"The venture capital process can be characterised as involving two sets of key relationships, those between venture capital firms and their fund providers and those between venture capital firms and the entrepreneurs in whom they invest." (Robbie et al., 1998, p. 1) The present work is concentrating upon the latter relationship. More specifically, it examines the effectiveness of pre-deal screening and post-deal monitoring by venture capitalists.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Introduction
- Pre-deal Screening and Adverse Selection
- Post-deal Monitoring and Moral Hazard
- Restructuring and Failure
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
The main objective of this work is to analyze the effectiveness of pre-deal screening and post-deal monitoring by venture capitalists. The paper concentrates on the relationship between venture capital firms and the entrepreneurs they invest in.
- Adverse selection problems in pre-deal screening
- The role of information asymmetry in investment decisions
- Moral hazard problems in post-deal monitoring
- The effectiveness of various monitoring mechanisms
- The role of active investors in restructuring troubled investments
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
Introduction: This chapter introduces the context of venture capital investments and focuses on the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.
Pre-deal Screening and Adverse Selection: This chapter explores the challenges of pre-deal screening due to adverse selection. It examines how venture capitalists evaluate entrepreneurs and projects, considering factors such as personal characteristics, experience, market conditions, and the possibility for high returns.
Post-deal Monitoring and Moral Hazard: This chapter discusses the challenges of post-deal monitoring due to moral hazard. It explores various mechanisms used by venture capitalists to mitigate moral hazard problems and the effectiveness of different levels of involvement in investee companies.
Restructuring and Failure: This chapter examines the role of active investors in restructuring troubled investments. It discusses the two general types of problem cases: 'Good Rump' and 'Living Dead', and the challenges associated with enforcing restructuring measures.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
Venture Capital, Pre-deal Screening, Post-deal Monitoring, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Restructuring, Information Asymmetry, Due Diligence, Entrepreneurial Ability, Monitoring Mechanisms, Active Investors, Corporate Governance.
- Citar trabajo
- Dr. Klaus Schöfer (Autor), 1998, Analyse the effectiveness of pre-deal screening and post-deal monitoring by venture capitalists, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/185876
