latter increasingly depended on access to Western markets to exchange oil and other raw materials for Western high technology.^[37]

Unlike Romania Hungary enjoyed extensive Western contacts with Moscow’s full endorsement. Moscow saw Hungary as a useful liaison with West European countries, the Eurocommunist movement and Yugoslavia.^[38] Especially to Austria and (West) Germany, Budapest enjoyed traditional links. A substantial Hungarian diaspora in North America facilitated economic contacts with the USA which had granted Hungary the status of a most favoured nation (MFN) in 1978.^[39] But also growing numbers of tourists travelling not only from the West to Hungary but also in the opposite direction demonstrated Hungary’s unique role in Eastern Europe and her open-mindedness to the world. In the 1970s the Kádár leadership increasingly had to use these Western contacts to secure a swelling flow of hard currency credits which could underpin a constantly rising standard of living through imports of high technology and consumer goods while domestic economic performance and growth rates went down.

Summing up, it can be stated that Hungary’s development in the 1960s and 70s was shaped by both Soviet hegemonic objectives and its own national legacies, most prominently expressed in the 1956 revolution. But also the ups and downs of détente had their impact on Hungary. Domestic economic reforms and far-reaching freedom were meant to legitimise and secure an ideologically unappealing and disliked system. The course and depth of these reforms were highly dependent on changing Soviet leaders and their ideological, political and economic priorities whereas the long-standing leadership of János Kádár secured an element of stability. This had repercussions on Hungary’s external relations, too. As a viable economy Hungary’s role within CMEA increased significantly though for the price of an growing dependence on Soviet deliveries of raw materials. For her political reliability Hungary became an appreciated Soviet ally as she became an attractive trading partner for the West, to which she cultivated both historic and post-1956 economic links which became more and more indispensable. The fate and success of the Hungarian model increasingly depended on the country’s special role between East and West.

3. The crisis of the 1980s: Growing internal and external constraints

Hungary’s special position in the international system was crucial for the success of Kádár’s model of communism. The complex interdependence between domestic reforms, extensive western links and integration into the Soviet bloc came under serious strain in the late 1970s and early 80s when all pillars of stability - economic success, Western links, Soviet aid and guidance and Kádár’s political leadership were struck by crisis. This crisis increasingly constrained domestic and external political leeway, as I will show below.

As outlined, Hungary’s economy was tightly knit into the CMEA-system on which it depended for both the supply of raw materials and energy and the export of its manufactured goods. At the same time economic ties to the West became indispensable. Rising exports of mainly agricultural products to Western Europe secured a constant flow of hard currency which was needed to service the rising debts and to finance the growing demand for Western consumer goods and high technology.

Since the mid-1970s growth rates in all CMEA countries stagnated. One of the most seriously affected countries was Hungary whose economic growth slumped to –2.3% in 1985.^[40] One of the major reasons for economic stagnation was the dramatic price rise and the reduction in volume of Soviet energy and raw material exports to CMEA countries following the oil crisis.^[41] The USSR now increasingly diverted her oil exports to the hard currency world market and charged higher prices within CMEA at the same time. The prices for oil and other raw materials were set on the basis of five-year moving averages that increasingly rose with the world economic crisis.^[42] Budapest’s costly contributions to joint CMEA projects, especially the exploration of new Soviet oil fields also did not pay off.^[43] For a country like Hungary that did not have any significant raw material deposits but which ran both input-oriented and energy-intensive industry, this meant a serious setback.

[...]

^[1] The author thanks his supervisor Dr Judy Batt for her guidance. Many thanks also to Anna Childs, Suzanne Freegard, Christian Ganske, Catherine Laverick, Katrin Robeck and Tome Sandevski for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

^[2] As in all communist regimes the party Central Committee and the Politburo took all major decisions, whereas the Foreign Ministry only served for executing these policies. Therefore most of the major changes and innovations discussed in this paper were developed by party officials such as Szürös, while the Foreign Ministry did not play a significant independent role.

^[3] R Tökés, ‘Hungarian Reform Imperatives’, Problems of Communism, Sept./Oct. 1984, p 1.

^[4] A Pravda, ‘Soviet Policy towards Eastern Europe in Transition: the Means Justify the Ends’, in: A Pravda (ed.), The End of the outer Empire, L: Sage, 1992, p 9.

^[5] For a detailed account of Soviet interests connected with Eastern Europe: A Korbonski, ‘Eastern Europe’, in: R Byrnes, After Brezhnev, London: Pinter, 1983, pp 301-339.

S Bialer even claims an overriding importance of communist ideology and Russian nationalism in Soviet-East European relations (S Bialer, ‘The Decline of an Empire’, in: S Bialer, S Bialer, The Soviet Paradox – External Expansion, Internal Decline, L: Tauris, 1986, p 192.).

^[6] A Korbonski, op cit, p 322.

^[7] A Pravda, op cit, p 6.

^[8] For a concise history of NEM see R Tökés, ‘Hungarian Reform Imperatives’, Problems of Communism, Sept./Oct. 1984, pp 1-23; on the Hungarian reforms in general : J Batt, Economic Reform and Political Change in Eastern Europe – A Comparison of the Czechoslovak and the Hungarian Experiences, NY: St.Martin’s Press, 1988.

