The structure of the text is as follows: I shall first give a very brief account of what it means to have a right, based on the Hohfeldian view, in order to understand the common framework upon which most modern rights-theory is founded. I will then move on to explain the rationales of the use of either choice theory or interest theory in the explanation of rights. This short theoretical introduction will serve as a base for the actual question of whether animals should belong in the category of rights holders.
2
Determining Rights-holders The Case of Animals
In this section I will present some of the views of the aforementioned authors and critically assess and reflect on them.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Having rights
3. Having Choices
4. Having Interests
5. Having Characteristics
6. Obligations and duties towards animals
7. Conclusion
Objective and Thematic Focus
The text explores the philosophical debate regarding whether non-human animals should be classified as rights-holders, analyzing the underlying criteria required for the possession of moral rights through the lens of prominent philosophical theories.
- Theoretical frameworks of rights (Hohfeldian view)
- Choice Theory versus Interest Theory
- Cognitive capabilities and the possession of interests
- Distinction between moral agents and moral patients
- The role of suffering and mental complexity in attributing rights
Excerpt from the Book
Having Interests
Contrary to the choice-based rights theory we find Interest Theory or Benefit Theory, whose main argument is that rights can potentially be ascribed to anyone or anything that can be a beneficiary or posses an interest. If X benefits from Y’s duty that Y not kills X, then X has a right not to be killed. The duties that we have do not all give rise to rights, though. It is said that it is only when duties are aimed at the benefit of specific individuals, as opposed to a general public, that they do so. The duty not to kill someone can thus be said to benefit individuals (and not merely a broader public), which gives rise to the right not to be killed, whereas the duty not to moonlight (illegally) benefits individuals “…only as members of an undifferentiated collectivity” (Jones 1994:28). In this case it would be highly arbitrary to talk of someone having a right that others not moonlight. Interest theory is in this sense restrictive in that it only allows for correlativity between duty and claim-right when the duties are “designed” to benefit specific individuals (Jones 1994:29).
If we perceive rights this way, it seems to open for the possibility to allow animals to be right-holders. After all, can we not talk of animals possessing interests? Indeed, if we find that animals can have interests, it should add plausibility to the belief that they could be ascribed rights. Joel Feinberg holds that an interest is compounded of conations, and that certain animals can be said to possess such through the demonstration of behaviour such as impulses, conative urges, preferences and rudimentary purposes (Feinberg 1974:195). I find this view quite plausible, especially when the image of a commercial for dog food pops into my mind – the dog makes a conscious choice about what brand it wants (Of course, such images are biased and the animal anthropomorphised in order for the consumer to choose the producer’s brand, but I believe that it would not be rash to say that at least some animals have preferences when it comes to food regardless of nutritional value, just as a Great White Shark may develop a taste for human flesh for no rational reason).
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Outlines the scope of the paper, focusing on the debate between philosophers who argue for and against the inclusion of animals in the category of rights-holders.
Having rights: Introduces the Hohfeldian framework to define the nature of claim-rights and liberty-rights in relation to animals.
Having Choices: Critically evaluates Choice Theory and explains why cognitive limitations typically disqualify animals from holding rights under this framework.
Having Interests: Discusses Interest Theory, which suggests that the capacity to possess interests makes animals potential candidates for rights.
Having Characteristics: Examines whether specific traits, such as self-consciousness or the capacity to suffer, are sufficient grounds to grant animals rights.
Obligations and duties towards animals: Analyzes the distinction between having duties towards animals and animals having rights over humans.
Conclusion: Argues that the debate is fundamentally theoretical and suggests renaming it to emphasize "human direct duties" rather than animal rights.
Keywords
Animal rights, Hohfeldian view, Choice Theory, Interest Theory, Moral agents, Moral patients, Claim-rights, Liberty-rights, Conations, Self-consciousness, Suffering, Ethical framework, Rights-holders, Obligations, Cognitive capability.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental subject of this text?
The text examines the theoretical question of whether animals should be recognized as formal rights-holders within an ethical and legal framework.
What are the primary thematic areas covered?
The core themes include the definition of rights, the divergence between Choice and Interest theories, and the moral status of animals as either agents or patients.
What is the author's central research question?
The research seeks to determine whether animals can and should be included in the "club of rights-holders," specifically by evaluating different philosophical criteria for rights possession.
Which scientific or philosophical methods are applied?
The work employs a critical comparative analysis of established philosophical literature, specifically referencing Hohfeld, Regan, Rachels, Feinberg, Frey, and Cohen.
What is addressed in the main body of the text?
The main body breaks down the theoretical prerequisites for rights, assesses the suitability of animals for these roles, and distinguishes between having duties toward animals and granting them inherent rights.
Which keywords best describe the discourse?
The discourse is best characterized by terms like moral agents, rights-holders, interest theory, choice theory, and the human-animal moral distinction.
How does the text define the "Choice Theory"?
Choice Theory posits that a right exists only when a rights-holder possesses the cognitive capacity to make choices and exercise control over the duties of others.
What is the "Interest Theory" perspective on animals?
Interest Theory suggests that any being capable of possessing interests—such as preferences or the capacity for suffering—could potentially be a rights-holder, which is a more inclusive approach than Choice Theory.
Does the author conclude that animals have rights?
The author argues that animals can be considered rights-holders only if one adopts a specific moral premise that allows for their inclusion, noting that the debate is largely about framework rather than empirical evidence.
- Quote paper
- Soren Andersen (Author), 2009, Who should be included in, and who excluded from, the club of rights-holders?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/146964
