China and the WTO - A Critical Analysis

Table of Content

China and WTO: A Critical Analysis

I. Introduction

II. China’s Entry into the WTO: A High, but Good Price?
1. Preparation Phase (1978-1986)
2. Negotiations to China’s WTO Accession
2.1. Market Economy Status
2.2. Developing Country Status
3. Assessment of China’s WTO Commitments
4. Summary

III. Implementation and Participation: Has China been a Reliable Member?
1. General Points on Compliance and Participation
2. Special Aspects of China’s WTO Participation and Implementation
2.1. China and TRIPS
2.2. China and Agreement on Textiles and Trade
2.3. China and Anti-Dumping
2.4. China and Technical Barriers to Trade
2.5. China and Regional Trade Agreements
3. Summary

IV. The Impact of China’s WTO Membership on China and the World
1 Impact on China
1.1. Impact on the Rule of Law
1.2. Impact on National Industries
1.2.1. The Automobile Industry
1.2.2. The Banking Sector
2. Impact on Developed Countries with the Example of the U.S
3. Impact on Developing Countries with the Example of India
4. Summary

V. Conclusions and Future Outlook

References

List of Tables and Graphics

Abbreviations

List of Tables and Graphics

Table 1: Eight General Areas and Number of China’s Trade Regime Commitments in Each Area.

Table 2: Comparison of China’s WTO Commitments with Indian’s WTO Obligation.

Table 3: China’s Textile Export 2005.

Table 4: China’s Clothing Export 2005.

Table 5: Leading Exporters of Textiles, 2005.

Table 6: Leading Exporters of Clothing, 2005.

Table 7: Anti-Dumping Targets country from 1995.1.1 to 2006.6.30.

Table 8: Impact on real GDP of ASEAN-China FTA..

Table 9: China’s Output of Automobiles 2000-2006.

Table 10: Foreign Investors/Strategic Partners in 3 of the big 4 Chinese banks.

Table 11: US Trade with China 1985-2005.

Table 12: Percentage of US import of Certain East Asian countries.

Table 13: Macroeconomic Data of the U.S. (1980-2006)

Graphic 1: Number of Companies having import/export trading rights.

Graphic 2: Number of Written Submissions in WTO in 2003.

Abbreviations

illustration not visible in this excerpt

China and the WTO: A Critical Analysis

I. Introduction

On December 11th 2001 in Doha, The People’s Republic of China^[1] was admitted to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) after 15 years of difficult negotiation.^[2] With its share in world export and import reaching respectively 7.7 percent from 6.1 percent in 2005 from respectively 4.3 percent and 3.8 percent in 2001^[3] , China has become the third largest trading nation in the world. China’s GDP increased with an annual growth rate of 9.5% from 1.3 trillion in 2001^[4] to US$2.2 trillion in 2005. China has also surpassed Japan as the largest foreign exchange holder in the world^[5] .

The Year 2006 was the fifth anniversary of China’s WTO accession and at this point China had to complete most of its obligations as stated in the WTO accession document. China is serious about its WTO commitments and regarding those commitments, felt unfairly treated with some of the “special treatments” stated in their WTO accession protocol. For example, China feels it should be recognised by its biggest trading partners, namely the U.S., EU, and Japan^[6] as a market economy. Interestingly enough, though, is that the U.S. also thinks that China’s WTO commitments in market accession are not deep or exclusive enough^[7] . Some trading partners of China even urge China to make market openings not required by its WTO entry agreement^[8] . It is then a worthy question, how should China’s WTO commitments be accessed, now that China has made most of its market opening obligations?

Regarding the implementation of its WTO commitments, the Chinese authority claims that, “China has earnestly fulfilled its WTO commitments and honoured its obligations within the multilateral trading system”.^[9] But some WTO members, including, especially the U.S., seem unsatisfied with the performance of China in its fulfilment of its WTO accession commitments. For example, in its 2006 Report to Congress, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated that China’s implementation to its WTO commitments “remain spotty and halting in important areas five years after China attained membership”. Has China really been neglecting its WTO obligations? How has China participated in the WTO?