^[9] J Valenta, ‘Normalization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia’, in: S Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, p 109.

^[10] R Tökés, op cit, pp 4-5.

^[11] C Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, Durham: Duke University Press, 1986, p 207.

^[12] JF Brown, ‘Détente and Soviet policy in Eastern Europe’, Survey, No. 20 (spring/summer 1974), p 48;

S Meiklejohn Terry, ‘Theories of Socialist Development in Soviet-East European Relations’, in: S Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, p 229.

^[13] E Comisso, ‘Introduction: state structures, political processes, and collective choice in CMEA states’, in: E Comisso / L D’Andrea Tyson (eds.), Power, Purpose and Collective Choice – Economic Strategy in Socialist States, Ithaka: Cornell University Press, 1986, p 33.

^[14] JF Brown, op cit, pp 46-58.

^[15] C Gati, op cit, p 58.

^[16] A Korbonski, ‘Eastern Europe’, in: R Byrnes, After Brezhnev, London: Pinter, 1983, p 292.

^[17] ibid, p 293.

^[18] JF Brown, op cit, p 52.

^[19] Given his own experience, Kádár vainly tried to warn Dubcek three days before the impending Soviet action against the Czecholslovak reforms, which he had welcomed in the beginning. When the Soviet intervention was put into action Kádár could but take part in order to save his own domestic reforms. (J Valenta, ‘Normalization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia’, in: S Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, p 112.).

^[20] S Bialer, ‘The Decline of an Empire’, in: S Bialer, The Soviet Paradox – External Expansion, Internal Decline, L: Tauris, 1986, p 194; J Valenta, ‘Normalization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia’, in: S Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, p 111.

^[21] JF Brown, op cit, p 53.

^[22] J Valenta, ‘Normalization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia’, in: S Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, pp 116-117.

^[23] ibid, pp 111/113.

^[24] Andropov in particular, who had been Soviet Ambassador to Hungary (1954-57) and Central Committe Secretary responsible for the liaison with ‘fraternal parties’ (1957-62) had a high opinion of and a close relationship to Kádár.

^[25] A Korbonski, ‘Eastern Europe’, in: R Byrnes, After Brezhnev, London: Pinter, 1983, p 299.

^[26] E.g.: Novoe vremya, No. 14 (1978), pp.21-24.

^[27] The East Europeans were reluctant to accept a further extension of Soviet authority into their national economies. While Romania for that reason chose to withdraw from CMEA to a great degree, Hungary proposed greater reliance on market mechanisms for socialist integration. (P Marer, ‘The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe’, in: S Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, p 161.).

^[28] This is the most common explanation (M Marrese / J Vanous, Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe, Berkely: University of California Press, 1983.). For a rival concept explaining CMEA as a customs union providing collective goods see: JC Brada, ‘Interpreting the Soviet subsidization of Eastern Europe’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 4, Autumn 1988, pp 639-658.

^[29] JK Hoensch, A History of Modern Hungary, 2nd edition, L: Longman, 1996, p 257.

^[30] A Korbonski, ‘Eastern Europe’, in: R Byrnes, After Brezhnev, London: Pinter, 1983, p 296.

^[31] ibid, p 308.

^[32] J Valenta, ‘Normalization in Hungary and Czechoslovakia’, in: S Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, p 116; J Eyal, ‘Military Relations’, in: A Pravda (ed.), The End of the outer Empire, L: Sage, 1992, p 34.

^[33] J Valenta, op cit, p 120; A Korbonski, op cit, p 306.

^[34] J Valenta, op cit, p 119.

^[35] W Zellner / P Dunay, Ungarn’s Aussenpolitik 1990-97, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998, pp 74-75.

^[36] ibid, p 77; J Kun, Hungarian Foreign Policy, L: Praeger, 1993, pp 34-35; V Mastny (ed.), Soviet-East European Survey 1983/84, Durham: Duke UP, 1985, pp 211-218.

^[37] A Korbonski, ‘Eastern Europe’, in: R Byrnes, After Brezhnev, London: Pinter, 1983, p 297.

^[38] J Valenta, op cit, p 116.

^[39] C Iordachi, The Anatomy of a Historical Conflict: The Romanian-Hungarian Diplomatic Conflict in the 1980s, MA thesis at the Central European University, Budapest, 1995 (source: http://www.cimec.ro/istorie/cristi/cuprins.htm; login: 6 June 2002).

^[40] C Gati, The Bloc that Failed, L: Tauris, 1990, p 108; A Felkay, Hungary and the USSR, 1956-1988, NY: Greenwood Press, 1989, pp 250-260.

^[41] 1982 alone saw a slump in Soviet oil deliveries to Hungary and other East European countries by 10 %. (A Korbonski, ‘Eastern Europe’, in: R Byrnes, After Brezhnev, London: Pinter, 1983, p 332.

^[42] P Marer, ‘The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe’, in: S Meiklejohn Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, pp 165-8.

^[43] G Schöpflin / R Tökés / I Völgyes,’Leadership Change and Crisis in Hungary’, Problems of Communism, September/Oktober 1988, p 24.