This study examines the role of General Georgios Grivas in the political and military crisis that engulfed Cyprus between 1967 and 1974, focusing particularly on their complex relationship with the Greek military Junta. Drawing on declassified United States intelligence documents, contemporary Greek and Cypriot press reports, Grivas’s own statements and manifestos, and existing historiography, this study offers a reassessment of EOKA B’. It examines the extent to which the organisation operated as an instrument of the dictatorship in Athens.
The book argues that EOKA B’ should not be understood simply as a proxy of the Greek Junta. Although Grivas maintained connections with the regime and shared important ideological and political objectives with its leaders, he retained a significant degree of autonomy, pursuing his own vision of enosis even when his actions conflicted with Athens’s calculations. The study traces the origins of this relationship, the deterioration of relations between Grivas and Archbishop Makarios, the establishment and activities of EOKA B’, and the escalating violence that preceded the events of 1974. It also situates the Cyprus crisis within the wider strategic calculations of the United States and other international actors during the Cold War.
Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction
Grivas: From “X” to EOKA
The Rise of the Colonels’ Dictatorship and American Reactions (1967)
The Greek Division in Cyprus and the First Clashes Between Grivas and Makarios (1967–1970)
The Founding of EOKA B’
From the Re‐election of Makarios to the Death of Grivas (1973–1974)
Conclusion
Objectives & Topics
This study investigates the tumultuous relationship between General Georgios Grivas, his underground paramilitary organization EOKA B’, and the Greek military junta from 1967 to 1974. Re-evaluating long-held historiographical assumptions that depicted Grivas merely as an obedient pawn of the dictatorship in Athens or an external Cold War proxy, the work explores the extent of insurgent autonomy and the intense political rivalry between Grivas and Archbishop Makarios III leading up to the 1974 crisis.
- The military and ideological background of Georgios Grivas from the “X” organization to the original EOKA campaign
- The reaction of the United States and the geopolitical posture of NATO toward the 1967 Greek coup d’état
- The deployment and controversial withdrawal of the Greek Division from Cyprus following the 1967 Kophinou crisis
- The clandestine founding, organizational structure, and paramilitary operations of EOKA B’
- The escalating internal Greek Cypriot conflict, political violence, kidnappings, and assassination attempts against Archbishop Makarios
- The limits of authoritarian leverage and insurgent autonomy under Cold War diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean
Excerpt from the Book
The Greek Division in Cyprus and the First Clashes Between Grivas and Makarios (1967–1970)
Until the establishment of the Colonels’ Dictatorship, Greece and Turkey remained locked in tense negotiations over the future of Cyprus. At that time, successive governments in Athens continued to press for enosis (union of the island with Greece), while Ankara opposed such a move, insisting on its right to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority. These talks were further complicated not only by the unstable political climate in Greece, but also by nationalist outbursts among ordinary citizens in both countries.
Amid this climate, Archbishop Makarios increasingly emerged as an independent actor. The Cypriot leader sought to pursue his own autonomous policy, even when this meant clashing with Athens. In a striking move, Makarios went so far as to order weapons from Czechoslovakia, despite Greek objections and vehement protests from the Turkish Cypriot community. At the same time, the presence of Greek military forces on the island, numbering several thousand troops, gave General Georgios Grivas significant leverage. His primary adversaries were not only the approximately 12,000 Cypriot communists—organized largely within the left-wing party AKEL—but also the armed formations of the Turkish Cypriot population.
Under these circumstances, analysts described the situation as particularly volatile. The CIA, for instance, hastened to issue assessments regarding the possibility of a Greco-Turkish war over control of Cyprus, generally stressing Turkey’s advantage. U.S. intelligence documents highlighted the broader socio-economic base of Turkey and the greater strength of its Armed Forces, concluding that in the event of hostilities, the Turks could potentially advance as far as Thessaloniki by launching an offensive through Thrace. By contrast, the Greek Army was noted to suffer from shortages in munitions and from the fundamental inability to defend both the Greek mainland and Cyprus simultaneously. On the island itself, however, the balance tilted in favor of the Greek side: the combined Greek Cypriot forces exceeded 31,000 men, reinforced by the Greek Division sent from Athens, consisting of 5,750 troops under the command of Grivas. In conclusion, during the spring of 1967, U.S. intelligence assessments consistently recognized the overall superiority of the Turkish Army, but nevertheless acknowledged the clear military advantage of the Greeks on the ground in Cyprus.