Around the time of China’s WTO accession, there were heated discussions in mass media and in academic circles about its possible impact on China and the rest of the world. Pessimistic predictions ranged from ruins of China’s national economies to collapse of the entire Chinese society and the world trading system. Optimists believed China’s accession would benefit not only China, but also the World^[10] . It is an interesting question now to ask of what China’s accession to the WTO has brought about for the world and for China itself.

To answer these questions, this paper gives in part two an analysis of China’s entry process into the WTO and an assessment on China’s accession commitment. In part three, the most important aspect of China’s performance and implementation is analysed. The paper then researches the impact that the WTO membership has brought to China and the world in part four. In this section, the impact on rule of law is researched and the impact on trade growth as well as employment are analysed. Part five summarizes the result and gives view of future prospects.

II. China’s Entry into the WTO: A High, but Good Price?

“China’s accession to the WTO was more important than launching a new round of trade liberalisation.”

--------- Mike Moore WTO Director-general, 1999 to 2003

Most of the time insulated from the rest of the world, China’s WTO accession by the end of 2001, was a milestone for China. In order to understand the difficulties China had to face in order to open up and integrate itself to the world, it will be useful to take an historical review of China’s road to this point.

The former Republic of China was one of the original contracting members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)^[11] . In the year 1950, the Republic of China^[12] retreated from the GATT, while the newly established People’s Republic of China stayed away from the GATT for ideological reasons^[13] .

During the time from 1950 to 1978 China was in a total planned economy^[14] and foreign trade was highly regulated. There was very small amount of foreign trade, the entire economy was highly planned and tariffs were high^[15] .

1. Preparation Phase (1978-1986)

The Year 1978 was a turning point in China’s modern history. The Chinese Communist Party has set economic development as the central goal of the country^[16] . The direct effect of this policy was to integrate China into the world economy after a long time of isolation^[17] . In 1980, China received official membership to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund^[18] . With the deepening of the opening up policy and the development of foreign trade, China realised the importance of becoming a member of the GATT^[19] . With the rapid development of foreign trade, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation and Trade (MOFTEC) applied to the State Council that China should join the GATT^[20] . In the application report in 1982 it was stressed that the trade among GATT members accounted for 85% of total world trade. China’s Trade with GATT member countries accounted also for 85% of China’s foreign trade volume^[21] . No matter whether China joined the GATT or not, the GATT regulations are both directly and indirectly binding for China. With this background, it was advantageous for China to regain its GATT contracting party status^[22] .

In November of 1982, China gained an observer status and also attended for the first time the 36th GATT member conference. From 1982 to 1984 China made preparation work for its application and in April of 1984, China became a special observer of the GATT. On July 10th 1986, China made its formal application to return to the GATT. The GATT formed a Working Party in March of 1987, composed of all interested GATT contracting parties to examine China’s application and negotiate terms for China’s accession.

2. Negotiations to China’s WTO Accession

China’s WTO accession negotiation took 15 years from 1987 to 2001. Why did it take such a long time?

The first reason is of a political nature. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, the western countries including the U.S. and the European Countries were politically not as eager to allow China into the GATT as they were with other former non-market economies of Eastern Europe^[23] . At the time of the Cold War, the US was willing to tolerate trade policies that were detrimental to its export interests for the sake of foreign policy objectives with regard to its treatment of accession to the former Soviet satellite countries (Yugoslavia, 1966; Poland, 1967;Romania, 1971; Hungary, 1973).^[24]

The second reason is economical. In respect to China’s size and pace of development the existing members saw a potentially strong exporter in the world market, while at the same time, it is an attractive growing market place especially for developed countries.^[25]

The third reason was that China as a whole, was not at all of the same opinion in regards to China’s WTO accession. There were reformers and conservatives in China as in every country.

Other factors played also a roll in the negotiation process. During the negotiation process, some important events influenced the pace: For example, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade of May 1999 which stopped the negotiation of the two countries.^[26]

The U.S. seemed to want a big price from China and therefore held China in the negotiation for such a long time^[27] . One of the key steps in the negotiation was the question of whether China should be recognized as a “market economy”. Another important aspect is China’s status as a developing country. These two aspects will be discussed in detail in the following section. While market economy principle is a precondition of the WTO, developing country status is an important base for market accession negotiations.

