Cruelty against married women has been an age-old phenomenon in India, where women have long been subjected to physical, emotional, and psychological exploitation within the domestic sphere, often under the pretext of dowry demands, family honor, or societal pressures. Recognizing the urgent need to address this social malaise, the Indian legislature enacted Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, through the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983, making cruelty towards a married woman by her husband or his relatives a cognizable, non-bailable, and non-compoundable offence punishable with imprisonment and fine. The section defines cruelty as conduct likely to drive a woman to commit suicide, inflict grave injury, or coerce her or her relatives into fulfilling unlawful property or dowry demands. The legislative intent was to offer the first substantive criminal remedy in India for domestic violence within marriage, thereby protecting women from oppressive practices that were otherwise difficult to address under pre-existing civil or criminal laws. Since its inception, Section 498A has served as a vital tool for women facing harassment and torture, empowering them to approach the police and courts for redress and instilling societal awareness about the legal protection available to married women. However, the law has also been mired in controversy, drawing sustained criticism from various quarters, including sections of civil society, police personnel, lawyers, and judiciary, on the grounds that it is often misused by some women and their relatives to harass husbands and in-laws for personal vendettas, financial gain, or other ulterior motives. The constitutionality of Section 498A has been challenged in multiple judicial forums, including Inder Raj Malik v. Sunita Malik (1986), Girija Shankar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1989), and Balakrishna Panduranga Moghe v. State of Maharashtra (1998), primarily on the premise that the terms “cruelty” and “harassment” are vague and confer arbitrary power on the police and courts, thereby violating Articles 14, 20(3), and 21 of the Constitution. In each instance, the respective High Courts upheld the validity of the provision, emphasizing that the language was sufficiently clear in context and that the legislative purpose of protecting women outweighed the speculative risk of misuse.
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- Citation du texte
- Bendalam Lavaraju (Auteur), 2018, Cruelty against Married Women. A Critical Study, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1654520
