The topic of this term paper deals with the Maastricht Treaty which came into force in November 1993 and created the European Union. I will examine in particular the negotiations between the member states of the EU, which led to the ratification of the treaty.
The reason for choosing this subject was on the one hand a presentation about the negotiations of the treaty and the integration theory which can explain best the results. I gave it within the scope of a seminar about European Integration during the summer term 2009. The Maastricht Treaty is, on the other hand, certainly a milestone of the European Integration and therefore an important and interesting topic to write about.
The research question is the following: is the Maastricht treaty a result of rational state preferences? Therefore I will analyze the negotiations with the integration theory of Liberal Intergovernementalism (in the following abbreviated “LI”) because the approach of LI is far better suitable to examine such a question than, for example, the theory of Neofunctionalism.
The term paper is divided in three parts: the first part is about the used integration theory, the LI. I will give a general explanation of the main features of this theory and about the theory
that states are acting in a rational manner.
The second section is the main part. This chapter has the focus on the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty between the member states of the EG. The positions of three nations during these negotiations will be viewed: Germany, Great Britain and France. It is obviously that a consideration of all projects which were on the agenda of the negotiations would go beyond the scope of his work. Therefore I will focus my attention on the Economic and Monetary Union.
Within this project the negotiating positions of the states mentioned above will be analyzed in regard to find out if the individual positions are the outcome of rational state preferences.
The third and last part will be the conclusion. There I will give a summary of the results of the analysis undertaken in the main part and the research question will be answered.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Liberal Intergovernementalism
3. Negotiating positions concerning Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
3.1. Germany
3.2. Great Britain
3.3. France
4. Points of criticism and other approaches
5. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This term paper examines whether the Maastricht Treaty, and specifically the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), can be explained as the result of rational state preferences among EU member states. By applying Andrew Moravcsik's "rationalist framework" of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the author analyzes the negotiating positions of Germany, Great Britain, and France to determine if their individual stances align with domestic pressures, bargaining power, and institutional choices.
- Theoretical application of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI)
- National preference formation regarding the EMU in Germany, Great Britain, and France
- Interstate bargaining processes during the treaty negotiations
- Evaluation of institutional choices, specifically the creation of the European Central Bank
- Comparative critique of domestic interest group influence versus geopolitical motivations
Excerpt from the Book
3.1. Germany
The general negotiating positions of Germany towards EMU shows that they were perhaps the state with the most positive attitude towards EMU, in nearly all points they were in favor of it. Within Germany, many actors participated and were involved in a national preference formation regarding EMU. The parties were predominantly in favor of EMU, so the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the Grünen gave their affirmation, whereas the PDS rejected the proposal. The major concern of the most parties was a democratic deficit of the treaty and the observation of the convergence criteria on stage 3 of EMU.
Other state institutions were also in the most part pro EMU, so e.g. the Bundesbank, the Finance Ministry (which has traditionally a strong role compared to other countries), the Auswärtiges Amt and the German Länder. However, within these institutions rose also critical voices: the Vice-President of the Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer, said that EMU could fail without an advancement of the political union. Other points were, just like the German parties, that Germany were not be able to meet the convergence criteria set out in the treaty, an anxiety about the power of the European Central Bank (ECB) to assure stability of prices and exchange-rates.
The economic interest groups in Germany were mostly in favor towards EMU. The BDI (Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie), the DIHT (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag), chief economists of the largest German banks and euro-academics backed it and tried to increase the public and governmental support for EMU with several presentations, plans and statements. The reason was the perspective of an increasement of the competitiveness of the German economy by an autonomous ECB which ensured low inflation.
Chapter Summaries
1. Introduction: The introduction outlines the scope of the paper, defining the research question regarding rational state preferences in the Maastricht Treaty and identifying the methodological focus on Liberal Intergovernmentalism.
2. The Liberal Intergovernementalism: This chapter provides a theoretical overview of the LI model, focusing on the three-stage rationalist framework of national preference formation, interstate bargaining, and institutional choice.
3. Negotiating positions concerning Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): This main section details the specific positions of Germany, Great Britain, and France, analyzing how each nation approached the EMU based on their domestic political and economic structures.
4. Points of criticism and other approaches: The chapter addresses academic critiques of the LI model, specifically regarding the relative influence of domestic interest groups versus geopolitical and ideological factors.
5. Conclusion: The author summarizes the findings, asserting that while rational state preferences largely explain the treaty outcomes, the influence of supranational factors and geopolitical concerns remains significant.
Keywords
Maastricht Treaty, European Union, Economic and Monetary Union, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravcsik, National Preference Formation, Interstate Bargaining, Institutional Choice, Germany, Great Britain, France, European Central Bank, Integration Theory, Supranationalism, Rational Choice
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary objective of this academic paper?
The paper aims to investigate whether the negotiations and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, particularly the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), can be explained by the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism as a result of rational state preferences.
Which theoretical framework does the author utilize?
The author uses Andrew Moravcsik’s "rationalist framework" of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, which examines politics through national preference formation, interstate bargaining, and institutional choice.
Which countries' positions are specifically analyzed?
The study focuses on the negotiating stances of Germany, Great Britain, and France, representing different economic and political perspectives during the negotiation process.
Why was the Economic and Monetary Union selected as the focus?
The author chose the EMU because it represents a critical milestone of European integration and serves as a highly suitable case study to apply the theories of rational state behavior.
How does the paper evaluate the influence of domestic interest groups?
The paper argues that domestic interest groups possess significant influence over government policy, though it suggests this influence might not be as absolute as Moravcsik posits, nor as negligible as some critics claim.
What is the role of the European Central Bank in this analysis?
The establishment of an autonomous ECB is analyzed as a strategic institutional choice by member states to ensure credible commitments, control inflation, and protect national economies from financial shocks.
How did Great Britain's position differ from that of Germany?
Great Britain held the most eurosceptical and depreciative position, largely due to internal party conflicts and a fear of losing sovereignty, eventually leading to the negotiation of an "opt-out" clause.
What was France's stance regarding the integration of Germany?
France supported the project but was driven by the desire to integrate the newly reunified Germany into the European framework to ensure regional stability and maintain their role as a "motor" of the EU.
- Citar trabajo
- Fabian Fuchs (Autor), 2009, The Treaty of Maastricht - the Result of Rational State Preferences?, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/160048