2.1. Market Economy Status

China as an planned economy under communism, did not get MFN status from the U.S. automatically. Under the Jackson-Vanik Freedom-of-Emigration Amendment of the Trade Act of 1974 China’s Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) status from the US should be conditionally renewed every year by the US congress.^[28] The sheer possibility of the termination of China’s MFN status by the US congress was a huge risk for China’s export, because it would mean a duty increase of 95% of US imports from China.^[29]

Becoming a WTO member would give China a safe world market environment, especially concerning the United States of America. Since the Tiananmen Incident, the US has suspended the MFN status of China. After that, the US congress voted annually about the MFN status of China.^[30]

According to Long Yongtu, before 1992, it was beyond its historical possibility for China to claim itself to be a “market economy”.^[31] At that time, China insisted that the economic system was a “commodity economy”, regulated by a combination of planning and market^[32] . But, this was not convincing to western countries^[33] . The western countries believe an economy is either a planned economy or a market economy and there is no “commodity economy”^[34] . The negotiations went into a deadlock, as nobody from China’s delegation could convince the other WTO members that such a commodity economy could be compatible with the GATT regulations^[35] .This problem was overcome in 1992 after Deng Xiaoping made the statement that “we, as a socialist country, can also build a market economy”^[36] .

During the negotiation process, China continued the liberalisation of its market according to market principles. In July of 1998 the EU deleted China from the list of non-market economies, but still treated China as a “conditioned market economy”^[37] . In November of 1999, China and the US agreed on the conditions of China’s WTO accession and within 15 years after China’s accession, the U.S. could treat China as a non-market economy.

In September of 2001, the working group of China’s WTO accession published “the Agreement on China’s Accession to WTO”, stating that within 15 years of China’s accession, other WTO members can treat China as a “non-market economy” (NME)^[38] .

What implications does this clause have for China? This NME status is relevant in anti-dumping investigations for the exporters of China, who have been the main AD targets since the establishment of the WTO (Compare III.2.3).

2.2. Developing Country Status

By aiming at accession under a developing country status, China would have some advantages^[39] . The important advantage of a developing country status is a longer transitional period in which to bring the economic system up to the WTO conformant level^[40] ; but, as Gurbaxani/Opper (1998) argued, taking all the special conditions as a developing country could be detrimental to China’s economic development^[41] .

According to the WTO, the implicated definition is that a developing country should be a country that can only support a low standard of living and is in the early stages of development^[42] . Under these two conditions (low living standards and low development) the more important determinant is the overall low standard of living^[43] .

According to the above mentioned definition, it was clear that China should be treated as a developing country , “with the majority of its 1.2 billion people living in urban and rural poverty, inadequate institutional and physical infrastructure, and an outmoded, state-owned heavy industry sector with a huge unskilled labour force.”^[44] The per Capital GDP in urban areas was USD 374 and in rural areas much less^[45] .

The US insisted that China’s economy had been growing fast, and should be treated as a developed economy not as a developing country. It seemed that the US was interested in getting as high as accession price as possible from China. This can be illustrated by the remark of Mickey Kantor, the then US Trade Representative to the US International Business Council in 1995, “ … for certain purposes, China is a developed country and for certain purposes it is a developing country. ”^[46]

After hard negotiations with the U.S., China agreed to accept that it would in practice not be treated as a “developing country”, as stated in the WTO China Working Party Report, paragraph. 9, “Some members of the Working Party indicated that because of the significant size, rapid growth and transitional nature of the Chinese economy, a pragmatic approach should be taken in determining China’s need for recourse to transitional periods and other special provisions in the WTO Agreement available to developing country WTO Members”.^[47]

In this section, the two important points regarding China’s accession negotiation are discussed and both of these points have consequences for China’s commitments. As a non-market economy, China would be confronted with to some degree unfair treatment in anti-dumping investigations^[48] . By joining as a non-developing country, China would be giving up special treatment, such as a longer transitional period, which Chinese industries could benefit from in order to “catch-up” and be in par with the rest of the developed countries. Even further, China agreed to certain discriminatory clauses to be admitted into the WTO. This is discussed in the following section.

