On February 4th 2012, Russia and China vetoed an Arab-West plan in the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC). The plan called for Syria’s President Bashar al Assad to step down. Russia, in particular, has often used the outcome of the Libyan resolution as a justification for its Syria vetoes.
This paper applies the two level game theory of Robert Putnam, and the foreign policy (FP) decision-making model by Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann. Its aim is to provide evidence to substantiate the hypothesis that domestic Russian interests were the driving factor behind the double SC vetoes and that China had echoed the move to honor its strategic partnership agreement with Russia.
Firstly, the paper will briefly explain the two-level game theory as well as the foreign policy decision-making model. Secondly, will follow an analysis of the international environment (level one) which influenced the veto decision. Thirdly, an investigation of the domestic game (level two) will be carried out, using the Hermann model before drawing to a conclusion.
The lack of access to detailed decision making protocols and the haziness surrounding the relevant domestic decision makers in Russia, have made it impossible to clearly identify the members of the ultimate decision making unit and the level one rationale for the Syria veto. One can assume, that in all likelihood, a single group composed of different players within the Russian elite, influenced the decision. China’s exact interests or its reasons to use its veto power remain undefined. It seems to be relatively safe to claim that Russia was the driving factor behind the veto and that China followed suit. The paper concludes that Russia’s national security concerns and its wish to be recognized once more as a great power, (this implies some anti- western feelings) were, in all likelihood, the important reasons behind the veto.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Two-level game theory and the foreign policy decision making model
3. Level one: Draft resolution S/2012/77
4. Level two: Domestic elements
5. Conclusion
Objectives & Core Topics
This paper examines the motivations behind the dual UN Security Council vetoes by Russia and China regarding the Syrian conflict in February 2012, testing the hypothesis that domestic Russian interests, rather than international pressures, were the primary driver of this decision.
- Application of Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory.
- Utilization of the Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann foreign policy decision-making model.
- Analysis of the historical evolution of Russian foreign policy since the 1990s.
- Investigation into the domestic elite dynamics and factional interests within the Russian political system.
- Evaluation of the strategic partnership between Russia and China in the context of UN diplomacy.
Excerpt from the Book
Two-level game theory and the foreign policy decision making model
Putnam’s two-level or nested game tackles the issue as to whether international relations or domestic politics are the determinative factors that form FP. It is based on the findings that there are no unitary national actors. It would be inaccurate to see government decisions as an outcome of unified views. The theory sets apart the international and the domestic levels. Different national groups might exert pressure on the government to adopt the policies that they favor. Politicians who want to stay in power therefore constantly need to form new coalitions among the various powerful groups whilst developing new policies. On the international scene, contrary to popular belief, the focal point rests, not on the nation’s interests, but on a strategy to make the domestic game favor the ruling authority and keep the government in power. FP decision makers therefore constantly need to consider domestic and international pressures and try to juggle them. The national level plays such a key role to the survival of the government that leaders will be most sensitive to domestic politics. Level one of the theory refers to international negotiations whereas level two touches on the domestic ramification process (Putnam, 1988).
The Hermann model is a polished version of the Easton Model. It tries to break up the political system’s black box and identify the main actors who influence the decision making process that leads to FP outputs. The focus of the Hermann model is not on which problems are addressed but on who deals with them and how the process to produce an output, affects the nature of the decision. Consequently, the theory centers on identifying the ultimate/authoritative decision unit (UDU) in order to be able to examine how it is operating. The UDU is defined as a set of authorities that has the power to deliver resources to remedy a specific problem. It cannot be contested without significant costs being incurred. The theory suggests three possible decision making units and provides various decision-making trees that help to identify the relevant UDU. It also helps to define the nature of the UDU and can to a certain degree, predict the general features of the expected process outcomes (Hermann, 2001).
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: This chapter outlines the context of the 2012 UN veto on Syria, states the primary research hypothesis, and introduces the theoretical framework applied to evaluate the decision-making process.
2. Two-level game theory and the foreign policy decision making model: This section details the theoretical foundations, explaining how Putnam’s two-level game and the Hermann model are utilized to analyze domestic versus international influences on foreign policy.
3. Level one: Draft resolution S/2012/77: This chapter analyzes the international dimension of the veto, tracing the evolution of Russian foreign policy from the Yeltsin era to Putin's assertion of great power status and its strategic relationship with China.
4. Level two: Domestic elements: This section investigates internal Russian political dynamics, focusing on elite factions, power bases, and the role of the state in linking domestic stability with foreign policy maneuvers.
5. Conclusion: The final chapter summarizes the findings, confirming that domestic security concerns and the aspiration for great power status were likely the core drivers behind Russia’s decision to use its veto power.
Keywords
Russia, China, Syria, UN Security Council, Veto, Two-level game theory, Hermann model, Foreign policy, Great power status, Domestic politics, Elite factions, Middle East, Strategic partnership, International relations, Sovereignty
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research paper?
The paper explores the decision-making processes behind Russia and China's double veto of a 2012 UN Security Council resolution on Syria, specifically testing the hypothesis that internal Russian domestic interests were the primary catalyst.
What theoretical frameworks are applied?
The author applies Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory to reconcile domestic and international pressures, alongside the Hermann model to identify the authoritative decision-making units within the Russian government.
What is the primary conclusion regarding Russia’s motivations?
The study concludes that Russia’s veto was driven by its desire to re-establish its status as a great power and deep-seated security concerns regarding the spread of Sunni extremism into the Caucasus region following a potential regime change in Syria.
How does the paper characterize the Sino-Russian partnership?
The partnership is described as strategic but pragmatic; while China supported the veto, the author argues this was likely due to complex indirect interests, such as concern over Iran, rather than a deep ideological alliance.
What is the role of elite factions in Russian foreign policy?
The paper argues that Russia's foreign policy is significantly influenced by powerful internal factions, including the security services and the military-industrial complex, which operate behind closed doors to influence policy outcomes.
Which scientific method is utilized?
The paper employs a qualitative analytical approach, using political science theories to interpret historical foreign policy documents and geopolitical events to substantiate the author's hypothesis.
What are the implications of the "anti-Western" discourse mentioned?
The paper suggests that the anti-Western rhetoric reflects Russia's ongoing search for a new national identity and a strategic shift toward strengthening ties with Asian partners.
How does the author address the lack of access to internal government protocols?
The author acknowledges the inability to view official, classified protocols, relying instead on analysis of historical patterns, scholarly literature, and official state documents to construct a logically supported assessment of the decision-making process.
- Citar trabajo
- Marcel Reymond (Autor), 2012, The February 2011 UN veto of Russia and China in the Syria case, Múnich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.grin.com/document/202344
