Mineral wealth and concomitant phenomena of violence state weakness and corruption
have been widely brought into contact by numerous scholars, as a considerable number
of empirical cases seem to give evidence to this. Particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa the
examples of Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola – just to
mention some of the most striking ones – led to various hypotheses about the influence of
resource plenty on governance issues. Due to several specific characteristics, the case of
Nigeria is different to many others. First of all, the Federal Republic of Nigeria turned out
to be Africa’s most populous state with about 140 million citizens. In addition the social
situation is rather unique, as Nigeria consists of more than 250 ethnic groups. The more
than 500 spoken languages spoken in the country further illustrate the socio-cultural
diversity. Nevertheless the three major communities include more than two thirds of the
country’s total population.
On the socio-economic dimension a key feature is the overwhelming importance of
oil as almost single export good and major contributor of the country’s GDP. The strong dependence on oil has been challenging Nigeria’s economy
considerably and can be seen as a major reason for socio-economic disparities throughout
the country, not to forget that it has been the origin for its ‘(political) Dutch disease’.
Contrarily to other so-called ‘crisis-states’ the main issues threatening statehood and
stability in Nigeria can be rather seen as domestic problems. Transnational issues like the
relations with Cameroon do not have the same structuring quality as in other states.
Although Nigeria improved in TI's CPI of 2008 the country still faces ‘institutionalized’ clientelism and
rent-seeking at almost each political and social level as poor performance in ‘group grievance’, ‘delegitimization of the state’ or ‘factionalized elites’ may illustrate. Secondly
manifold forms of institutional and informal violence are destabilizing the socio-political
architecture. Various attempts to counter those phenomena have been ineffective or
implemented insufficiently, sometimes not at all. The result is a current situation of
disorder, human insecurity, economic inequality fed by a prosperous environment for
individual enrichment provided by a state which is rather effective in facilitating illicit
political and economic behaviours, be they plundering of public goods, drug or weapon
trade or other.
At a glance
- Grade: 2.0 (1.0 is the best grade)
- Applies theories by Rotberg, Reno, Collier and Bayart to Nigeria
- 36 sources in the bibliography
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS
2.1 STATE WEAKNESS AND STATE FAILURE
2.2 'SHADOW-STATEHOOD'
2.3 GREED AND GRIEVANCE IN WAR ECONOMIES
2.4 'THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY' REVISITED
3. POLITICO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
4. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF NIGERIA
5. POLITICS, VIOLENCE & IMPUNITY
6. GODFATHERS, CORRUPTION & CLIENTELISM
7. EXTERNAL FACTORS
8. ON THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT
9. CONCLUSION
Objectives and Themes
This work examines whether Nigeria’s oil wealth can contribute to institutional weakness, corruption and violence, and asks how these interconnected phenomena affect the stability of the state. It combines approaches to state failure, informal power and political economy with an examination of Nigeria’s post-colonial development and the Niger Delta conflict.
- State weakness and the provision of public goods
- Informal patronage and shadow-statehood
- Greed, grievance and resource-related conflict
- Federalism, political violence and corruption
- Foreign oil interests and the Niger Delta
Excerpt from the Book
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF NIGERIA
With independence Nigerian politicians began to cope with these. In the context of federalisation “Nigeria was split into twelve states in 1967; this increased to nineteen in 1976, twenty-one in 1987, and thirty in 1991. Since 1996 Nigeria has been divided into thirty-six states.” The evolved federal system turned out to be the most structuring issue in Nigeria’s polity consisting today of three levels for political decision-making: the central government, the federal state level and the level of local authority. Most of the vital capacities and competences are though still centralized in Abuja, which was given status of Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in 1991.
Indeed the federalization was particularly a strategy for a “partial compartmentalization or decentralization of conflicts in separate, multiple, sub-federal arenas”. For instance, the three major ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa/Fulani and Igbo) have been fragmented as the borders of different federal states cut their traditional territories whereas former ethnic minorities should gain influence owing to the federal topography.