3. Assessment of China’s WTO Commitments

In general, acceding countries of the WTO have to pay a high price for “coming on board”. Namely, they have to “assume obligations that are far more extensive than the existing members at an equivalent stage of economic development^[49] . At Japan’s accession to the GATT in 1995, Japan was even denied MFN status by invoking the non-application clause of the GATT by many members^[50] . China’s WTO commitment^[51] was substantial, extensive and demanding in comparison to most member developing countries. There are 685 commitments regarding China’s trade regime beside market accession commitments for goods and service areas, as according to the United Sates General Accounting Office (GAO) (see Table 1).

A comparison of China’s accession commitments with India’s current obligations shows clearly the demanding nature of China’s accession commitments (compare Table 2). Out of the eight main areas of China’s commitments, three are rated better: tariff bindings, agriculture and trade-related intellectual property; two are rated equal or better: trade-related investment measures and quantitative restrictions; and three areas are equal between China and India, GATT member since 1947: Information Technology Agreement, services and subsidies.

Another special feature regarding China’s accession commitment is that it contains many China-specific clauses, which are in their nature against the main principle of non-discrimination^[52] . Strikingly different from the commitments of other WTO members, China’s Commitment Protocol is not a standardized document, but rather contains a large number of special provisions, which are called “WTO-Plus” Obligations^[53] . These include Textile Safeguards and product specific safeguards clauses, and transitional review mechanism as well as some other special regulations for China.

Textile Safeguards: China must be committed to

- allowing WTO members to invoke the textile safeguard against China when imports of Chinese textiles or apparel products cause market disruption that threatens to impede the orderly development of trade.
- Holding shipment of textiles and apparel to certain levels, upon request for consultations to ease market disruption
- permitting WTO members to use the textile safeguard until December 31, 2008, 4 years after expiration of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.
- Allowing WTO members to apply safeguard measures under the textile safeguard only for 1 year, without reapplication, unless otherwise agreed.
- Prohibiting the textile safeguard and product-specific safeguard from being applied to the same product at the same time

source: GAO 2002 “Analysis of China’s Commitments to Other Members”

Product Specific Safeguards: China must be committed to

- Allowing WTO members to withdraw concessions or limit imports when Chinese products are imported to WTO members and cause or threaten to cause market disruption.
- Allowing WTO member to withdraw concessions or limit imports only for such time as is necessary to prevent or remedy market disruption.
- Allowing China to suspend application of substantially equivalent concessions when a WTO member adopts a measure in response to (1)a relative increase in Chinese imports, and when the measure remains in effect for more than 2 years or (2) an absolute increase in imports, when the measure remains in effect more than 3 years.
- allowing WTO members to withdraw concessions or otherwise limit Chinese imports if the application of the product-specific safeguard by another WTO members against China threatens to cause significant diversions of trade into the market of the other importing WTO member.
- Terminating the product-specific safeguard on December 11, 2013, 12 years after China’s accession to WTO

Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM) is another China-specific clause. The TRM has the function of monitoring and enforcing the implementation of China’s WTO commitments and is also subjected to the WTO Trade Dispute Mechanism (TDM)^[54] . The TRM requires that China provides specific information, which is then subject to examination by 16 subsidiary bodies and also at the General Council Meeting of the WTO^[55] .

Another example of China-specific clauses is in section two (c) of the Protocol and Working Party Report paragraph 334, which demands that China should “translate all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to trade into at least one official language of the WTO and to make such translations available to WTO members no later than 90 days after their implementation or enforcement.”

There is no WTO regulation for such an extraordinary requirement. The Chinese government may issues hundreds of laws, regulations and measures and it could take months for the central government to collect all the relevant laws, regulations and measures from all the local governments of China.^[56] To translate them within 90 days after implementation is an extremely challenging, if not impossible, task. While it is understandable that this requirement would make the Chinese trade system transparent, these special transparency provisions could prove to be unrealistic.^[57] While the conditions in China were not much different from other developing and transitional economies, it is interesting to ask why in the case of China such “special treatments” came about. The negative impact of these “China-specific” requirements could damage the basic principle of the rule of law, since there is no mentioning of any reasons in the Protocol why such requirements came into being.^[58]

Despite the demanding and to some extent discriminating nature of the WTO accession commitments, China achieved its basic goal in its accession agreement: MFN status from all the WTO members, especially from the US. MFN status was a troublesome factor for China before WTO accession, which made China’s export and investment environment unsafe.^[59] Another important aspect is that China, now as a member, can make its own voice heard in making new rules in future negotiations.

