To understand the roots of the capital markets and the rating agencies I want to start this Bachelor Thesis with a historical development. With introduction of the Issuer Pays Model and the proclamation of so called NRSROs there is the starting point for a long time discussion within the credit rating industry. Then I want to introduce the case of Enron, a former energy conglomerate which has been wrongly rated by the rating agencies.
I want to investigate if there are any parallels to the crisis of 2007. I also want to understand and show the reasons and the structure of the crisis of 2007. So I will introduce the Subprime market and structured finance, as these topics were probably the triggers for the crisis. The main part of my thesis is to find an explanation for the performance of the credit rating agencies. I use a theoretical model which stresses the complexity of assets. The model says that the more complex an asset is, the harder it is to rate for the agencies.
In opposite to that I want to compare the results of the theoretical model with an empirical study. I want to investigate if the theoretical model gets the same result as the empirical approach or if there are huge differences. At last I want to introduce some solution proposals by myself and think about further approaches.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Historical Development of the Rating Agencies and Recent Problems
2.1 Years of Foundation
2.2 The Issuer Pays Model
2.3 Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization
2.4 Recent Rating Problems- The Case of Enron
3 The Financial Crisis 2007 - ?
3.1 Reasons
3.1.1 The Subprime Market
3.1.2 Structured Finance
3.2 The Development
4 The Role of the Rating Agencies- A Model trying to explain
4.1 Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity
4.2 List of Literature
4.3 A Model of an Asset Auction and a Market for Ratings
4.4 Mandatory Disclosure of Shadow Ratings
4.5 Voluntary Disclosure
4.5.1 The Disclosure Decision
4.5.2 The Acquisition Decision
4.6 The Main Results of the Theoretical Model
4.6.1 The complexity of assets raises the incentive to shop for ratings
4.6.2 Complexity affecting ratings bias
4.6.3 Issuer might prefer more complex assets
4.7 An Empirical Dispute
5 Proposed Solutions and Further Perspectives
6 Conclusion
Research Objectives and Themes
This thesis examines the role of credit rating agencies in the context of global financial crises, specifically investigating why these agencies failed to accurately assess risk during the Enron scandal and the 2007 financial crisis. The research aims to understand the impact of asset complexity and the "issuer pays" model on rating accuracy and the resulting market consequences.
- Historical evolution of credit rating agencies and their business models.
- Analysis of the triggers and mechanisms behind the 2007 financial crisis.
- Theoretical modeling of "ratings shopping" and asset complexity.
- Empirical evaluation of rating performance for structured finance instruments.
- Discussion of regulatory improvements and structural reform proposals.
Excerpt from the Book
The particular Importance of Enron
Until four days before Enron filed for bankruptcy, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch had rated the company by investment grade.
How could this happen? The simple version: Enron was highly complex in its business strategy and diversification. “-some of its executives were among the most sophisticated of the ‘rocket scientists’, developing transaction structures dazzling in their intricacy.” In the special case of Enron, the complexity of business is not sufficient, but necessary to explain the cause. Another cause of the wrong rating of Enron is the fact, that the managers practiced immense accounting fraud. Yet Senator Joseph Lieberman, whose Senate committee held the first hearings on Enron blamed the rating agencies: “The credit- rating agencies were dismally lax in their coverage of Enron. They didn’t ask probing questions and generally accepted at face value whatever Enron’s officials chose to tell them. And while they claim to rely primarily on public filings with the SEC, analysts from Standard and Poor’s not only did not read Enron`s proxy statement, they didn’t even know what information it might contain.”
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: Provides an overview of the rating agencies' influence and states the intention to understand the triggers for their performance during crises.
2 Historical Development of the Rating Agencies and Recent Problems: Details the origin of the industry and the rise of the "issuer pays" model and NRSROs, with an early case study on Enron.
3 The Financial Crisis 2007 - ?: Explores the reasons for the 2007 crisis, focusing on the Subprime market and the structure of complex financial instruments.
4 The Role of the Rating Agencies- A Model trying to explain: Utilizes theoretical models and empirical data to analyze how asset complexity and ratings shopping contribute to biased ratings.
5 Proposed Solutions and Further Perspectives: Discusses potential reforms, such as setting complexity thresholds and establishing neutral, government-funded rating entities.
6 Conclusion: Synthesizes the findings, confirming that while ratings shopping is not solely proven as the cause of failures, the high complexity of assets remains a critical factor.
Keywords
Credit Rating Agencies, Structured Finance, Subprime Market, Ratings Shopping, Asset Complexity, Financial Crisis 2007, Enron, Issuer Pays Model, NRSRO, Ratings Inflation, Information Asymmetry, Market Failure, Securitization, CDO, Financial Regulation.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this academic work?
The work focuses on the systemic failure of credit rating agencies to accurately evaluate financial risks, specifically examining how business models and asset complexity led to catastrophic misjudgments during major financial events like the Enron collapse and the 2007 subprime crisis.
What are the primary thematic fields covered in the research?
The research covers the historical foundations of the rating industry, the mechanics of structured finance (including CDOs and RMBS), the theoretical economic models of ratings shopping, and empirical data on rating downgrades.
What is the central research question?
The primary research question explores the underlying triggers and reasons for the poor performance of credit rating agencies, specifically testing the hypothesis that increasing asset complexity creates structural incentives for ratings shopping and resulting inflation.
Which scientific methods are employed?
The thesis utilizes a literature-based historical analysis, a theoretical economic model based on the work of Skreta and Veldkamp, and an empirical discussion comparing these theories with the performance data analyzed by Benmelech and Dlugosz.
What is the content of the main body?
The main body investigates the historical development of the rating industry, the specific mechanisms of the subprime and structured finance markets, and performs an in-depth analysis of how complexity in financial assets affects the objectivity of ratings.
Which keywords best describe this study?
The study is characterized by terms like Credit Rating Agencies, Structured Finance, Asset Complexity, Ratings Shopping, and the 2007 Financial Crisis.
How does the author explain the Enron rating failure?
The author attributes the failure to a combination of Enron's immense business complexity, which outpaced the analytical capabilities of the agencies, and widespread accounting fraud that the agencies failed to uncover through rigorous due diligence.
What solution does the author propose for the "ratings shopping" problem?
The author suggests that one of the most realistic solutions is to establish a threshold for asset complexity, alongside the consideration of creating a neutral, government-funded rating agency to eliminate the conflicts of interest inherent in the "issuer pays" model.
- Quote paper
- Malte Henrik Klein (Author), 2010, The Role of Rating Agencies in Financial Crises, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/162621