Chapter Summaries
Preface: Introduces the life, ideological extremism, and controversial historical legacy of General Georgios Grivas, setting the stage for an inquiry into his degree of autonomy from the Greek military regime.
Introduction: Outlines the historiography of the Cyprus Question and establishes the central thesis that EOKA B’ operated with substantial political-military independence rather than serving as a passive puppet of Athens.
Grivas: From “X” to EOKA: Traces Grivas’s early military education, his participation in the Asia Minor campaign, the establishment of the anti-communist “X” organization during WWII, and his leadership of EOKA in the 1950s anti-colonial struggle.
The Rise of the Colonels’ Dictatorship and American Reactions (1967): Analyzes the April 1967 military coup in Athens, King Constantine II’s reaction, and the shifting, realpolitik response of the United States and the CIA during the Cold War.
The Greek Division in Cyprus and the First Clashes Between Grivas and Makarios (1967–1970): Examines the crisis of November 1967 at Kophinou, the fateful recall of the Greek Division from Cyprus, and the deepening personal and strategic breach between Grivas and Makarios.
The Founding of EOKA B’: Details Grivas’s clandestine return to Cyprus in 1971, the formation of EOKA B’ and its political wing ESEA, the controversial Czech arms deal, and the mounting polarizations on the island.
From the Re‐election of Makarios to the Death of Grivas (1973–1974): Chronologically traces EOKA B’s violent campaigns, the kidnapping of Justice Minister Vakis, the Junta’s official disavowal of Grivas, and Grivas’s sudden death in January 1974.
Conclusion: Synthesizes Grivas’s complex career and assesses the limits of insurgent autonomy, showing how mutual opportunism and divergent goals shaped the path toward the catastrophic 1974 coup and Turkish invasion.
Keywords
Georgios Grivas, EOKA B, Archbishop Makarios, Greek Junta, Cyprus Question, Enosis, Cold War, CIA assessments, Colonels Dictatorship, Kophinou crisis, Greco-Turkish relations, guerrilla warfare, political violence, Dimitrios Ioannidis, Georgios Papadopoulos
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this book?
The book analyzes the insurgency, political rivalry, and geopolitical dynamics surrounding General Georgios Grivas, the paramilitary group EOKA B’, and the Greek military regime in Cyprus between 1967 and 1974.
What are the central thematic areas explored?
The work focuses on the ideological formation of Grivas, the domestic friction between pro-Enosis nationalists and the Cypriot government under Makarios, Athens’ military interventions, and Cold War international diplomacy involving the U.S., Turkey, and Great Britain.
What is the primary objective and research question?
The main objective is to determine whether Grivas and EOKA B’ functioned merely as subordinate proxies of the Greek Junta or whether they operated with a significant degree of autonomous agency driven by Grivas’s uncompromising vision of Enosis.
Which scientific and historical methodology does the study use?
The research relies on critical historical-archival analysis, drawing extensively on declassified U.S. intelligence documents and diplomatic telegrams, contemporary press reports, manifestos, and primary military memoirs.
What is examined in the main body of the work?
The main body examines Grivas’s wartime record, the April 1967 coup in Greece, the deployment and recall of the Greek Division in Cyprus, the underground formation of EOKA B’, and the violent clashes that led up to Grivas’s death in early 1974.
Which key concepts characterize the text?
Key concepts include Enosis (union with Greece), insurgent autonomy, anti-communism, authoritarian manipulation, paramilitary violence, and triangular Greco-Turkish-Cypriot diplomacy.
Why was the withdrawal of the Greek Division from Cyprus in 1967 so consequential?
The withdrawal, forced by Turkey following the armed clashes in Kophinou, removed over 5,000 regular Greek soldiers, leaving Cyprus militarily exposed to future Turkish amphibious invasion and deepening mistrust between Makarios and Athens.
How did the relationship between Grivas and Archbishop Makarios deteriorate?
While originally allied during the 1950s anti-colonial struggle, Grivas viewed Makarios’s pragmatic acceptance of Cypriot independence and intercommunal talks as treason against the ideal of Enosis, leading Grivas to wage an armed paramilitary campaign against the Makarios administration.
Did the Greek Junta fully control EOKA B’ during Grivas’s lifetime?
The archival evidence shows that although Athens provided covert aid, Grivas frequently acted independently, openly disobeyed Athenian directives, and even suffered public disavowal from Papadopoulos in 1973, demonstrating that the Junta never achieved complete control over him while he lived.
- Citation du texte
- Emmanouil Peponas (Auteur), 2026, Georgios Grivas, EOKA B’, and the Greek Junta, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/1791017