4. Summary

In this Section, the process of China’s WTO accession was described and analysed.

The process of China’s entry into the WTO is also the process of China’s transition from a planned economy into a market-oriented economy. Interesting here is the different characteristics of China’s transition in comparison with the Eastern Europe States.

Unlike the East European States, China has not followed the Washington Consensus^[60] for its transformation process. Instead it has just “crossed the river by feeling the stones”. The WTO accession is within this background an instrument for China’s reformers to get China’s transformation going. Instead of a Big Bang transformation, it has installed a gradual process of marketing reforms. Keeping this in mind, it is understandable that 15 years of WTO negotiation was also the process of market opening and liberalisation.

China has been a WTO member since 2002, how has China been performing in the WTO with regards to its accession commitments? This will be discussed in the following part.

III. Implementation and Participation: Has China been a Reliable Member?

1. General Points on Compliance and Participation

“Even if there are still areas that need some improvements, the political commitments and determination showed by the Chinese government is serious and responsible and all members have acknowledged it”

-----------Pascal Lamy, Director General of WTO

Long before China’s formal accession, China had begun tariff and non-tariff reduction, the revision or abolishment of laws inconsistent with the WTO obligations, as well as widespread “WTO-education.”^[61] China has revised more than 3,000 laws and regulations since WTO accession.^[62] Many “think tanks” and research organisations were established to give support. One good example is the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Centre.^[63] Since its establishment in October 2000, it contributed greatly to the fulfilment of China’s accession commitments, especially through consultation given to the central and regional governments in their adaptation to the WTO regime.^[64]

Additional to the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the Chinese government liberalized the right to engage in foreign trade. This was reflected in the rapid and substantial expansion in the number of domestic firms granted trading rights, as shown in Graphic 1.

While there are clearly some areas where China can do better, it is assumed that China cannot fulfil its commitment one hundred percent. The Director General of the WTO, Mr. Pascal Lamy, has praised China’s performance: “The Chinese implementation of the WTO commitments in many areas has set a good example.”^[65]

According to a survey conducted among US companies by the USCBC, 83% of the respondents evaluate China’s WTO implementation as “fair” or “good”.^[66] According to the survey of U.S. companies the areas in which the implementation is good are:^[67]

- Trading and distribution rights
- Market sector openings
- Tariff and duty reduction

Areas in which implementation is not satisfactory are:^[68]

- IPR protection
- Transparency in the process of law making, decision making, and product and technology standards
- Incomplete market openings in certain service sectors.

There are areas where China is still falling short of the requirements of the WTO commitments, but no single foreign actor has accused China of strategically ignoring its WTO obligations.^[69]

As a new WTO member, China has been also actively participating in the WTO regular activities as well as in the Doha Round negotiations.^[70] This can be illustrated by an analysis of written submissions in 2003 to the ruling bodies of the WTO as well as in the Doha Round negotiations: China, as the most active member from developing countries, has submitted 65 submissions, that is more than India (50) and Chile (45), the next two active participants of the WTO (compare Graphic 2).

[...]

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^[1] Hereinafter referred to as “China”.

^[2] WTO successfully concludes negotiations on China’s Entry, WTO News, 17.09.2001, available at www.wto.org , accessed on 11.10.2006.

^[3] World Trade Statistics 2006 and World Trade Statistics 2002, World Trade Organisation

^[4] Yi, Xiaozhun: Statement to the First WTO Trade Policy Review of china, 19.04.2006

^[5] In May 2006, China has 925 billion foreign exchange, Japan 843, Euro Area 173 and USA 41,

IMF, quoted from „Weltkrieg um Wohlstand“ in: Der Spiegel, 37/2006, p.53

^[6] A Study in China shows that marktetization in China was 73.8% in 2003 and according to the 2006 list of economic freedom of Heritage foundation, China received similar scores with Russia, which received market economy status from the U.S. in 2002. See: Wang, Yong: China in the WTO an Chinese View, 11.12.2006, available on www.uschina.org, accessed on 22.12.2006.

^[7] Compare: China’s Implementation of Its World Trade Organisation Commitments. Oral Testimony by the US-China Business Council, 28.12.2006.

^[8] Overmyer, Michael: With China’s WTO Entry Requirements Winding Down, Will 2006 become China’s “Year of the Bank“?

