Extracto
Contents
1 Introduction: Some Basic Concepts in the Philosophy of Science, and What it Means to Be ‘Scientific’ in the Academic Study of International Relations
2 From Traditionalism to Behaviouralism: the ‘Second Great Debate’ of the 1960s and its Impact on the Contested Epistemology of IR
2.1 The Success of Positivist Methodology in the Natural Sciences
2.2 Traditional Approaches to the Study of IR and the Positivist Challenge
2.3 Positivism and its Shortcomings: Why ‘Scientific Realism’ Faces Significant Limits in the Social Realm
3 Assessing the Conceptual Adequacy and Empirical Potential of a Synthetic Perspective on IR Research Methodology: Two Illustrations, One Suggestion
3.1 Game Theory and its IR Applications: Reasons for and Against a New Orthodoxy of Rationalist Social Analysis
3.2 The Democratic Peace Thesis as an Example of Combined Positivist and Normativist Thought in IR
3.3 Bridging the Gap between ‘Hard Core’ Positivism and ‘Radical’ Interpretivism: the Study of World Politics and the Differing Foci of Causal and Constitutive Theories
4 Conclusion: Is Positivism (Still) an Appropriate Toolkit for Systematic Inquiry in the Social Sciences?
Appendix: The Four Humean Conditions of Causality
Abbreviations
References
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- Dipl.-Pol., MSc (IR) Jan-Henrik Petermann (Autor), 2006, Scientific Approaches to the Study of International Relations, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/182615
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