The main objective of this paper is to discuss how official doctrine and Gilbert Ryle explain how one performs an intentional action. Gilbert Ryle developed his theory of mind in his book “The Concept of Mind” (1949) against the Cartesian dualism. The official doctrine is mainly originates from René Descartes “mind-body dualism”. Concerning the official doctrine, I aspire to elucidate two main aspects: Firstly, I will epitomize important aspects of mind-body “parallelism”. More precisely, I will illustrate, taking into account the official doctrine, that mind and body are two separate entities. Secondly, I will illustrate mind-body “interactionalism”.
Table of Contents
Foreword
1. The ontological view of the official doctrine: Mind-body parallelism
1.1 The ontological view of the official doctrine: Mind-body interactionalism
1.2. The difficulties of the official doctrine
2. Ryle vs. the official doctrine
2.1 The notion of dispositional properties
2.2 Dispositional statements
Research Objectives and Themes
The paper examines the debate between the "official doctrine" of Cartesian dualism and Gilbert Ryle's critique regarding the explanation of intentional human action. It explores how traditional views posit a dichotomy between mental "theorizing" and physical "acting," while Ryle proposes that mind-related concepts are actually dispositional properties rather than occult mental causes.
- The distinction between the official doctrine of mind-body dualism and Ryle’s philosophy.
- The logical fallacy of the "category-mistake" in attributing mental processes to physical behavior.
- The role of dispositional properties in describing intellect and character.
- The rejection of the "Ghost in the Machine" paradigm in explaining intentional actions.
Excerpt from the Book
2. Ryle vs. the official doctrine
The advocates of the official theory treated mind like all other elements of the physical world. They ignored the point that minds are not bound by the same rules as those things in the physical world. We know about causes and effects in the physical world, but we don’t know anything about the mental causes at all. The official doctrine lumped mind and body into same logical category, however, they don’t belong in the same category (cf. Ryle, 1949: 22). According to Ryle, it a category-mistake (it is a mistake that occurs when someone believes something belongs to one logical category, however, it belongs to another). According to Ryle, category-mistakes are usually semantically wrong, but syntactically correct. For example, “she came home in a flood of tears and a sedan-chair” (Ryle, 1949:22). The syntax of this sentence is perfectly all right since its grammar is logical, but the meaning of the sentence is illogical since two different physical categories, namely “a flood of tears” and “a sedan-chair” are put into the same category, however, they belong to different categories. “Now the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine does just this. It maintains that there exist both bodies and minds; that there occur physical processes and mental processes; that there mechanical causes of corporeal movements and mental causes of corporeal movements” (Ryle, 1949:22). According to Ryle, the phrase “there occur mental processes” does not mean the same sort of thing as “there occur physical processes”. They don’t belong to the same category, therefore, Ryle does nothing more than “rectify the logic of mental conducts concepts” (Ryle, 1949:16). Ryle does not argue that there are no mental processes at all. According to Ryle, for example, “making a joke” and “doing long division” are mental processes.
Summary of Chapters
Foreword: Introduces the objective of the paper to compare Ryle’s theory of mind against the Cartesian "official doctrine" regarding intentional action.
1. The ontological view of the official doctrine: Mind-body parallelism: Outlines the dualist perspective where mind and body are viewed as separate entities, with the mind existing in a private, non-spatial mental world.
1.1 The ontological view of the official doctrine: Mind-body interactionalism: Discusses the assumed causal relationship where mental states (theorizing) are believed to steer physical acts.
1.2. The difficulties of the official doctrine: Highlights the problems of the mind-body interaction and the "problem of other minds" as inherent weaknesses in the dualist paradigm.
2. Ryle vs. the official doctrine: Details Ryle’s critique, focusing on the "category-mistake" that dualists commit by treating mental states as occult causes of physical behavior.
2.1 The notion of dispositional properties: Explains Ryle’s view that mental descriptors like "intelligent" refer to behavioral dispositions, not internal episodes.
2.2 Dispositional statements: Analyzes the logical structure of dispositional statements as conditional relations and their role in describing human abilities.
Keywords
Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Official Doctrine, Cartesian Dualism, Mind-Body Problem, Intentional Action, Category-Mistake, Dispositional Properties, Mental Conduct Verbs, Introspection, Interactionalism, Behaviorism, Occult Mental Causes, Philosophy of Mind
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
The paper focuses on the philosophical conflict between the "official doctrine" of Cartesian mind-body dualism and Gilbert Ryle's critique as presented in "The Concept of Mind."
What are the central themes discussed?
Key themes include mind-body dualism, the concept of intentional action, the nature of mental processes, and the logical analysis of dispositional terms.
What is the main research question or objective?
The objective is to analyze how the "official doctrine" explains intentional actions through internal "theorizing" versus Ryle's view that such actions are manifestations of dispositional properties.
Which scientific or philosophical method is employed?
The paper utilizes a conceptual and critical analysis of Ryle’s work, specifically contrasting his logical arguments against the traditional dualist interpretation of mental states.
What does the main body of the work cover?
It covers the ontological commitments of dualism, the problems regarding mind-body interaction, the critique of the "Ghost in the Machine" dogma, and the classification of dispositional properties.
Which keywords characterize this study?
The study is characterized by terms such as Cartesian dualism, category-mistake, dispositional properties, and intentional action.
What does Ryle mean by a "category-mistake"?
A category-mistake occurs when one treats a concept as belonging to a logical category it does not actually inhabit, such as treating "mind" as a separate entity parallel to "body" rather than as a set of dispositions.
How does Ryle reinterpret "intelligence"?
Ryle argues that calling an action "intelligent" is not a report of an occult internal cause (theorizing), but rather an attribution of a dispositional property concerning how an individual acts in certain situations.
- Quote paper
- S.Abir Anbari (Author), 2009, Ryle vs. official doctrine on how to explain an intentional action, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/139481