^[9] Yi, Xiaozhun, 2006.

^[10] Compare: Yu, Peter K. and others: China and the WTO, Progress, Perils, and Prospects, Columbia Journal of Asian Law, Vol. 17, p.1, 2003

^[11] Prime, Penelope B.: China joins the WTO: How, Why and What Now?, Business Economics, vol.XXXVII, No.2 (April, 2002), pp.26-32.

^[12] Taiwan Province of China, hereafter referred to as „Taiwan“.

^[13] Kahl, Jürgen: „Großer Sprung in die Globalisierung – China vor dem Beitritt zur WTO (Big Leap into Globalisation – China before WTO Accession), July 2001, FES - Analyse

^[14] Kornai, János: Das Sozialistische System: Die Politische Ökonomie des Kommunismus, 1. Aufl.. - Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verl.-Ges., 1995.

^[15] Kornai, 1995.

^[16] Zhongguo Shiwunian Rushizhilu (Fifteen Years of China’s WTO Accession Process), online accessed on 11.01.2007 e56.com.cn.

^[17] Ibid.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] Ibid.

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Ibid.

^[22] Ibid.

^[23] Because of different geopolitical positions, the US and EU saw China differently at the time of China’s accession negotiations. For the US, it was a question of yes or no, as of for EU, it was how, should China enters the WTO.

^[24] Hoekmann, Bernard M. and Kostecki, Michel M: The Political Economy of the World Trading System, the WTO and Beyond, Oxford University Press, 2001, Page 67; Eglin, Michaela: China’s Entry into the WTO with a little help from the EU, in: International Affairs 73, 3 (1997), p.494.

^[25] Eglin, 1997, p.506.

^[26] Long Yongtu: Huigu Zhongguo Rushi Tanpan 15nian Licheng (Looking back of the 15 Years of WTO Negotiation Process), Speech at the Beijing Foreign Trade University, 2002, Beijing.

^[27] Gurbaxani, Indira,and Opper, Sonja: Chinas Weg in die WTO im Spannunsfeld chinesisch-amerikanischer Partikularlinteressen, in: Tübingen Diskussionsbeitrag No.130, March 1998

^[28] Pregelj Vladimir N.: Most-Favoured-Nation Status of the People’s Republic of China, December 6, 1996, CRS Report for Congress, available at http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/international/inter-12.cfm#_1_2, This linking of China’s MFN status to political situation was abandoned in 1994 when Clinton renewed the china waiver only on the freedom-of emigration requirement. In 1979, Deng Xiaoping made a historic visit to the United States to further the normalization of relations between the two countries. At a White House meeting, President Carter raised the issue of human rights and asked whether Deng was willing formally to permit freedom of emigration from China. Deng Responded: “If you want me to release ten million Chinese to come to the United states, I’d be glad to do so.” (Jimmy Carter, Keeping faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p.209).

^[29] Pregelj 1996.

^[30] For detailed information on China’s MFN status from the USA, see Pregelj, Vladimir N.: Economics Division, December 6, 1996, available on www.fas.org/man/crs/92-094.htm, accessed on 10.01.2007-01-11

^[31] Long, 2002.

^[32] Long, 2002.

^[33] Long, 2002.

^[34] Long, 2002.

^[35] Long, 2002.

^[36] Wu, Yifeng: Lishixing Lilun Nanti He Dengxiaoping ‘Shehuizhuyi Shichangjingji’ Lilun (‘Historical theory difficulty and Deng Xiaoping’s theory on socialism market Economy’), in: Dang Dai Jing Ji Yan Jiu (Reseach on Modern Economy), 2004, 8th.

^[37] . Wang, Bing and Chen, Yanhe: Economic Analysis of China’s Market Economy Status”, http://www.jjxj.com.cn/news_detail.jsp?keyno=11759, accessed on 09.01.2007.

^[38] Lawrence, Robert Z.: China and the Multilateral Trading System, Conference Paper, Seoul, May 2006. p.7.

^[39] Senti, Richard, WTO System und Funktionsweise der Welthandeldordung, Schulthess Juristische Median AG, Zürich, 2000, Capital 7.2 about the special treatment to developing countries in GATT, TATS and TRIPS.