As mentioned above Nigeria consists of 36 federal states plus FCT Abuja. Under the level of states 774 local governments form the third layer. Nigeria is officially described as federal republic headed by the president (at the moment: Umaru Yar’Adua) who is at same time head of the federal government called Federal Executive Council. The legislative branch is marked by a bicameral arrangement, the National Assembly composed by the Senate (109 senators) and the House of Representatives (360 seats). The most important judicial institutions are the Supreme Court and the Federal Court of Appeal both depending on centralized institutions.
The Nigerian Federalism is a quite unique example among other federal systems. Unlike other federal states, like the U.S., Germany or Austria, Nigerian federalism tended – or may even be supposed – to enforce primarily central government, as the extensive splintering of states “has simply compounded the over-centralization” and as a result weakened the relative power of every single state towards central government. It is outstanding that Nigerian states do not possess a notable number of inalienable competences respectively there is no empirical evidence of them using such. The policy of revenue collection fits in this assumption, too. More than 80 percent are collected by central government, respectively responsible central institutions leading to severe dependence of single states but then as well to increased “partisan, sectional, and factional political and economic competition” destabilizing the country.
Chapter Summaries
INTRODUCTION: Introduces Nigeria’s oil-dependent economy and the hypothesis connecting resource wealth with institutional weakness, violence and corruption.
THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS: Presents approaches to state failure, shadow-statehood, greed and grievance, and the politics of the belly as tools for the analysis.
POLITICO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: Traces changes in government and economic development after independence, with particular attention to the expansion of the oil industry.
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF NIGERIA: Examines federalism, political institutions and the distribution of power and revenue between levels of government.
POLITICS, VIOLENCE & IMPUNITY: Discusses political violence, electoral competition and the role of armed groups and impunity.
GODFATHERS, CORRUPTION & CLIENTELISM: Investigates patronage and rent-seeking, including a case study of political conflict in Oyo State.
EXTERNAL FACTORS: Considers foreign oil companies, international trade, major powers and transparency initiatives in Nigeria’s political economy.
ON THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT: Explores oil-revenue distribution, regional movements and interactions among communities, state forces and oil companies.
CONCLUSION: Reassesses the theoretical approaches in light of the Nigerian case and considers the relationship between institutional reform, economic diversification and stability.
Keywords
Nigeria, oil, resource wealth, state weakness, state failure, corruption, political violence, patronage, clientelism, shadow-statehood, federalism, rent-seeking, Niger Delta, greed and grievance
Frequently Asked Questions
What is this work about?
It examines connections between oil wealth, political violence, corruption and state weakness in Nigeria.
What are its central themes?
The main themes include statehood, resource dependence, informal political networks, federalism, external influence and conflict in the Niger Delta.
What is the main research question?
The work asks how resource abundance may contribute to institutional weakness, violence and corruption in Nigeria.
What scholarly method does the author use?
The author develops a theoretical framework from existing scholarship and applies it to a literature- and report-based analysis of Nigeria’s political economy and conflicts.
What does the main body cover?
It covers post-colonial development, political institutions, violence, patronage, external actors and the Niger Delta conflict.
Which keywords characterize the work?
Key terms include oil, state weakness, corruption, political violence, patronage, rent-seeking and the Niger Delta.
Which theoretical approaches are applied?
The analysis draws on Robert I. Rotberg’s work on state weakness, William Reno’s shadow-statehood, Paul Collier’s greed and grievance framework, and Jean-François Bayart’s politics of the belly.
How does the work examine political godfatherism?
It discusses patronage, corruption and political violence through a Human Rights Watch case study concerning Oyo State.
How is the Niger Delta conflict connected to the wider analysis?
The chapter considers how oil-revenue distribution, local movements, security forces and oil companies relate to Nigeria’s national political economy.
- Quote paper
- Christoph Vogel (Author), 2009, Between Resource Plenty and State Failure, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/181554