^[40] Eglin 1997.

^[41] Gurbaxani/Opper, 1998, pp.6-8.

^[42] See GATT article XVIII, available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm

^[43] Eglin 1997.

^[44] Eglin 1997.

^[45] Eglin 1997.

^[46] Kantor, Mickey: US insists position remains unchanged on China entry into WTO, in: Inside US Trade, March 17, 1995, quoted from Eglin 1997, p.493.

^[47] Working Party Report on China’s Accession, available at www.wto.org

^[48] Ikenson, Daniel: Nonmarket Nonsense, U.S. Antidumping Policy toward China, March 7, 2005, Trade Briefing Paper, Cato Institute’s Centre for Trade Policy Studies.

^[49] Lawrence, 2006, p.6.

^[50] Yang, Yongzheng, “China’s Integration into the World Economy: Implications for Developing Countries”, IMF Working Paper WP/03/245, December 2003, p.18.

^[51] The whole accession document is downloadable online under: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm#list; compare also: GAO (United States General Accounting Office) Report to Congressional committees, “World Trade Organisation Analysis of China’s Commitments to other Members”, GAO-03-04, 2002 October

^[52] There are 7 major areas where China-specific “WTO-Plus” clauses are included: (1)Transparency, (2) Judicial Review, (3) Uniform Administration, (4) National Treatment, (5) Foreign Investment, (6) Market Economy, and (7) Transitional Review. For more details please see Qin, Julia Ya, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organisation Legal System, an Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, Journal of World Trade 37 (3): 283-522, 2003

[52] Compare China’s Accession Terms, see WTO documents at www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_3/pr252-3.htm.

^[53] Qin, Julia Ya: “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organisation Legal System, an Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, Journal of World Trade 37 (3): 283-522, 2003.

^[54] Farah, Paolo D.: Five Years of China’s WTO membership, EU and US Perspective on China’s Compliance with Transparency Commitments and the Transitional Review Mechanism, in: Legal Issues of Economic Integration 33(3): 263-304, 2006.

^[55] Farah.2006, p.294.

^[56] Qin 2003, p.492

^[57] Qin, 2003, p.494.

^[58] . Qin, 2003, p. 514.

^[59] Gurbaxani/Opper 1998, p.5-6.

^[60] Williamson, John, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform”, in: Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?” (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics) April, 1990.; See also Ramo, Joshua Cooper: The Beijing Consensus, London, 2004.

^[61] This paper does not guarantee to cover all the efforts of China for compliance efforts, for details please see the United States-China Business council’s summaries: “Towards WTO: Highlights of PRC Implementation Efforts to Date (June 2001), at www.uschina.org/prcwtocompliance.pdf and “Toward WTO: Highlights of PRC Implementation Efforts to Date, September 2001”, in China Business Review, Jan.-Feb. 2002, P.14., as well as Gurbaxani/Opper 1998.

^[62] China Daily, : China’s Entry Recasts Economic Landscape, 11.12.2006

^[63] Gong, Baihua: Shanghai’s WTO Affairs consultation Centre: Working Together to Take Advantage of WTO Membership, available at www.wto.org/English/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case11_e.htm, accessed on 08.12.2006

^[64] Gong 2006.

^[65] Lamy, Pascal: China was Strong when it opened to the World, September 6, 2006, available at http://wto2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/chinanews/200609/20060903149385.html,accessed on 25.10.2006.

^[66] China’s Implementation of Its World Trade Organisation Commitments, Oral Testimony by the US-China Business Council, September 28, 2006, Submitted in response to the Office of the US Trade Representative’s Request for Comments and Notice of Public Hearing Concerning China’s compliance with WTO Commitments (Federal Register, Pages 42886-42886, July 28, 2006).

^[67] Frisbie, John, “China’s WTO entry: the View of US Companies”, Speech at the international conference “Five Years After China’s WTO Accession to the WTO: China and the WTO in Retrospect and Prospect”, hosted by the Shanghai WTO Consultation Centre and supported by the PRC Ministry of Commerce, Shanghai, September 6, 2006.

^[68] Frisbie, 2006.

^[69] Overholt, William H.: China’s Economy, Resilience and Challenge” in: Harvard China Review, Spring 2004.

^[70] Lawrence, 2006, p.11.